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INTRODUCTION 
"And is not this dispositif - the frame through which one can glimpse the Other 
Scene - the elementary dispositif of fantasmatic space from the prehistoric 
Lascaux paintings to computer-generated Virtual Reality? Is not the interface of 
the computer the last materialization of this frame? What defines the properly 
"human dimension" is the presence of a screen, a frame, through which we 
communicate with the "suprasensible" virtual universe to be found nowhere in 
reality." (Žižek, 1997, 60) 
The moment I had the opportunity to execute a philosophical-anthropological research 
project on the presuppositions and implications of cyberspace, of which the work at 
hand is the result, the abovementioned passage from Slavoj Žižek's work helped me link 
the fields of psychoanalysis and Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs). 
An obvious starting point for analyzing cyberspace from the perspective of Lacanian 
theory is the issue of imaginary and symbolical identifications, and their role in the 
construction of 'virtual identities'. But what about the third crucial category posited by 
Lacan: the real? Here it was Žižek that gave the pointer for taking a closer look at the 
notion of fantasy, which turned out to bring together the three domains of the 
imaginary, the symbolic and the real. And above all, I found fantasy to be the central 
concept of psychoanalysis – at least of the Freudo-Lacanian stream. So what better way 
for studying identity in an age of information than taking fantasy as the thread for 
'thinking through digital technology'? Žižek's hint made for a good begin. But then? 
How to understand his idea of the 'window' as the crucial element of a human reality 
that is inevitably connected to the realm of virtuality? And how is virtuality linked to 
the 'other scene' of the unconscious? Did virtuality exist before its technological 
incarnations? If it did, how does technological virtuality distinguish itself from other 
varieties? Grasping psychoanalytic theory itself also took some harsh work (which led 
me for a year to Paris), for it was not very obvious how fantasy works in Lacan's theory. 
As it had not been drawn up extensively and systematically, I had to carry out this job 
first of all, using the dispersed fragments on fantasy in Lacan's oeuvre. Doing these 
preliminary investigations, I touched upon many basic questions. What is the 
ontological status of fantasy? How does it differ from the imaginary? How does it relate 
to pleasure – and do we really have to conceive this pleasure as nothing but a substitute 
for neurotics who repress their desires? Then there is the question of what Freudo-
Lacanian psychoanalysis considers to be real. So the apparently simple hint dropped by 
Žižek is followed by a whole range of difficult and crucial questions.  
However tempting it might be to use Žižek's work as a guide for developing 
answers to these questions, I thought it more accurate to turn to Lacan's work itself – 
also the major pillar of Žižek's theory – for a straight development of a Lacanian 
analysis of cyberspace. This avoids the danger of getting trapped in a 'Žižekian' reading 
of Lacanian theory, and forces one to approach the question of fantasy and the interface 
in a more systematical manner –  these not being the most rigorous aspects of Žižek's 
work (so that, at the very least, the present work has no precedent in that it covers the 
whole field of Lacanian theory relevant for analyzing cyberspace). And didn't Lacan 
state that it was so much the better when one doesn't understand his writings –  since it 
2gives a chance to explain them (S.20, 35). Developing the theme of the interface gave 
me the possibility to bring together and explain Lacan's fragmented comments on 
fantasy, and from there develop a perspective on cyberspace. Since Žižek also 'explains' 
Lacan in his own manner, I hope by taking a similar approach to avoid the danger of 
merely repeating Lacan. From a Lacanian perspective, following like a dog a 'master' 
who teaches you what precisely is the meaning of an utterance or theory is the worst 
mistake one can make. Therefore 'returning' to the 'original' theory, rearticulating it, is 
the only sound possibility ('retour à Lacan?').  
The subject of my investigations is cyberspace. Since the present work also tries to 
(re)articulate the 'Lacanian subject' in the age of information by means of contemporary 
examples and cases, its subject is also an 'updated' explanation of Lacan's theory of 
subjectivity. Therefore my method is two-edged. My use of Lacanian theory to analyze 
the 'life on the screen' tries simultaneously to illustrate and articulate the sometimes 
difficult and abstract notions of Lacanian theory. At the root of my work is the question 
of what actually is the (ontological) status of the screen or window; therefore the 
subtitle: 'A Lacanian Cyborg Ontology'. Its central thesis claims that the computer 
screen functions in cyberspace - as a psychological space – as the screen of fantasy. My 
method is to (re) think Lacanian theory, and to apply it to ICTs, taking into 
consideration some of the most relevant research on this topic. 
 In order to differentiate cyberspace from related terms, some comments must be 
made here. One generally acknowledges that 'new media' have the following three 
decisive characteristics: they are digital, multimedia and interactive. Nevertheless, new 
media are not by definition synonymous to Information and Communication 
Technologies (ICTs), a term that I have used above. Older, non-digital media like the 
telegraph and the telephone are also ICTs. This shows the contemporary tendency to 
consider all ICTs to be new media, because these technologies are increasingly being 
digitalized: mobile phones, for instance, are digital, interactive, and also increasingly 
multimedia. Furthermore, 'new media' are merely a subcategory of current digitally 
based media-technologies. Whereas digitization tends to diminish the differences 
between the terms 'new media' and ICTs, it remains worthwhile to also note their 
differences.  
The technologies that I discuss are digital technologies, bluntly put:  computers, 
as a medium in widely varied fields of human reality: communication, entertainment, 
science ... Nevertheless, as a philosophical anthropologist interested in the human mind 
I focus primarily on the mental (and not so much the material) aspect of these 
technologies, so that the actual topic of my investigation is cyberspace: the mental 
space of the conceptualization or representation of the codified objects (data-objects) of 
the computer. The digital revolution that forms the basis of the worldview I analyze, 
makes, as it is often said, the world into a huge database: a world of computerized 
codified objects only accessible via all sorts of interfaces. This situation implies that, 
from a 'philosophical' perspective, there are three fundamental domains. The Matrix as 
the 'noumenal' dimension of codified objects consisting of zeros and ones (the 
database), cyberspace as the 'phenomenal' mental space of the conceptualization or 
representation of code-objects, and the interface as their crucial medium. The interface 
is the 'gate' leading man into cyberspace, connecting him to the Matrix while 
simultaneously –  because of its particular formations –  still separating him from it as a 
whole. Since the world as a database (the Matrix) cannot appear to us (cyberspace) 
3without media that open it up (interface), the interface, I claim, has a similar status to 
that of fantasy in Lacanian theory. For Lacan considers fantasy (at least in my 
'explanation') to also be an inevitable medium for 'interfacing' the inaccessible real and 
the world of imaginary depictions and symbolical representations which man mentally 
lives in. The theoretical turn (twist, distortion?) that I make here consists of course in 
going from a 'psychological' theory concerning the intermediate screen to its current 
digital formations. But as cyberspace is to such a large extent a 'psychological space', I 
consider this transformation worthwhile and hope to show that it is valid.  
 A new media object 'on the screen' does not have a one-to-one relationship to the 
codified object of zeros and ones in the computer databases. The applications' 
algorithms that digitize an object into computer-codes determine how the object is 
codified, and also how it 're-appears' on the screen. Different applications can stage the 
code-object differently in our reality. The appearance of the object hence also depends 
on technological possibilities and limitations. Whereas 'old media' usually only have 
one interface for showing the object (a film screen opens only one format of a film, 
while a computer screen can set up several formats for a digital film; a traditional text 
has to be read in the form of, for instance, a book, while a hypertext has different 
possible appearances), 'new media' often have several interfaces. The increasingly 
problematical status of the notion of identity in an age of digital technologies coheres to 
this issue.  
 When there is no strict identity of code-object and its format(ion), no full 
correspondence, or analogy, the relationship between user and sign (on the screen) goes 
beyond interpretation and hermeneutics. The technological formation of the object 
introduces into this ideal relationship – in which the sign supposedly expresses an ideal, 
abstract concept – a 'distorting' (disturbing) element. Therefore the relation of user and 
sign is also 'cybernetic': the object's form also depends on the technological media that 
stage it for us. When viewed in the context of Lacan's ideas on the codification of 
objects in memory, and their subsequent recollection, what catches the eye is Lacan's 
denial that this process is a matter of clear language or pure codes. As he shows in his 
discussion with cybernetic theory, such a presumed clear language of zeros and ones is 
always 'distorted' by imaginary elements that belong to the human mind itself. Lacan's 
'first model' of fantasy, in which imaginary elements mediate the codified object and its 
representations, already evinces a likeness to the model of the new media object. I 
therefore think that, from a Freudo-Lacanian psychoanalytical point of view, this 
fantasmatic mediation of the code-object is what the computer interface is all about. Just 
as Lacan considers the formation of an object to be largely determined by the 
(fantasmatic) possibilities and limitations of the human mind, technological interfaces 
determine the appearance of an object. Therefore the 'human mind' is working in 
technologies. Just like early man painted his other Self on the walls of his cave, and 
thereby opened up and created his world, modern man 'paints' or designs his virtual Self 
on or with the interfaces of computer technologies. 
Lining up technologies with language does not necessarily mean envisaging 
them as merely 'linguistic' or semiotic phenomena codifying objects in 'new languages'. 
Neither does my position look at them as laying a substitute layer of new images over 
'real reality'. The 'deepest' aspect of digital technologies –  where they touch most upon 
reality 'as we know it' – is in its combination of symbolic (codes, signs …), imaginary 
(audio-visuals) and real aspects (whatever this may be: 'affects', pulses … ?). The avatar 
is the model for illustrating this process. An avatar is a virtual personae that we assume 
4when we pick up a self-image and use it to stride through a virtual world on the Internet, 
or when we 'write' our identity in a text based community. By extension it is the 'face' of 
ourselves that we present to the other in all sort of computer mediated communication. 
Even e-mail messages and personal websites might thus generate our avatars. The 
avatar illustrates the three orders that Lacan uses to analyze human reality: the 
imaginary, the symbolic and the real. For the avatar consists both of self-images, and 
symbolic elements of self-representation. We can have, for example, 'virtual' (computer 
mediated) meetings, for business, entertaining or therapeutical purposes, in a Virtual 
Reality environment or in a virtual environment which I can enter via my PC. My self-
representation in such virtual spaces consists of imaginary and symbolic elements: there 
is an image of my face or of my entire body, and I use spoken language and other codes 
in order to represent myself (properly). The question then is, of course, whether this 
virtual Self is still related to the real Self. And here we touch upon the crucial notion of 
the real, which I consider extensively in this work. My thesis considers the avatar to be 
related to the real, just as – and here I follow (my 'explanation' of) Lacan – the screen or 
fantasy formation is related to the real, albeit in an ambiguous and very complex 
manner.
So it may be true that we create our virtual personae in order to get a pleasant 
image of ourselves; it shows the order of virtual images and codes as led by affectivity. 
But we may question whether this is merely a desire for simple pleasure, just as Freudo-
Lacanian psychoanalysis questions whether the relationship between fantasy formations 
and the real is merely one of substitute/stand-in pleasure. We might forget the defensive 
function of the screen, and too easily take the real as a given within (easy) reach. Lacan 
relates the real to the impossible and thus places psychoanalysis in a tradition that 
locates truth in the realm of tragedy. Lacan even claims that psychoanalysis becomes 
impossible in societies that have lost a sense of tragedy – which might be confirmed by 
Baudrillard's descriptions of a society of hyper ('happy') realities: in it, the unconscious 
'evaporates'.  
Considering the computer interface a fantasmatic window for representing the object 
may bring about other perspectives in Lacanian thought as well, which currently 
remains focused on language as man's primary universe. Analyzing the interface as a 
fantasy-screen may bring in technology as a force which possibly could have similar 
effects on the human universe. Lacan's theoretical development in any case shows an 
interesting parallel to developments in technological culture, such as the shift of focus 
from language as an autonomous structure to fantasy as the elementary medium. This 
shift seems well-suited to grasp new media's pretense of 'showing' the object with 
several, different interfaces. Lacan's theory passes beyond the ideas of a notion of 
identity (the paternal metaphor) determining paternalistic society. With the focus on 
fantasy there is a much greater understanding of difference, without Lacan being a 
postmodernist. For he does not let go of the principle of a formal, 'rationalistic' subject – 
without claiming that it is a 'substance'. Thus he establishes a theory of the subject with 
fantasy as its pivotal notion. This subject cannot avoid 'actualizing' itself continuously 
in new formations, or in/on new technological interfaces. This subject-theory, I claim, 
can offer an alternative to the currents of modernism (with its claims of 'identity') and 
postmodernism (with its condemnation of 'identity').  
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6CHAPTER ONE. TECHNOLOGY AND DESIRE 
Introduction
This chapter will discuss technology from the perspective of man's primordial desire for 
real presence. Hence from the very beginning I approach technology from the 
perspective of what I will call the technological Eros. In order to situate the notion of 
the desire for real presence I will turn to classical metaphysical systems which maintain 
that the real is simply something that is already there, only needing to be discovered by 
man, and whose offspring can still be found all around us in the present world. This is 
the structure of nostalgia, which tends to neglect the process of the construction of the 
object that we long for. In order to 'deconstruct' nostalgic notions of desire also 
permeating technology, I will use psychoanalysis as it focuses exactly on this process of 
(psychical) construction, thereby hopefully avoiding the pitfall of thinking naively about 
representation. I think psychoanalysis in this way can be especially helpful in the age of 
information and communication technologies. For the crucial aspect of this age is that 
the encoded objects do not have a firm relationship with the objects as they appear on 
the computer screen. There is no intrinsic motive for the relationship between bits and 
their form. I will try to show that fantasy-desire plays an important role in this 
interfacing with bits. To do this I will give a general introduction to Lacanian 
psychoanalysis' conception of reality and desire, and focus on fantasy as what 
'interfaces' them. This introduction should clarify the fundamental role of mediation in 
our striving for presence. For the digital era requires a paradigm of mediation, instead of 
a paradigm of analogous reflection to do justice to the influence of new media.  
1. Technology: the desire for presence 
1.1. What is technology? 
How does technology affect human existence? What are its implications for our 
consciousness? In order to shed some light on these fundamental questions I will first of 
all try to define what technology is. Not a simple task, for there is hardly any consensus 
on the meaning of the term technology. However, there is a generally accepted – 
although not completely homogeneous – understanding of what technology refers to.1
First of all there is the ‘commonsense’ view that identifies technology with particular 
artifacts, such as tools, machines, computers et cetera. The second conception stresses 
the idea that the fundamental issue of technology is not the objects that are made but the 
process of making and using those objects. It focuses on the invention, design and 
public use of technology. A third conception views technology as a kind of knowledge,
that consists of skills, rules, laws and theories that teach us how to achieve the 
technological artifact we desire. The fourth conception of technology relates it to the 
aims, intentions, desires and choices of man as the ‘user’ of technology: technology as 
volition. It is on this most difficult and 'hidden' aspect of technology that I will focus.  
1
 For this categorization, see: Mitcham (1980 and 1994). As Carl Mitcham is one of the most important 
historians of the philosophy of technology, I will frequently refer to his work. 
7“The most unformulated, the most difficult to formulate, and yet the most 
commonly assumed viewpoint on technology is that it is grounded in some 
human act of the will” (Mitcham, 1980, 316).  
This viewpoint holds that the control of the process of producing technological artifacts 
does not fully depend on the exact knowledge of the systematic functioning of that 
process.
Is man autonomous in his use of technology, or is rather technology an 
autonomous mover in our world? The substantialist view of technology propagated by 
its first generation of twentieth century philosophers - Heidegger, Mumford, Ellul, and 
present-day peers such as Neil Postman and Don Ihde, holds that technology has a 
transformative effect on our perception and awareness, on politics and society and on 
our culture as a whole. Technology hence profoundly interferes with subjectivity: it is a 
strong 'mediator' that transforms our perception of being. This vision strongly opposes 
the commonsense view, yet not very common among theoreticians, that technology is a 
neutral instrument that we can use for all sorts of different goals. This does not mean 
that the major current in the philosophy of technology is the substantialist one, quite the 
opposite. New, mostly American philosophers of technology, support the philosophy 
that technology is a (social) construction.   
The British thinkers Hughes and Pinch, in cooperation with their Dutch 
colleague Bijker, laid the foundations of social constructivist theories: The Social 
Construction of Technological Systems (1987). Social constructivism strongly opposes 
the view, which predominantly accompanies the substantialist vision, of a technology 
that determines history and society. Such a technological determinism poses technology 
as a system with inevitable and irresistible social (or other) effects. In what 
commentators refer to as ‘hard determinism’ (cf. Levinson, 1997, 3-4), technology is an 
autonomous force that shapes man and the world, and eliminates human autonomy. The 
‘soft’ version of technological determinism also holds that technology has a determining 
influence, but it is not the only determining factor. The shape of society, culture and 
‘subjectivity’ is the result of several forces (economical, military, social …) of which 
technology is only one. Although this emphasis on multicausality involves an 
‘overdetermination’ of an effect by multiple causes, the ‘soft’ version of technological 
determinism still thinks in a scheme of cause and effect. Social constructivism tries to 
break out of this scheme. Although there are different approaches in social 
constructivism, a common feature is the view of technological development as a 
contingent process that involves heterogeneous factors. Different actors or relevant 
social groups play a decisive role in technological change. They are engaged in all sorts 
of strategies in order to shape technology to their own plans. The directions and goals of 
technologies therefore depend on the choices and influences of the different social 
groups that carry out their design and implementation. By stressing the importance of 
the choices of actors and groups, and by its empirical approach, social constructivism 
tries to distance itself from the ‘monolithic’ approach of technological determinism, and 
hence is much more in accord with the current distaste for 'grand narratives'.   
This brief description of the different currents in the philosophy of technology is 
important for our question regarding the role of man in the 'will to achieve 
transcendence' (Mitcham) by means of technology. The fourth conception of technology 
as volition may renew our 'Freudian obligation' of becoming aware of the involvement 
of our unconscious desires in technological enterprises: "Wo Es war, soll Ich werden".  
81.2. Technological desire for presence 
"[I]n a new variant on the story of Narcissus, people are able to fall in love with 
the artificial worlds that they have created or that have been built for them by 
others. People are able to see themselves in the computer. The machine can seem 
a second self" (Turkle, 1995, 30). 
Cyberspace is the ‘electronic space’ that came into existence from the sixties of the 20th 
century through a joining together of various computer networks, and became a broad 
social phenomenon from the eighties and beginning of the nineties. “Digital 
technologies became the infrastructure of cyberspace. The new space served as the 
locus of communication, sociability, organization, and transaction, as well as a new 
market for the exchange of information and knowledge” (Lévy, 2001, 14).   
In line with many present day thinkers on information technologies who 
consider cyberspace as a new land for the fulfillment of our wildest fantasies, Michael 
Heim posits the old Platonic Eros as the foundation of our actions in cyberspace (Heim, 
1993, 88). It is the desire to (re) find our Other Half - that what we are missing, what 
lies beyond the limit of our possibilities - that motivates man's use of technology. This 
is the age-old desire for presence, of which Virtual Reality technologies are the latest 
'material' manifestations. As Vivian Sobchak expresses in her influential essay on the 
phenomenology of electronic presence:  
"In sum, just as the photograph did in the last century, so in this one, cinematic 
and electronic screens differently demand and shape our "presence" to the world 
and our representation in it" (Sobchak, 1994, 84). 
The "goal of virtual reality, presence, is part of an ancient desire to use media for 
transportation and experience "physical transcendence" over the space we live in 
and to experience an "essential copy" of some distant place, a past experience, or 
the experience of another person" (Biocca, 1997, § 5.1.2.). 
Information technologies thus seem to design or create a second, parallel world. 
Philosophically speaking, this is the technological design of being, of presence. The 
issue is, however, that many (utopist or idealistic) perspectives consider this parallel 
world from a Platonic perspective: as a substantial world that exists independently from 
the human subject. Cyberspace than is an informational space wherein the data are 
already present, and just wait for us to reveal them. This makes cyberspace into a realm 
of immaterial data that exist independently from the computers and networks, 
independent from the hardware, the software, and the human wetware. Just like Plato 
thought that the content of concepts is neutral with regards to the form in which they are 
represented: concepts (Ideas) exist independently from the knowledge, experience or 
imagination of the human user. And in these uncritical perspectives, cyberspace also 
reproduces the Platonic dualism of body and mind. For they conceive the cybernaut as 
an immaterial mind that dwells unhindered by its bodily limitations through the data 
flows of cyberspace. Information and communication technologies seduce or lure the 
user into thinking that there is a steady contact point between the representation and the 
things they represent. They make us believe that they represent the real 'as it really is'. 
9In semiotic terms this 'metaphysical' paradigm implies that there is something 
like a immediate relationship between user and an abstract or medium-independent sign 
system, that puts the user in a direct relationship with the content or concepts that the 
sign system expresses (cf. Simons, 2002, 148). From a Lacanian perspective one could 
call this the dual relationship between user and content. One must note that 
psychoanalysis recognizes the seduction of such a belief in transparency. And one must 
also recognize that digital media especially have the power and the aim of achieving 
such an immediacy (cf. Bolter/Grusin, 1999, 22), Nevertheless, what is at stake in the 
era of digital media is the exact analysis of the role of the medium, the form, in the 
relationship between user and content. And thus to replace the dual paradigm by a 
triadic relation between user, sign and medium. This is what I will try to do via the 
theory of Lacanian psychoanalysis, wherein fantasy is the primal (mental) form or 
medium between subject and object.  
1.3. An 'erotic core' of technology? 
 "technology's essence is nothing technological." (Heidegger, 1997, 4). 
The description of what is technology is not neutral, already being somewhat 
determined by the methodology, background and portrayal of man one has. It is 
therefore very hard to maintain a strict distinction between the philosophy of technology 
and philosophical anthropology.  
There seems to be some reason to assume a form of essentialism in statements 
that consider an intimate relationship between man and technology. One can mention 
Heidegger here, who discovered an intimacy between technology and language, and 
showed that it is this intimate infiltration of technology in the human world that gives it 
its most awesome power. “But the truth of the matter might well be that the language 
machine takes language into its management and thus masters the essence of the human 
being” (Heidegger, cited in Heim, 1993, 61).2 Like Heidegger, Ivan Ilich considers 
computers and language technologies to be an enormous threat. If they deprive man of 
his natural language, they strip off his essence (cf. Achterhuis, 1997, 11). For Heidegger 
and Ilich language is the essence of the human being. Lacan makes a similar statement 
about desire being the essence of reality. In the domain of philosophical anthropology it 
seems that from a Lacanian point of view the analysis of the ‘technological Eros’ 
touches on the essence of technology.3
 Carl Mitcham uses Paul Ricoeur's distinction between three levels of the human 
will to explain the technological Eros. “Technology as volition can thus be analyzed in 
at least these three volitional senses, as technological desire, as technical motivation or 
movement, and as consent to technology. Such an analysis could begin to elucidate the 
2
 Martin Heidegger, 'Hebel - Friend of the House' (1957), in D.E. Christensen (ed.), Contemporary 
German Philosophy (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1983), 89-101.  
3
 Lacan’s theory does have a certain inclination towards essentialism, in that it grounds certain systems of 
representation in desire (art) or a negation thereof (science). Compare Lacan’s text ‘La science et la 
vérité’ (E., 855-877) where he analyses the modern subject of science as a subject that forecloses the 
object-cause of desire and thereby the desiring subject itself. In 'The Age of the World Picture' Heidegger 
makes a similar analysis (Heidegger, 1997, 115-154): the modern subjectivity that emerges in ‘the age of 
the imaging of the world’ determines truth as certainty (scientific objectivity). 
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dialectic of “technological eros” (Jakob Hommes 1955)” (Mitcham, 1994, 255).4 The 
relationship between technology and Eros is only one of the four ‘classical’ ways to 
understand what technology is. Therefore, my investigation of the ‘technological Eros’ 
does not cover the ‘whole’ domain of technology, but is restricted to this aspect that is 
most intimate to ourselves and therefore the hardest to grasp. This statement should also 
help to avoid the trap of an imbalanced essentialism.  
1.4. Technological media: beyond the conscious intentions of man 
In philosophical anthropological studies one considers technology in relation to the 
position of man in and towards nature. The ‘classical’ position holds that man is a 
defective animal that needs technology in order to survive. As biological deficiencies 
and shortcomings characterize man at the biological plane, technology is a means to 
substitute for these shortcomings. The essence of technology is then its ability to 
compensate or substitute for biological or natural needs.5 This dominant conception of 
technology places its meaning completely on the natural level. Technology is a means 
to transform or manipulate nature in order to fulfill human needs. It is a form of 
teleological or purposeful action that satisfies utilitarian or practical functions and goals. 
Or, as a training institute summarizes the (fourth) conception of technology, technology 
“begins with a need and ends with a solution”.6
In the conceptualization of the computer as such an instrument, 'usability' is the 
central term: the question is which interface-design is most effective in helping the user 
to perform his job. However, the computer functions increasingly as a medium. This 
was initiated with the design of the graphical user interface - designed in the 1960's at 
Xerox PARC. Together with Douglas Engelbart's invention of the mouse, the GUI was 
successfully introduced by Apple in the nineteen eighties on the Macintosh computer. 
The graphical user interface gave, for the first time, a spatial dimension to data-objects, 
so that the computer could appear as an environment that the user can travel through. 
With the boom of the Internet in the nineteen nineties this notion of the computer as a 
medium became very influential. As this conceptualization of the computer as a 
medium closely connects to the representation of data-objects on all sorts of displays, it 
may be a useful metaphor for my approach of cyberspace. Although we must not 
overlook the fact that cyberspace probably is a combination of several, different 
metaphors - both on the level of the producer and that of the user; in design and in 
reception - the metaphor of the medium has a particular interest when one focuses on 
the 'volitional' aspect wherein the computer - unconsciously - creates a world. 
The crucial difference between the computer as an instrument or as a medium 
holds for information technologies in general.7 They bring us to the important question 
whether those technologies are an extension of man, or a medium in which he constructs 
new ‘faces’ of himself. We must ask the question whether technology is something that 
4
 Jakob Hommes, Der technische Eros: Das Wesen der materialistischen Geschichtsauffassung (Freiburg: 
Herder, 1955). 
5
 Arnold Gehlen represents such a view in his Man in the Age of Technology (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1980). 
6
 http://atschool.eduweb.co.uk/trinity/watisec.html 
7
 Technologies often start as an instrument, and later on they frequently become a medium as well. 
Computer technologies often make it to the general public when they are applicable to communication. 
This is the transition from information technologies (IT) to information- and communication technologies 
(ICT). From a psychoanalytical perspective computer technologies are principally interesting as a 
medium (ICT). 
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(instrumentally) helps us to exist in this world, or (substantially) creates a world: is it 
merely a means or not rather a medium? Do we only use technology in order to 
safeguard our biological survival or do we also apply it in order to transform the world - 
and ourselves -according to our desires? In order to stress my volitional approach to 
technology, I mention here (again) that several philosophers of technology make notice 
of  this idea of technology as led by a will to transformation. The existentialist analysis 
of Ortega Y Gasset ground technology in a willed self-realization. Hannah Arendt 
considers modern technology as an answer to old cultural dreams, as a realization of the 
desire to leave the earth and its conditions (cf. Mitcham, 1980, 243-249). For the French 
philosopher Jean Brun "technology grows out of Western ontological aspiration to 
merge subject and object" (Mitcham, 1994, 249). Also Heidegger - both in Being and 
Time (1927)8 and in his later important discussion of this subject in "The Question 
concerning Technology" (1949-1950) - rejects the common idea of technology as pure 
means: technology is, instead, a revealing or disclosing of what is. 
From the perspective of the technological Eros, technology involves more then 
the rational use of means. And technology as volition is more than the ‘conscious’ 
intentions of individuals and social groups. The question whether the human 'will' is 
primarily a conscious affair or not returns in the discussion on technology. For it is the 
fourth conception of technology (according to the  categorization that I use, see § 1.1.) 
as a kind of willing or volition that is subject to different interpretations. A recent 
encyclopedic article on the philosophy of technology – that recommends the value of a 
social constructivist conception of technology - replaces the volitional conception of 
technology with the idea of technology as a social process.9 Then the conscious 
intentions of social groups that produce technological artifacts determine the outcome of 
the process. Unconscious aspects of the human ‘will’ are left out of consideration. It 
thus emphasizes the determination of technology by the rational aims, choices, and 
‘desires’ of social groups 
 A discussion of this influential current called social constructivism can elucidate 
the technological Eros. Social constructivism received important criticism in an 
influential article by Langdon Winner.10 His critique concerns its lack of consideration 
for the deeper structures that govern technology. For social constructivism does not pay 
attention to the power struggles and the political dimensions that underlie the so-called 
construction of technology by social groups. It also ignores the influence of the broader 
cultural context on the shaping of technology. Philosophers of technology such as Marx, 
Mumford, Heidegger and Ellul, who reflected on the broader patterns of technology, 
can thus too easily be pushed out as old fashioned. To the list of elements that social 
constructivism disregards according to Winner (beyond the ones I have mentioned: the 
social consequences of technical choice, the social groups that are not excluded in the 
construction of technology, and the evaluation of technology) I would add the element 
of non-reflexive intentions: desire. For social constructivism considers the social 
construction of technology as the outcome of rational choices and strategies. A simple 
example might show the limitations of this approach. Was the development of the flying 
8
 "Although Heidegger does not use the term "volition" and "will" frequently, Being and Time presents 
technology as object, knowledge, and activity as fundamentally related to volition" (Mitcham, 1994, 256). 
9
 Peter Kroes, ‘Philosophy of Technology’, in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (London: 
Routledge, 1998).  http://duke.usask.ca/~wjb289/big/Kroes_Philosophy_of_Technology.PDF
10
 Winner uses social constructivism as an umbrella term for the body of ideas of a variety of thinkers as 
Steve Woolgar, Trevor Pinch, Wiebe Bijker and Bruno Latour. 
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machine solely the result of the rational intentions of the actors and groups that were 
involved in its production? What about the pioneers of aviation who willingly took the 
risk of flying the first flying machines, with the chance of crashing right away. Was that 
simply a calculated risk? Probably not. It was also an (unreflected) act, for they did not 
know what the outcome was going to be. Social constructivism seems to reduce the 
reason that permeates technology to its instrumental version. It cannot understand 
technology as a construct of a ‘crazy animal’. Furthermore, when it makes the role of 
social actors in the construction of technology absolute it seems to tumble into the same 
trap that it wanted to avoid in the first place. This is the trap of determinism, for it 
considers everything to be the result of social interaction. It therefore neglects typically 
human factors, like the meaning that people give to things and the (sometimes strange) 
reasons and motives they have for performing certain actions.  
Considering technology from the perspective of desire – the term that I will use 
from now on in order to specify one domain of volition, namely the Lacanian Eros – 
apparently entails from the beginning a non-instrumental consideration of technology: 
technologies offer media that we (unconsciously) 'live in'. Instrumentality strives for an 
exact knowledge by man of his intentions during the technological process, while the 
approach from desire points to the deficient transparency of those intentions. Man’s 
intentions are partly unconscious; which is what psychoanalysis takes a close look at. 
This limitation of self-consciousness is probably not absent with regards to man’s ‘use’ 
of technology (the philosopher of technology Ivan Ilich speaks paradoxically of 
"unintended intentions"; Mitcham, 1994, 183). 
"Tools are made to accomplish our purposes, and in this sense they represent 
desires and intentions. We make our tools and our tools make us: by taking up 
particular tools we accede to desires and we manifest intentions" (Mitchell, 
1994, 59). 
1.5. Technologies as media for simulating the real and regaining enjoyment 
 "Simulation is the ecstasy of the real" (Baudrillard, 1988, 187). 
One often considers technology as a way to cancel the (sense of) loss. Media theorist 
Peter Weibel therefore describes all technology as psycho-technology:  
"Technology helps to fill, to bridge, to overcome the insufficiency emerging 
from absence. Every form of technology is teletechnology and serves to 
overcome spatial and temporal distance. However, this victory over distance and 
time is only a phenomenological aspect of the (tele-) media. The real effect of 
the media lies in overcoming the mental disturbances (fears, control 
mechanisms, castration complexes, etc.) caused by distance and time, by all 
forms of absence, leave, separation, disappearance, interruption, withdrawal or 
loss. By overcoming or shutting off the negative horizon of absence, the 
technical media become technologies of care and presence. By visualizing the 
absent, making it symbolically present, the media also transform the damaging 
consequences of absence into pleasant ones" (Weibel, 1992, 75). 
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With (psycho) technologies we try to transgress, confront, shift or reposition our 
limit(ation)s. Within a Lacanian context where the real is exactly what withdraws itself 
from our grasp, and therefore poses a limit to ourselves (the real core inside and outside 
of ourselves), the real is what we cannot confront or reach except through a medium. As 
Peter Weibel states, technologies are indeed media to bridge the gap that separates us 
from the real: teletechnologies that seek to overcome distances, immersive technologies 
that seek to close the distinction between the virtual and the real environment.11 The 
purpose of a technological media is hence to obfuscate itself as a medium and to claim a 
real presence. And to provide enjoyment in this presentation of things on opaque 
screens that seem to be reality itself. According to Bolter and Grusin these are "the twin 
preoccupations of contemporary media: the transparent presentation of the real and the 
enjoyment of the opacity of media themselves" (Bolter/Grusin, 2000, 21). 
The dynamic of erotic desire has as its goal a realization of fantasy. Then 
fantasy, which normally is a vital support of desire, becomes an opaque screen turning 
the reality of the desiring subject into a lure. For these are the two basic forms of the 
object of desire: 
"But the object of desire, in the usual sense, is either a fantasy that is in reality 
the support of desire, or a lure" (S.11, 186). 
We can analyze, according to Lacan, this lure by referring to Freud's analysis of love, 
and find out that it has a fundamentally narcissistic structure. Fantasy can become so 
pressing that we take its images - that we love so much as the perfect reflection of 
ourselves - for reality itself. In media-studies one tends to call this striving for 
something that seems to be more real than reality itself, a desire for a 'fully realized 
world' on the screen.  
Two examples, one concerning mechanical technology and one concerning 
digital technologies,  illustrate this thesis that technology seeks to replace the real by its 
'simulated version'. First of all the experience of speed. In its driving version, the 
technological vehicle that can provide us with this experience, the car, is a frame upon 
reality that allows our experience of reality to change. Thus it allows for a hyperrealistic 
perspective upon reality: as in the experience of speed, but also in the new world order 
that came along with car use. So the car was a new vehicle for the distanciation of the 
here and now. And as Kaufmann and Smarr show in their Supercomputing and the 
Transformation of Science (1993) supercomputers radicalize this drive in the digital 
domain: they can simulate things that no man has ever seen yet – molecules or the 
origin of the universe – or visualize places that are impossible for man to reach, and 
hence almost fully detach our outlook from our physical position.  
Technology has a peculiar relation to the real as the impossible. On the one side 
it virtualizes – via the screen (of fantasy) – our subordination to our immediate 
environment (teletechnologies). On the other hand it tries to restore – on the screen – a 
sort of virtual immediacy: think for example of the real time telecommunications. 
Technology seems to be guided by the ideal of eliminating our immersion in the 
‘natural’ environment (‘natural presence’), and to restore an immersion in a virtual 
11
 Hence we may consider the notion of a desire for simulation. "Simulation is no longer that of a 
territory, a referential being or a substance. It is the generations by models of a real without an origin or 
reality: a hyperreal" (Baudrillard, 1988, 166).  
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environment (‘virtual presence’). As human beings we seem to be condemned (or 
blessed) to exceed the limits of our ‘natural’ position in the world and hence we try to 
rediscover the paradisiacal enjoyment of immediacy (which was never a reality) 'stolen' 
from us.
 So, to formulate a Lacanian perspective in Baudrilardian words, we say that 
there is a desire for an ecstasy of the real.12
2. Philosophy: the metaphysics of presence 
2.1. Nostalgia: an analogue desire 
We all know the phenomenon of nostalgia. We can be full of nostalgia for times gone 
by. Or we can be nostalgic for a space that has a particular interest to us. However, 
usually the object of nostalgia has a specific location in space and time. It is to a certain 
environment at a particular time, or to a long gone period of our life at a specific place, 
that our thoughts return. In those recurring thoughts we feel that we return home. Or, at 
least we feel as if we are returning home to the environment in which our desires were 
fulfilled. So, in our imagination there seems to be a parallel world: we experience an 
imaginary world parallel to our desires. The major question then concerns, of course, 
the status of this world: is it true or merely an illusion? Is our representation of the 
events that occurred in it a correct reflection of the ‘original’ events, or is it rather an 
echo of our own desire for moments of fulfillment? In short, was there ever such a 
‘home’? 
 The phenomenon of nostalgia shows that the psychic experience of a ‘home’ is a 
fact. There is at least the suggestion of a relationship of similarity between the psychic 
object and the ‘real’ object, and because of this relationship one could call this nostalgia 
an analogous desire. For what defines analogy in its broadest sense is the suggestion or 
recognition of a relationship of similarity. It is quite obvious that in nostalgia the 
situation in the past to which we refer is long gone. The point at hand, however, 
concerns the actuality of an event at the level of representation. Is my representation of 
the event in accordance with the ‘original’ event; is there a line of continuity between 
them? Is the world of psychical reality analogue to ‘real’ reality? Does it represent what 
the original situation signifies, by establishing a relationship of parallel degree? If it 
does so, there is a resemblance, imitation, or even unity between the element of 
representation and the ‘original’ event. In nostalgia there seems to be such a parallelism 
between the subject and the object of representation. 
2.2. Platonism 
Taking this issue into its philosophical dimension, we note that ever since its debute in 
Western history, philosophical speculation considers representations as analogous to the 
object represented. In contrast to the (indirect) knowledge that we collect in all sorts of 
discourses, immediate ‘sight’ is analogous (van den Boom, 1991, 185). The Platonic 
origin of this notion of ‘view’ or ‘sight’ (theoria), asserts that the object of knowledge 
resembles the object of view in its true form. Subject and object are then immediately, 
without mediation, together. This is the paradigm of the direct vision, intuition and 
sight. Knowledge is thus a depiction or representation of ‘true’ reality and consists of 
12
 Considering Baudrillard's work as a description of a realized fantasy in this manner, I agree with Scott 
Durham's remark that "Baudrillard's work may be most usefully read as one articulation of a certain 
phantasy of postmodernity as a totalitarian operational system" (Durham, 1993, 161). 
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adequate representations, ideas or images on the ‘mental screen’. The metaphysical 
assumption that there is an original plenitude that guarantees the meaning of 
representations is the foundation of true knowledge (Hayles, 1999, 285). One often 
refers to this Platonic basis of Occidental thought as a ‘metaphysics of presence’. 
Jacques Derrida, who continues the Heideggerian critique on this metaphysics, allies the 
original presence with Logos, God and teleology (Derrida, 1976). As Eric Havelock 
shows in his Preface to Plato (1963), it is this original presence that allows for the 
notion of a coherent self that can produce true knowledge of reality. 
When one does assume such a unity between the subject and object one gets 
trapped in what Lacan calls a ‘dyadic’, imaginary, or 'nostalgic' theory of knowledge. 
As is the case in Plato's highly influential theory of reminiscence (anamnesis).  
“Something of the ability to recognise his natural object, so apparent in animals, 
is present in man. There is being captured by form, being seized by play, being 
gripped by the mirage of life. That is what a theoretical, or theorial, or 
contemplative, or Platonic thought refers to, and it isn’t an accident that Plato 
places reminiscence at the centre of his entire theory of knowledge. The natural 
object, the harmonic correspondent of the living being, is recognisable because 
its outline has already been sketched. And for it to have been sketched, it must 
already have been within the object which is going to join itself to it. That is the 
relation of the dyad. Plato’s entire theory of knowledge – Jean Hyppolite won’t 
contradict me – is dyadic” (S.2, 87). 
Platonism grounds its claim on true knowledge in assigning a pivotal role to 
reminiscence or recollection. Via the exact recollection of the knowledge that is already 
present in his mind (but that might have got 'forgotten' or turbid) man can gain true 
insight in himself and the world. Thus giving man the possibility to (re) find the lost 
presence, it is a nostalgic desire that drives Platonic philosophy. The decisive point of 
Platonism is its transformation of transcendence (what surpasses our knowledge and 
vision, and hence is what our desire is directed at) into an object that can be ‘seen’ by 
the ‘eye of the soul’. Similarly Plato turns light, that which gives all else visibility, into 
an object; a conception that the ancients had never used before (Hillis, 1999, 138). Not 
surprisingly, the Platonic metaphysics that grounded the Western world is a 
‘metaphysics of light’ (Blumenberg, 1993, 33). The Platonic notion of mimesis, that 
drives this metaphysics, connects the world of 'true objects' (the Ideas) and the sensible 
world. Representations of the sensible world only contain truth when they imitate or 
resemble the Ideas as truthfully as possible. Plato hence upholds a theory of truth as 
correspondence: a statement is only true when it corresponds to an extra-linguistically 
reality. 
 In the philosophy of language this Platonist philosophy became the foundation 
of the ‘classical’ theory of meaning. This theory holds that words directly express 
meaning. Language supposedly names objects and concepts that exist independently of 
being named. In the influential semantics of St. Augustine, Platonism came to imply 
that a person could retrieve the meaning of a word by finding out what it refers to. In the 
classical theory of meaning (Plato, St. Augustine, Frege), meaning is a thing that exists 
objectively and independently of the subject. Due to this reification of meaning a 
philosopher of the classical school can think meaning as that which characterizes the 
essence of the reference. In assuming a continuous and uninterrupted line between the 
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world of meaning and its representation, it can maintain that the subject can grasp the 
meaning of things, a meaning existing independently of him (mental representations, 
Platonic forms), and express it in words. It considers mental representations as 
objective, i.e. they have an exact resemblance, correspondence or analogy to the object: 
the object of expression is analogous to the expression itself. In his description of 
himself as a child, for instance, St. Augustine could retrieve the meaning of a word by 
observing the gestures and facial expressions that the adults used to indicate an object. 
While there is thus no dissimilarity or difference in the process of representation (the 
facial expressions of the adults show exactly what they mean, there is no deformation or 
distortion in it, i.e. no 'unconscious') the representations show us the meaning of the 
object they refer to.  
2.3. Modern subjectivity: the analogous representation of the world 
The Platonism of ‘pure sight’ is a kind of passive representation. It certainly is not the 
active representation or putting forward, and one might even use the terms ‘production’ 
or ‘performance’, that according to Heidegger is so characteristic of modern thought. 
Decisive for the modern age is the transformation of man into a subject that grounds 
truth: something is only true when the subject represents it. Being is identified with 
‘being represented’. Thus the essence of the modern age is the becoming image of the 
world (it is 'the age of the world picture'). Heidegger connects this decisive transition in 
the Western world to a crucial difference in the status of fantasy. In (pre-socratic) Greek 
thought fantasy (phantasia) still concerns the 'coming into appearance' of Being: it 
reveals something of the secrecy of Being. Modern man, however, who has turned the 
world into an image, merely fantasizes: he imagines all beings to be nothing but objects 
that are at his use: 
"In unconcealment fantasia comes to pass: the coming-into-appearance, as a 
particular something, of that which presences - for man, who himself presences 
toward what appears. Man as representing subject, however "fantasizes", i.e., he 
moves in imaginatio, in that his representing imagines, pictures forth, whatever 
is, as the objective, into the world as picture" (Heidegger, 1997, 147). 
In his text on modern subjectivity Heidegger addresses primarily René Descartes (1596-
1650), one of the main founders of modern thinking about man and world. The modern 
science that Descartes helped to set up posits the human subject at a centrally located 
point: as the guarantee of the certainty of knowledge. For Heidegger this modern 
subject of representation is a philosophical dreamer: it imagines the world to be 
analogous to its desire for certainty.13
 The tradition of the analogy of mind and world, representation and reality, or 
knowledge and truth reached its height in the philosophy of Hegel where the Spirit finds 
its completion (desire finds its fulfillment) in a complete knowledge of itself as it is 
reflected in the world: “Das absolute Wissen”. Because this ‘absolute knowledge’ 
13
 Gilbert Durand also stresses the relationship between modern subjectivity and the fantastic function. He 
does not characterize the subject of representation itself as a fantasizing entity, but holds fantasy to be 
ineradicable from the scientific enterprise, whose foundations he discovers in the analogous relation 
between the natural and the mathematical: "Invention is creative imagination … The whole of modern 
science, since Descartes, rests on a double analogy: namely that algebra is analogous to geometry, and 
that natural determinisms are analogous to mathematical processes" (Durand, 1999, 381). 
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results from a dialectical development of the Spirit throughout history, Hegel criticizes 
the Romantic notion of an intuitive knowledge given in ‘intellectual vision’ (Schelling’s 
‘Intellektuelle Anschauung’). Nevertheless, the knowledge of the Spirit is based on 
recollection. For it is about the inwardizing (Er-Innerung; recollection) of the Spirit 
which was still (only) outwardly manifested (Hegel, 1977, 456). The Spirit that gains 
(full) consciousness of itself is the re-collection of the Spirit that is still exterior in its 
natural, outward appearances. So the end of Hegelian desire is the dissolution or rising 
of nature into its true form: attaining a true sense of presence.14
3. Psychoanalysis: the mediation of presence
“The crumbled and crumbling character of that repressed thought is what our 
everyday experience, in psychoanalysis, teaches us. Therefore it is a gross and 
improper mythology to present as the foundation of our experience whatever 
nostalgia, of a pure and simple pulsation of satisfaction, for a primitive unity” 
(S.14, 18-01-1967; my translation15).
3.1. The 'gap' in the analogical mind 
In the philosophies of Plato and Hegel, the first and the final steps in the metaphysical 
tradition of anamnesis, mental representations are essentially a reflection of a 
(transcendent or immanent) 'true reality'. The principle of analogy underpins this 
identity of representation and reality. As well as a certain notion of recollection.16 But 
Freud's 'discovery' of the unconscious was a major factor in the obstruction of the 
pretentious transparency of the subject of representation. Recollection can also be an 
unconscious process; one can recollect a traumatic experience at an unconscious level. 
Although Freud in his early work thought that it was possible to recollect, and thereby 
discharge, these traumatic events, he soon came to realize that one cannot resolve 
psychical reality into 'true reality’. There is a ‘gap’ (of reference) in reality, and 
therefore representation (of the past) is never (fully) analogous. It is not an exact 
resemblance of (historical) reality; other codes than those of analogy determine 
representation as well. The unconscious involves a gap in the representation, which 
causes the resemblance with the object to fall short. Therefore the Freudian discovery is 
a break with the paradigm of similarity, or even (complete) identity, of knowledge and 
truth. Conscious knowledge never fully corresponds with the (unconscious) truth of 
ourselves.
 Nostalgia also thrives on the illusion of a parallelism between an ideal order of 
references (the 'true' object) and an order of representations (the human subject). It is, 
however, not a similar parallelism that establishes desire. Precisely the ‘blind spot’ in 
14
 With his ‘mirror of nature’ thesis Richard Rorty expands such a description of two major philosophies 
of the modern age to the whole of ‘traditional’ philosophy. Throughout the ages the major traditions in 
philosophy would frenetically have tried to position itself as a ‘mirror of nature’ that reflects the basic 
structures of reality and studies the laws of reflection itself. Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of 
Nature (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980). 
15
 I will henceforth refer to my translations as m.t.
16
 I equate analogy with mimesis and resemblance, as Markus Doel and David Clarke do in their article 
on virtual worlds (Doel and Clarke, 1999, 270). 
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‘the analogical mind’17 constitutes desire. One cannot understand its meaning by 
comparing it to (paralleling it with) the familiar situation. It does not ‘represent what is 
signified’ but it signifies itself: only by telling about my desires can I come to know 
what they mean, they do not have a  'true reality' before their articulation. Reality, which 
psychoanalysis primordially conceives as a psychical reality, is always-already 
complemented or supplemented (‘completed’) by the desire to have what one never had. 
Nostalgia illustrates this: the best way to annihilate this desirable reality is to invent a 
time-machine and travel back in time in order to find out that ‘real’ reality does not 
correspond to the representation we made of it. 
 Therefore, there is no identity of thinking and being, and, Lacan says, there 
never will be: “Aufhebung is one of philosophy’s pretty little dreams” (S.20, 86). Desire 
is not a ‘mirror of nature’. If one considers it to be so, one is in the dyadic structure of 
imaginary illusions. Lacan might share Rorty’s analysis that philosophy is very capable 
of constructing such “pretty little dreams”. And – I would add – technologies are also 
very capable of doing so. In an uncritical approach the notion that technologies – from 
photography to Virtual Reality – can achieve an unmediated presentation of reality (an 
'undistorted' relation between subject and object) is still very compelling (cf. 
Bolter/Grusin, 2000, 30). And  a user hardly notices or perceives that the 'images' he 
deals with are built up of discontinuous elements. But when one takes a better look, one 
must admit that the digital world is discontinuous, it represents by means of discrete 
units (cf. the digital clock with its 'jumps'). So, as Steven Holzman analyses, "there will 
always be a gap of some sort in any digital representation" (in Simons, 2002, 68).  This 
discontinuity, however, does not just characterize digital representations. All sign 
systems have such a gap: they never represent reality as a perfect copy, but always by 
means of something (words, images …) different from what it represents.18
Furthermore, in sign systems there is always a selection and a composition of elements 
(for instance in a sentence: which words do I choose, and how do I combine them; 
which Lacan elaborated into the metaphorical and metonymical axis of language). The 
two basic principles that guide most computer application are selection and 
composition. The material that is composited into a new media object is in many cases 
selected from a database of documents.  
In this gap Freud posits the functioning of the unconscious, with the psychical 
reality of fantasy as its core: fantasy 'fills in' the gap. Therefore Freudian theory is an 
instrument well-suited to the analysis of the digital era. It is not without reason that 
some critics state that reality in the digital era resembles the psychical reality that 
psychoanalysis analyses: they both consist of the compositing of different elements or 
fragments. In an essay called 'Digital Desire' a commentator stresses this 
correspondence between digital media and Freud's theory: "history is similarly 
represented by fragments, in the form of images, sound bytes and video clips, which 
embody the whole, but do not reveal the whole in detail" (Savage, 2000)   
17
 I refer here to a collection of essays on cognitive psychology: D. Gentner, K. JHolyoak, and B. N. 
Kokinov, The Analogical Mind. Perspectives from Cognitive Science (Cambridge, Ma. /London: MIT 
Press, 2001). 
18
 There is a gap in the signifying order. The order of representations that allows man to encode and store 
knowledge of the world does not cover all that is knowable in the world. Language does not tell all there 
is to tell about reality. Therefore the British writer Lewis Carroll (1832-1898) invented his own language: 
'Jabberwocky'. He thus shows that human creativity can fill in the gap of language by creating new signs 
(cf. Danesi, 2002, 32).  
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 In his analysis of hypertexts, that construct the World Wide Web, Espen Aarseth 
puts this problematic of the part and the whole in a central position. In hypertexts we 
never reach completion because there are always the links that we haven't investigated 
yet. Because of this 'constitutive leftover' hypertexts are structurally constructed around 
aporia's:  
"the hypertext aporia prevents us from making sense of the whole because we 
may not have access to a particular part. Aporia here becomes a trope, an absent 
pièce de résistance rather than the usual transcendental resistance of the (absent) 
meaning of a difficult passage (Aarseth, 1997, 91).  
Hypertexts thus seem to bring about a transition from the interpretative-hermeneutical 
enterprise of discovering the (hidden) meaning of a text or story, to the discovery and 
exploration of the informational space. When the text thus becomes a labyrinth, reading 
becomes exploring, and interpreting becomes doing puzzles (Simons, 2002, 195). 
Lacan's remark that in order to become a good psychoanalyst, one should try to 
resolve many crossword puzzles hints that in his work one can find both the 
hermeneutical and the explorative schools of thought. I will first of all describe the 
hermeneutical paradigm of the 'classical' Lacan, in which the discourse of the Other 
(sign systems, 'langage') gives meaning to individual expressions ('parole'). This 
description takes place in the next paragraph (3.2.) where I explain the Lacanian split 
subject by way of the Platonic Eros, clarifying the notion that the desire to become One 
is always mediated by the Other. Further on in this thesis I will focus more on the later 
Lacan with his emphasis on the 'constitutive leftover' of the discourse of the Other (the 
object a) that prevents all interpretation from reaching 'true meaning'. The limit of 
interpretation is then not only the result of the transcendental absence of such a meaning 
(of the object that we desire), but also of the inescapable (bodily, libidinal) fantasmatic 
formation of the object. It's not just that we cannot reach the true meaning of a text 
because all words do not come up to the mark, but also because we 'mark' the text by 
our subjective completion of it (we flesh out the transcendental lacuna). Lacan then 
moves from asserting the gap between signs and reality, towards the (material) 
formation of this gap: the 'support' of the 'texts' moves from Other to fantasy. In this 
chapter I will introduce fantasy's necessary mediation by means of the sentiment that is 
attached to it: namely beauty (3.3.). Thus I hope to introduce the notion that the 
interfaces of information and communication technologies are clear-cut media that give 
form to the gap.
3.2."You can't have One without the Other" 
In The Symposium Plato gives a glorious account of love. The guests he puts on the 
scene at Agathon's dinner discuss the god Eros and delineate what is now known of as 
the Platonic concept of love. Through Aristophanes Plato formulates a myth about the 
original human body (with four legs, arms et cetera) which Zeus, as a punishment for 
man’s attempts to attack the gods, cuts in half in order to weaken mankind. Love is the 
desire of the split human being for its Other half: the desire to become One again.  
Platonic Eros is the inner tension that makes us aspire and desire for the 
beautiful, for it is beauty, in all its manifestations, that love aims at. In beauty man finds 
what he is looking for. We can only be happy if a perfectly realized love makes us 
return to our original state and thus ‘heals’ us. Since Platonism conceives the beautiful 
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as something which really exists, the desire for it is not principally unrealizable. Man 
can realize his basic ‘nostalgic’ desire, which continuously causes him to search further 
and further, in the contemplation of the archetype of all that is beautiful: the Form of 
Beauty. A (re) finding of beauty in a particular thing is seen as a reference to beauty in 
general. Physical beauty refers to spiritual beauty, and the beauty of social institutions 
refers to the beauty of knowledge and science. Platonic Eros is a desire which refers to 
Beauty itself and finds its final aim in its contemplation. This Beauty, of which all other 
things partake, really exists in a higher ontological domain.  
For Plato, as he states through Agathon in Symposium, love hence can eliminate 
alienation:
“And now I am stirred to speak in numbers, and to tell how it is he that brings 
  Peace upon earth, the breathless calm 
   That lulls the long-tormented deep,  
  Rest to the winds, and that sweet balm 
   And solace of our nature, sleep. 
And it is he that banishes estrangement and ushers friendship in” (Plato, 1978, 
549).
Plato explains, through Socrates’ account of the theory of the fortune-teller Diotima, 
that Eros is the child of Success and Poverty. In its pursuit of Beauty it finds itself 
between Insight and Ignorance. Lacanian Eros is rather - in the words of Lacan 
commentator Bruce Fink - a child of language and jouissance (cf. Fink, 1999). 
Language divides the 'original' experience of being One (jouissance); it cuts the human 
being into two parts, as Zeus did with the original man. To exist is then to live within 
the domain of the Other.19 Because the medium (language) wherein we express 
ourselves necessarily connects us to the Other, the loss of the satisfied Self is original: 
we are necessarily alienated.  
Therefore one cannot use Lacanian theory for a romantic criticism of 
technology, as witnessed especially the 1960s (cf. Mitcham, 1994, 243). Technology is 
not alienation from a pre-technological real world. In the context of a theory of new 
media, Lacan's basic notion of mediation through the Other (alienation) teaches us that 
all representations are already discontinuous with 'real reality', since they consist of 
discrete units (the binary oppositions of structural anthropology - high/low, in/out etc. - 
or those of digitality - zeros and ones). Although new media may appear as an 
(analogue) resemblance of reality, they still are a 'language' in that they represent by 
means of discrete and discontinuous units. 
For Lacan, the operations of alienation and separation (of the satisfying objects) 
go hand in hand: they constitute the subject (cf. S.11, ch. 16). In the first episode of his 
thinking, untill the end of  the 1950’s, Lacan focuses on the concept of alienation. The 
multivalent notion that ‘desire is the desire of the Other’ summarizes this tendency. This 
19
 In Lacanian theory one writes the Other with a capital O in order to indicate its general meaning as the 
place to which the word addresses itself, which is not necessarily another concrete person; also non-
concrete others such as God, ideals et cetera, can occupy this place. However, the first Other is the 
mother, the parents or guardians. "The Other is the locus in which is situated the chain of signifiers that 
governs whatever may be made present of the subject - it is the field of that living being in which the 
subject has to appear" (S.11, 203). I will explicate the Other of language, in relation to virtualization, 
further in chapter 3: § 3.2. 
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means first of all that man desires to be the object of the desire of the other. Via Kojève 
this leads back to the Hegelian notion of recognition as a fulfillment of desire. It also 
means that the subject desires as another. The desire of others mediates our desire: I 
want something because someone else wants it. In addition to this it implies that desire 
is a desire for the other, as in Plato’s conception of Eros, added with the ‘incestuous’ 
dimension that desire is thought of having in psychoanalysis. Lastly, it means that desire 
is always “the desire for something else” (Ec., 167). So we see that the early Lacan 
follows the Hegelian tradition in the analysis of desire. At the apogee of his structuralist 
period, as in his first seminars at the beginning of the 1950’s, he seems to believe in a 
full determination by the symbolic Other. Symbolic laws govern the reality of man, who 
can only find some sort of freedom by recognizing the law. It is the (structural) field of 
the Other that determines meaning. 
One could illustrate the workings of the realm of the Other as it brings reality 
into existence using Orson Welles' radio transmission of 30 October 1938: The War of 
the Worlds. Many listeners actually experienced this 'news-broadcast' as being the 
commentary of earth's invasion by Martians. They were lured because the institutional 
contexts of Hollywood and of radio-news were changed without any (explicit) notice to 
the listener. This shows that in order for something to be experienced as true, it is 
necessary that one believes in the whole network of cultural, institutional and 
professional conventions that present it. For if this act of faith was not (unconsciously) 
executed (that is, when it was made explicit that the broadcast was a Hollywood 
production) all the commotion about being attacked by Martians would not have 
occurred. So, with this awareness of the constitutive role of the big Other, one could 
doubt whether it is the introduction of digital images as such – embroidering on the 
prior introduction of photographic, filmic or televisional images - that leads to a bigger 
distrust of their veracity (cf. Simons, 2002, 165, 322). For reality's representation 
always was to a large extent a matter of selection and composition. It is precisely the act 
of belief in the context in which it is presented (the big Other) that is decisive for its 
truthfulness.
3.3. Eros as Thanathos: Beauty as a mediator 
 "For Beauty is nothing but 
 the beginning of awesomeness which we can barely endure, 
 we marvel at it so, because it calmly disdains  
to destroy us" (Rilke, 1975, 2) 
Lacan outgrows structuralism, accompanying this shift with an emphasis on the real 
other of the process of separation. He now holds that it is not just the context of 
signifiers that determines the value of a representation, but also the (idiosyncratic) 
pleasure they may provide. Lacan focuses on the subject as a libidinal body. This 
(bodily) subject is separated from the objects of its partial drives, and is not just 
alienated because of the intersubjective character of the human world. Separation hence 
poses an internal limit towards the possibilities of ‘appeasing’ desire by means of 
recognition. The drives don’t care about recognition; they want satisfaction. 
Notwithstanding the fact that we have lost the objects that can satisfy our desires, the 
drives remain attached to those impossible object-experiences of full satisfaction. They 
seek its 'simulation' by means of fantasy. The drives' excessive nature causes the 
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realization of (full) satisfaction to be at the expense of desire (the conception of the 
orgasm as 'the little death' says it all). They are essentially death-drives. The main road 
to avoid their impossible goal is to provide substitute pleasure by means of fantasy, that 
is, as we will see, to seek the enjoyment of beauty. 
Plato grounds the desire for 'self-realization' in the reminiscence of Beauty 
"seen" by man's psyche 'before he saw the first light of day as a material being. As our 
corporeal existence now chains us to the material world and chains our mind, the goal is 
to free ourselves from the material delimitations. Lacan, who radically rejects all 
speculative ideas about a higher realm beyond our earthly world, also grounds desire in 
some sort of reminiscence. He situates this reminiscence that guides our desire in what 
he calls the real, the real of our past and earliest satisfactions of the different drives. 
Because those satisfactions that direct our desire are, obviously, not present anymore 
and are not representable as what they were, they belong to the order of the real. Just 
think of attempts, common enough, to reconstruct a pleasurable event of the past: it is 
never the same. Therefore, Lacan says, it is via fantasy that we relate ourselves to the 
real. The lost satisfaction of the drives motivates Eros, not the Platonic ideal forms of 
Beauty.  
Lacan puts forward that a fundamental loss characterizes the desiring subject; it 
does not have a complementary part that can deliver it.  
“Aristophanes’ myth pictures the pursuit of the complement for us in a moving, 
and misleading, way, by articulating that it is the other, one’s sexual other half, 
that the living being seeks in love. To this mythical representation of the mystery 
of love, analytic experience substitutes the search by the subject, not of the 
sexual  complement, but of the part of himself, lost forever, that is constituted by 
the fact that he is only a sexed living being, and that he is no longer immortal” 
(S.11, 205). 
Lacan puts his myth of the ‘lamella’ (S.11, 197-199; Ec., 845-848) against the myth of 
Aristophanes. The ‘lamella’ is what gets lost every time sexual reproduction leads to 
new life. Like an egg (with the perfect shape of continuity of Aristophanes’ original 
people) must break in order for the new creature to come out. What gets lost with sexual 
reproduction is eternal life itself. Lacan calls the ‘lamella’ the libido, the pure force of a 
life that is indestructible. So it is sexual reproduction that introduces in life a real loss, 
namely individual death. Not a loss that man can cancel by recovering what it has lost.20
Lacan uses his myth that links life to death for his broader theory on sexuality. There is 
no sexual completion of desire; man does not complete woman, or vice versa. Not even 
love can bring salvation.  
As this relentless search for lost satisfactions goes along with something “that 
goes against life” (S.17, 51), Eros is bound up to Thanathos. Or, to put it in the words of 
Marie Bonaparte, “one of the most constant features of Eros is that he drags his brother 
Thanathos along behind him”.21 Lacan’s theory of desire hence continues on the 
fundamental insights of Freudian theory regarding the inseparability of Eros and 
Thanathos. Or, actually it modifies the Freudian binary conception of the drives by 
viewing the drives that support life, and the drives that aim at death, as two aspects of 
the same drive (Miller, 2000, 20-21). Every drive is, profoundly, a death drive (S.11, 
20
 Man can only retrace this original loss, without finding it again. This retracing is the path of fantasy! 
21
 Marie Bonaparte, Eros, Chronos et Thanatos (Paris: P.U.F., 1952, 120). Cited in Durant, 1992, p. 189. 
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205). When it reaches ‘the real thing’ the tension in the ‘psychic apparatus’ is reduced 
to zero. Antigone illustrates this realization of desire as an ‘eclipse’ of the subject. As 
she demonstrates in Sophocles' tragedy of the same name, in ‘not giving up on her 
desire’: she dies. The final point of desire is the point where desire extinguishes itself, 
where it annihilates itself and its object. It is the point of (self)sacrifice.22
Nevertheless, there is also in Lacanian theory an obvious relationship between 
Beauty and desire (cf. 'The function of the beautiful', S.7, 231-240). Yet not in the 
Platonic sense: Beauty does not fully realize desire itself, as in the Platonic view. 
Lacan's analysis of Sophocles' tragedy Antigone shows this (S.7, 243-287). According 
to Lacan, Antigone makes us see the terminal point of desire, and because she does not 
‘give way to her desire’ she radiates Beauty. This Beauty that the tragedy expresses can 
lessen our desire, and therefore tragedies can have a cathartic function. For Lacan 
Beauty has a protective function: it makes us stop before we might reach the terminal 
point (‘in the real’, by means of the transgressive act) of our desire.  
From this notion of Beauty as it functions in tragic desire, one can discern the 
function of Beauty in a broader scope. When there is no 'happy' terminal point when we 
try to realize our (excessive) desire, it is only the 'beautiful' substitution of the 
impossible object that can give some satisfaction. It is, as Lacan says, Beauty that can 
'dab' or ease our desire. It cannot realize it. It prevents us, by contrast, from the fateful 
dynamic of 'self-realizing' transgressions by giving a sublime mask to a non-existing 
object. All most highly valued cultural representations (art, literature, science) focus on 
such a representation of a non-representable real (cf. Ribettes, 1984, 196-7). They try to 
give a beautiful form to an object that is beyond our (human) limits. In that sense they 
all involve artistic sublimation.  
Beauty is the name for the affect that is attached to fantasy. It indicates that the 
screen of fantasy mediates the relation of the subject and the object of desire. Nowadays 
we must also consider how this sublimatory activity takes place in technology. From an 
anthropological point of view a major factor that connects man to the technological 
world, is the technological production of attractive objects. Their value surpasses their 
usefulness.
3.4. Lacanian anthropology: beyond the need 
For Lacan desire is the essence of human existence, as it was for example for Spinoza 
(cf. S.11, 275). Actually one must be more precise, for, Lacan says, in a-theological 
system (that pulls man away from the center of the world) the term “man” is impossible 
to conserve. Then he suggests substituting the Spinozist formula that “desire is the 
essence of man” by “desire is the essence of reality” (S.14, 16-11-1966). 
Notwithstanding this transformation, he situates his theory in a long tradition of thought 
profoundly connecting human existence to desire. His formulation of the real as the 
impossible object of desire, that needs a screen (of fantasy) in order to make itself 
known, implies at the plane of philosophical anthropology that we never attain the final 
answer to the appeal that has haunted man throughout the ages and guides him towards 
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 Therefore Lacan states that pure desire is equal to a radical following of the obligation of the Kantian 
moral law; “the moral law which, looked at more closely, is simply desire in its pure state, that very 
desire that culminates in sacrifice, strictly speaking, of everything that is the object of love in one’s 
human tenderness – I would say, not only in the rejection of the pathological object, but also in its 
sacrifice and murder. That is why I wrote Kant avec Sade” (S.11, 275-276). For an analysis of this 
subject, see: Bernard Baas, Le désir pur.
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his most secret dimensions: “Man, know thyself”. Thus Lacanian theory of desire 
distinguishes itself from three major traditions in the conception of man.  
Religious anthropology understands man - as a ‘homo religiosus’ - from his 
relations to the gods or God. It links up man's desire with a divine dimension that can 
salvage man’s shortcomings. Rational anthropology puts the autonomous reason, as 
discovered by the ancient Greeks, on the foreground and considers it the excellent 
instance of the human being (‘animal rationale’) through which it can realize or 
contemplate the ideal world. So Kant states in his Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point 
of View (1798) that the process of Enlightenment can realize man. Not the individual 
person but mankind as a whole can fulfill its rational nature by realizing the goals it sets 
itself. Other rational philosophers, such as Hegel and Schelling, articulate an 
anthropology in which the goal - which can be achieved in reality - is a self-
consciousness of the Spirit. Biological anthropology, finally, traces the essence of man 
back to his biological substance. Then man can be understood without reference to a 
different level of reality (other than the natural) and without crude opposition between 
man and animal (as in the rational anthropology), for the objects of human intentions 
are reducible to the natural level. 
 Lacan’s conception of man as a ‘desiring animal’ moves away from those 
classical lines of thought in anthropological thinking. He openly dissociates himself 
from the biological model that was dominant in his days (and still is). For ‘biologism’ in 
psychoanalysis leads to an obliteration of the distinction between nature and culture, 
and to a confusion of desire and need, of drives and instincts. In order to avoid such a 
muddle Lacan introduces a strong distinction between need, demand and desire. Need is 
a psychological tension that results from physiological disequilibria. Physiological 
processes determine the object of the need. Need is removed when it has found an 
adequate object: food soothes one's hunger. With demand we enter the cultural domain 
of intersubjectivity. It is the articulation of need. Through this articulation the subject 
directs itself not just towards objects that can satisfy its needs, but also towards the 
Other. The demand is essentially a demand for love. The infant that expresses its needs, 
however inarticulately, does not solely want a satisfaction of its needs. It also demands 
the Other’s presence, a presence symbolizing its love. However, the Other cannot 
provide the unconditional love that the subject demands. After the satisfaction of needs 
something remains left. The fact that the love of the Other is ‘not all’ causes the surplus 
of demand that is called desire. “Desire is neither the appetite for satisfaction, nor the 
demand for love, but the difference that results from the subtraction of the first from the 
second” (Ec., 287). The cause of desire is a gap between need and love, an inability in 
ourselves to symbolize and present the Other.23
 Lacan’s theory of desire places itself in a long tradition that goes from Plato to 
Spinoza and Hegel. Whereas Lacan’s a-theological thinking of desire seems almost 
impossible without the Nietzschean notion of the ‘death of God’, the absence of 
references to Nietsche in his work are remarkable. For the ‘death of God’ implies not 
only that a metaphysical or religious fulfillment of desire is impossible; it moves every 
notion of a ‘realization’ (of desire, man, the world …) into the realm of the 
impossible.24 As there is no basis on which a fixed determination of man can be made, 
his essence is characterized as the ‘non-determined animal’. It is only with this 
23
 This cause of desire is what Lacan later calls the ‘objet petit a’, the object a.
24
 Interestingly enough, this notion of the Impossible appears via the work of Georges Bataille in Lacan’s 
notion of the Real. 
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disappearance of the foundations of man that the ‘homelessness’ of his desire is 
thinkable in its radical quality. Therefore Lacan’s theory of desire has similarities with 
other great thinkers about man after the ‘death of god’. Heidegger characterizes man as 
ex-sistent, Plessner as ex-centric. Man has lost the substantial center of his existence 
(remember Lacan’s myth of the lamella); it is an empty place now.25
 The surplus-object of the needs (the 'lost substance') places the Lacanian subject 
outside the major oppositions that philosophical anthropology uses to determine the 
position of man. Man is not deducible to one of the oppositional poles of the 
dichotomies of Body and Mind, Nature and Culture or Animal and Human. It was of 
course Freud who mentioned that the drive is a concept on the border of the mental and 
the somatical.26 It is a psychical representation of the stimuli that come from the body 
and reach thus out into the mental. So the drive has a psychical object. And fantasy 
constitutes, forms, and moulds (and we might even use the word ‘designs’) this object. 
Therefore fantasy is the instance in the subject that is the interface between the natural 
order of (animal, bodily) forces and the cultural order of (sublimated) representations.  
 Now that I have brought forward that man is essentially a subject of desire 
according to Lacan in which it is fantasy that creates the desirable object, and that 
technology has an enormous power to produce and present objects of desire, shouldn't 
we alter our picture of man? For man as the result of the combined action of natural and 
cultural forces might increasingly be a compound of natural and technological forces (at 
the expense of the cultural dimension?). Beside the notion of man as a linguistic being 
we must also take seriously the question of man as a technological being. In the story of 
man the 'speaking organism' gets intermingled with the 'cybernetic organism'. For the 
distinctive feature of the cyborg is the interface of the physical body with technology 
(Gray, Figeueroa-Sarriera, & Mentor, 1995; Biocca, 1997). 
 Because the interface of fantasy plays a central role in both the experience of a 
desired presence (d.i. in the fulfillment of desire) and the relation between man and 
technology, I take fantasy as the thread in my thinking through technology.  
3.5. Law and fantasy: the object a as surplus-enjoyment 
"Perhaps the most prominent psychological impact of presence is enjoyment" 
(Lombard/Ditton, 1997) 
From a Lacanian point-of-view desire proper does not exist before this introduction of 
the law. It is the law that installs desire! Here Lacan differs significantly from Freud, for 
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 What is at the real core of my motivations?: "I don't know". It is only by acknowledging this gap in the 
discourse of knowledge that we may avoid tumbling deeper into the trap of alienation. "The sudden, 
prodigious development of the power of the signifier, of the discourse that emerged from the little letters 
of mathematics and that is distinct from all previously existing discourses, becomes an additional 
alienation. In what way? Insofar as it is a discourse that by reason of its structure forgets nothing. That is 
why it is different from the discourse of primary memorization, which carries on inside us without our 
knowledge, different from the memorizing discourse of the unconscious whose center is absent, whose 
place is identified through the phrase "he didn't know", that is precisely the sign of that fundamental 
omission in which the subject is situated" (S.7, 236). The discourse of mathematics - that is also at the 
basis of the technologies of information - might forget the subject of the unconscious. 
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 Sigmund Freud, 'Instincts and Their Vicissitudes' (1915). The German 'Triebe' in the title 'Triebe und 
Triebschicksale' is here strangely enough translated as  'Instincts'. 
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whom there are incestuous desires and fantasies before the end of the Oedipus complex. 
For Lacan they are the result of the ‘prohibition’. 
“But we must insist that jouissance is forbidden to him who speaks as such, 
although it can only be said between the lines for whoever is subject of the Law, 
since the Law is grounded in this very prohibition” (Ec., 319). 
The loss of the 'imaginary plenitude' causes the proper desire of the subject.  
“Castration means that jouissance must be refused, so that it can be reached on 
the inverted ladder … of the Law of desire” (Ec., 324). 
As the subject of desire tries to reorganize this lost object of enjoyment by means of 
fantasy, it is fantasy that guides the reality of the subject after castration. So, from 
castration results  
 “that there is no cause of desire than produced by that operation, and that fantasy 
 dominates all the reality of desire” (S.17, 149; m.t.).
The law regulates our normal condition. Its axiom of the ‘never too much’ normalizes 
our jouissance - that is translated as enjoyment - within the limits of the pleasure 
principle. But within this rule of the pleasure principle there are ‘places’ wherein the 
remnants of a more profound enjoyment appear in a disguised form: sublimated, artistic 
…. That is the domain of fantasy. Lacan introduces the term object a for the residue of 
an impossible satisfaction that fantasy tries to frame within the limits of the pleasure 
principle. The object a is a remains of the enjoyment of the ‘lost paradise’, that is to say 
the surplus of enjoyment after the installment of the law. This 'object' is what causes
desire, and as such also the object of desire. In its affective dimension it is beyond 
signification: we cannot exactly say what it is. It transgresses the domain of the 
subject(ivity) of language, and makes us aware of the subject of the body. 
 At the intersubjective level of desire the object remains an enigma: each time we 
try to name it, it slips away. Lacan shows this by means of another reading of Plato’s 
Symposium in his seminar on transference. At the banquet Alcibiades tries to explain his 
love for Socrates. Socrates is a wise man, virtuous, courageous etc. All these qualities 
can yet not explain Alcibiades’ love for Socrates, so in the end he must recognize that 
there is a hidden treasure in Socrates (the ‘agalma’), which makes him so desirable. 
According to Lacan Alcibiades hallucinates in his speech an object of desire (Schokker 
& Schokker, 1998, 182). This object that Alcibiades hallucinates is transferred 
(‘transmitted’) to Socrates who carries it, Lacan says, ‘in his belly’. This object is what 
is in Socrates more than himself, what is more then the ideal image that Alcibiades 
constructs of him. The object a as object of desire is exactly what is in the other more 
then himself  (‘in you more than you’; S.11, 268 - like a media personality who 
becomes a 'phenomenon' that 'is bigger than himself'). The object a is a supplementary 
form of enjoyment that for the subject becomes the object of his desire. It is that in the 
other which makes him desirable.  
“For the subject, it is that value he or she is seeking in all of his or her activities” 
(Fink, 1999, 96).  
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Crucial to the logic of fantasy, and to the theory of psychoanalysis in general, is the 
determination of the constitution of the object a (cf. S.14, 16-11-1966). The object a is 
the surplus value that we attribute to the other via fantasy, and that transforms the 
other’s being. Slavoj Žižek gives the example of the anti-Semitic fantasy in which the 
attribution of that which is “in the Jew more than the Jew himself” transforms the Jew 
into what he phenomenally is (Žižek, 1993, 268).  
The object a is not only the lost object of desire but also the object that provides 
a positive content to desire via a fantasmatic formation of the objects of the partial 
drives: surplus enjoyment. This is important in order to elevate Lacanian theory from a 
theory of negativity (we always desire what we do not have) into also a theory of 
positivity (we desire what we experience as a positive content of what we do not have). 
“[W]e must guard against what would be an exclusive view of object a considered as a 
loss. Object a can be theorized in different ways, above all as surplus-of-jouissance
where far from being a loss it is an accumulated surplus” (Nasio, 1998, 88). So within 
the rule of law there is a surplus, a surplus of enjoyment that does not cause desire by 
merely imposing limits (principle of negativity) but by providing positive ‘content’ to 
our desire. One could say, playfully, that the law provides the medium for the subject, 
and fantasy is the ‘content provider’. Fantasy therefore has a perverse structure, for the 
most general characteristic of the perverse position is the ambiguity ('double talk') 
towards castration: one does, and does not recognize the lack (principle of disavowal - 
'Verleugnung'). The perverse structure of fantasy is thus that it searches for enjoyment 
after castration, that is, via a medium, a mediating apparatus. Jean Baudrillard discerns a 
similar relationship between media and enjoyment: a technical apparatus always 
mediates enjoyment, but most often fantasy is the mediator– enjoyment always implies 
an intermediary manipulation of scenes or of gadgets (Baudrillard, 1981, 170-1). Is this 
perverse structure of fantasy as a medium and, as I will claim, the medium as a fantasy, 
not most clearly expressed in the attitude of someone towards his /her 'online adultery'. 
"It is not so bad because it is not real," thinks the fantasizer. This is exactly the status of 
fantasy: it is not real but it causes all sorts of effects in reality. As an inescapable 
medium it brings enjoyment within acceptable limits.  
From the expositions on the fantasy-object we can draw an important conclusion 
for our investigations: 
All communication transmits an element that is beyond the objective qualities 
of either the sender or receiver. This is the element of desire that fantasy 
constructs: the object a.
3.6. Fantasy and surplus-enjoyment: between pleasure and jouissance  
Psychoanalysis considers man to be an excessive animal that tries to regain, hazard and 
maintain his (mental) balance within the extremes of enjoyment and pain (what Lacan 
calls the real of jouissance). Fantasy functions as a screen with regards to a jouissance
that is too excessive, traumatic. It has the fundamental tendency to limit too excessive 
forms of excitement and bring them within the homeostatic borders of the pleasure 
principle. Actually, psychoanalysis advocates that fantasy has no other function than to 
temper this excessive jouissance (Ribettes, 1984, 192). And at the same time it 
preserves in this protective function something of the jouissance it tries to temper, by 
transforming it, imagining it. The example of 'online cheating' may illustrate this. 
Playing these 'imaginary' scenes may be a way to deal with and give form to ones 'wild' 
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and 'unknown' sexual drives. In directing the drives the scenes may prevent libidinal 
energies from freely fleeting and being destructive. And at the same time it is this 
'formation' that gives a certain pleasure to the subject. In Freudo-Lacanian 
psychoanalysis the pleasure principle is a principle of homeostasis: it must keep the 
tension at a constant, acceptable, 'comfortable' level. Fantasy is beyond the pleasure 
principle in a double way. First of all it precedes the pleasure principle. Fantasy makes 
its functioning possible by binding the excessive energies to representations. Secondly, 
it exceeds the pleasure principle: after it has conditioned the pleasure principle it 
organizes ‘situations’ wherein man can experience something of what is beyond his 
possibilities. Fantasy, in its normal form, is thus protective and subversive at the same 
time.
These are the two forms of the 'beyond of the pleasure principle' that Freud 
discerns. His analysis in Beyond the Pleasure Principle of repetition of painful dreams 
in traumatic neuroses and the repetition of the departure of the mother in a child’s play 
shows that there are phenomena that seem to contradict the mechanism of the pleasure 
principle. For the pleasure principle is first of all a mechanism to avoid displeasure: the 
psychic apparatus aims at keeping the quantity of tension or excitement as low as 
possible, or at least at a constant level. Freud argues that the repetition of painful events 
functions as a capturing of energies that are not bound. It binds the energies of the 
trauma to certain representations, and as such it is preliminary to the opposition of 
pleasure and displeasure. By binding the energies it actually installs the pleasure 
principle, for this is a principle that functions at the level of psychic representations. It 
controls the excitement that is associated with certain representations. Because of this 
binding of excitement to (imaginary) representations the pleasure principle functions at 
the level of the Lacanian imaginary. The death drive, by contrast, consists of the 
unbinding of the mediated representation of excitement, and is hence characterized by 
the loss of control over excitement. It disrupts the imaginary order of the pleasure 
principle.
In order to understand the enjoyment ‘at work’ in fantasy, we must first of all 
take a look at Lacan’s comprehension of enjoyment (jouissance). The most commonly 
made mistake is to confuse enjoyment with feelings of pleasure. However, if one wants 
to have an idea of what Lacan means by enjoyment, the first thing to do is to let go of 
this confusion. Enjoyment is not pleasure! It can be found exactly there where the 
regulation of the psyche by means of the principles of pleasure and displeasure reaches 
its limits. The excitement that seizes someone who drives his car as fast as possible is 
not pleasure. The excitement of a voyeur who can be caught any moment in his act of 
looking is not simply pleasure. “Let us be clear: jouissance is not pleasure, but a state 
beyond pleasure; or to use Freud’s terms, it is an excessive tension, a maximum tension, 
while on the contrary, pleasure is a diminution of tension” (Nasio, 1998, 106); “Pleasure 
is always dependent on the coming and going of images that appear to me. Pleasure is a 
sensation perceived and experienced by the ego … Lacan, inspired by the cogito of 
Descartes, located the position of the subject in the state of jouissance by stating “I am 
there where I do not think” (Nasio, 1998, 39-40). Enjoying is even dissimilar from 
feeling, if one comprehends feeling as a conscious process, as a conscious noticing of 
sensations (cf. Nasio, 1987, 135). I can enjoy a book, but this enjoyment is not simply 
equal to the perception of the feelings it provokes (I feel exalted, wrought up …). The 
enjoyment might be that it ‘transposes' me in another mood: I am absorbed into another 
world, into another way of perceiving (so that I might feel what the protagonist is 
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feeling). Because of this effect, often not even consciously perceived, enjoyment is so 
difficult to grasp. Nevertheless, it does have a conditioning function. It is comparable to 
a mood: a frame of mind, a state of mind. It shows itself in its effects: in a depressive 
mood an occurrence that otherwise might make me exalted now makes me sad.27
 In enjoyment the limits of our self are at stake. With this given one can 
discriminate between three major forms of enjoyment: enjoyment that recognizes the 
law and that therefore seeks its benefit in an imaginary realm where the law does not 
count; enjoyment that transgresses the law, and enjoyment as a ‘playing’ with the law. 
Since the law - as normative for personal identity - is the measure, the question is how a 
subject of the law relates to (pre-subjective) enjoyment (that is to say enjoyment that is 
not reconcilable with functioning as a healthy individual). In the first form of enjoyment 
the subject holds to it while at the same time acknowledging the rules and customs that 
prohibit the (‘infantile’) forms of enjoyment. This situation of conflict will then give 
rise to the formation of (neurotic) symptoms. Such symptoms are the clearest 
manifestation of a form of enjoyment based on repression. The unacceptable desires are 
repressed, but in spite of this dominance of the law the subject is so much attached or 
‘fixated’ to the ‘forbidden fruits’ that his desires find a compromise form of enjoyment 
in his symptoms. Because of the organization of enjoyment within the rule of the 
(paternal) law this enjoyment is called phallic.  
 The second form of enjoyment does not exist in recognition of the law, but in 
transgressing it. The subject then rejects the normalizing mediation of the law that 
prescribes us how to relate to the other. The subject refuses to be subjected: it 
immediately realizes its desires. The ‘passage a l’act’ is a clear example of such a total 
form of enjoyment. However, this ‘foreclosure’ of the law, the refusal to mediate desire 
via the law of the Other, also means a collapse of normalcy. Psychotic hallucination, 
which is also a form of total enjoyment, shows this. The object of desire is then 
immediately present. That is, dreams become true, they become present in the real, 
which results in the incapability to maintain a sufficient distinction between reality and 
illusion: in a hallucination someone immediately perceives what he imagines. For Lacan 
a real hallucinatory satisfaction of desire is therefore destructive. It is a radical way of 
escaping the external limitations that the reality principle imposes. It is not a safe haven 
where the subject can continue to experience the pleasures that reality made it give up, 
but it radically rejects reality. Therefore pleasure can exceed into total enjoyment. 
 The third form of enjoyment is the surplus-enjoyment. Actually, this is the ‘first’ 
form of enjoyment, for enjoyment is introduced first of all as surplus-enjoyment (cf. 
S.17, 56). Lacan modeled his notion of surplus enjoyment after the Marxian notion of 
surplus value (cf. Žižek, 1992, 171; Fink, 1999, 96). In a capitalist system of production 
the workman looses the enjoyment, the ‘fruit’ of his labor: this goes to the capitalist (for 
reinvestments). Similarly, man as subjected to the law – that assigns him a limited 
position - looses enjoyment. Alienation – the subjection to the chain – causes a 
separation of what is most valuable to us. However, according to Lacan the subject can 
regain some elements of this lost enjoyment after the recognition of the law. This occurs 
not via the neurotic or the transgressive path, but via what one is tempted to call the 
‘normal’ path. That is, via fantasy. For it is fantasy that organizes the forms of surplus
enjoyment
27
 Let me notice here that enjoyment consequently is a crucial notion for ‘the virtualization of feelings’. 
There are not simply natural feelings. In the way I elaborate the notion of enjoyment now, feelings are 
conditioned by enjoyment as a frame of mind. 
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 Psychologist and system-analyst Raymond Barglow brings forward that 
mechanical technologies seem to correspond to the logic of what we would call phallic 
enjoyment, wherein the subject finds it enjoyment in a further strengthening of its 
singularity and (pretended) autonomy (and therefore in a repression of his limitations). 
Mechanical technologies, such as driving a car and using hand tools, turn around the 
notions of an autonomous individual and human agency. They suppose an instrumental 
use of technologies wherein man is an autonomous agency who uses the technologies 
according to his plans. However, information technologies operate on a much 'trickier' 
level, where the roles might be turned around: those technologies involve us to such a 
degree that they challenge the boundaries of the rational self. That is, the computer may 
appear as an other, or as an extension of myself that I - as a rational subject - cannot 
clearly control because my machine and I are so closely tied together. As such they 
provide a form of hallucinatory enjoyment, wherein the rules of 'normal reality' are 
sidelined. From a psychoanalytical perspective one can make the distinction between 
technologies as a pre-Oedipal or as an Oedipal object. "The difference between our 
interactions with mechanical and with information technologies can be viewed 
psychoanalytically. The automobile is an exemplary Oedipal object, especially for men. 
It fulfills the classical male fantasy of penetration without entrapment: one hurtles 
through space to one's destination, but one can stop at any time one wants. Conversely, 
the rage experienced when one's trajectory is impeded expresses a kind of castration. 
The computer, on the other hand, tends to operate in the unconscious at a more 
fundamental level, as a pre-oedipal object related to its user as a mother is bonded to her 
child before its own boundaries and personal identity have been consolidated" 
(Barglow, 1994, 14). 
 Interestingly enough within a Lacanian theory of fantasy one does not have to 
think within this scheme of two opposites. The (technological) fantasy-object is not 
necessarily an object that individuated, Oedipal subjects erect as a phallus in order to 
show their potency, and that acts as a destructive force towards everything that does not 
comply with their will. Neither does it have to function as an object that engages the 
desiring subject's attention to such a large degree that he gets fully absorbed in it and 
loses contact with reality. The most interesting issue is to get sight of how fantasy-
objects already shape the awareness of reality. That is, how they unconsciously shape 
our experience of reality, without this 'formation' being necessarily a merely imaginary 
deviation. The 'third road' of fantasy as a necessary intermediary between so-called 
objective reality and subjective illusion will guide us in our consideration of the new 
technological formations of the object. 
Conclusion.
When one focuses on technologies from the perspective of desire – a perspective I have 
argued is legitimate but difficult – they 'work' beyond instrumentality. The technologies 
then appear as (psychical) media: as environments for us to live in, and in which we 
'enjoy ourselves'. The desire for 'transcendence' that is at work in technologies may find 
some sort of  (momentary) 'realization' when the medium succeeds in luring us and 
making us believe that we are dealing with 'the real thing'. Since Baudrillard's work 
considers this 'hallucinatory' aspect of the world of media and technologies, I found it 
worth mentioning in order to articulate a 'realization of fantasy' also evident in Lacanian 
psychoanalysis as a destructive terminal point of desire. Although Lacan and 
Baudrillard differ on whether desire can actually realize itself, and hence exterminate 
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itself in technological fantasy (which would imply a 'murder on the real' - as Baudrillard 
claims) I think Lacan also uses a concept of 'desire for simulation'. So, though I 
recognize the 'desire for simulation', I don't think we should jump to the conclusion too 
hastily that media fully realize this desire leading to a world of mere simulations. On the 
other hand, it would be wrong to think naively that media can transport us to the real 
(world). By discussing a selection of both classical lines of thought and major topics in 
Lacanian psychoanalysis, it becomes clear that we should not conceive of this double, 
parallel world of media - that we always live in - as the perfect 'mirror of nature'. The 
latest technological manifestation of this parallel world, cyberspace, should hence not 
be considered as a (present) space of information that we must get access to. Rather 
cyberspace should be conceived as a technological construction in the same realm of 
images and symbols with which man has always constructed reality. In order to 
understand media beyond the models of simulation and of 'access to the real', I 
introduced the model of fantasy. Fantasy is crucial for grasping, on the psychical level, 
this aspect of construction. In Lacanian psychoanalysis fantasy is a necessary 
intermediary between 'real presence' and human consciousness. I have shown this 
crucial functioning of fantasy by its affectivity of beauty. And by describing that fantasy 
is not first of all a matter of (neurotic) imaginary pleasure, or of (psychotic) 
hallucination. Fantasy is a 'necessary deviation': as beings of desire - cut in half by the 
word - we cannot avoid to seek fulfillment and organize (particular) forms of 
enjoyment. The law that structures reality, and the desire that animates reality go hand 
in hand. Objective reality is supplemented by a surplus. Only then reality has meaning, 
significance, sense for us. Technologies as the creation of human beings operate on this 
fantasmatic level when they try to create worlds for us to live in.   
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CHAPTER TWO. THE TECHNOLOGIZATION OF HUMAN VIRTUALITY 
Introduction.
When investigating virtual reality the concept "virtuality" naturally takes center stage. 
Therefore this chapter will examine its conception throughout the past, and then relate 
"virtuality" to the contemporary technologically-driven expressions of this concept 
which have excersized such a strong influence on its use. Reality and virtuality might 
well not be two conflicting domains. I draw a line from the analysis of Pierre Lévy, 
which shows profound philosophical insight and knowledge of state of the art 
technologies, to Lacan's work, trying in this way to show that his theories on language 
and law already contain a conception of virtuality. Where Lacan leaves off, I will try to 
go on and distinguish how technologies function as forces of virtualization. The 
computer is especially interesting as a force of virtualization, and I will try to describe 
how computer interfaces both continuate the virtualization of reality as well as giving it 
new forms. Whether computer virtuality is so revolutionary that it gives rise to 
dramatically new senses of the meaning of representation, and whether we can still even 
speak of representation in the modern sense of the word, is what I will address in the 
last part of this chapter. On the basis of the  semiotic theories which influenced Lacan 
so strongly this chapter will conclude by lining out a notion of mediation 
(mediatization) in which there is still place for the human subject, a notion that does 
justice (I hope) to the vast realm of influence of digital technologies. 
1. Introduction to the question of virtuality 
1.1 What is virtuality: historical overview 
A widely accepted conception of virtuality juxtaposes it to reality. This opposition leads 
us to the first meaning of the word ‘virtual’, where it is something that only seemingly 
exists.  It is "an image or space that is not real but appears to be", such as the space of 
the telephone or electronic money (Mirzoeff, 1999, 91). Besides this everyday meaning, 
the virtual has also an important philosophical meaning. Its technological meaning will 
be considered later on in the next subsection. 
 In order to illuminate the philosophical meaning of the word ‘virtual’ we note 
that it derives from the Latin virtus, which means power, efficiency. One can trace the 
word virtus in its turn back to vir: a man or manliness (as in virility) (cf. Porter, 1996, 9-
10). Thus one arrives at the notion of virtus in its more physical meaning, where it 
equates with health and sexual purity. In its moral meaning virtus relates to ‘virtue’ and 
indicates courage, excellence and virtuousness. Latin philosophical terminology 
includes the virtual in this sense of power; Greek philosophy did not know the notion of 
virtuality.  
 The philosophical application of "virtual" relates it to the relationship of cause
and effect. Thomas Aquinas introduces the notion of the virtual or ‘virtual implication 
or containment’ (‘virtualis continentia’), as a synonym of Aristotelian potentiality, 
indicating that the effect is already contained (‘present’) in the cause: the tree is already 
virtually present in the seed. In this classical notion, founded in the Aristotelian theory 
of potential and actual existence, the virtual stands for the potentiality of an essence. 
Duns Scotus extends this theory of virtual content, capacity or substance (‘essence’) 
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from the metaphysical to the epistemological domain by claiming that the conclusion is 
already present in the premises. So when it is true that machines have no feelings and I 
am a machine, than the conclusion that I have no feelings is already virtually present. In 
spite of the many controversies over this theory of virtual content, it persevered into the 
modern age when Leibniz brought a new edge to the position of Scotus with his theory 
that in all true sentences the subject contains the predicate either explicitly or virtually. 
 In the fourteenth century, Scholastic terminology introduces the noun virtualitas,
effectiveness, efficiency. In its Scholastic definition, "virtuality" acquired a meaning 
other than one would expect from its semantics. Among the scholastics the virtual 
acquires the meaning of a ‘virtual distinction’, a distinction as-if. What we cannot 
distinguish in reality should be seen as if it were distinguished (‘virtualiter’), just as a 
rider in the Tour de France can virtually wear the yellow jersey when during a race he is 
sufficiently far ahead of the leader, although in the real (actual moment) it is another 
that wears this jersey. Virtuality here acquires the meaning of fictionality. There is a 
second, fictional order wherein things are differently structured than in the order of 
things ‘as they really are’. Things are not solely what they seem: they have a 'virtual 
double'. 
 The classical notion of "virtuality" equates it to potentiality. Virtuality 
subsequently came to characterize man as a being still able, within certain boundaries, 
to realize his potencies. Charles Sanders Peirce strongly criticizes this confusion of the 
virtual and the potential. He associates the virtual with a difference of orders. It is not 
something of the same order as the potential, which has - being the potential - merely 
not realized itself yet. When all being is like the potential being of the tree in the seed, 
everything has the same nature. He defines the virtual as follows: “A virtual X (where X 
is a common noun) is something, not an X, which has the efficiency (virtus) of an X … 
This is the proper meaning of the word; but it has been seriously confounded with 
‘potential’, which is almost its contrary. For the potential X is of the nature of X, but is 
without actual efficiency” (Peirce, 1902, 763). Alterity hence seems to characterize the 
virtual. This bears a resemblance to the thinking of Gilles Deleuze, as formulated in 
Difference and Repetition. There Deleuze introduces a capital distinction between the 
possible and the virtual. The possible being is already constituted and static; it only 
lacks existence and must to that end realize itself. This realization, Deleuze says, is 
quite different from the actualization of the virtual, which is a creation, a ‘becoming-
other’ (cf. Lévy, 1998, 14). And as Deleuze states in his book Bergsonism: “the possible 
is a false notion, the source of false problems … Everything is already completely given:
all of the real in the image, in the pseudo-actuality of the possible” (quoted in 
Doel/Clarke, 1999, 280). So what Peirce and Deleuze teach us is that the multiple ways 
in which the virtual can actualize itself ('what man is depends on what becomes of him') 
differs profoundly from the teleological striving of the possible that wants to realize 
itself in a certain pre-determined manner ('the seed and the tree'). This notion of 
'heterogenesis' is also at the basis of Pierre Lévy's philosophy of virtualization which I 
will discuss in part two of this chapter.28
 Noteworthy is that the two meanings of the virtual, the common and the 
philosophical, are also present in the terminology of modern physics. After the decline 
28
 It should be noted that the 'Deleuzian' critique of the notion of the possible bears upon its 'classical', 
Aristotelian interpretation. However, one cannot equate the possible to this interpretation, as for instance 
the philosophy of Heidegger makes clear when it characterizes being-in-the-world by a possibility that 
cannot be reduced to some sort of unrealized essence. 
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of Aristotelian philosophy modern physics included the aforementioned notions of the 
virtual in its new theories. In optics the theory of the ‘virtual image' appears around 
1700. This is the (virtual) point where the beam of rays that an object radiates and 
which is refracted by an optical instrument seem to converge. It is the point in a 
Newton (mirror) telescope where one must position one's eye in order to see the object; 
it is the virtual image in the mirror. The optical theory of refraction also accounts for 
the fact that when one puts a stick halfway in the water, what one sees is the virtual 
image of the part of the stick in the water, and not its actual position. In mechanics the 
notions of virtual powers and virtual velocity appear around 1800. These powers or 
velocities are not actually present but have the potency of becoming real: they can be 
actualized (or realized). As the emphasis is on the possibility or potency of these 
powers for becoming active, we are still very much in the Aristotelian scheme. One can 
only call them virtual in the sense of Peirce when they are already efficient although 
not actually present.29
1.2. Computer virtual reality 
Nowadays we associate the notion of virtuality mostly with the virtual reality that 
computers generate. By calling this reality virtual, one usually refers to just one of the 
two basic meanings of "virtual", namely that something only seemingly exists; it is not 
‘real’. This was also the way in which the term was introduced in the terminology used 
to describe interactive computer systems. Theodore Nelson, who invented the term 
‘hypertext’ and is (one of) the first to apply the term virtuality to computers, described 
virtuality in 1980 as follows: 
“By the virtuality of a thing I mean the seeming of it, as distinct from its more 
concrete "reality," which may not be important ... I use the term "virtual" in its 
traditional sense, an opposite of "real". The reality of a movie includes how the 
scenery was painted and where the actors were repositioned between shots, but 
who cares? The virtuality of a movie is what seems to be in it.” (quoted in 
Rheingold, 1991, 177).  
The movie is not just virtual on account of the fact that it is not real, but more so 
because of the ‘reality-effects’ it creates, which makes us believe that the illusion is real. 
The more important meaning of virtuality is this capacity to cause effects; “the virtual is 
not imaginary. It produces effects” (Lévy, 1998, 30).  
 The example of the movie indicates at the same time that virtuality in ‘imaging-
technologies’ does not exclusively belong to the virtual reality of computers. Already 
the spectators of classical art felt themselves ‘transported out of reality’ and visiting a 
virtual reality. The development of the panorama (1792) marked the next step, wherein 
virtuality moved from the mental space into virtual architecture (Mirzoeff, 1999, 93). 
With the stereoscope, a device that contains two photographs that must be held up to the 
eyes to produce an effect of three-dimensionality, the possibility of such virtual visits to 
29
 Benthams design of the Panopticum (1791) as a model prison in which all prisoners in a ring of cells 
could be supervised from a central control tower would be the dark manifestation of Peirce’s notion of 
virtuality (or : it makes the virtual perspective into an element of social control). Although the guard is 
not (necessarily) present in his observation post, the possibility that he can observe the prisoners already 
causes an effect on their behaviour. This once again illustrates the crucial importance of the notions of 
cause and effect in the investigation of virtual reality. 
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other places became available to a broader public. This stereoscopic virtual reality 
received comments that show a remarkable resemblance to the way one speaks 
nowadays about the virtual reality of computers. The American critic Oliver Wendell 
described his experience as “a dream-like exaltation in which we seem to leave the body 
behind us and sail away into one strange scene after another, like disembodied spirits” 
(quoted in Mirzoeff, 1999, 94). Through its introduction of the moving interface, the 
cinema marks another important stage in man’s desire and ability to interface with 
virtual reality.
 Interfacing with virtual reality by means of the computer distinguishes itself in 
two important ways from previous notions of virtuality. This goes especially for 
immersive Virtual Reality (VR): sensorimotor interaction with a computer model via a 
head-tracked head mounted display that gives the user a compelling sensation of 
actually 'being there' (presence) in the virtual world. With the computer there is for the 
first time an interactive version of virtuality.30 Because the interface is interactive, man 
is not solely a passive spectator, but he can actively intervene, or navigate, in the 
representations that the computer generates. The user can change for instance the point 
of view from which the information becomes visible, or alter the conditions of the 
virtual world he is in. This interactivity that results from sensorimotor feedback creates 
a sensation not found in media like film or television and give the users a specific 
awareness of their bodies, for their head movements alter what they see (Biocca, 1997, 
§ 5.3). Sandy Stone also considers interaction as the modality that distinguishes the 
computer from the cinematic mode of engagement (film, theater): "Interaction is the 
physical concretization of a desire to escape the flatness and merge into the created 
system. It is the sense in which the "spectator" is more than a participant, but becomes 
both participant in and creator of the simulation" (Stone, 2001, 192).  
The second feature of computer generated virtual reality is its already mentioned 
immersive character. Via the use of stereo glasses and data gloves the user has the 
physical sensation of being immersed in a computer-generated reality. A direct 
projection of the images on the retina is currently the most advanced version. There are 
also technologies that use helmets (Head Mounted Display), or that project the images 
on screens that surround the user (CAVE). In any case, the goal of the interface-design 
is the experience of three-dimensionality, of being in another world that completely 
surrounds us.
 Of course it achieves those effects in different degrees, dependent on the 
technology and how this makes the materiality of the interface disappear. Immersive 
Virtual Reality achieves the strongest effects of virtuality. But the two-dimensional 
screen of the personal computer can also lead to a sense of immersive virtual reality. In 
a virtual world such as World3D the user's avatar enters a virtual world inhabited by 
others, and hence experiences a sense of entrance or insertion in another world. A 
general characteristic of virtual worlds is that the tools for communication, search and 
retrieval are present in a continuous space. So computer virtual reality (virtual reality in 
the weakest sense) refers to all software objects, such as computer programs and 
databases, and their contents. The virtual reality experience then results from the 
30
 Outside of this focus on immersive VR, one generally distinguishes between two forms of interactivity. 
Interactivity in a human-human relationship, and that in a human-data relationship. Interaction can thus 
consist of communication with other users, manipulation of digital objects, and navigation through a 
digital space of information (cf. Simons, 2002, 79). 
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ongoing interaction with a program or a model that results in the automatically 
generating of ‘texts’, messages and all sorts of images (cf. Lévy, 2001, 54-55). 
1.3. The real and the virtual in digital technologies: four models 
In their article on virtuality Marcus Doel and David Clarke describe the four major 
conceptions of virtuality in its contemporary technology-driven version. The first 
version of virtual reality, simulation, considers the virtual as a copy, as nothing more 
than a pale imitation of the real. The correspondence theory of representation that 
guides this discourse (a representation is only true when it corresponds to extra-mental 
facts) posits the real as something original that is self-identical. Here the virtual is a 
dangerous supplement, as the image is in Plato’s philosophy. The second version of 
virtual reality, suppletion, falls victim to the same discourse of approximation, although 
it is an inversion of it. Here it is the real that is impartial, lacking, and imperfect. The 
virtual can supplete this real. The virtual relates to the real as the perfect does to the 
imperfect; it can correct the defects in the real. Doel and Clarke name the third version 
seduction, or s(ed)uction, and this “fetishised ideal of the virtual would amount to living 
in the (tele)presence of a full realization of the worlds possibilities” (Doel/Clarke, 1999, 
274). It leads to a total annihilation of semblances. They introduce this with a nice 
quotation from Baudrillard. The technicians from IBM take over the task of transcribing 
the nine billion names of God from a community of Tibetan monks: their computer can 
do in a few months the job that according to the monks' beliefs achieves the purpose of 
the world and will end it. In this version of the relation between the real and the virtual, 
the real is ‘a real drag’ that should be left behind. The fourth version of virtual reality, 
which the authors adhere to themselves, revolves around the notion of the simulacrum
as elaborated by Deleuze and Guattari. The authors' main thrust is to show that this 
notion evades the mistake of confusing the virtual with the possible made in the 
discourses of hyperrealization (the first two versions) and ex-termination (the third). 
The question of virtuality, they hold - and this is the same argument discussed in the 
treatment of Peirce and Deleuze - is about actualization and not about realization (of 
possibilities). The simulacrum expresses exactly this idea of a creation of new events 
out of the heterogeneous play of forces composing the virtual.   
 Doel and Clarke sketch the field in which one, as a philosopher, must find a 
position.
2. Virtualization: from Lévy to Lacan 
2.1. Characteristics of virtualization 
Pierre Lévy concludes his analysis of virtuality by putting it on a par with 
desubstantialization. He summarizes his views as follows: 
“Virtualization, or the transition to a problematic, in no way implies a 
disappearance in illusion or dematerialization. Rather, it should be understood as 
a form of  “desubstantialization” … This desubstantialization is broken into a 
related series of changes: deterritorialization, the Moebius effect – which 
organizes the endless loop of interior and exterior – the sharing of private 
elements, and the subjective integration of public items … Subjectivation is the 
implication of technological, semiotic, and social means in the individual’s 
37
psychic and somatic functions. Objectivation will be defined as the mutual 
implication of subjective acts in the process of constructing a shared world. 
Subjectivation and Objectivation are therefore two complementary aspects of 
virtualization. In fact, in terms of what they do, neither subject nor object are 
substances but fluctuating nodes of events that mutually interface with and 
envelop one another” (Lévy, 1998, 169). 
This very brief description needs some explanation. First of all we make note of the 
proposal contained in Lévy’s analysis to go against the tide of philosophical tradition 
which always focused on the passage from the possible to the real, or from the virtual to 
the actual (cf. Levy, 1998, 16-17): the model of  'realizing our possibilities' and of (the 
humanistic ideal of) self-actualization etc. Lévy tries to analyze the inverse 
transformation, that is to say the ‘becoming virtual’. This is not something that, as 
common understanding would have it, occurs only by way of digital technologies. As 
will be shown further on, it belongs to the process of ‘becoming human’ itself. Lévy 
understands this virtualization as a “transition to a problematic”. Hereby an object - or 
the human self - loses its fixed identity and is transposed to a virtual field of (opposing) 
tendencies and forces within which it can manifest itself in several, different 
actualizations. Similarly a virtualized text, a constructive hypertext, loses its fixed 
character and steady authorship and may therefore appear in several new forms 
(Michael Joyce distinguishes the constructive hypertext that allows the 'reader' to 
become a 'writer', from the explorative hypertext that merely enlarges the user's 
navigational space, cf. De Mul, 2002, 119). For the human being in general goes that it 
can manifest itself differently in different circumstances. Lévy’s Deleuzian inspiration 
resides in this focus on the creative process of  ‘becoming other’ or heterogenesis which 
is enabled by virtualization. 
 Lévy’s study stresses, in its philosophical-anthropological dimension, that 
virtualization and humanization are concurrent processes. His reflections teach us that a 
dimension of virtuality always permeated man's reality. This is nothing other than 
saying that ‘desubstantialization’ characterizes man’s reality. Lévy divides this 
‘desubstantialization’ into several categories. First there is the process of 
deterritorialization as a detachment of the here and now. He describes this process by 
referring to the work of one of his predecessors in the description of the virtual, Michel 
Serres, who in his book Atlas pictures the virtual as a process of leaving the ‘there': 
“Imagination, memory, knowledge, and religion are the vectors of virtualization that 
have enabled us to leave this “there” long before the appearance of computerization and 
digital networks” (Lévy, 1998, 28). 
 With his reference to the Moebius effect Lévy emphasizes that a category such 
as virtualization impedes us in thinking in schemes of simple oppositions. For the 
Moebius strip, which can be formed by twisting a long rectangle of paper and joining its 
ends together, is a figure in which one cannot distinguish between the inside and the 
outside: they are continuous. Considering virtualization as a constitutive function of 
human reality there is no clear division between inside and outside, between self and 
other ('no clear distinction of body and mind'): we incorporate texts written by others 
(we subjectify them), we externalize our inner body by medical imaging technologies 
(we objectify our body) … Similarly, virtualization rejects a chasm between an event 
and the messages about it. For example one cannot separate an election from the 
information that press agencies distribute about it: “The messages that virtualize the 
38
event are at the same time its prolongation; they participate in its accomplishment, its 
incomplete determination. They become a part of it” (Lévy, 1998, 74). Reality 
inevitably contains a fictional element.  
 Lévy’s notion of virtualization as the foundational process of community 
(communality, communion, collectivity) is in accord with the Moebius effect as a 
process that entwines the interior and the exterior (an effect, anyway, already 
extensively analyzed by Hegel). Virtualization connects ('interfaces') the private and the 
public. “The transition from private to public and the reciprocal transformation from 
interior to exterior are attributes of virtualization that can also be analyzed from the 
point of view of the semiotic operator” (Lévy, 1998, 93).31 Virtualization is a process 
through which we come to share a reality –  a reality that is constituted in its basic 
structure, as Lévy also indicates, by an externalization of the personal and an 
internalization of the social. By verbalizing an emotion we ‘bring it out’ and share it 
with others, and merely by listening to music, looking at a painting or reading a poem 
we personalize a public item (cf. Lévy, 1998, 93); “the construction of a society takes 
place through a process of virtualization” (Lévy, 1998, 98).32
 Most interesting is what Lévy discerns as the ultimate goal of virtualization, its 
‘engine’, namely the effort to escape death and decay. “In general, virtualization is a 
war against fragility, pain, wear. In search of safety and control, we pursue the virtual 
because it leads us towards ontological regions that ordinary dangers never reach” 
(Lévy, 1998, 99). Although we do not necessarily always win this 'war against fragility', 
distancing oneself from the anxiety provoking real seems to be the 'fundamental 
inspiration' of the imagination that underlies virtualization.33
2.2. Forces of virtualization: language, ‘law’, and technology 
The pursuit of the virtual, which at the same time constitutes humanity itself, takes 
place in three ways. It is no surprise that Lévy associates the first mode with man’s use 
of signs: “Human language virtualizes real time, material objects, actual events, and 
ongoing situations” (Lévy, 1998, 93). In language we exist: we are detached from the 
real ‘here’ and the real ‘now’. Language opens up an ecstatic time, a past and a future 
wherein we live: “Through their vital connection, the inherited, remembered, and 
reinterpreted past, the active present, and the hoped-for, feared, or simply imagined 
future are psychic, existential” (Lévy, 1998, 92). The virtualization of real time is the 
31
 The prime moderator of virtualization is language itself. Lévy develops this notion towards his theory 
of collective intelligence, “a fully distributed intelligence that is continuously enhanced and synergized in 
real time” (Lévy, 1998, 122). I will leave for what it is this theory of the congruence of thought and 
psychic life with society, and merely use the basic ideas of  subjectivation of the social and objectivation 
of the individual. I do not consider Lévy's thoughts on collective intelligence his most interesting work. 
Lévy is at his best, I think, in the solid philosophical work on virtualization, as brought forward in his 
Becoming Virtual.
32
 With this aspect of virtualization we are at the level of the conditions of possibility of cyberspace as a 
sphere of community (and it is this - Kantian - level of fantasy as a condition of experience that I want to 
describe): how it is possible that the ('illusory') world of online communication can create the real effect 
of communality. 
33
 Gilbert Durand concludes in his grand work on the role of the imaginary in human existence: "[I]t is 
obvious that the inventory of the imaginary, from the great sacred myths to the purely aesthetic emotions, 
is completely oriented by its fundamental inspiration: to escape death and the vicissitudes of time … The 
struggle against decay, the exorcism of death and temporal decomposition: such is, in our view, the 
euphemising function of the imagination as a whole" (Durand, 1999, 391). 
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condition for remembering, telling stories, imagining, simulating etc: ways by which we 
can travel to other worlds.  
 Lévy typifies the second form of virtualization as a ‘virtualization of violence’. 
“Ritual, religion, morality, law, economic and political regulations are social 
mechanisms for virtualizing relations of force, immediate impulses, instincts, desires” 
(Lévy, 1998, 97). All those 'rules' are about the detachment from a direct relationship or 
a particular situation. The law holds for anyone, independent of their personal situation; 
just as marriage regulates the relationship between man and woman in general. “The 
virtualization of relationships and immediate impulses, while it stabilizes behavior and 
identity, also determines specific procedures for transforming our relationships and 
personal status” (Lévy, 1998, 98). Virtualization functions as a mediation that 
transforms man’s identity.34
The third process of virtualization is that of technology. The general 
understanding of technology – reduced here to the production of tools by Levy – 
considers tools as an extension of the body: the hammer as an extension of the arm etc. 
Lévy does not follow Marshall McLuhan’s understanding of technology as an extension 
of the body. “A wheel is obviously not an extension of our leg but a virtualization of 
walking” (Lévy, 1998, 95). He emphasizes the moment of the virtualization of action in 
technology. A hammer is a virtualization of the action of striking and, following his 
Deleuzian inspiration, this virtualization is actualized every time a hammer is used. 
“The tool and the permanence of its form are the memory of the original moment of 
virtualization of the actual body. The tool crystallizes the virtual. Technology virtualizes 
not only bodies and actions, but things as well” (Lévy, 1998, 96). This actualization of 
the virtual can take place in different forms: I can use a hammer to demolish, to build, to 
kill … By conceiving technology as a process that virtualizes the original object or 
action in a materialized way (writing virtualizes remembering, the wing of an airplane 
virtualizes flying), and that can be actualized in new forms, Lévy places technology in 
the philosophy of heterogenesis which in his opinion characterizes humanity itself.  
2.3. Language: the virtualization of the real 
After Lévy's sharp insights for understanding the virtual, I will now switch over to a 
Lacanian understanding of virtualization. In Lacanian terms, the mediation of language 
is what opens us to the ‘space and time of the Other’. The notion of language as the 
symbolic Other originates in the simple premise of Lacanian theory that man as a 
subject of language constitutes himself in an intersubjective relationship: the word 
addresses itself always to the other. “The Other is, therefore, the locus in which is 
constituted the I who speaks to him who hears, that which is said by the one being 
already the reply, the other deciding to hear it whether the one has or has not spoken” 
(Ec., 141). In a more general sense the Other is not merely the other person to whom 
one speaks but the order of symbols in which speech literally takes place: the Other is 
the locus of speech. This Other place is also the foundation of (fictional) truth. Lacan 
34 In order to anticipate the Lacanian version of the virtualization by means of language and the 'law', I 
give an example. When someone receives his (Holy) Communion his identity is transformed into a 
communal form. This form does not (imaginary) reflect the 'real form' of his identity, but constructs it 
symbolically. 
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considers “what I call the capital Other (le grand Autre), the locus of speech and, 
actually, the locus of truth” (S.11, 129; translation changed).35
The symbolic Other - for instance in the realm of language - is a domain in 
which a symbol functions within a network of interconnected signifiers. A symbol, 
unlike an image, does not represent an established meaning but gets its meaning from 
the relations to other signifiers in the symbolic order (cf. appendix; Zwart, 1998, 108). 
For the meaning of a symbol the presence or absence of elements is of decisive 
importance: an additional smaller bar on the standard version of the Christian cross 
produces a symbol (an orthodox cross) distinct from the cross with only one bar 
(catholic). Similarly, scientific symbolizations also work with this system of presence 
and absence: A+, B-, etc for the representation of blood types, the codes of DNA … 
(Zwart, 1998, 110-111). The symbolic 'dissects' reality by reducing it to all sorts of 
basic elements (signifiers) that function as a language of their own (the mathematical 
language of nature, the language of DNA, the language of the unconscious …). By way 
of such 'languages' symbolic systems structure the real rather than reflecting the real, as 
images pretend to do with their mimetic forms of representation. 
The dimension of the Other is the scene in which real events inscribe 
themselves, thus virtualizing the real. This allows, for instance, for the possibility of 
lying (pretending), and of (unintended) 'subversion'. When I write an email to a friend 
that mentions both the words 'Bush' and 'dead' in no direct relation to each other (for 
example, I said that I do not agree with the policies of Bush, and later on describe that 
my cat is dead), those two words might be connected by the computers of the National 
Security Agency checking my emails, and interpreted as a hint for a terrorist attack. The 
words are inscribed in 'another scene' of a big Other (that is in this case very much 
focused on everything with the connotation of terrorism36). This illustrates the general 
idea that the significance of the ‘original material’ must be sought in its relationship to 
the Other. I mention again the example of deterritorialization that Lévy uses to illustrate 
virtualization as desubstantialization. One cannot conceive the meaning of an election 
by referring to the event that took place at a particular place and time, for its meaning 
constitutes itself in the information about it that influences all sorts of systems outside 
of its actual location: stock markets, diplomacy etc.  “The message about the event is 
also and indissolubly a sequence in the unfolding of the event … Events and 
information about events exchange their identities and functions at each stage of the 
dialectic of signifying processes “ (Lévy, 1998, 74-75). It is this structure that Lacan has 
in mind with his theory that the ‘original event’ is already ‘decentered’, as it is 
inseparable from the information about it. The ‘information’ about the event necessarily 
35
 In french it says: “le grand Aute, le lieu de la parole, virtuellement le lieu de la vérité”. In the English 
version ‘virtuellement’ is translated as ‘potentially’, d.i. in its second meaning of ‘virtuality’. The French 
adverb ‘virtuellement’ does however have a meaning that differs from the two meanings of the virtual, 
namely:  'actually', 'practically spoken'. So the big Other is not an order that has the potency to ground 
truth, but can actually be considered to do so, it is ‘as good as’ a foundation of truth. See Ɯcrits p. 454, 
where Lacan says that the big Other is nothing but the guarantor of Good Faith. Even though we lie, the 
Other may assume it as true. This is exemplary for the way wherein according to Lacan the Other twists 
our ‘inwardness’ (in this case: our real intention) and constitutes truth. To put it in the words of Žižek 
(who, for his part, quotes the X Files motto): ‘the truth is out there’. "The Unconscious is outside, not 
hidden in any unfathomable depths" (Žižek, 1997, 3). 
36
 The paranoid reaction of the U.S. government on a work of art of Steve Kurtz of the Critical Art 
Ensemble that it considers as a terorrist activity, is of course a perfect illustration of this. 
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takes the event into another place; the place of the ‘signifying process’ that Lacan calls 
the locus of the Other.
The present day 'paranoid' big Other that is anxious of terrorism shows that the 
structure of the big Other can manifest itself in different symbolic systems (of law, 
language, culture …). The analyses in my 'ontology of virtualization' do not primarily 
concern all the differences between various symbolic systems, they explore the insight 
that there is always a mediation of the real. We always live in a reality that is structured 
as a fiction. The current narrative of terrorism (and of course all the other grand 
narratives: communism, liberalism, capitalism) illustrates this. So:  
“But it is clear that Speech begins only with the passage from ‘pretence’ to the 
order of the signifier, and that the signifier requires another locus – the locus of 
the Other, the Other witness, the witness Other than any of the partners – for the 
Speech that it supports to be capable of lying, that is to say, of presenting itself 
as Truth. Thus it is from somewhere other than the Reality that it concerns that 
Truth derives its guarantee: it is from Speech. Just as it is from Speech that 
Truth receives the mark that establishes it in a fictional structure” (Ec., 306).37
 When Lacan speaks of truth he always refers to the truth of desire. This truth is, 
contrary to the notion of truth as exactitude that the exact sciences aim at, related to 
metaphorical language: “it is with the appearance of language that the dimension of 
truth emerges” (Ec., 172). Because an original substitution by the signifier characterizes 
humanity, the ‘paradox of the truth’ is that there is only metaphorical truth. 
Metaphorical truth is what  "makes a hole in knowledge" (Bergoffen, 1995, 574), and 
because truth is essentially metaphorical we must also validate other (artistic) discourses 
than those of exactitude (Bergoffen, 1995). Signification is essentially metaphorical (S. 
14, 7&14-12, 1966). As long as we are in the order of meaningful language, we are in 
the order of substitution and the metaphor. The subject is therefore always already in the 
order of substitution that language introduces. This is Lacan's theory of primal 
repression. The subject of the signifier is virtual.38
37
 In his 'Le facteur de la vérité' (1980) Derrida diagnozes that Lacan uses a very orthodox distinction 
between reality and truth. And in his Positions (1972) he states that the crucial aspect of the Lacanian 
thought of the Écrits is the identification of truth (as disclosure of being) and the word (of the Logos) (p. 
115-117). The word reveals the truth of being. It would - as 'full speech' - lead to a true, authentic 
presence, and result in the exclusion of all sorts of simulations as unreal alienations. By contrast, I have 
sketched a story of Lacanian thought, wherein the focal point is the constitutive function of alienation. 
Nevertheless one must stress that it is especially in the later development of  Lacanian thought (with its 
focus on the process of separation beside that of alienation, and the centrality of the notion of jouissance)
that moves further away from a notion of 'full speech' as an 'authentic' disclosure of being. With this 
development towards the unrepresentable (real) core of reality Lacan's thought even gets closer to that of 
Derrida than one would assume at first sight (cf. Nusselder, 2003). Simulation is then certainly not a 
negative notion. 
38
 With his theory that considers thoughts as signs Peirce reaches a similar conclusion, as Peter Skagestad 
shows: “Peirce never denied the existence of consciousness, and he did not deny that we may have 
introspective knowledge of our conscious mental states, but he simply did not regard cognition as 
consisting of such conscious states. Cognition consists in the manipulation of signs which may be 
externally embodied; as each sign is what it is by virtue of its possible later interpretations - i.e. virtually - 
so the mind itself is virtual. As Peirce put it in one of his classic 1868 articles in the Journal of 
Speculative Philosophy:  “Finally, no present actual thought (which is a mere feeling) has any meaning, 
any intellectual value; for this lies not in what is actually thought, but in what this thought may be 
connected with in representation by subsequent thoughts; so that the meaning of a thought is altogether 
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2.3.1. The retroaction of 'real time' 
Through the inscription of ‘events’ in the locus of the Other they acquire a sigificance 
that the subject does not know and cannot foresee. An artist being a terrorist (see note 
8): this shows once more that the unconscious as a symbolic structure is 'out there'; it 
ex-sists - as Lacan says in his Télévision - only in a discourse (Lacan, 1973, 26). It is for 
that reason that the locus of the Other is Lacan’s translation of the Freudian notion of 
the unconscious as ‘another scene’. The Other is also the place that installs the ecstatic 
dimensions of time: past, present and future. Tying in with Lévy’s description of the 
virtualization of ‘real time’, language thus opens up a field of future possibilities. By 
linguistic articulation it functions as a medium that can make events from the past re-
appear; it is a sort of virtual memory of the past. Lacan however develops a notion of 
time that tries to do away with the view of time as a linear development. Like the future, 
the past is characterized by openness. It is the virtual subject of language (the 'subject of 
the signifier') that ‘determines’ how the past re-appears. The 'subject of the signifier' 
(re)structures the real (of the past). Lacan’s exposition of the notion of temporality 
comes down to the idea that who someone was in the past depends on how he conceives 
of himself in the light of present experiences and future possibilities (and there is 
therefore no 'real past'). A separation from a lover may thus change from a painful loss 
into a liberation. It is all about the way that someone currently assumes, or structures by 
means of speech, his anterior states in the light of the future: “History is not the past. 
History is the past in sofar as it is historcised in the present” (S.1, 12).39
 This notion of 'historization' or restructuring makes the psychological symptom 
a ‘trace’ which acquires its content or its meaning only in the future; in the ‘second 
time’, the time of its articulation. With this notion of retroaction (‘après coup’) Lacan 
translates Freud’s notion of the ‘Nachträglichkeit’ of the symptom. For Freud it is not 
the event itself that is traumatic, but its conscious reception, or recording, in the psychic 
system. Also in his theory of dreams he stresses the importance of this ‘secondary time’. 
The secondary elaboration restructures the ‘original’ and heterogeneous dream elements 
(preconscious day remnants, unconscious material).40 For there is an intellectual system 
in us that demands unity, coherence and clarity and thus restructures incomprehensible 
material into a new ‘meaning’. It is only to the (fictive) truth of this restructured 
material that we have access. Or, as Derrida points out in his reading of Freud, when 
something virtual. ... At no instant in my state of mind is there cognition or representation, but in the 
relation of my states of mind at different instants there is”. In a letter to the editor, William T. Harris, 
Peirce elaborated: “I do not say that we are ignorant of our states of mind. What I say is that the mind is 
virtual, not in a series of moments, not capable of existing except in a space of time - nothing in so far as 
it is at any one moment.” (Peter Skagestad, ‘Peirce, Virtuality, and Semiotics’, 
http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Cogn/CognSkag.htm)
39
 Cf. for this topic Lacan’s  pivotal ‘Discours de Rome’ (1953): ‘The Function and Field of Speech and 
Language in Psychoanalysis’ (Ec., 30-113). Also in The Language of the Self. The Function of Language 
in Psychoanalysis. Translated with notes and commentary by Anthony Wilden (Baltimore/London: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1968).  
40
 “The secondary elaboration is an a posteriori reworking which takes place in the successive 
transformations which we impose on the story of the dream once we are awake. This consists essentially 
in restoring a minimum of order and coherence to the raw material handed over by the unconscious 
mechanism of displacement, condensation and symbolism, and in imposing on this heterogeneous 
assortment a façade, a scenario, which gives it relative coherence and continuity” (Laplanche & Pontalis, 
1986, 21). 
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there is no origin (of meaning, memory, subjectivity), the repetition of the 'origin' itself 
is original.41
2.4. 'Law': the virtualization of ‘natural forces’ 
Representing reality in all sorts of discursive structures, we are necessarily 'subjected' to 
the laws that govern these discourses. Games may illustrate this. When I play a game, 
that is to say when I represent myself as a certain player of a game, I am inescapably 
submitted to the rules that determine how the game should be played: how one should 
interact etc. Lacan considers reality, in its most fundamental form, to also be a 'game' 
(shown by his saying that the principle of reality is the principle of collective fantasy). 
Language composes the fabric of its general discourse. Therefore the law that organizes 
language is basic: the law of the signifier. "The law is the set of universal principles 
which makes social existence possible, the structures that govern all forms of social 
exchange" (Evans, 1996, 98). Those principles that organize the human world precede 
the individual and determine the relationships between people; they make them 
independent of the “fluctuation in the relations of force” (Lévy, 1998, 97). Therefore the 
law corresponds to Lévy’s notion of the contract as a virtualization of violence: it 
virtualizes ‘brute reality’.  
The unconscious as the field of the Other ‘re-shapes’ nature by means of 
structures that Lacan cannot but help formulate in terms of the laws of the signifier.  
“Before any experience, before any individual deduction, even before those 
collective experiences that may be related only to social needs are inscribed in it, 
something organizes this field, inscribes its initial lines of force … Before 
strictly human relations are established, certain relations have already been 
determined. They are taken from whatever nature may offer as supports, 
supports that are arranged in themes of opposition. Nature provides – I must use 
the word – signifiers, and these signifiers organize human relations in a creative 
way, providing them with structures and shaping them” (S.11, 20).  
The relation to the Other, or the symbolic order, causes an entwining of Inside and 
Outside.  
As man interiorizes the law as his ego-ideal (the ideals, values etc of his 
environment, of significant others, that the individual identifies with), the social Outside 
inevitably becomes part of the subject’s Inside world. With regards to the question of 
fantasy this means that the Inside (the fantasmatic images supposedly belonging to our 
most intimate self) inevitably consists of elements that come from the Outside. 
Furthermore, when we want to express our deepest fantasies, we necessarily place them 
in a signifying chain that 'annihilates' their 'original meaning'. When we want to access 
our fantasies, we cannot avoid 'deconstructing' them: the law (of the signifier) is an 
inevitable moderator. Lacan's analyses of the unconscious fantasy contains the crucial 
41
 McQuire uses this theory to understand the current breakdown of traditional oppositions 
(subjective/objective; interiority of living memory/exteriority of artificial memory) in technological forms 
of registration and memory (the 'camera model'): '[R]emembering' something involves less the repetition 
of a stable past than the reinscription of the putative origin. The Freudian logic of the 'deferred effect' 
suggests that each repetition must be its own origin, but, instead of happening just once, the origin is itself 
a weave of differences which inceasantly point elsewhere. From this perspective, memory would name 
the enigmatic event of originary repetition: a repetition which - if only by dint of repeating - differs from 
what it repeats" (McQuire, 1998, 172). 
44
notion that fantasy is unconscious because it concerns "an image set to work in the 
signifying structure". 
 The constitutive role of the relation to the Other preempts all conceptions of the 
unconscious as merely a ‘dark inside’ of the subject. Therefore its representation as a 
cellar, or even as a cave by way of allusion to Plato, is not a good comparison (S.11, 
187). The unconscious straddles the interface of the Inside and the Outside, where the 
particular and the general or the individual and the social meet. As we have seen, this 
interfacing is of crucial importance for virtualization according to Lévy. 
“the unconscious, which I represent to you as that which is inside the subject, 
but which can be realized only outside, that is to say, in that locus of the Other in 
which alone it may assume its status” (S.11, 147). 
For Lacan the unconscious is nothing without the word: it must come into existence by 
means of its articulation. The subject must come into existence at the locus of the Other; 
a possible Lacanian translation of Freud’s adage that where the unconscious Id was, the 
I must become (‘Wo Es war, soll Ich werden’). In stressing the word ‘must’ it becomes 
clear that in Lacanian theory the subject necessarily has to externalize itself.  
3. Interface technologies and the virtualization of the real 
3.1. Technological fiction: invocational media
Several authors stress the intricacy of (the mediation by) language and technological 
mediatization. De Kerckhove, for example, formulates it succinctly in his chapter on 
‘The Origins of Technology in Language’ (De Kerckhove, 1997, 21-35). His 
predecessor in Toronto, Marshall McLuhan, refers to such a philosophy of technology 
in the work of Henri Bergson: “It is the extension of man in speech that enables intellect 
to detach itself from the vastly wider reality. Without language, Bergson suggests, 
human intelligence would have remained totally involved in the objects of its attention 
… Bergson argues in Creative Evolution that even consciousness is an extension of man 
that dims the bliss of union in the collective unconscious” (McLuhan, 1994, 79). As an 
extension of man, language is the first technology in that it enables man to consciously 
grasp the world beyond the objects of his attention: language implies a mediation of the 
world. All sorts of technologies bring this expansion of man's possibilities in space and 
time even further (mediatization). So in general one can say that technology, just like 
language as the first technology, brings about ‘space-time distanciation’: it detaches us 
from the here and now. In his theory of mediatization John Thompson stresses this 
intricacy, as both kinds of media are about the transmission of symbolic forms (it is not 
very problematic for him to name this symbolic communication as his analysis concerns 
the modernity of mass communication, and not so much the ‘postmodernity’ of 
information technologies that put the symbolical - further - under pressure): “The 
transmission of a symbolic form necessarily involves the detachment, to some extent, of 
this form from the original context of its production: it is distanced from this context, 
both spatially and temporally, and inserted into new contexts which are located at 
different times and places” (Thompson, 1990, 13, cited in Crang et al, 1999, 10).42 This 
42
 Harold Innis was the first to systematically address the issue of how electronic media affect our 
perception of place and time, and with that, consciousness. His critical approach to the technological 
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is what Lévy considers to be virtualization. Virtual technologies are - more than 
previous media like photography or film that it 'remediates'- in a especially close 
connection to (spoken) language. For it not only opens up a world that we look at, but a 
world in which we can do something; virtual technologies contain performative 
environments.
Michelle Kendrick also brings forward that we always already inhabited a 
technological world, just as Lacanian theory states that we always already inhabit the 
world of language. Whereas Lacan states that there is no subject outside language, she 
states that there is no subject outside technology. She uses the term ‘technological real’ 
to indicate that “technology has always been an affective agent in subjectivity” 
(Kendrick, 1996, 144).43 Applying the notion of technology in a broad sense, she states 
“that subjectivity is always in the process of being reconstructed by the technologies – 
material and semiotic – which it purports merely to manipulate. In this respect, any 
subjectivity or identity – any sense of a pretechnological reality or a reality distinct from 
or prior to technological interventions – can only be imaginary” (Kendrick, 1996, 144). 
Because of the constitutive function of both linguistic mediation and technological 
mediatization (language as a technology, technology as a language), the notion of a self-
evident real outside those media, and separate from them, is a purely imaginary illusion. 
I will illustrate this virtualization by means of information technologies with a few 
examples. 
 "No one has ever seen a molecule". This quote heads an article about one of the 
Netherland's top scientists in molecular dynamics.44 Heinz Pagels in his book The 
Dream of Reason. The Computer and the Rise of the Sciences of Complexity (1988) 
expands this topic to all of the computational sciences. Why is it, he asks, that we make 
a model of reality and represent it as a myth, a metaphor or a scientific theory? Why 
does the mind reform its experiences in terms of symbols? According to Pagels a good 
simulation (a religious myth or a scientific theory) gives us the feeling of control over 
our experiences. With the appropriation (symbolic representation) comes the realization 
that we have denied the immediacy of reality (Pagels, 1988, 88). This 'immediacy of 
reality' (what I would call the real) is what we cannot grasp, or see (we cannot see 
atoms). It is, so to speak, what 'we have lost' (and the example of the atoms clarifies that 
- applied to the scientific enterprise - we have never possessed this ' immediate sight', 
although we try to simulate this immediacy).45
  We might recall here the earlier description of virtual environments as 
'objectified metaphors'. And Alexandre Leupin writes: "The technology of the Internet 
confirms Ferdinand de Saussure's discovery that language, taken on the level of 
signifiers, is only a series of relative and negative differentials, which can be written 
conquering of space and time, the way technology effects social control and causes economic and 
democratic inequalities, was succeeded by the work of his fellow Canadian Marshall McLuhan. His far 
less critical analysis claim that electronic media can ‘abolish space and time’ and make of the world a 
‘global village’. The British sociologists Anthony Giddens and John Thompson put more emphasis on 
social structures in their analysis of the intricacy of media and the perception of space and time.  
43
 In a Lacanian terminology this use of the notion ‘real’ is very disturbing. This intermingling of 
subjectivity and (language as) technology is exactly what Lacan calls reality.  
44
 Wilfred van Gunsteren (professor Informational Chemics, E.T.H. Zürich) in NRC Handelsblad, 17-11-
2001.
45
 According to Debra Bergoffen the West expresses its grief over the lost object of its passion for 
knowledge (the Thing: the void around which all the symbolizations circle) by priviliging the discourses 
of the sciences (Bergoffen, 1995, 576).  
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minimally as [0,1]: from the outset language was already digital". The computerized 
virtual world that those two basic elements can create is "a continual prolongation of 
what we have always termed cosmos, i.e. the linguistic fiction of our perceptions … In 
this way, the Internet does not constitute an epistemological break" (Leupin, 2000). 
Also Turkle's analysis that cyberspace can be a good medium for 'finding out who I am' 
considers cyberspace to be a virtual space wherein one can explore the real (me). She 
draws a parallel between online personae and the self that emerges in a psychoanalytic 
encounter: both are significantly virtual, either constructed within the space of analysis 
or in the virtual space of online role-playing communities (cf. Turkle, 1995, 256). In 
general, one can consider cyberspace as a realm of interconnected signifiers, as a reality 
made out of fiction. It is for instance a well-known fact that online communication 
(especially in Internet Relay Chat and Usenet-newsgroups) has its own rules and 
signifiers: (_)] -. In a more visual form the narrative structures that virtualize reality 
can be found in computer games and Virtual Worlds. So from a Lacanian perspective 
cyberspace is a realm whose 'truth' does not find its foundation in reality, but in the 
signifier. Truth has the structure of a fiction. "Cyberspace can be seen as an extension, 
some might say an inevitable extension, of our age-old capacity and need to dwell in 
fiction" (Benedikt, 1994, 6). So when one focuses on the fictitious structure of reality, 
that is to say on the fact that discourses, narratives etc (in general: signifiers) structure 
reality, than cyberspace seems to be nothing else than a realm of technologically 
produced fictions, that does not differ fundamentally from 'reality as we know it'.  
The matter with computers is that they objectify into a material form the 
representations, metaphors or symbolizations that have always mediated man's 
perception of reality. Computers do not just 'lead us away from reality into fictionality' 
(we are always already in a fictitious perspective towards the real); they may create new
and different (virtual) perspectives. As Pagels brings forward that the computational 
point of view of physical processes (the material world and the dynamic processes in it 
are considered to be computers) creates a new perspective that unifies science in a 
different way (Pagels, 1988, 45). In a Virtual Reality environment we can stand inside a 
molecule and observe it from the inside. With computers we can extend the calculability 
of natural laws that define the development of systems (the brain, the solar system, 
quantum particles …). In tele-presence systems we can look through 'distant eyes'.  
Since computers also present the real (the 'real me', the atoms) by means of 
signifiers, one may hold that, at a psychological level, computers contain an aspect of 
invocation or incantation. By their very technical structure computers create a world on 
the screen that mediates a 'pre-technological reality' (Kendrick), that I call the real. As 
such they 'put a spell' on the world. Therefore many researchers point at the 
resemblance between computers and magic (particularly Davis, 1993). They allow us to 
handle or manage a real world behind the screen that we otherwise could not deal with 
(because of its complexity, its non-existence, because it is heavily emotionally charged 
…). Because of this basic technical feature Chesher calls computers invocational media: 
"Computers are invocational media. Using a computer is related to speech more than to 
travel. Data are invoked by a command, a call or a click on an icon. 'Invocation' is a 
kind of speech act by which a supplicant calls to a greater power for immediate aid. 
Traditionally invocation involves magic or a deity, but it is a useful metaphor for how 
computers allow people to 'call up' data'" (Chesher, 83-84).  
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3.2. The digital revolution: from analogue to digital representations, from object to 
interface 
Since this study is focused on information technologies, the question arises whether the 
description of technology that I have given up to now also suits the situation in which 
technologies operate on information. For there is the pitfall that we might still consider 
technology to be a sort of tool that transforms nature. Information technologies, 
however, do not operate on (material) nature but on (‘immaterial’?) information, and 
might show that the usual conception of technology is too restrictive. At the very least, 
by this (postmodern) replacement of nature by information, it questions the modernist 
thinking (about technology) in terms of an univocal opposition of nature and culture. 
The confusion of the natural and the artificial brings us in ‘the postmodern condition’. 
We might even be said to be living in a ‘technological universe’ (Jacques Ellul) because 
of a thoroughgoing replacement of the natural by the technological. So, what is the 
importance of the fact that we are dealing with information technologies? This brings us 
to the (philosophical) question on the difference between analogue and digital 
representation. 
Shouldn't this be a question for engineers? That is to say, can't this difference be 
accounted for in a technical way? Not really. “The distinction between digital and 
analogue representation is philosophical before it is technical” (Chesher, 1997, 86). The 
difference is not fully explicable in a quantitative manner (e.g. I see reality better with 
my virtual reality goggles on), because it has a qualitative aspect (I see a different 
reality). The Kantian critique of naïve realism remains crucial today. As digitization 
highlights the issue that reality is not an objective given, our investigation comes to the 
matter of analyzing how reality consists of a framing of things and how technologies 
organize such windows on the world. 46
 Let me now give a simple example to illustrate the question of analogy. When I 
see a large mushroom cloud above a city (on television, on a drawing, through the 
screen of my cockpit, or on the screen of my computer: in all cases it appears on a 
'screen') not only do I know there was an explosion (there is a causal relation, it is an 
index as Peirce would say) but I also know that there has been a huge explosion. 
Analogue representations encode or represent their message in a proportional or 
continuous degree (cf. Lévy, 2001, 33). They are based on this proportionality between 
object and representation, matter and form, sender and receiver. In its technical 
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 The objects of cyberspace do not exist as such. They would not appear as they do without the element
of construction by the subject that interacts with them. They do not exist ‘in the real’. The real of the 
cyber-object is rather its code. Cyberspace is therefore conceivable in this dimension of a reality without 
‘real’ objects, by proceeding from Kantian philosophy in which it is the human subject that positions the 
(sensible) impressions of the objects in the dimensions of space and time (I will elaborate on the question 
of space in chapter three). In order to understand the 'real' objects we cannot simply address the 'things as 
they are', because we ourselves also constitute them. Because of this Kantian Copernican revolution a 
philosophical analysis of the digitized object consists in an analysis of the conditions of possibility of the 
appearance of the object. “[O]ne of the most significant consequences of Kant’s Copernican revolution is 
that ‘first-order talk about objects is replaced by second-order talk about the conception of an object, and 
the conditions of its conception (epistemic conditions). The meaning of ‘object’ is thus to be determined 
by an analysis of these conditions’” (Stern, 1990, 18). The so-called ‘Toronto school’ in media studies 
(McLuhan, Havelock, Ong, De Kerckhove, a.o.) analyzes the mode in which media determine our 
experience of reality in such a Kantian way. I will also use this transcendental approach which focuses 
less on concrete descriptions of specific cases than on the way we conceive of an object by means of the 
conditions of the techno-fantasmatic screen. Such a 'philosophical' analysis is less concerned with the 
content than the structure of appearance. 
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manifestations the analogue representation implies that the object that emanates the 
signal has the same, or similar, form as itself. “An analogue code represents what it 
signifies by establishing a relationship of parallel degree … The signal is analogous to 
what it is representing … Where analogue involves a conversion of form, digital always 
involves encoding and decoding “ (Chesher, 1997, 86). An example of an analogue 
‘conversion of form’ is the vinyl record. Its structure is similar to the structure of the 
sound volume it generates: the deeper the groove, the higher the volume. The analogue 
representation is thus characterized by a proportionality between the representation and 
that what it represents. And the analogue sign system uses continuous, and not 
separated, units (the analogue clock illustrates this: it represents time without intervals, 
unlike the digital clock). But this does not imply per se that they have a figurative 
resemblance with what they represent. For what would time look like? And a curve that 
represents someone's heartbeat naturally does not look like the beating of a heart 
 The first crucial characteristic of the ‘digital revolution’ is the analogue to digital 
conversion called digitization. It is a conversion of continuous data into a numerical 
representation. That is to say that all sorts of objects are encoded into the 'language' of 
zeros and ones that the digital information consists of. This 'language' has different units 
for different sorts of media. Images are encoded as pixels, sounds as voxels, texts as 
numbers and letters, graphical representations as polygons, and scripts or sets of 
algorithms are units of movements. 47  As the objects are thus transformed into the 
digital language of the computer, they become easily manipulable, they can be 
transported with the speed of light, and endlessly copied. The object that is supposed to 
be the unity behind the different actualizations that we see on the computer screen then 
becomes a purely virtual object. Although the actualizations do approach to a certain 
extent the encoded object, they are never identical to it. The encoded object loses its 
true form in representation. For what is supposed to be the right form of a 'package' of 
zeros and ones? The perceptible, or phenomenal, properties and characteristics as such 
are not present in the encoded object. The appearance of the object depends on the 
software of the user (do you use Internet Explorer or Netscape Navigator?), its 
configurations and the manipulations by the user. 
 Digital representation breaks with the principles of continuity, proportionality 
and similarity that characterize analogy. The similarity of form between object and 
representation is no longer the basis of its encoding, but a translation of the object into 
numbers that can be expressed in a binary language. This difference has “far-reaching 
consequences for our visual culture” (Mitchell, 1994, 4). The computer represents the 
objects as data that can appear in various forms; it substitutes every constant with a 
variable! (cf. Manovich, 2001, 43). Manovich designates variability as the crucial 
aspect of the new media object (Manovich, 2001, 36-45). Because the ‘digital 
revolution’ recasts all kinds of representational systems as digital information, there is a 
similarity at the level of binary coding. Since different media all have the same basic 
structure one can also speak of a  ‘multimedia revolution’ (cf. Lunenberg, 1999, xvi) 
  One must not forget that the digital object does have a previous history. Earlier 
the electronic object in media such as radio and television caused an important shift 
47
 Not many sorts of information(processing) resist such a transformation into digital information 
Scientists are even developing technologies for the digitization of the human mind: downloading it onto a 
computer. In addition to the fundamental questions this raises, there is still, because of the capabilities of 
computer memory, a technical limit to this undertaking that will not be overcome for at least a few 
decades. However, the promise of an outright digital mind is there.  
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from the material object to an electronic signal, which is only radicalized with the 
digital object. “In contrast to a material object, the electronic object is essentially 
mutable. This mutability of electronic media is just one step away from the “variability” 
of new media” (Manovich, 2001, 133). The present state of the new media object is 
‘liquid’; it does not have a fixed form or identity. Data can appear in different forms: 
just imagine what digital photography can do with the 'real' image. Digitization 
confronts us with the notion of a radical break with the principle of analogy as a 
‘conversion of form’, for the very reason of its breaking loose of the identity of form.
The images that I see on my computer screen, for instance, are not necessarily similar to 
the ‘real object’ because for the computer the ‘real’ consists of digital information that 
can be stored, mutated, controlled and accessed by the user at his will. Digital imagers, 
for example, accordingly “give meaning and value to computational ready-mades by 
appropriation, transformation, reprocessing, and recombination; we have entered the age 
of electrobricolage” (Mitchell, 1994, 7).  
Crucial is the notion that the object consists of data. And these data can appear 
in different forms, i.e. they can appear via a number of different interfaces. Therefore 
Manovich states: 
“A new media object can be defined as one or more interfaces to a multimedia 
database” (Manovich, 2001, 37). 
3.3. Digitization and the mind's schemes of representation  
I will indicate briefly how the process of digitization modifies the two basic coordinates 
of the mind's representation of reality: time and space. As Jeremy Rifkin states in his 
book Time Wars, the way in which we imagine, explain and use time mediates all our 
perceptions of ourselves and the world and is hence constitutive of our identity and the 
culture we live in (Rifkin, 1987, 1). Digitization of time can change the way we 
experience time, the way we relate to the past and to the future. Programming can 
determine in advance the sequence, duration and tempo of an event: automated 
machinery automatically instructs us how to make a product or when to deliver a 
service. Because human mediation (modification, error, caprice) dissolves there is a 
basically different design of time than with the schedule, the plan or the project, which 
are our 'traditional scheme's for our relation to the future (cf. Rifkin, 1987, 98). 
Programs also eliminate the user from his subjective experience of the past - which he 
usually takes as a source and guide (a 'scheme') for future actions - and make him rely 
more on data than on personal recollections (Rifkin, 1987, 100). Digitization of time 
therefore means a (further) removal from the object of our ‘natural’ or ‘immediate’ 
experience. This digitization of the time scale is typical of the changed relation towards 
the surrounding world that the computer causes. Whereas the clock, as an analogue 
representation of time, refers to the circular time defined by the earth's orbit, the digital 
time scale is no longer bound to such a circular reference. With the computer we are 
less bound to the space-time of our direct environment, as we can be virtually present in 
different time zones (me, a European, being at night virtually present in an Australian 
day). Time is less experienced as temporality with its (analogue) representations than as 
speed ('virtual immediacy'). 
With respect to space, cyberspace can actually bring a physical elsewhere in the 
physical presence of the user, and offer the user the possibility of actually moving and 
acting in that virtual elsewhere. This is what we call 'telepresence' (such as seeing 
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through the eyes of a robot48), which highlights the question of what is real and what is 
virtual (am I here - at the place where I sit, or am I there - at the place from which I 
see?). The example of telepresence, wherein cyberspace functions as a medium to let 
the user perceive in a different space, shows that digitization can radically cause a 
(further) discontinuity between man and his surrounding world, as well as between his 
body and his mind.49 What we call cyberspace is a 'realization' of this experience in a 
parallel space wherein the continuity with natural space has almost dissolved (we are 
not subjected to the laws of gravity, to our physical position, to physical distances …). 
In the case of web cams, for instance, digital technologies work to annul, undo (or, 
philosophically, negate?) the distances that separate the user from the place (resort, or 
home) where he wants to be. They virtualize those places, and transform them into 'non-
places' that are extracted from their geographical, historical, cultural and linguistic 
contexts (cf. Simons, 2002, 302). Therefore a standard fantasy imagines cyberspace as a 
space of surpassing (transcending) all the old limits.  
Then the major question is whether we must understand this as a breaking free 
from the confines of natural reality, as liberation. Will cyberspace finally realize our 
Gnostic desire for a departure of our earthly and bodily existence, that is so 
characteristic of all ‘technological dreams’ (cf. Romanyshyn, 1989, 20)?50 It seems that 
cyberspace leads to a 'time-space compression', wherein the schemes with which we 
organize reality (the physical space-time that we exist in) loose their firm grip on our 
experience of reality. Time and space seem to be dimensions of the world that we can 
compress by means of the computer: they loose their significance. Nevertheless, this 
may be only one side of the story. Cyberspace as a medium of 'immediacy' seems to 
transport us immediately to another space-time ("Hang on … teleporting", as this 
transportation is described and visualized in the virtual 'World3D' on the Internet). And 
it may give us the impression that all information is present in it, and can - or must be - 
withdrawable on demand, without notice. However, this 'immediacy' also causes time 
and space to become more important, they become increasingly critical dimensions. For 
we don't want to wait for a file to be downloaded. Transportation must be done in real 
time, without delay. This duplicity of real time interaction shows that it is this quest for 
48
 See for instance: http://www.telepresence.com/telepresence-research/index.html
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 This discontinuity or conflict between body and mind can, as Michael Heim notices become 
pathological when it "breaks the harmony between the biological body and the cyberbody", which occurs 
for instance with soldiers who train in flight simulators. Simulator sickness is a well-known phenomenon. 
"The high speed dynamics and aggressive tempo of cyberspace brings with it a disharmony between the 
earth-rooted biological self and the digitally trained mind. The person is split between personal 
experience based on computer life and personal experience based on felt bodily awareness" (Heim, 1998, 
172).
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 In order not to address in a naïve way the question whether cyberspace realizes our (Gnostic) desire, we 
must not brush aside the abovementioned Kantian ‘Copernican revolution’ that showed that the human 
subject always already constructs 'natural reality'. A conception of the ‘digital revolution’ as merely a 
breaking free from the chains of natural reality might be naïve, because in a Kantian – and as we will see, 
even more so in a Lacanian – approach this escape goes along with the breaking of the frames of our 
experience of reality. For this reason, a philosophical understanding of the influence of digital 
technologies on our conception of reality must bring together two ‘revolutions’ in the relation of the 
human subject towards the object of his representations: the Kantian and the ‘digital revolution’. Both 
involve a radical questioning of a natural world of references: the Kantian revolution questions it mainly 
because of the constitutive feature of the subject, the digital revolution mainly because of the assembled 
feature of the (digitized) object.  
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immediacy that challenges the 'traditional' experience of reality that is based on delay
(cf. Derrida, 1987).51
3.4. Computer virtual reality: from insight to liberation? 
The computer does not cause a 'paradigm shift'. It is an objectification of otherwise 
subjective processes that adjust  - but not necessarily adapt - man's relation to the 
outside world. It seems to give us a clearer insight into the process of self-construction. 
The virtual world to which the interface leads us shows in a 'materialized' way that our 
'real reality' is also already virtualized by different systems of codification. Analogous 
to Vivian Sobchak's insight that cinema for the first time gives us a good look at the 
subjective structure of our vision, computer virtual reality also exposes our subjectivity 
but only more so.  
"In its pre-electronic state and original materiality, however, the cinematic 
mechanically projects and makes visible for the very first time not just the 
objective world, but the very structure and process of subjective, embodied 
vision - hitherto only directly available to human beings as that invisible and 
private structure we each experience as "my own." That is, the materiality of the 
cinematic gives us concrete and empirical insight and makes objectively visible 
the reversible, dialectical, and social nature of our own subjective vision." 
(Sobchak, 1994, 96).
Virtual Reality may bring us to the very heart of "that invisible and private structure we 
each experience as "my own"". On the computer screen the process of subjectivation by 
way of the law may become explicit. For when I expect to enter cyberspace without any 
constraint (for I am after all alone behind my computer) the difficulties of 'direct 
expression' become all the more noticeable: I'm confronted with 'Wizards' that try to 
socialize my behavior (personifications of the law), I feel ashamed or guilty to say what 
I want to say (internalization of the law), I must make the effort of typing in words in 
order to make myself heard in a chat room (the law of the signifier) … The computer 
interface thus seems to endorse Sobchak's thesis that technologies can make the 
structures of our subjectivity more visible. Or as McLuhan puts it: new media may lead 
to some sort of 'consciousness of the unconscious'. 
 Because of this enhanced insight into the structures that form us, we might be 
able to take greater distance from those structures and even play with them. It is for that 
reason that a common vision of cyberspace connects it intimately with perversion (cf. 
Žižek, 1999a). In perversion there is alongside the normal subject (that recognizes the 
law) a second subject that does not recognize the law and disavows the renouncements 
that the law demands (castration). In perversion the conventionality of the law is 
attacked precisely because of its conventionality (cf. Verhaeghe, 1994, 187). So, if I 
know that the law is a convention, I can play with it within my self-built world or moral. 
And this is what happens in cyberspace, where one can build such alternative, virtual 
worlds. Having the conventionality of law in view also allows for a transgression of the 
law without feelings of guilt - an absence of guilt that characterizes perversion. Most of 
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 In his 'Speculations on Freud', from his book The post card: from Socrates to Freud and beyond (1987), 
Derrida advances the fundamental thesis that, in Freudian psychoanalysis, a detour ('Umweg') is the 
efficacy of the psychic apparatus, necessary in order to avoid the destructive and deadly limits of pure 
enjoyment and pure reality. 
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the players of cybersex don't consider it an act of adultery, but rather 'an innocent game' 
that doesn't affect their 'real-life situation'. Fanatic players of aggressive and violent 
(online) games use the same arguments against people who suggest that playing those 
games can lead to more aggression in real life. They assert that because they know 
perfectly that it is nothing more than just a game it does not influence their behavior. 
And indeed, they are almost always very decent young people in real life.  
Lacan claims that each and everyone of us is either in the neurotic position 
('Versagung': giving up enjoyment, and compensating for it in an imaginary manner), 
the perverse position ('Verleugnung': disavowing the lack of enjoyment, and playing the 
game of enjoyment as a reality, just with another set of rules) or the psychotic position 
('Verwerfung': rejecting that there is a lack of enjoyment and fully 'enjoying' the 
imaginary world as reality itself). The subject of cyberspace seems to come closest to 
the perverse position, where the double moral standard is practiced perfectly. 
 When everything and everyone is controlled or constituted by information 
codes, and humans can program information codes, the idea may arise that humans can 
control everything, including their own self. Considered in a modernistic sense this 
implies the control of the laws of nature. Cyberspace, being the most advanced form of 
the technological enterprise, offers itself - as Markley brings forward - as the logical 
'telos' of technological progress. For its symbolic coherence cyberspace depends on the 
narrative logic of progress: it is the completion of our craving for transcendence 
(Markley, 1996, 6). Cyberspace must thus be situated in the Enlightenment project in 
which science and technology (must) contribute to economical and political freedom 
(cf. Ess, 1994, 234). 
However, insight and playful management of the processes of self-construction 
might also evoke the postmodern idea that we ourselves can creatively remodel the law. 
When subjectivity is a matter of construction, why then do we not construct ourselves? 
This leads to the liberating, postmodern model of cyberspace as a realm of free self-
construction where the 'old paternal' law no longer goes. In its extreme form this leads 
to the 'Humpty Dumpty complex' (see appendix) wherein someone may come to the 
(psychotic) illusion that he himself can determine the meaning of his words. Cyberspace 
promises us to lead us to our 'true self' (my online self freed from the law), to true 
democracy (wherein everybody participates immediately via his mouse). It may offer a 
possibility to remodel the laws of culture and society that subject us. Or as Ken Hillis 
analyzes, technology radicalizes the cultural 'will' (that also Durand and Pagels stress) to 
escape the real. "Culture offers an ironic form of security that denies the real … all 
cultures facilitate this "escape" from the body and its needs and actions involving food, 
sex, and death … If culture offers a way to deny the contingency of the real, as part of 
culture, technology is now being positioned to suggest an alternative to the natural 
world" (Hillis, 1999, xvi-xvii). Hans Moravec's work most clearly illustrates these high 
hopes of technology, since he considers the computer revolution a breakthrough that can 
both liberate the human mind and human culture (Moravec, 1988, 4). 
4. Interface technologies and the question of representation 
4.1. Spaces of representation, or simulated spaces? 
In a Cartesian conception, the body is merely a natural, mechanical thing characterized 
by extension in physical space. The mind, on the other hand, is the instance of true 
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thought that exists in a virtual space of representation (as the mind does not have an 
extension one could situate it in 'spaceless space' - a term Manovich uses to describe 
cyberspace). From this duplicity of physical and of virtual space the classical notion of 
representation, in which physical space finds its true form in the virtual space of 
representation, arises. However, in the age of information it seems reasonable to 
question whether there actually is such a sharp distinction between physical and virtual 
space. For instance, do all sorts of imaging technologies not blur the distinction between 
the body as a physical extension and as a virtual representation? In imaging 
technologies the body parts are not presented (by drawings, formulas, and calculations 
etc that abstract it from physical space) in a - second - space of representation, but 
simulated in a space that does not seem to be different from physical space.  
So do information technologies actually generate a 'revolutionary' space of 
representation? Do they blur the difference between physical and virtual space? 
Cyberspace has been interpreted in both ways. On the one hand, encircled by a great 
deal of high-tech rhetoric, as a (non-physical) space inhabited by immaterial data-
objects, in which the user can wander around as a bodiless intelligence. As a pure mind 
of symbolical representation he would be liberated from all the limitations imposed by 
physical space. In this sense, it would realize the Platonic desire for access to the 
immaterial realm of Ideas, and Descartes' ideal of disengaged knowledge. On the other 
hand, cyberspace has also been interpreted as a very compelling and fascinating virtual 
space that continues, and sometimes even seems to replace, physical space. Thus we 
would enter the culture of  'real virtuality' "in which reality itself (that is, people's 
material/symbolic existence) is entirely captured, fully immersed in the setting of a 
virtual image, in the world of make believe, in which appearances are not just on the 
screen through which experience is communicated, but they become the experience" 
(Castells, 1998, 373) In the culture of 'real virtuality' the strict difference between 
physical and virtual space is hard to maintain. Virtual and physical spaces appear to 
blend, by which we are in accord with Manovich clearly in the 'mediated environment' 
of the simulation tradition, and not in the double space of the representation tradition. 
He distinguishes the tradition of representation (Renaissance painting) from that of 
simulation (frescoes, mosaics, wall paintings, wax museums, sculptures on a human 
scale):  
“The simulation tradition aims to blend virtual and physical spaces rather than to 
separate them. Therefore, the two spaces have the same scale (p. 112) … if in 
the simulation tradition, the spectator exists in a single coherent space – the 
physical space and the virtual space that continues it – in the representational 
tradition, the spectator has a double identity. She simultaneously exists in the 
physical space and in the space of representation” (Manovich, 1999, 113). 
 The computer is a simulation machine that presents data as objects in a virtual 
environment. In her influential work Life on the Screen (1995) Sherry Turkle shows that 
the culture that surrounds the personal computer evolved from a notion similar to 
calculation towards one more like simulation.52 Interacting and playing with the 
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 What Turkle calls simulation corresponds more to Doel and Clark's fourth model of the relationship 
between the real and the virtual (see § 1.3) of the simulacrum, d.i. of continuously new formations of 
reality that are not modeled according to some 'true' form of the real, than to their model of the 
simulation, which stands for nothing but a false copy of the real. It shows that different interpretations of 
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computer increasingly replaces the use of the computer as a program that follow strict 
rules. The 1990’s mark an especially strong shift from calculation towards ‘bricoloage’. 
Turkle’s analysis distinguishes a clear ‘progress’ from the modernist culture of 
calculation towards the postmodern culture of simulation (Turkle, 1995, 20). The 
computer would therefore evolve from an extension of (mental) functions and 
capabilities into a medium in and with which to interact. Another computer theorist, 
Brenda Laurel, makes a similar distinction. “Human-computer activity may be divided 
into two broad categories: productive and experiential” (Laurel, 1993, 22). In productive 
activities, such as word processing, one uses the computer to achieve certain outcomes 
‘in the real world’ that are beyond the experience of the activity itself. In experiential 
activities, such as computer games, the computer is an ‘environment’ for experiencing a 
certain activity. Meredith Bricken describes this paradigm shift between traditional 
interface design and the design of virtual worlds as a shift from user to participant. 
“Among software developers, the term user refers to the generic person who, at the end 
of the programming and interface design process, receives a software application geared 
to “average” human functioning. Participants are active agents” (Bricken, 1994, 366). 
Rather than being environments for a spectator cyber spaces may well be for a user or 
participant. In many cases they are above all performative spaces for someone to act in, 
before they are representational spaces. Because of this, the question whether they are 
true or adequate representations of the real-life models is not always appropriate (cf. 
Simons, 2002, 246). In the culture of 'real virtuality' the distinction between 
performative and representational spaces becomes increasingly blurred – to say the 
least. It is for this reason that simulated environments are often compared to games: 
both are fictive spaces for the performance of real acts. That is why, in my opinion, the 
computerized simulated environments resemble the 'intermediary' space of fantasy. For 
fantasy is also the interface between the real and the fictional.  
This 'intermediary' space may become such a natural habitat for us that we enter 
a post-modern culture of simulation.  This is a conclusion that Turkle draws from 
technological developments. Because we are already so accustomed to interfacing with 
technological media, we take the simulated images at face value:  
"We have learned to take things at interface value. We are moving toward a 
culture of simulation in which people are increasingly comfortable with 
substituting representations of reality for the real" (Turkle, 1995, 23) 
Information technologies radicalize the process of  ‘substitutiting’ the (physical) object 
with a (digital) form: they increasingly transform the object into the ‘window’ in which 
it appears. They radicalize the ‘breach of contact’ with natural reality and thereby are 
the most obvious manifestations of the post-modern era. Nevertheless, the ‘digital 
revolution’ forces us to examine the distinction between the (modern) age of 
representation (of nature) and the (post-modern) age of simulation and construction of 
nature “Today the computer is an actor in the struggle between modern and post-
modern understandings” (Turkle, 1995, 43). From a Lacanian perspective, the issue is 
and remains gaining some sort of awareness of how we fantasmatically simulate the 
real. Although we cannot escape the mediation by our fantasy, neither can we be 
"comfortable with substituting representations of reality for the real". The Lacanian 
the notion simulation are in use: simulation as a productive re-creation of reality (Turkle), and as a 
diversion (as in Doel and Clark's categorization). 
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theory of the subversive dialectic of desire that distorts all 'closures' of comfort, 
happiness etc, seems to be an abdominal form of the modernist critical position seeking 
to expose 'false representations'.   
 In order to further investigate issues concerning representation and simulation, I 
will lay out the paradigm which the 'new media' seem to force upon us, and which led 
Baudrillard as early as the 1970s towards the radical position of the irrelevance of the 
question whether images refer to a reality outside the media. In Lacanian theory the 
notion of symbolic representation takes a crucial position, and for symbolic 
representations the central question regards the relation between them and the reality 
they represent. So Lacanian theory must confront the challenge of 'new media' over the 
relationship between representations and reality. 
4.2. 'On the interface of it, it seems impracticable to link sign and referent' 
Do signs in an 'age of information' still refer to a reality? Does the digital revolution 
force us into a new aesthetics, a ‘new depthlessness’ in which it is hard – or impossible 
– to distinguish between signifier and signified, according to thinkers as Eco, Jameson 
and Baudrillard the result of the massive influence of new media? “Eco … focuses on 
formal features as the most important aspects of contemporary culture, pondering the 
end of innovation and metaphor (definitive of modernism) … Jameson and Baudrillard 
(though in very different ways) both view developments in technologies of 
reproducibility as a central, ultimately perhaps the central, determinant in the process of 
the development of a general preponderance of form over content” (Darley, 2000, 73). 
Mark Poster subsequently states that the representational character of language is very 
problematic nowadays: “In sphere after sphere of daily life, the relation of word and 
thing is complicated by the loss of the referent” (Poster, 1990, 12). The word no longer 
refers directly to the thing, and may even replace the thing completely. When language 
thus starts to represent itself, the relation between words and things is no longer one of 
representation but of simulacra, of representations without any reference to an (original) 
object. Therefore Mark Poster speaks of the  
“instability of the rational individual or centred subject whose imagined 
autonomy is associated with a capacity to link sign and referent, word and thing, 
in short, a representational functioning of language” (Poster, 1990, 14).  
Information technologies even detach us completely from our point in space and time. 
"In the mode of information the subject is no longer located in a point in absolute 
time/space, enjoying a physical, fixed vantage point from which rationally to calculate 
its options" (Poster, 1990, 15).53
 The instability of the relation between the signifier and its signified causes the 
'uncertainty' of the rational individual. Although for De Saussure the relationship 
between signifier and the signified is arbitrary, the two are still as inseparable as the two 
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 One might suggest that rationality itself acquires another (‘post-modern’) meaning, wherein it is the 
capacity to link sign and referent in a playful - and not in a certain - way that defines rationality. For is it 
in the age of the digital sign not crazy to believe in the truth (as correspondence) of what one sees? Would 
such a belief not define madness? The new ‘rational individual’ might be the one that is capable of 
playing with and using the simulacra that fill its world.  
 Nevertheless, I will argue that it is fantasy as a mediating screen that allows for a third 
conception of the self, beside the modernist unitary self and the post-modern fragmented self. Fantasy 
constitutes identity without this identity having a stable referent in reality. 
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sides of a piece of paper: the social and cultural conventions combine them 
(inseparably) together. Digitization challenges exactly this conventional combination of 
signifier and signified. That is why several theoreticians ascertain that in digital 
communication the signs only refer to other signs. Poster: “For the subject in 
electronically mediated communication, the object tends to become not the material 
world as represented in language but the flow of signifiers themselves. In the mode of 
information it becomes increasingly difficult, or even pointless, for the subject to 
distinguish a “real” existing “behind” the flow of signifiers” (Poster, 1990, 15). And 
Bolter: “All electronic texts are self-sufficient, in the sense that each element refers only 
to other elements in the network” (Bolter, 1991, 195). Sherry Turkle expands the 
question of the sign to a general theory about the second nature character of screen-
identity (I emphasize these terms, for they are pivotal in my analysis of the interface as a 
fantasy-screen): “With computers we can simulate nature in a program or leave nature 
aside and build second natures limited only by our powers of imagination and 
abstraction. The objects on the screen have no referent. In this sense, life on the screen 
is without origins and foundation. It is a place where signs taken for reality may 
substitute for the real” (Turkle, 1995, 47). 
 According to Hayles information technologies “fundamentally alter the relation 
of signified to signifier. Carrying the instabilities implicit in Lacanian floating signifiers 
one step further, information technologies create what I will call flickering signifiers, 
characterized by their tendency towards unexpected metamorphoses, attenuations, and 
dispersions” (Hayles, 1999, 30). It is the ‘fluidity’ of digital communication that, 
according to Hayles, causes signifiers to flicker rather than float. Texts, for example, are 
no longer durable inscriptions but changeable (by the author, or the reader who then 
becomes the author …) so that (unexpected) transformations in signification can occur. 
A broader current of (post-modern) theory that bases its views also on the semiotic 
theories of the ‘empty’ or ‘floating’ signifier that is completely disconnected from the 
signified, declares this ‘fluidity’ to be the principle of post-modern subjectivity itself, in 
that it offers the individual the possibility to constantly reinvent himself.54
4.3. A mediamatic elimination of human subjectivity? From Vorstellung to Darstellung? 
Are digital technologies leading us into a post-Cartesian era: a posthuman an era in 
which the power of technology is so compelling that it seems to efface the human 
subject that thinks it can rationally represent the world in its true shape? Such an erasure 
of the human subject of representation would lead us to the simulation model. The Eros 
that is the topic of my investigations is the desire for 'the perfect copy'. This aspiration 
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 One must discriminate the utopian view of technology eliminating the mediation of reality by means of 
arbitrary and conventional symbols (as is the case for Lanier, Warwick, Bolter and many representatives 
of post-modern feminist theory), from the critical view (as represented by Poster and Baudrillard, who 
even speaks of the 'loss of reality' itself). One's position depends to a large extend upon the philosophical 
position that one holds concerning the relation between sign and reality. Therefore I will shortly describe 
the three main positions, which is also the tripartition that one applies in systematic descriptions of the 
metaphor and of imagination! (see also appendix). First of all there is the positivistic or realistic position 
that holds that a metaphor, a sign or a product of imagination is a depiction or representation of reality 
and adds nothing new to it. According to the idealistic position reality is constituted on the basis of 
human knowledge, language and imagination, and therefore there is no ‘real reality’ at all. The 
constructivist position emphasizes the creative dimension of the ‘mediators’ in our understanding of 
reality: they can create new forms of understanding and new images, without the tie with some sort of 
‘deeper reality’ being cut. 
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for 'photo realism' is for instance - and not insignificantly with regards to situating 
Lacanian theory - a characteristic of the scientific enterprise.55 "Such exclusion of 
human bias is the point of many standard scientific procedures … The photographic 
procedure, like the scientific procedures, seems to provide a guaranteed way of 
overcoming subjectivity and getting at the real truth" (Mitchell, 1994, 28). Also 
representational painting and traditional photography tried to efface the visible signs of 
human agency in the production of the image. Computer graphics is the latest 
expression of this desire to remove the traces of the human subject (cf. Bolter/Grusin, 
2000, 26-27).
The idea that cyber-technologies can represent the real thing on the screen 
without any distortion - and thus can overcome the imperfections of human reality - 
seems to be ineradicable. 56 For instance in cybernetics, where an interesting exponent 
of this theory, professor Kevin Warwick, had implants built into his body in order to 
communicate with objects around him, so that the door of his garage would open 
automatically when he approached, etc. (the next step being the direct exchange of 
thoughts - via the Internet - with others). In his account of his experiments in the book I, 
Cyborg he writes:
[W]hen we compare ourselves with technology, the way humans currently 
communicate is so poor as to be embarrassing. Human speech is serial, error-
prone and an incredibly slow way of communicating with others. Our coding 
procedures, called languages, severely restrict our intellect, as all our thoughts 
and ideas have to be transformed into signals that do not always accurately 
represent the original concept [my italics] 
Human communication is on the verge of a complete overhaul. We will shortly 
make much more use of the technology that can send and receive millions of 
messages, in parallel, with zero error. We will interface with machines through 
thought signals. We will become nodes on a techno-network. We will be able to 
communicate with other humans merely by thinking to each other. Speech, as 
we know it, may well become obsolete" (Warwick, 2002, 2/3). 
Digital encoding would liberate us from linguistic subjectivity. Although Warwick has a 
very utopian, and somewhat naïve vision of this, digitization does affect our worldview. 
As an ‘equalization’ of the whole range of different signifiers into data, 
digitization abstracts signs from their specific medium: “Digital encoding frees signs 
from a dependence on the medium of transmission” (Chesher, 1997, 86).  Because of 
this 'liberation' one can play with the 'representations', manipulate and transform them, 
as is clear in digital photography. In watching a digital photograph we must be aware of 
the possible discontinuity between the photograph and the 'real object'. Now with the 
omnipresence of digital media this discontinuity even becomes an aspect of the world as 
we 'objectively' experience it. This paradoxical situation is what Vivian Sobchak notes 
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 In his 'La science et la vérité' (1965, E. 855-877) Lacan situates psychoanalytical theory both as 
inseparable from science, as it is related to the same 'Cartesian' epistemological rupture (with nature), and 
as different from science by paying attention to the subject (of desire) in the disclosure of reality. 
56
 It remains interesting that the most advanced technologies, and scientist, incline to lead our thinking 
back to a superseded view on interfacing with the real thing, wherein the interface, or the medium, is 
astoundingly without any influence on the 'content' of the message. 
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in the post-modern experience of time. "Indeed, objective time in post-modern 
electronic culture is perceived as phenomenologically discontinuous as was subjective 
time in modernist cinematic culture. Temporality is constituted paradoxically as a 
homogeneous experience of discontinuity" (Sobchak, 1994, 99). The ‘abstraction’ of 
signs from their analogue media touches on our system of beliefs, on the idea of being 
certain. Therefore it is a philosophical issue.57 For it was Descartes who situated the 
question of certainty at the heart of philosophical investigation. So digitization touches 
at the heart of us as rational subjects: it touches on the belief in the representational 
function of signs.  
Some theorists draw from technological development crucial conclusions for the 
rational subject as it is formulated in modern philosophy.  
“The old-European subject of representation ['Subjekt der Vorstellung'] has 
totally disappeared, in its place the project of showing ['Projekt der Darstellung'] 
has come about” (Van de Boom, 1991, 184).58
In the 'age of information' the modern subject of science, with its foundational belief in 
the recording instrument, would lose its conviction or belief that it can be certain of its 
objective representations of the world: the causal relation, in which an image is a true 
picture or depiction of the object, is affected (by - unconscious - intentions).59 As 
Mitchell concludes: 
"Digital imaging dramatically changes the rules of this game … The distinction 
between the causal process of the camera and the intentional process of the artist 
can no longer be drawn so confidently and categorically" (Mitchell, 1992, 31). 
Digital technologies may penetrate the human mind to such an extent that it 
could result in a reconsideration of the whole field of epistemology. Do we see anything 
other than the products of our own technological imaging (imagination)? When the 
images of our interfacing with technology appear in such intensity that they seem to be 
the thing itself, there is a shift from the realm of representation (Vorstellung) towards 
the realm of ‘presentification’ (Darstellung).60 A Vorstellung must represent the world 
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 One is tempted to situate this issue as a variant of the religious issues of information technologies, that 
Carl Mitcham describes as “how computers and information technology affect (to employ Christian 
terms) faith”. Carl Mitcham and Alois Huning (ed.), Philosophy and Technology 2. Information 
Technology and Computers in Theory and Practice (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1986), 11. 
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 In order to track the (semiotic) origins of the rift of the notions of Vorstellung and Darstellung it is 
interesting to relegate to the work Sprachtheorie. Die Darstellungsfunktion der Sprache (Jena: Fischer, 
1934) of the German linguist Karl Bühler, who uses the notion Darstellung to indicate the indirect (d.i. 
mediated) relationship of sign and referent. 
 Lacan-commentator Anthony Wilden states that the confusion of the representation with the 
thing represented is the feature of schizophrenia and psychosis; Anthony Wilden, The Rules are No 
Game: The Strategy of Communication (London: Routledge & Kegan, 1987), 201. Such formulations 
introduce the question of possible psychopathological implications of the digital mediation of the world. 
59
 Referring to Lacan's discussion of science and truth one could say, hyperbolically, that according to 
Lacan the pretended impersonal neutrality of scientific objectivity is already affected by the affects. 
60
 Heidi Tikka uses this translation of Darstellung as opposed to Vorstellung to account for the visual 
space of the binocular technology of stereographic images. She takes these words from Monique David-
Menard who argues in her work Hysteria from Freud to Lacan, Body and Language in Psychoanalysis
(New York: Continuum Publishing, 1989) that the (hysterical) symptom is a Darstellung instead of a 
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as it really is: it gives a true picture of the world in the space of representation. 
Darstellung is the realm of heightened presence in which the Vorstellung is no longer a 
representation but to use the whole range of English terms, an impression, an image, or 
a show(ing), a production, a performance. Precisely the fact that it is so hard to 
determine whether we are dealing with one level or the other makes digitization such a 
powerful force: what is real?61
4.4. Cyber-subjectivism or cyber-objectivism? 
When digitization causes the rational subject to lose its certainty concerning the 
correspondence of signs to reality, a pressing question might arise. The loosening up of 
the strict correlation between signs and referent might be conceived of as liberating us 
from the oppressive discourses that have always determined this relationship according 
to a certain 'ratio' (rationalistic discourses, paternalistic …). Then digitization shows us 
that there is no 'true reality' expressed by the signs, and that in fact everybody creates 
his own reality: cyberspace as a domain of liberation in which everybody can be 'who 
he really is' or 'whoever he wants to be', unrestrained by traditional discourses. This 
formulation leads to a form of subjectivism, which takes individual consciousness as the 
point of departure for the consideration of human thought and actions. Cyberspace 
would then finally do justice to the fact that everything is the product or the content of 
individual consciousness. On the other hand, digitization may also lead to the 
conviction that we are finally at the brink of eliminating the human subject with all its 
wishes, convictions etc which distort our clear, rational view of reality. Digitization 
would allow us to view the world independent of the shortcomings of the human 
subject. This is the claim of objectivism, which often governs scientific thought: 
objective knowledge of the world that is free of subjective interests of the human mind.  
I will first discuss an example of a 'subjectivist' vision on cyberspace. Virtual 
Reality pioneer Jason Lanier sees the promise of new technologies in the possibility of 
transcending the mediation of the symbolic subject. Technology replaces the symbolic 
mediation of the world and generates a new world. He expresses this return to a pre-
symbolic immediacy in his infamous notion of ‘post- symbolic communication’: "If you 
make a house in virtual reality … you have not created a symbol for a house or a code 
for a house. You've actually made a house. It's that direct creation of reality; that's what 
I call post-symbolic communication" (Lanier & Biocca, 1992, 161). Michael Benedikt 
explains: “In such an era, language bound descriptions and semantic games will no 
longer be required to communicate personal viewpoints, historical events, or technical 
information. Rather, direct – if “virtual” – demonstrations and interactive experience of 
Vorstellung.  “Darstellung is the realm of heightened presence. This presence is sometimes achieved in 
dream images which may become so intense, that they seem to pass into the body as if in a hallucination 
… The hysterical state of Darstellung and the stereographic view both challenge our sense of distance”
[my emphasis, A.N.];  
Heidi Tikka, 'The Surface of a Hysterical Body as an Interface'                                                                                            
http://www.isea.qc.ca/symposium/archives/abstracts95/abs61.html
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 And isn't the same problem involved in psychopathology: are the symptoms of a hysteric real, or is he 
simulating? Or, and this is the most intriguing option, does simulation make it real (Jean Baudrillard's 
simulation model)? We see (to pursue the ideas of Tikka in the previous footnote) that there actually is a 
line - via hysteria - from Freud to Baudrillard. "To simulate is to feign to have what one hasn't" 
(Baudrillard, 1988, 167). But Baudrillard continues his thought by questioning whether the work of the 
unconscious must then be considered as the real cause of simulation: "why should simulation stop at the 
portals of the unconscious?  Why couldn't the "work" of the unconscious be "produced" in the same way 
as any other symptom in classical medicine" (Baudrillard, 1988, 168)? 
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the “original” material will prevail, or at least be a universal possibility. We would 
become again “as children”, but this time with the power of summoning worlds at will 
and impressing speedily upon others the particulars of our experience” (Benedikt, 1994, 
12-13).
In the domain of technology the claim of objectivism is the standard view of 
communication: communication is simply the transmission of a message from one 
person to another, without subjective elements playing a role in it. This so-called 
‘transmission model’ of communication considers the message as a ‘parcel’ that the 
sender delivers to the receiver. This commonsense idea of communication is also the 
foundation of one of the first major attempts to formalize information, made by 
Shannon and Weaver. They fully abstract information from its context.62 According to 
the American telecommunications engineer Claude Shannon (1916-2001) - Warren 
Weaver was merely an expounder, albeit famous, of Shannon's theory (cf. Hayles, 1999, 
300) - information is a probability function with no dimensions or materiality. It 
represents a choice of one message from a range of possible messages. The more 
probable a message is, the less information it contains. So when I say that it will rain in 
the coming month I deliver far less information than when making this statement for the 
coming two days. The founding father of cybernetics, Norbert Wiener, also sees 
information as representing a choice of one message from a range of possible messages 
(Hayles, 1999, 52). This definition of information as a function of the probabilities of 
messages is known as the Shannon-Wiener theory of information. Both Shannon and 
Wiener separated information from meaning, since they wanted information to have a 
stable value as it moved from one context to another. Their goal was to develop a 
mathematical theory of information, and the introduction of meaning into it would burst 
this goal by contextualizing information.63   
4.5. From semiotics to the subject as a mediating window
The space of fantasy inevitably implies a focus on the world of information as a 
meaningful world. Therefore we must consider the possible relation between 
information and meaning. An excursion into the past may be helpful. The relation 
between information and meaning was also the general question in the discussions on 
the nature of information during the Macy Conferences. Not everyone favored the 
mathematical theory of information. A British researcher, Donald MacKay, explicitly 
tried to link information to meaning. He held that information has to do with a change in 
the mind of the receiver, and concluded that:  
“subjectivity, far from being a morass to be avoided, is precisely what enables 
information and meaning to be connected” (Hayles, 1999, 56). 64
This pushes us in the direction of my Lacanian thesis regarding the subject in the age of 
information. Several influential theories and authors, briefly discussed in the following, 
may furthermore support this line of thought. 
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 Claude Shannon and Warren Weaver, The Mathematical Theory of Communication (Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, 1949). 
63
 So: Information refers to the probability that a certain message will occur in a certain situation; 
meaning to the special kinds of nuances the message entails (Danesi, 2002, 19). 
64
 Donald M. MacKay, Information, Mechanism, and Meaning (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1969). 
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In stressing the importance of social contexts and codes, semiotics opposes the 
so called ‘transmission model’ of information. Information is not a ‘thing’ that is there 
(in the mind, in the world), simply to be transmitted by different kind of media; it is 
linked to meaning that the human subject introduces. Semiotics teaches us that ‘reality’ 
is not something that is simply present and waits to be articulated ‘objectively’ by a 
meta-language purified of all particularities. It shows that by representing 'reality', 
through the use of sign systems and codes to communicate and to live in a 'shared 
world' (Lévy), we also construct reality. The lesson of semiotics concerns the active 
creation by the human subject of meaning in the world. The roles the human subject 
plays and the codes and conventions that govern our daily life (possibly without us 
being aware of it) create meaning. Only when meaning can be objectified into 
information with a stable value will we have entered the posthuman era.65
 Semiotics analyses human reality as inseparable from the sign (for this theme, 
see also the appendix). This is also the basic principle of Ernst Cassirer’s philosophy of 
the symbol: the function of  ‘signifying’ is the basis of all systems of symbols. Cassirer 
creates an entire philosophy of culture out of this, a sort of semiotics of the symbolically 
‘encrypted’ phenomena of culture. He takes the theory of the sign beyond the domain of 
language into the domains of science, mythology, art and religion. Every system of 
symbols brings about a specific modeling or design not of the world but rather to the
world, to an objective whole of meaning and representation. The notion of a natural 
disposition of a non-mediated ‘real world’ is, according to  Cassirer's diagnosis, an 
uncritical, inept and nonsensical assumption (cf. Neumann, 1973). In addition to this, 
the so-called ‘Toronto School’ applies semiotic theory to technology as well. Our 
experiences are greatly influenced by technological media. Those media do not simply 
register the world 'as it really is' but actively create the world that we live in: they form 
our picture of the world. In its most extreme formulations this school of thought 
approaches an idealistic position (see also appendix). When “the medium is the 
message” the reference to ‘the real world’ is gone and the media themselves fully 
determine meaning.66
In line with this school of thought I would like to situate my own analysis. In 
analyzing the human subject in the 'age of information' I will try to avoid the extreme 
positions of subjective idealism, where all reality is the construction of the human 
subject, and naïve objectivism, that presupposes that elements of the human subject do 
not play a decisive role in our knowledge and experience of the world. For my point is 
that the 'instability of the rational subject' of representation does not lead to a situation 
of  'free subjectivism' or 'scientific objectivism' but to a situation where we should think 
of the subject as constituting, by means of his fantasy-screen, a window upon reality. 
The age of information highlights this fantasy-subject as a window, that is neither a 
65 At least, that is the thesis of Katherine Hayles in her book How We Became Posthuman 
(Chicago/London: University of Chicago Press, 1999), wherein she sketches the road towards the 
posthuman and the delimitations these projects encounter(ed). So, to use the 'Saussurian' distinction 
between systems of signs and their concrete use, does the ‘digital revolution’ lead to posthuman patterns 
of information (‘langue’) that have lost their link with the material world of limitations, or do they 
generate human forms of individual or even idiosyncratical ways of speaking (‘parole’)?  
66
 Jean Baudrillard is one of the most exciting postmodern theorists who draw such far-reaching 
conclusions out of modern semiotics. Therefore there are critics that call him an 'semiological idealist' 
who ignores the materiality of sign production ; Kellner, cited in Robert Stam, Film Theory, (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2000), 306. 
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purely imaginary illusion (as realism would have it) nor an absolute expression of 
reality (as from an idealistic perspective).  
The 'Lacanian' point that I will try to make is not to think in simple dichotomies. As if 
the modern subject of autonomy has completely vanished and was replaced by a post-
modern subject that has lost all sense of a stable self. As if we must decide the battle 
between body and mind in one direction. There might also be a third possibility when 
one focuses on the crucial role that fantasy might play in the Cartesian, rationalistic 
subject: fantasy as a window upon 'different' aspects of myself, where the self is not 
fully fragmented but a - modernist - transcendental unifying point (a sense of unity of 
the self that accompanies our sensations, without this 'I' being a substance). Fantasy as a 
'contextualization' of the 'disembodied' information codes. Precisely because 
information technologies highlight the tension between modernistic and post-
modernistic understandings, this 'intermediary' form that centers on the question of 
fantasy might be brought into the open.  
Conclusion
This chapter showed man's existence as a being of language as already characterized by 
an entwining of the (conscious) Self and the (unconscious) Other. In a theory of 
virtualization body and mind, here and there, message and event, and sign and referent 
are not only two separate entities, but also connected. In order to illustrate this point, I 
used Lévy's analysis of virtualization to try and bring Lacan's 'theory of virtualization' 
into a broader, technological context. Of the three 'forces of virtualization' that Lévy 
distinguished, I elaborated the 'force' that Lacan's theory does not address, namely 
technology. The third part of the chapter showed interface technologies as indeed a 
major factor in the virtualization of the real: they radicalize the 'space-time 
distanciation'. As Lévy's work, which owes so much to the work of Deleuze, turned out 
to be suitable to the context of Lacanian theory, the relationship between the real and 
the virtual in this theory is not so different from the (fourth, Deleuzian) model of Doel 
and Clark that centers virtualization around the notion of a continuous 'recreation' of the 
real. From a Lacanian perspective the real is neither a perfect original plenitude of 
which the virtual can only be a pale imitation, nor an imperfect 'drag' that the virtual can 
fully supplement. It is for that reason that I speak of interface technologies, which work 
in the tension - which cannot be canceled - of the real and the virtual. I distinguished the 
meaning of the word ‘virtual’ in every day speech, wherein it often denotes false 
appearances and illusions, from its technological meaning that both denotes it in a 
stronger (immersive VR) and weaker sense (desktop VR). For a philosophical 
understanding of technologies it is important to relate the technology-driven version of 
the virtual to the technological ability to cause effects that we experience as reality. The 
car and the computer have significance beyond their instrumentality: they are media that 
create new spaces for us to 'live in'. Therefore it is hard, or even impossible, to make a 
clear distinction between virtual technologies that result in ‘false appearances’ (because 
all technologies, from the alphabet to the computer, might be such 'teletechnologies' as 
they – further – detach us from the here and now), and virtual technologies as ‘efficient’ 
technologies, that cause all sorts of new effects. For the point is that those technological 
powers create effects that we experience as if they were real. The newspaper, the radio 
and the television open up my world, and so does the computer as a 'remediation' of 
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previous media. When world is disclosed in this manner, technologies create reality-
effects: new ways in which the world appears. 
When one proceeds from (fantasy) desire, the interface becomes the main issue. 
Although I recognized that these technologies further virtualize and 'fictionalize' our 
existence, I remain cautious with the utopian and dystopian discourses surrounding it. 
Interface technologies do raise serious philosophical questions concerning the status of 
(modern) human subject representation, and therefore I gave a broad overview of this 
discussion. However, starting from the centrality of (fantasy) desire one does not have 
to choose for one of the positions that often dominate the discussion. The technologies 
that virtualize our existence by information codes and 'technological fictions' do not 
either empower or eliminate the autonomous human subject. Semiotic and other 
theories showed that a more significant answer to the question of representation turns up 
by considering subjectivity as what 'interfaces' or contextualizes (disembodied) 
information codes and (embodied) meaning. Subjects are therefore always in a position 
of 'remediating' their perspectives on reality. Man's subjectivity is mediated, in the 
middle, in media. And it is 'remediated' by new technologies: thus we theoretically 
proceed from philosophical mediation to technological mediatization. And fantasy is 
exactly where this mediation or interfacing takes place. The interfaces of digital 
technologies (with the computer screen as its general model) that mediate man and 
world I hence conceive as an analog to the (mental) screen of fantasy as analyzed in 
Freudo-Lacanian theory, which will be the central theme of the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER THREE. FANTASY AT THE INTERFACE 
Introduction 
In the previous chapters I briefly introduced the concept "fantasy" as a key notion for 
the understanding of new media. This chapter will underpin this thesis with an 
interpretation of the role of design in technologies. The two extreme positions of fantasy 
as what functions (unconsciously) as a 'natural environment', or (consciously) as a 
merely imaginary simulation may help to focus on fantasy in its most interesting and 
valuable form, which is what I will call its functioning as a window. For interface 
technologies may show that the computer screen actually functions as a window. As I 
consider this window as a window of fantasy, it is necessary to take a profound look at 
the issue of fantasy (as a window) throughout the history of philosophy and 
psychoanalysis. From there on I hope to arrive at a model of the (computer)screen of 
fantasy that may illuminate its functioning and its role in the psychical economy.  
1. Fantasy as design 
1.1. Design displays the critical role of fantasy 
As a central theme in the philosophy of technology, one generally considers design to 
be a process, pattern or scheme that describes how to realize a practical aim, function or 
artifact. It has to take account of two different sorts of constraints (Mitcham, 1980, 308; 
Brey, 1997). The first is the scientific or technological constraint: it is only possible to 
create what is technically possible. The second is the ‘social constraint’: the design 
process has to take account of the social, economical, ‘cultural’ demands that are 
imposed on it (safety regulations, standards, norms, prices, dominant aesthetics et 
cetera). But are these constraints independent of each other? The so-called ‘hard’ 
version of technological determinism holds that technology is autonomous; so that when 
something is technically possible it will be done (Ellul, Postman). In contrast to this, 
social constructivism states that the technological constraints are also socially 
constructed, which leads, as already mentioned, to a strange kind of social determinism.  
 The perspective (of the ‘technological Eros’) that I will describe, stresses the 
importance of  ‘unconscious’, (inter)subjective ‘ideals’ (fantasies) in the process of 
design.  
"Designing (from the Latin word designare, "to mark out") … is, as it were, 
reified intention" (Mitcham, 1994, 200).  
As not all intentions are conscious ones, design is also a matter of desire. Both on an 
individual and a collective scale. Hence the manifestation of the technological Eros in 
design can help to clarify, for example, why people in a specific culture (or subculture) 
all try to look the same and love the same gadgets. For example, why did Michael 
Jackson suffer all his plastical surgery operations; and why does a computer-addict 
sacrifice his relationship by being on-line all the time (these examples already indicate 
the difficulty of clearly separating the individual and the trans-individual level, for does 
the cultural context not also determine Jackson’s fantasy of his ‘perfect’ face?). It 
therefore stresses an element in the list of ‘social constraints’ that is beyond the 
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pragmatic, instrumental and teleological reason in the process of design. To describe 
this element is to speak of phenomena like beauty (remember the importance of beauty 
for the formation of desire; see chapter one: § 3.3) and enjoyment. 
 Design is at the interface of what is technologically possible and what is 
desirable (the impossible): that's why it is like fantasy. Interface theorist Steven Johnson 
expresses the idea that the interface is about the design of desire by bringing forward 
that this technological enterprise is basically an artistic matter:  
"The most profound change ushered in by the digital revolution will not involve 
bells and whistles or new programming tricks. It … will lie with our generic 
expectations about the interface itself. We will come to think of interface design 
as a kind of art form - perhaps the art form of the next century" (Johnson, 1997, 
213).
Design is a matter of both engineers and artists.  “The engineering design ideal of 
efficiency stands in contrast to the artistic ideal of beauty. Beauty is not so much a 
question of materials and energy as of form [my italics]” (Mitcham, 1994, 229). Derrick 
de Kerckhove, in investigating the electronic technologies, gives an even broader scope 
to this intermediate status of design. He considers technology, as an extension of our 
mental and bodily functions, to be an externalization of our inner selves. Design gives a 
form to these technological extensions of ourselves, and is therefore at the interface of 
the body and the mind, the material and the cultural, the ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ of man.  
“Design, as I understand it, is a modulation of the relationship between the 
human body and the environment as it is modified by technology. Technology 
comes out of the human body and design makes sense of it … mind and body 
are so intermingled that it is pointless to separate them” (De Kerckhove, 1997, 
156).
Therefore a clear distinction between the material and the formal is in his opinion 
impossible. The place where we exist is in the between (in the middle, in media), where 
the content is intermixed with the form (or, in Lacan's theory, truth with fantasy). As a 
creation of the surface of things, De Kerckhove calls design ‘the skin of culture’. “Being 
the visible, audible or textual outer shape of cultural artifacts, design emerges as what 
can be called the ‘skin of culture’” (De Kerckhove, 1997, 154). For a ‘member’ of 
McLuhans ‘Toronto School’ (“the medium is the message”, or: “In the electric age, we 
wear all mankind as our skin”, by which De Kerckhove opens his book) such an 
idealistic, ‘postmodern’ notion of the relationship between sign and referent (or (de)sign 
and referent, or even better: referent as design) does not appear strange. However, it 
does make clear the immense meaning of technological design (or technology as design) 
for the understanding of our culture and ourselves. As a mediation of the world that 
technology constructs, design functions as a technological externalization of the 
function of fantasy that Lacanian theory describes.67
 When one moves from technology in general via electronic technologies to 
‘immersive technologies’ like Virtual Reality, one can make even stronger claims about 
67
 During a conference on technological design E. O’Doherty stated in his paper on the ‘Psychological 
Aspects of the Creative Act’ that “the phantasma, or sensory representation at whatever level of 
complexity … is what we are concerned with” (cited in Mitcham, 1994, 222). 
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the role of design. “VR is as close to ‘pure’ design as one can get in applied technology 
because it is entirely based on software activities” (De Kerckhove, 1997, 89). The 
equilibrium between instrumental and ‘Erotic rationality’ (excuse my language) shifts to 
the latter with Virtual Reality technologies. “Most of today’s world builders have 
focused on solving a particular problem. In the future, most virtual worlds will be 
designed in and of themselves to generate new discoveries, new insights, and new 
delights” (Pimentel&Teixeira, 1993, 154). The goal of designing interfaces has always 
been to immerse the user in the virtual environment of the screen: think for example of 
the movie theater, with the surrounding screen of the IMAX theatre as its apogee. 
Virtual Reality is (currently) as close as one can get towards the design of a 'fully 
realized world' on the screen. It is until now the most overwhelming experience of 
designer presence, the best illusion of an experience of 'being there' without mediation, 
that is, of technological enjoyment. 
 Although technologies may seem to provide this full enjoyment (jouissance)
through the effect of generating an unmediated, immediate experience, this 'real 
presence' is mediated at the symbolical level, by metaphors.68
1.2. The design of technological presence by means of metaphors 
Metaphors play a crucial role in the design of the form that the digital information takes 
(cf. Johnson, 1997, 45). They help us to imagine and represent the information (a visual 
metaphor like the folder on the desktop) and to make sense of it (a discursive metaphor 
like ‘the information superhighway’ as a representation of the Internet). Metaphors are 
means to give form to what does not (yet) have a place in reality ‘as we know it’. They 
even link the non-representable as such to familiar representations; all speaking about 
God can thus be said to be metaphorical. The notion of metaphors, for instance in the 
influential theory of Lakoff and Johnson, is therefore crucial for the understanding of 
virtual reality, for in "a way virtual environments are objectified metaphors and 
analogies delivered as sensory patterns" (Biocca, 1997, § 1.2). According to Sandy 
Stone cyberspace is nothing but "a space in which everything, including bodies, exists 
as something close to a metaphor" (Stone, 2001, 190). So we should be careful to 
consider cyberspace as an objective fact or objective information. It is a product of 
human imagination, wherein we use known metaphors for a new domain of information 
and communication. They inevitably go along with a distortion, misrepresentation or 
bias of the domain that they structure, since they describe it as something other than 
what it is. 
Lacanian theory incorporates this notion of metaphors by considering distortion 
as an (constitutive) aspect of reality itself. Metaphors link the subject to the ‘original’ 
event (the real as loss) that - as nostalgia shows - is not present in our reality.69 Freud 
describes this metaphorical structure as one of the two basic mechanisms of the 
unconscious and called it ‘condensation’. A representation represents (‘condensates’) 
68
 This may already put us on the track of a crucial aspect Lacan's notion of fantasy (which I will describe 
in greater detail later on): that of symbolic structures governing the images and sceneries that fantasy - at 
first sight - consists of. Therefore the imaginary redoubling of reality in fantasy is already a metaphorical 
presentation of reality itself. So we can give an answer to the question that heads an article on virtual 
communities in cyberspace: 'Avatars R Us?' (McIlvenny 1999). Yes, 'Avatars R actually like Us' - 
although they never realize us. This anticipates on Lacan's theory of fantasy as the 'real stuff' of the virtual 
subject.  
69
 For example: the 'encounter with God' is not joyful, but painful (or to be more precise: it is both; this 
runs ahead of Lacan's notion of jouissance).
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several associative chains and is therefore overdetermined. Several associative elements 
compose a dream-image and other ‘formations of the unconscious’, that therefore do not 
have a single referent (for instance: a character in a dream is an 'assembly' of traits of 
different persons). Those ‘metaphorical formations’ do however form a link between a 
person’s conscious life and the reality of his unconscious. They represent (present in 
reality) the inaccessible real. Lacan therefore describes the Freudian process of 
condensation as a metaphorical process (cf. S.11, 247). By means (or media) of 
association and composition there is a representation of something that does not exist as 
such (remember the two basic principles of selection and compositing that characterize 
most computer applications). Lacan calls this ‘thing’ real and considers it to be present 
only at the level of psychical reality. The metaphor is therefore always a substitution. It 
substitutes a 'real presence' that is impossible. And as Andrew Darley (2000) describes, 
the computer deals with this impossible real, as a machine that can present photo-
realistic representations of impossible, non-existing worlds and phenomena. For Lacan 
it is exactly the metaphorical dimension of language that precludes that the truth of 
being (in the metaphysics of presence: the Idea, God, Logos) can be represented in exact 
language. All reality can therefore be said to be metaphorical. We never see 'reality as it 
really is', but always via (conceptual) frameworks. The displays of the computerized 
world that surround us are the new frameworks, in which we design reality via the 
metaphorization of data. 
Interface-metaphors represent data-objects that do not have a phenomenal 
existence (they are, to speak in Kantian terms, of the noumenal dimension). 
Information-design transforms the data-objects into something visible or 
understandable, something meaningful (objects of representation). And this 
transformation is not completely ‘objective’ because the digitized real world does not 
possess in itself a structure or form according to which it should appear. For what is the 
true form a data-object? As it appears on your computer display, or on mine? And what 
is the true representation of cyberspace? Is it a huge brain (Pierre Lévy's  'Collective 
Intelligence'), a database, or a medium? And if we digitize a dog into a data-object, 
what would subsequently be the 'essential form' of a dog? A Tamagochi? … the 
meaning of a dog reduced to the exact codes by which it is communicated? And even if 
objects did have a true form, this form might be impossible to retrieve. For example: 
whatever amount of information on the Big Bang we may have, it will be impossible to 
visualize it in a virtual reality environment in its true form, because the event withdraws 
itself from its (technological) imaging. Platonism (the doctrine of the true form) is hard 
to maintain in the digital age. 
Therefore truth cannot be equated – in the modern scientific sense of Descartes – 
with exactitude of the representation.  For the human subject also determines the form 
in which the real object is represented: this is the ‘Kantian revolution’ that is so 
important for an understanding of the digital age. Needs, interests and desires of the 
user determine the way the data-object appears on the computer display. Thus it may 
already become a little clearer that for Lacan fantasy is the dimension that we must not 
exclude when we consider the Cartesian ideal of exact representation. Even more so, 
fantasy is actually the 'content' of this format of representation. There is a gap between 
the object and its correct representation. In this gap the (unconscious) functioning of 
fantasy takes place, as a metaphorical (trans)formation of data into a new 'face' of 
reality. For McLuhan media are already such interfaces. 
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 For McLuhan the spoken word is the first technology by which man grasps his 
environment in a new way (and Lacan shares this opinion). The metaphors that 
intersperse speech hence have a constitutive function. But not just the spoken and the 
written word, also optical, mechanical and electronic technologies are according to 
McLuhan throughout history ‘active metaphors’ and ‘translators’ between man and 
world.
 “All media are active metaphors in their power to translate experiences into new 
 forms” (McLuhan, 1994, 57). 
[J]ust as a metaphor transforms and transmits experience, so do the media” (id. 
59).
However, we must be careful not to take metaphors literally, though this can be very  
tempting in case of the (metaphorical) worlds that computers create. "This kind of 
mistake happens because, first, people use metaphors unconsciously, and, secondly, 
because you must use metaphor to understand most of what happens in a computer" 
(Lakoff, 1995, 128). This is the conundrum we are in: we inevitably 'live in metaphors' 
and at the same time we must avoid the seduction of taking them literally. So: 'Wo Es 
war …'. Freudian theory makes us aware of the trap that goes along with fantasy's 
metaphorical production of reality. 
2. Fantasy: either 'natural' or 'artificial'? 
2.1. Freudian theory: fantasy appears as a 'natural' mediation
Freud's discovery of psychical reality as the proper domain of psychoanalytical 
investigations implies that a depth-psychological investigation of the screen that 
connects man and computer cannot simply depart from an 'objective' reality'. The notion 
of psychical reality means that there is a reality of desire that revolves around drives and 
their psychical representations. The drives do not have a natural object in 'objective 
reality'; their objects are psychical constructions. The undiluted distinction between 
reality and imagination hence loses its signification: the representations of the drive are 
just as much a fictitious reality as a real fiction (Bernet, 1996, 182). Because the objects 
that seem to correspond 'naturally' to the drives are already fantasmatic projections, man 
– as a libidinous being – always already lives a 'life on the screen'. Therefore the 
computer screen may be more than merely a medium that leads us away from reality to 
fictionality. 
 Just like technology is at first sight a rational means to achieve a transparent 
goal, man's drives seem to be natural means to fulfill biological needs. However, in both 
cases one 'forgets' the fantasmatic element that functions as a screen between man and 
world. In order to clarify this mediation Lacan accentuates Freud's saying that the drives 
are actually our myths. 
“The drives are our myths, said Freud. This must not be understood as a 
reference to the unreal. For it is the real that the drives mythify, as myths usually 
do: here it is the real which creates [fait] desire by reproducing therein the 
relationship of the subject to the lost object” (Lacan, 1996, 418). 
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The drives mythify our real aspect of existing as defective beings, as decentered or split 
subjects. They mythify the fact that we are not whole ('not-all'), by (psychically) 
reproducing the relation of the desiring subject towards the (lost, real) object. As myths 
tell stories about origins, the drive ‘fantasizes’ about its object. Therefore the drive 
apparently has a ‘natural’ object; only at first hand it is ‘natural’. This formation of the 
object is so original that we seem to have a natural relation to the outside world. It is for 
that reason that Freud comes to the remarkable conclusion that original fantasies appear 
to be instinctual in man. 
“When Freud asked himself whether there was anything comparable to the 
‘instinct in animals’, he found the equivalent not in the drives (Triebe) but in 
primal fantasies.70 It is a valuable clue, since it demonstrates indirectly his 
unwillingness to explain fantasy on biological grounds: far from deriving 
fantasy from the drives, he preferred to make them dependent on earlier fantasy 
structures” (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1984, 23). 
Fantasy provides the coordinates for our ‘natural’ relation to the world. For instance: the 
woman that sexually attracts me is not the natural object of my (sexual) desire. She only 
appears as natural because she fits within the fantasmatic coordinates that direct my 
drives. Lacan follows with the thesis that ‘there is no sexual relation’. With Freud he 
shares the idea that the object [a] of the drive is actually a matter of our deepest 
fantasies:
“after the mapping of the subject in relation to the [object] a, the experience of 
the fundamental fantasy becomes the drive” (S.11, 273). 
Similarly, the experience of being present in the 'here and now' appears a simple 
natural fact. It nevertheless contains an important element of construction, and it is for 
that reason that (virtual reality) technologies can achieve a strong sense of presence - of 
actually being somewhere (else). Theories of the (psychological) construction of 
presence are consequently of the uttermost importance for those technologies. As Frank 
Biocca states: "We have been present in this environment for so long and it is so natural, 
that the idea that presence might be a psychological construct is only raised by 
philosophers and perceptual psychologists" (Biocca, 1997, § 5.3) 
 The fantasies that (unconsciously) shape our world defy analysis most and are 
laborious to grasp. Because we disguise those fantasies by 'living in them', dreamlike 
elements penetrate our 'alert life'. "How can wish-fulfilling fantasy function with the 
psychic force of dream, since when we entertain such a fantasy we are awake and hence 
know all along that it is only a fantasy? It can function in this way because the mind 
disguises not only the unconscious desires that animate fantasy, but also the fact that it 
is through fantasy that these desires are realized; that is, fantasy itself is also disguised 
… It is disguised through the … projection of fantasy onto the world in such a way that 
one's actions are dictated by fantasy" (Allen, 1995, 136). When the 'effect' ('affection') 
of wish-fulfilling fantasies is fully unconscious, fantasmatic reality appears as a natural 
environment that covers all there is (a sort of subjective idealism). However, when one 
holds that there is a simple and strict separation of reality and (conscious) fantasy, the 
70
 S. Freud, ‘The unconscious’ [1915], S.E. 14, 195; ‘From the history of an infantile neurosis’ [1918], 
S.E. 17, 120, footnote. 
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realm of imagination is nothing but an imaginary illusion separated from 'objective 
reality'. I will hold that fantasy can and should not be reduced to either one of those 
positions. Then we can see how it functions as a subjective element in 'objective reality'. 
In order to do so, I will sketch Freud's 'first position' in the theory of fantasy, wherein 
one can find a rather strong distinction between reality and fantasy. This position leads 
to a view of cyberspace as a realm of imagination that either (euphorically) liberates or 
(dispiritedly) alienates us from reality. At the same time this description is the first step 
in a theory of fantasy that goes beyond the strict separation of reality and illusion. 
2.2. Fantasy as imitation: hallucinatory wishfulfillment 
The interface technologies that lead us into cyberspace prove that one cannot detach 
technology from desire. "This is the now standard fantasy in computer graphics about 
the new worlds opened up by computer technology: new spaces where all the old limits 
might be transcended" (Chesher, 1999, 79). Digital technologies promise to transcend 
reality and to reconnect us to the paradise that reality has taken from us. Down with the 
detours and delays of reality: instant gratification! With the computer we can connect to 
porn sites that satisfy  sexual wishes, we can be the hero of our own (game)world, etc. 
The classical description of cyberspace as a 'consensual hallucination' (William Gibson) 
designates its intimate relationship with desire. By merely imagining our desires as 
fulfilled cyberspace fulfills our desires in a hallucinatory way. Cyberspace as an 
electronic realization of the fantasies accompanying and supporting the technological 
enterprise, which proves the love affair of man with technology.71
In many cases these fantasies boil down to the notion that technology offers us 
means to surpass the limits that reality imposes upon us: it offers us to relieve us from 
the burdens of reality. From a Freudian perspective this wish-fulfilling aspect of 
technology functions as the realized fantasies of a hallucination. What we cannot have 
in reality, we can have via the fantasy-screen (of the computer). As a 'consensual 
hallucination' cyberspace would be the new ideal world, or - by contrast - nothing more 
than merely an imaginary illusion. In order to better understand such a sharp distinction 
between reality and illusion, and look from a Freudian perspective at cyberspace as 
either surpassing reality or as a loss of it (which depends on ones evaluation of its 
transcending capacities) we must take a close look at the (first) Freudian model of 
fantasy. 
Although it is nearly impossible to make a clear demarcation among Freud's 
different uses of the notion "fantasy"  – which, consequently, I will not do – it is clear 
that Freud uses fantasy first of all as what we would call ‘fantasizing’. Fantasy then is 
the hallucinatory fulfillment of wishes that cannot be satisfied in ‘real life’. The 
paradigmatic example of this kind of fantasy is the daydream. In 'Hysterical Phantasies 
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 Deborah Lupton describes the inherent antagonism in this love affair of man and computer. It 
anticipates the issue of the (human-computer interface as a) fantasy screen that is both opening up and 
fending off the unknown dimension of reality. "The relationship between users and PCs is similar to that 
between lovers or close friends. An intimate relationship with others involves ambivalence: fear as well 
as pleasure. As we do with people we feel are close to us, we invest part of ourselves in PCs. We struggle 
with the pleasures and fears of dependency: to trust is to reap the rewards of security, but it is also to 
render ourselves vulnerable to risk. Blurring the boundaries between self and other calls up abjection, the 
fear and horror of the unknown, the indefinable … Computer users, therefore, are both attracted towards 
the promises of cyberspace, in the utopian freedom from the flesh, its denial of the body, the opportunity 
to achieve a cyborgian seamlessness and to 'connect' with others, but are also threatened by its potential to 
engulf the self and expose one's vulnerability to the penetration of enemy others" (Lupton, 2000, 487). 
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and their relation to Bisexuality' (1908) Freud writes: “These phantasies are 
satisfactions of wishes proceeding from deprivation and longing” (S.E. 9, 159). This 
notion of fantasy is very clear and gives it a well-defined position. Fantasy is an illusion 
that does not take into account the demands and constraints that reality imposes upon 
us. What is called the ‘central usage’ of fantasy in Freud’s work hence functions as the 
pivotal notion for distinguishing reality from illusion. It is therefore not surprising that 
during the Controversial Discussions (see also § 4.4.) Anna Freud (who puts a strong 
emphasis on the role of the ego in her father’s conceptualization of the mind as 
consisting of Id, ego, and superego) adopted this usage, to be followed later on by the 
ego-psychologists (Bott Spillius, 2001, 362), who focus on the integrative and 
organisatory functions of the ego and thus develop the adaptive point of view that 
presupposes a concordance between man’s inner world and his surrounding world.  
 Freud’s so-called ‘central usage’ of fantasy originates in his theory of auto-
eroticism. Freud discovers that in the first stages of the development of the drive (oral, 
anal), it finds it satisfaction at the own body. When, for instance, the child sucks on its 
thumb it repeats the (oral) pleasure of sucking on the breast that originally went along 
with the taking in of food. This auto-eroticism functions according to the pleasure 
principle governing the most ‘primitive’ processes in the psychic system that Freud 
therefore calls primary processes. In these energy floats freely, with no ‘regulation’ by 
the laws that govern social reality. The pleasure principle supplies the only rule: to 
avoid displeasure or, when the tension is too high, to gain pleasure through a discharge 
of energy. So when I am angry I shout or hit, and when I am horny I surf the Internet 
porno sites and masturbate. The pleasure of the porn-surfer is thus an auto-erotic and 
'masturbatory' pleasure via a computerized, 'hallucinatory' visualization of a fantasmatic 
scene that arouses sexual desire. Hallucination is the fastest way of constructing pictures 
(in the mind, or 'materialized' via the computer) that appear to resemble earlier 
satisfactions, and thus to (re)gain satisfaction.72 For the primary processes it is of no 
interest that the screen is an ‘imaginary shortcut’ towards a satisfying object. All it cares 
about is that the object is perceived as being satisfactory. It only focuses on an ‘identity 
in perception' (‘Wahrnehmungsidentität’): ‘this is a picture that provides me 
satisfaction, so let’s use it’.  
In The Interpretation of Dreams (1900) Freud describes this primitive 
functioning of the psychical apparatus as follows:  
“we were already able to add a second hypothesis, to the effect that the 
accumulation of excitation … is felt as unpleasure and that it sets the apparatus 
in action with a view to repeating the experience of satisfaction, which involved 
a diminution of excitation and was felt as pleasure. A current of this kind in the 
apparatus, starting from unpleasure and aiming at pleasure, we have termed a 
‘wish’… The first wishing seems to have been a hallucinatory cathecting of the 
memory of satisfaction” (S.E. 5, 598).
In ‘Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning’ (1911) Freud comes 
closest to a formal definition of fantasy. Here he connects fantasy explicitly to the 
pleasure principle. Fantasy then is a (auto-erotic) refinding of pleasure by hallucinating 
the object of the wish.
72 The fantasmatic scenes that the porn-surfer constantly retrieves express the (fantasmatic) fixations of 
his desires: in that sense "free surfing" can attribute to self-knowledge.  
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“A general tendency of our mental apparatus, which can be traced back to the 
economic principle of saving expenditure [of energy], seems to find expression 
in the tenacity with which we hold on to the sources of pleasure at our disposal, 
and in the difficulty with which we renounce them. With the introduction of the 
reality principle one species of thought-activity was split off; it was kept free 
from reality-testing and remained subordinated to the pleasure principle alone.73
This activity is phantasying, which begins already in children’s play, and later, 
continued as day-dreaming, abandons dependence on real objects” (S.E. 12, 
222).
 Freud considers a specific relationship between fantasy and sexuality. Sexuality, 
a broad notion, contains all activities that generate in one way or another pleasurable 
feelings in one of the erogenous zones of the body.74 As the sexual drive could long-
lastingly find satisfaction with its own body, and was thus not subjected to the reality 
principle, the field was open to the fantasies that accompanied it. Since the sexual drive 
must also – although with delay – find its object in the external world in order for the 
subject to stay healthy, those fantasies are particularly vulnerable to repression. They 
may be impossible in the socialized world, or become unacceptable for the subject 
himself. When, in the case of the masturbatory act, “the subject renounces this type of 
satisfaction, composed of masturbation and phantasy, the action is given up, while the 
phantasy, from being conscious, becomes unconscious” (S.E. 9, 161). Sexual fantasies 
play a central role in mental life, despite – or rather: because of – the fact that they in 
particular meet the fate of repression, which is why Freud calls them “the weak spot in 
our psychical organization” (S.E. 12, 223). This repression creates the psychic 
disposition towards neurosis in man, the conflict between unconscious desires and 
conscious control. That sexuality is actually the weak spot in our psychical organization 
is proven by the fact that many (predominantly male) users of the Internet cannot resist 
the temptation to seek sexual pleasure via the computer screen. Sex is still the biggest 
business on the net, offering such a massive electronic hallucination of gratifying 
objects.
3. Fantasy at the interface: windows of perception 
3.1. Fantasy: from lure to the condition of reality 
In her 2002 Freud Lecture at the Sigmund Freud Society in Vienna, the prominent 
Internet (psycho)analyst Sherry Turkle describes cyberspace as what some have called - 
following the terminology of Erik Erikson - a "psychosocial moratorium". Cyberspace 
offers a "time out" of reality, in which people can experiment with their identity. As 
Freud describes fantasizing as a "time out" during reality testing, Turkle interprets 
cyberspace as such an always-available playground. "Time in cyberspace reworks the 
73
 “In the same way, a nation whose wealth rests on the exploitation of the produce of its soil will set 
aside certain areas for reservation in their original state and for protection from the changes brought about 
by civilization (E.g. Yellowstone Park).”  
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 We must remember here that Freud discovers that the ‘sexual’ drive always–already is made up of 
different partial drives that center around erogenous zones (mouth, anus, even the eye). This allows him 
to formulate in ‘Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality’ his ‘scandalous’ theory of infantile sexuality. 
We must stress here that this ‘sexuality’ of the partial drives is not equal to what we normally consider 
sexuality, d.i. genital sexuality, that according to Freud only becomes dominant with puberty. 
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notion of moratorium because it may now exist on an always-available "window"" 
(Turkle, 2002, §4). The opinion that there is a sharp distinction between reality and the 
fantasy-space of cyberspace does not necessarily result from this. For she appeals to 
Erikson in order to bring forward that this withdrawal from reality is necessary for 
personal identity itself. "Relatively consequence-free experimentation facilitates the 
development of a "core self", a personal sense of what gives life meaning that Erikson 
called "identity"" (Turkle, 2002, §4). Translated in Freudo-Lacanian terminology 
Turkle's remarks signify that cyberspace is not merely a fantasy reserve for the pure 
functioning of the pleasure principle. It is also a window for gaining insight in what 
actually is the object of desire. As a staging of the drives it may offer a blindly desiring 
subject a view of what it wants and what kind of object responds to that. As such it is 
the condition for fantasizing: only when one knows what one wants, one can stage the 
objects in imaginary scenes (cf. Bernet, 1996, 175).  
Although the Internet is of course an enormous playground for gaining pleasure 
from imaginary scenes, Turkle also shifts the attention to a 'deeper' aspect: the 
functioning of fantasy as a window. In Freudian theory, these two aspects are closely 
connected, as I will briefly show by means of Freud's central notion of the lost object. 
For Freud the hallucinative experience is a revived experience of earlier, real 
experiences. In the case of imbibing food into ones own body by means of the mother’s 
breast, the real or actual object of the drive (the breast) is lost. Fantasy tries to recover 
this object, but all it can do is to generate a substitutive experience of satisfaction.75
Although Freud uses fantasy as an ‘illusory’ function which does not take reality into 
account, we can already discern the constitutive function of fantasy in it. For it is the 
recovery of the lost, real object that motivates us to confront external reality. Fantasy is 
not solely the opposite of reality but also the (libidinal) motivation of our odyssey 
through reality. This shift has important consequences for a Freudian view of 
cyberspace. For if the fantasy screen is also an indispensable 'window' on reality 
without which reality would not be of much interest to us, the computer screen may also 
be more than simply a window that leads us into an illusory world.  
3.2. Kantian theory: mediating sensations and reality 
The digital revolution transforms the object into an interface.  Accordingly, I showed, 
with Rifkin and Chesher, that information technologies cause another awareness of time 
and space: they alter these fundamental 'schemes' with which we represent reality. In a 
Kantian terminology, we can say that the 'informational imagination' leads to different 
appearances of the world: as – for Rifkin – more programmable, less dependent on 
subjective experience, expandable … As the computer interface gives (a new) form to 
the temporal and spatial dimension of things, it is indeed a medium of (Kantian) 
imagination. Virtual reality may accentuate this. On the basis of (the 'real') data the 
computer transforms sensations of a virtual world into a mental representation of a 
reality by means of "the body as a display device for a mind" (Biocca, 1997, § 1.2.) –  
interfaces as channels of perception.76
75
 To put it in Lacanian terms: fantasy functions as a medium for acquiring the object of the need. Thus it 
constitutes the desiring, and not the indigent, relation to the object.  
76
 One domain in which similar investigations of the interface take place is computerized art. The name of 
the 2001 CYNETart festival was INTERFACES - Channels of Perception. It tried to establish the 
connections between technological and bio-psycho-social interfaces. The general goal of the institute that 
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Many immersive Virtual Reality designers actually consider the body - in 
accordance with the work of perceptual psychologist J. J. Gibson – to be an "array of 
sensors propelled through space to scan, rub, and grab the environment" (Biocca, 1997, 
§ 1.1.). The Virtual Reality interface provides the (chaotic) stimuli, and simultaneously 
causes a coherent perception of (a virtual) reality. The interesting Kantian point to be 
made here is that we should not think of perception as preceding the arrangement made 
by the understanding. With its conceptual apparatus the understanding determines 
perception. Cyberspace, as such an apparatus, therefore may have an enormous 
influence on our perception of things. The conceptual apparatus determines the senses, 
even before perception occurs. This much, as Horkheimer and Adorno already showed 
in 1947, both Kant and Hollywood film production know :  
"Intuitively, Kant foretold what Hollywood consciously put into practice: in the 
very process of production, images are precensored according to the norm of the 
understanding which will later govern their apprehension" (Horkheimer and 
Adorno, in Simmons, 1995, 147). 
Perception is not a 'natural given', but something that makes sensations 
correspond with the category of reality (which is for Kant the first category of quality). 
Judgment, whether something can be affirmed as a reality, comes first. "Perception is 
not prior to the category of reality, underwriting it in some way, but requires that the 
category be given in order to take place" (Caygill, 1995, 345). For Kant reality is a pure 
concept of understanding, "that which corresponds to a sensation in general" (CPR A 
143), a category that affirms the being of something (in time). The understanding must 
judge whether the application of the category of reality to certain sensations is 
legitimate, and therefore must determine whether there is something real in ones 
perception.
As we know, Kant rigorously confines reality to the limits of possible 
experience. The principle of the 'anticipation of perception' determines the quality of 
appearances, its 'degree of reality'. This anticipation is a preconception that allows 
perception to take place. For Kant the 'real' is that which corresponds to sensation in the 
object. The 'anticipation of perception' takes care of the matter that perception is always 
a perception of objects that are real. Without it there might be the (illusory) possibility 
of perceiving objects that are not real. An instantaneous synthesis, "generated in the act 
of apprehension" (CPR A 167), thus anticipates sensation, and its intuitive, spatio-
temporal synthesis (Caygill, 1995, 75). With this theory Kant radically 'deconstructs' 
direct perception. Even he himself found the idea of a pre-intuitive positing perplexing. 
"Nevertheless there must always be something striking about this anticipation of 
perception for a researcher who has become accustomed to transcendental consideration 
and thereby become cautious, and some reservation is aroused about the fact that the 
understanding can anticipate a synthetic proposition of the sort which that concerning 
the degree of everything real in appearance is". (CPR A 175). 
 What we call reality is a matter of (unifying) judgment and of a pre-intuitive 
synthesizing of sensations. For reality to be rightly granted, something real at the level 
of experience must correspond to it. Virtual Reality generates such 'real experiences'. 
That is, the interfaces stimulate different sensory channels: visual (head mounted 
organizes the annual festivals is to focus on the relationship between media-technologies and 
consciousness (http://www.body-bytes.de/tma/index.htm)
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display), aural (spatial audio), tactile (tactile feedback) and proprioceptive (force 
feedback and motion display). This transformation of (the real of) the computer code 
into the physical sensations of the computer output is already a 'synthesizing' activity 
which the computer appropriates itself from the human subject, for whom it is – 
according to Kant - the most elementary activity in relation to the 'object'. The 
technological interface synthesizes that which subsequently becomes an object for our 
intuition: it 'allows our perception to take place'. So already at this level it functions as a 
medium. Even prior to its more amenable functioning as a (Kantian) 'screen of 
imagination' that puts - like a television screen - the 'real object' of the computer codes 
in a spatio-temporal dimension. 
 However, whereas in case of the human subject this 'anticipation of perception' 
must ensure that it is dealing with a real object, the 'computerized subject' - for whom 
the computer establishes the appearances - cannot be so sure of this. So, the question is 
whether there corresponds a 'real' object at the level of experience to the 'codified 
object'. Is the experience that a Virtual Reality installation provides also good enough to 
confine reality to it? Or does it fool us (turn us into hallucinating fools) by making us 
illegitimately apply the category of reality to its simulated experiences? That is, does it 
lead us into the illusion of presence, by exceeding the limits of  (real) experience?  
In her 'Reflections on Real Presence by a Virtual Person' Carrie Heeter 
concludes, "it is the experience itself (the mediated experience) and not technology 
alone that engages the subjective experience of presence" (Heeter, 2003, 344). Real 
presence (here: reality, the experience of  'being there') is not only a matter of sensory 
realism and 'real' sensory stimuli. She illustrates this by her visit to the Space Shuttle. 
Despite the total physical realism, she did not particularly feel as if she was there. 
"Expectations, lack of familiarity, limited prior experience, and limited cognitive 
schemas dampened my sense of presence" (Heeter, 2003, 336). Giving a survey of the 
literature on presence, she brings forward that presence is not a static internal state, but 
varies from moment to moment. And in daily life different individuals experience 
different amounts of presence. Embroidering the so-called Myers-Briggs personality 
test, that classifies people as being either dominantly sensate or intuitive, she refers to 
research results concerning people online. "A majority of people (close to 85 %) are 
sensory types who are 'more at home in the physical material world' … sensate types 
'focus on what is happening in the here and now', whereas intuitives focus on 'the 
abstract, conceptual world of ideas - inferences, theories, daydreams, musings, 
speculations, symbols'. Intuitives and sensates are aware of the physical world 
differently. Presence for an intuitive is likely to be more conceptual, whereas presence 
for a sensate would be more perceptual" (Heeter, 2003, 338). Furthermore, there is a 
difference between numerous moments of moderate presence and peak moments of 
extreme presence:  
"Some individuals are probably presence junkies, seeking intensity all the time. 
Others are the opposite, avoiding being present as much as possible" (Heeter, 
2003, 339). 
An interesting variation on this is that we are both, only at different times. She rejects 
the dichotomy of perception ('perceptual processing') as presence, and conception 
('conceptual processing') as absence. Both can evoke presence, as long as they are tied 
to current sensory stimuli. "Presence occurs during periods of time when cognition 
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(processes such as perception, attention, learning, thought, and affect) is closely tied to 
current perceptual stimuli" (Heeter, 2003, 340). So, as her Space Camp mission 
illustrates, presence may be lower during a real visit with inadequate conceptual 
processing (high expectations of what it would be like to be on a space shuttle, no sense 
of danger, little knowledge of and experience with the shuttle …), than during a virtual, 
simulated visit with better conceptual processing.  
The 'Kantian' conclusion is that for 'real presence' the objects must (also) 
conform, or pattern themselves to, the human subject. It is not simply sensory realism 
that takes the measure of presence. Presence is the result of the interfacing of the real 
(stimuli) and the virtual (mind). It is presence for a subject, restricted by the point that 
the subject must have some sort of sensory experience of the (real) object. And that is 
what computers can do: they transform the object into interfaces that we can physically 
experience. In that sense, the human subject would be inclined to apply the category of 
reality to it 
3.3. Freudo-Lacanian theory: desirable reality 
Beside this functioning of the computer interface as a screen that transforms various 
perceptual sensations into certain appearances (the Kantian transcendental imagination) 
that we judge successfully or otherwise as a 'real presence', there is furthermore the 
(psychoanalytical) issue of a 'desirable presence', of making the appearances into certain 
objects of desire. The subject of desire posits its own unconscious fantasies ('schemes') 
in the production of objects, as well as in their consumption. This is what Teresa 
Brennan asserts in her essay on the role of foundational psychical fantasies in our 
current technological world. She stresses the (Freudian) point that consumer goods 
encapsulate foundational fantasies. The desire for instant gratification, the desire to 
imitate the original, the desire for the mother are part of an original human condition. "I 
want to propose that the desires encapsulated in commodities reflect an underlying 
transhistorical psychical fantasy. In other words, I am proposing that we treat the 
commodity as an external expression of that fantasy" (Brennan, 1993, 94). Giving a free 
utilization, this would imply that we constantly buy the same consumer goods (are 
attracted to them) because they express transhistorical fantasies. In her Electronic Eros
Claudia Springer shows that a similar desire, the desire to merge (with technology) 
permeates many expressions of popular culture. And Raymond Barglow's work may 
support the idea that 'constitutive myths' pervade information technologies, as he 
maintains that they assume many maternal characteristics: "as providers of information, 
they are bounteous mothers of a kind … Much mythology is built up around mothers: 
that they are all-knowing, all-powerful, limitless nourishing" (Barglow, 1996, 132). This 
'mythology' is actually built-in technology. For instance in the voice control system in 
the cockpit of the Eurofighter jet the (mostly male) pilot can perform tasks using his 
voice; a computer voice gives him the information he asks for. Intriguing is that this 
computer voice is female. Because the pilots react best on a female voice. Or as one of 
the pilots stated: "mama knows best". The affective relationship with the computer 
voice leads to better performances. 
Freudo-Lacanian theory depicting fantasy as what 'rules' the formation of the 
desirable object teaches us an awareness of a deep psychological structuration of the 
world. Much more than we are aware of, fantasy organizes our perception of the world. 
And technologies actually seem to embody this psychological level. I will give one 
more example, coming from Clifford Nass, a leading theorist who focuses on the 
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relationship between technology and psychology. He discovered some interesting 
phenomena in Voice User Interface design. First of all that people react the same to a 
synthesized voice as to a natural one. Secondly that there is an important role of fantasy 
in the perception of a computer voice: a 'male' computer voice is often perceived as 
competent and concise, whereas 'female' computer voices are supposed to be better in 
communicating on topics such as relationships and love (cf. Nass et al, 2003).77
Fantasy as a medium that supports reality by making it an attractive or engaging 
process (beyond our 'instrumental' involvement), may be illustrated by taking a crucial 
passage from The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis (pp. 178-180) where 
Lacan uses a very instructive distinction about man's interfacing with technological 
media. He distinguishes between the English terms ‘aim’ and ‘goal’ in order to “clear 
up the mystery of the Zielgehemmt” (p. 179). A partial drive can reach its aim, which is 
to attain satisfaction, without achieving its goal, the realization of its biological 
function. Fantasy as a medium that constructs the drive's object can provide satisfaction 
- and actually does so in most of the cases - without fulfilling ('natural') needs. 
According to Lacan this duplicity characterizes man: the drive aims at a continuation of 
satisfaction and not merely at a fulfillment of a need. It is this excess of pleasure that 
accounts for much of man's construction of reality.78 In man's electronic realities we can 
find the same functioning of fantasy-objects as media that support reality and provide 
pleasure. The cell phone, for instance, sustains the construction of a reality of mobile 
communication. And it is obvious that it does so by providing pleasure (of chatting) and 
enjoyment (of contemplating the beauty of the latest gadgets). It is an example of an 
object that gives a new shape to our world. 
 Cyberspace in general will – as a space wherein we are always 'transcendentally' 
involved – not appear to be a reality without the functioning of (transcendental) fantasy. 
Online psychotherapy, and online relationships in general, would be uninteresting – and 
hence stop – without (unconsciously) positing something in the impressions that we get 
from the other on the screen. The whole sexual thing on the Internet would stop without 
its fantasmatic support. For if we would simply measure it against 'true, face to face 
reality', we would immediately realize that it is not real, and quit surfing. Online virtual 
worlds are also an expression of fantasy but, as many users endorse, it is far from 
merely being an imaginary illusion: they 'live in it'. Because of this creation of a world 
by means of a (fantasmatic) screen I cannot share John Suler's conclusion that we may 
become free to enjoy cyberspace as we wish, that is without unconscious 
'(de)formation'. For as long as we wish – and that is something we hopefully always will 
keep on doing – there will always be 'unconscious strings attached' (at the very least in 
the broad, transcendental-psychological sense that I try to describe here). Suler: 
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 For a recording of Nass speaking on this subject at Stanford University:                                                                                
http://murl.microsoft.com/videos/stanford/CS547b/001201_OnDemand_100_100K_320x240.htm
 Combining Nass' conclusions with the previous example on fighter pilots, one apparently must 
conclude that - for pilots - the effects of communicating with a computer are optimal when its 'cold' 
capacities of competence are wrapped up in a 'warm' form: the pilot's situation seems to require a 
sufficient sense of trust. 
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 I will elaborate this relationship between loss and excessive pleasure (jouissance) in chapter six. Both 
themes converge in Lacan's notion of the object a, that I will introduce here by rendering Lacan's 
description of it in case of the oral drive: “It is not introduced as the original food, it is introduced from 
the fact that no food will ever satisfy the oral drive, except by circumventing the eternally lacking object” 
(S.11, 180). 
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"Healthy online relationships are those in which we realize that our perceptions are not 
always accurate. Other people are other people, not extensions of our beliefs or ghosts 
in our machine. Given the complexities of transference reactions, this isn't always easy 
to do. As Otto Kernberg was fond of saying about unraveling transference in 
psychotherapy, one must continually ask, "Who is doing what to whom?" Once we fully 
realize that the computer AND online others aren't our Moms, Dads, Sisters, or 
Brothers, we become free to enjoy cyberspace in the ways that we wish, without any 
unconscious strings attached" (Suler, 1998). 
 Indeed, we must come to realize that our perceptions are not accurate. That is 
what I tried to do in my exposition of (fantasy as) the window of perception. But then, 
exactly, one comes to the awareness that we cannot do away with the screen, for there is 
no ‘true reality’ behind it. Reality is always affected by desire. I will shortly discuss this 
issue in psychotherapy. 
3.3.1. Psychotherapy: transforming, not eliminating, fantasy 
The Freudo-Lacanian issue of fantasy governing the perception of reality itself entails 
that the truth of a fantasy has nothing to do with a correspondence with an objective 
reality (cf. Bernet, 1996, 180-3). Evaluating fantasies is not so much a matter of reality 
as it is of truth. A psychoanalyst does not try to liberate his patient from so-called 
‘unrealistic fantasies’. More so, to deny being a subject of desire results not in 
autonomous freedom but in pathology. Let's say that my unconscious fantasy in writing 
this work is to establish myself as a great philosopher. My psychoanalyst would 
subsequently not try to show me that this is an unrealistic fantasy and that I also can be 
happy and satisfied when writing this work helps me to find a job as a scholar etc. It is 
not simply reality that takes the measure of my fantasies, but the truth of desire, which 
is that there is no reality in which my desires are satisfied: even if I become a great 
philosopher this is ‘not all’. Another example. We cannot say that it is 'unrealistic' to 
buy consumer goods that attract us, and hold that they have nothing to do with reality. 
What we can, or even must, say is that we must not be deluded by the idea that they are 
the true objects of satisfaction (as they try to present themselves).  
 So what first of all is at stake in psychoanalytic therapy is that I come to realize 
that I am subjected to a fantasmatic formation of desire. Than the issue becomes 
recognizing the content of my desires. It is about gaining insight, and from that point on 
trying to relate differently to the (problematic or pathological) fantasmatic formation 
and enjoyment of my desires. It is not about the elimination of fantasmatic mediation. 
For the fantasies that might motivate my writing are also what create a valuable reality 
for me. They just must not become a prison. This insight through articulation in ‘the 
structure from which everything gets a meaning for a specific subject’ (the fundamental 
fantasy) is called ‘subjective destitution’. The end of analysis consists of a 
transformation of myself, a ‘destitution’ of the place from which I believed or supposed 
that I desired (in fantasy). This change in the relationship between subject and object of 
desire often manifests itself as a melancholic depression or a maniacal enthusiasm. They 
indicate a transformation of the subject’s relation to the formation of his unconscious 
desires, to his unconscious enjoyment. 
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4. Origins of interface subjectivity 
4.1. Historical sketch of the notion fantasy: between perception and understanding 
The word fantasy (‘Phantasie', 'fantasme') derives from the Greek words ‘phantasma’ 
and ‘phantasia’: appearance. In Latin ‘phantasma’ became ‘fantom’. In the philosophy 
of Plato ‘phantasia’ mostly has this meaning of appearance (Camassa, 1989, 515). In his 
Republic he links ‘phantasia’ to the concept of mimesis. At the height of ancient Greek 
culture mimesis had a broad range of meanings: imitation, copying, reproducing, but 
also portraying, depicting, representing and producing. In the Republic Plato states that 
the painter copies (false) appearances and not the true world; his work hence is 
necessarily fake. He produces, what Plato later calls in his Philebus, a ‘phantasma’: a 
bad copy that only appears as a likeness to the ‘real thing’. The good copy (the ‘eikon’) 
on the other side truly participates in the Idea of the thing: it approaches the ideal (cf. 
Doel/Clarke, 1999, 277). In his Sophist Plato distinguishes explicitly between the two 
forms of mimesis. The one form imitates the invariable model faithfully and can 
therefore be called a true copy or true representation. The other form produces a 
deceiving likeness and is therefore false.79
 Aristotle defines ‘phantasia’ (provisionally) as a capacity to produce images 
without an actual affection of the senses: for there also appear images when the eyes are 
shut. Fantasy takes us beyond the actual sight of sense perception. For Aristotle as well 
as  for Plato, ‘phantasia’ as a capacity of the soul, is ambivalent with regards to truth 
(Camassa, 1989, 517). But the two agree for opposite reasons. According to Aristotle 
sense perception constitutes what is true. Thinking, however, may be false. ‘Phantasia’ 
as what is in between these two instances can go either way as far as its truth is 
concerned. Aristotle defines phantasia most prominently in De Anima III.3:  
"phantasia is that in virtue of which we say that a phantasma [an appearance] 
occurs to us" (Aristotle, 1986, 428a1).  
The most interesting aspect of Aristotle's thoughts on fantasy is that he, especially in his 
De Anima, understands ‘phantasia’ as a capacity that causes things to appear in a certain 
way. Thus the attention shifts from fantasy as (illusory) imagination to fantasy as 
(truthful) appearance. As such a productive capacity, 'phantasia' creates conceptions
(‘phantasma’) in the process of thinking. In the process of remembering it creates 
mental pictures (‘eikon’). And in sleep it produces dream-images (‘eidolon’, 
‘phantasma’). Furthermore, it establishes ideas that function as the goal that motivates 
human action or the movements of organisms (as such a faculty that excites or enthuses 
living entities, it seems not far removed from Lacan's notion of fantasy). Fantasy thus 
occupies a central role in human existence, for it determines significantly how the world 
appears to us: it is the cause of appearance.80
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 Although Plato is ambivalent with regard to the truth-value of mimesis, in general mimesis has a 
somewhat pejorative meaning in his thinking: it refers to something that is not true. And the same goes 
for fantasy. As he situates ‘appearances’ in the Sophist as a mixture of perception and opinion (‘doxa’) it 
still belongs to an inferior understanding of the world, for it does not belong to the order of pure thinking 
that can offer true insight in the unchanging forms of the eternal world.  
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 Some commentators use "to cause to appear" to translate the root verb of  'phantasia', phantazo. In this 
highlighting of  'phantasia' as appearance, and not as imagination, Martha Nussbaum for instance "focuses 
the attention in the definition Aristotle gives of phantasia: "that in virtue of which we say that a 
phantasma occurs to us," on the phrase "occurs to us." Phantasia is the capability that we have not only 
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In Aristotle’s thought ‘phantasia’ occupies an intermediate position between 
sense perception and the intellect. This feature has since then become a classical notion 
in the understanding of fantasy. It found its way into the philosophy of Aquinas, who 
accepted it as self-evident in his commentary on De anima, via Renaissance 
philosophers such as Ficino and Pico della Mirandola to the work of Kant. In order to 
get a closer look at this fundamental role of fantasy in human reality I will extrapolate 
the discussion of fantasy to this pivotal thinker of Western modernity. The philosophical 
work of Immanuel Kant attributes a transcendental role to the imagination: it conditions 
our experience in a way that cannot be overcome. No experience of reality outside the 
frame constituted by the imagination. With Kant's thinking it is impossible to go beyond 
the formations that the imagination imposes upon our reality.81 The imagination 
produces reality. 
The equation of ‘phantasia’ with the meaning of (productive) imagination which 
is nowadays current, is historically nevertheless not the first time this has happened. It 
was Philostratus (170 - 244/249), one of the leading sophists or orators of his time, who, 
with his famous comparison between ‘phantasia’ and mimesis, stands at the threshold of 
our common conception of fantasy. He holds ‘phantasia’ for a wiser artist than imitation 
that only reproduces what it has seen. For ‘phantasia’ produces also what it has not 
seen, and posits it as a substitution for reality (cf. Camassa, 1989, 521). 
So already from the beginnings of Western philosophy fantasy seems to be the 
condition for virtuality (or, to switch back to the theme of the previous chapter, of the 
virtual subject of the signifier). It is the capacity to produce images of objects without 
the 'real presence' of the objects. By presenting (virtually) an object that is not 
immediately present (but 'in absentia'), fantasy sustains reality's virtual character. 
Without this constitutive function of fantasy in human existence, virtual reality would 
be impossible: cows do not interface with cyberspace. In this sense, fantasy is 
constitutive for the technological enterprise. 
4.2. The (unconscious) productive imagination: from Kant to Freud 
In his Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (1798) Kant distinguishes 
‘phantasia’ (that is here equivalent to ‘Einbildungskraft’, imagination) into a “faculty of 
the original representation of the object (exhibition originaria)”, that is to say preceding 
the perception of the object, and “a faculty of the derived representation (exhibition 
derivative), which recalls to mind a previous empirical perception” (Kant, 1974, §28). 
In the Critique of Pure Reason (1789) he describes this distinction as the difference 
between a productive and empirical imagination. The productive imagination is an a 
priori structure of the human understanding that precedes sensibility and hence 
conditions our experience. Productive imagination synthesizes the manifold sense-
impressions by putting them in the dimensions of space and time (like a television 
synthesizes the signals by putting them successively and spatially on the screen), and 
thus causes the world to appear as a coherent whole.  
to perceive an appearance, but also to say that we see it as an appearance of a particular type. Nussbaum 
extends the definition: "phantasia is the faculty in virtue of which the animal sees his object as an object 
of a certain sort." Thus phantasia goes beyond just the perception of an image, to the interpretive power 
of the individual to see that object as something" (Noel, 1997). 
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 In a Lacanian terminology this impossibility is called 'the real', as the 'hard core' of what we experience 
as reality. I will further elaborate this parallel between Kantian and Lacanian thought at the end of this 
chapter. 
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The principle of the necessary unity of the pure (productive) synthesis of the 
imagination prior to apperception is thus the ground of the possibility of all 
cognition, especially that of experience" (Kant, CPR, A 118).  
We do not willingly execute this (synthesizing) activity of the imagination. It is, on the 
other hand, something that conditions - outside of our reflexive self - our ideas or 
constructions of the world. For Kant describes the synthesis in general as "the mere 
effect of the imagination, of a blind though indispensable function of the soul, without 
which we would have no cognition at all, but of which we are seldom even conscious" 
(Kant, CPR, A 78).82
The productive aspect that imagination has in Kantian philosophy shows that 
fantasy is more than the capacity to give an identical representation of the empirical 
object. The issue is that of the ‘disturbance’ between the perception of the object and 
our actual understanding of it. This 'disturbance' may be a matter of defectiveness (a 
flaw in our capabilities for remembering, a neurological deficiency). But this 
inadequacy can also be structural, that is to say it belongs to the human condition itself. 
And this notion of structural inadequacy is what rallies Kantian philosophy and 
psychoanalysis. Freudian psychoanalysis holds that there always is a mental distance 
from the traumatic 'object'. That is why Lacan defines the real (object) as the 
impossible. In Kantian philosophy the object as it is 'in itself' is impossible to get to. 
Because of this 'impossibility' fantasy plays a crucial role as mediation towards the real.  
So this issue of a productive imagination leads us away from Platonism as the 
doctrine of a true correspondence between subject and object (contemplation as a 
reflection of the world in its true form). And brings us from Philostrat via Kant to 
Freud. Kant already emphasizes the ‘unconscious’ aspect of imagination. This aspect is 
obviously present in the poetic or productive imagination: the artist creates what is not 
there in reality. But is it not also ‘working’ in the reproductive imagination that forms 
out memory or recollection? Kant seems to give an affirmative answer to this with his 
transcendental notion of fantasy: I cannot recollect anything without integrating it 
within the mind's horizon of space and time. Freud gives a more concrete form to this 
notion. For him the schemes that fantasmatically mediate the real are not so much 
universal structures but particular 'mental screens' made up of the material of individual 
history. 
 The difficulty of accounting for the ‘unconscious productive imagination’ that 
leads to 'distorted' memories is already discernable in Aristotle’s analysis in De anima,
where this problem is consistently left out. His analysis of ‘phantasia’ have the tendency 
to ignore the moment of the ‘productivity’ as an uncontrollable change of the 
representations, and solely illuminate its constitutive function in knowledge-acquisition 
(Camassa, 1989, 519). Freud focuses exactly on this problem, after having discovered 
that the memories of our (ineluctably sexual) history are always-already affected by 
(unconscious) fantasies. The notion of psychical reality that results from that discovery 
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 And is Lacan not referring to the same mechanism when he brings forward that a 'merging into 
unconsciousness' can result in a crumbled experience of oneself or of the world. The fragmented body can 
manifest itself in dreams, but can also result from the aggressive destruction of the unity that one is. "This 
fragmented body … usually manifests itself in dreams when the movement of analysis encounters a 
certain level of aggressive disintegration of the individual. It then appears in the form of disjointed limbs, 
or of those organs represented in exoscopy, growing wings and taking up arms for intestinal persecution - 
the very same that the visionary Hieronymus Bosch has fixed, for all time, in painting" (Ec., 4). 
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indicates a peculiar psychological field between sense perception and consciousness. 
For Freud this particular field becomes the focal point of his investigations. A field that 
is not reducible to the pretended true registration of the world by means of sense 
perception or the understanding. This connects the psychoanalytical conception of the 
mind to the Kantian. Fantasy is essentially productive and spontaneous; there is no pure 
or clear reproduction of earlier perceptions (Kunz, 1946, 64-65). 
4.3. The origins of Freudian theory: psychical reality and the real as fantasmatic  
In order to illuminate the subjective-objective character of fantasy I will indicate how 
Freudian theory shifted its attention from the real as a real event in objective reality, 
towards the original fantasmatic mediation of the real (as a traumatic core in subjective 
reality). We must therefore recapitulate Freud's original formulations of 
psychoanalytical theory. In the earlier formulations of his theory Freud considers 
fantasies as having been made unconscious by means of ‘forgetting’ or defense. He 
considers the symptoms of his first (hysterical) patients as the result of fantasies that 
were conscious first and later made unconscious. So if the therapy might bring to light 
the real events in infantile life that gave rise to these first conscious fantasies, the 
unconscious fantasy might loosen its grip on the patient. At the outset of his 
development of psychoanalysis Freud devotes his labor (for which he even uses 
hypnosis) to the process of remembering. At the time he still understands the real cause 
of mental states in a scientific-positivistic manner supposing that it can make the real 
present. But this was soon to change.  
 Because of his shocking discovery that infantile scenes are not always true, 
Freud had to revise his idea that by the analysis of symptoms one can get to know the 
infantile scenes that fixate the libido and determine the symptoms. Symptoms can also 
be representations of fantasies! Of those fantasies Freud says: 
“They too posses a reality of a sort. It remains a fact that the patient has created 
these phantasies for himself, and this fact is of scarcely less importance for his 
neurosis than if he had really experienced what the phantasies contain. The 
phantasies possess psychical as contrasted with material reality, and we 
gradually learn to understand that in the world of the neurosis it is psychical 
reality which is the decisive kind” (S.E. 16, 368). 
Thus Freud repeats in 1917, in the twenty-third of his Introductory Lectures on 
Psychoanalysis, the decisive discovery that he first formulates in his famous letter to 
Wilhelm Fliess of the twenty-first of September 1897. In that letter he declares that he 
no longer believes his neurotic patients anymore. Several arguments led to this 
conclusion. First of all the impossibility of bringing the analysis to a real conclusion. 
Secondly, the improbability that every scene of seduction, that so many of his patients 
came up with, really occurred. The perversity of ‘fathers’ towards children could not be 
that widespread. So Freud distances himself from his previous theory of seduction. 
“Then, thirdly, the certain discovery that there are no indications of reality in the 
unconscious, so that one cannot distinguish between the truth and fiction that is 
cathected with affect” (S.E. 1, 260). Fourthly, the consideration that even in the most 
deep going psychosis the unconscious memory does not overcome the resistance of the 
conscious. So there is no reason to expect that in treatment the conscious will 
completely tame the unconscious. 
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 Between 1895 and 1899, the years that completed the discovery of 
psychoanalysis, Freud abandoned his theory of seduction. He no longer believed that a 
trauma that really took place, the seduction by the father or the ‘uncle’, was the cause of 
hysteria. Instead, he discovered the (auto)erotic impulses of childhood (cf. Verhaeghe, 
1999, 28). The scene of seduction is not (necessarily) a real event but a fantasy that 
functions as a cover up of the spontaneous manifestations of sexual activity. In his 
History of the psychoanalytic movement, Freud formulates his decisive discovery as 
follows:  
“If hysterical subjects trace back their symptoms to traumas that are fictitious, 
then the new fact which emerges is precisely that they create such scenes in 
fantasy, and this psychical reality requires to be taken into account alongside 
practical reality. This reflection was soon followed by the discovery that these 
fantasies were intended to cover up the autoerotic activity of the first years of 
childhood, to embellish it and raise it to a higher plane. And now, from behind 
the fantasies, the whole range of a child’s sexual life came to light” (Freud, 
quoted in Laplanche & Pontalis, 1986, 8). 
Freud discovered a connection between sexuality, trauma and defense, and his intention 
now was “to show that it is in the very nature of sexuality to have a traumatic effect” 
(Laplanche & Pontalis, 1986, 9). The insistence of sexual impulses is an urge that needs 
a screen(ing) and an adequate formation. 
4.4. Fantasy in Freudian psychoanalysis: beyond the opposition of reality and illusion 
The notion of fantasy, which is the fundamental object of psychoanalysis (Laplanche & 
Pontalis, 1986, 14), has different meanings that one cannot easily heap together. There 
is its common meaning in which it is equal to the activity of imagination, the capacity of 
the mind to produce images. This is also the way Freud uses it before he discovers its 
more constitutive role for human reality, which led him to use fantasy from 1897 
onwards as a (central) concept of psychoanalysis (Roudinesco & Pion, 1997, 284). 
Psychoanalysis focuses on the role of imaginary worlds and their contents in human 
reality (neurosis and art for example).  
However, a crucial issue is that of consciousness. Are we consciously aware that 
our use of fantasy leads us into an imaginary world that we can distinguish from reality? 
This is the model of daydreaming, as a product of the ego that tries to compensate for its 
(imagined) shortcomings and seeks to realize the imaginary ideal. Or is the indulging in 
fantasies also, or to a large extent, an unconscious activity? Then fantasy is the product 
of the 'unconscious subject' (as Lacan names it) that cannot avoid being (transgressive, 
subversive) to all that is (necessarily) excluded from consciousness. The (fantasmatic 
capacity of the) unconscious subject is then the other side of the process of 
individuation: it sustains individuality by relating the subject in a manageable way to 
what is beyond itself. Thus fantasy would help us construct our reality, without us being 
aware of it. The French language discriminates between ‘fantasme’ and ‘fantaisie’; 
'fantasme' mostly indicates (in psychoanalytic theory) the unconscious 'dreamlike' 
aspect of fantasy, whereas 'fantaisie' rather refers to the products of someone's 
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conscious fantasies. In the German language both aspects are rounded together in the 
only word it knows for fantasy, which Freud also uses: ‘Phantasie’83
 How sharp is the distinction between unconscious and conscious fantasies? For 
there is clearly a difference between the fantasy-work in dreams and in daydreams. This 
was the central issue of the Controversial Discussions in the British Psycho-Analytical 
Society in the nineteen forties (cf. Bott Spillius, 2001). In her paper ‘The Nature and 
Function of Phantasy’, which was first given at the Discussions, Susan Isaacs departs 
from the central role of unconscious fantasies in the work of Melanie Klein in order to 
introduce a distinction between conscious and unconscious fantasies. She suggests the 
graphological use of phantasies for unconscious fantasies, and fantasies for conscious 
ones. Since then the Kleinian school in psychoanalysis - that focuses on the 
'unconscious all along' aspect of fantasy: it is an activity that accompanies all mental 
activity - uses this difference between fantasy and phantasy to stress its conscious or 
(otherwise) unconscious character. As this issue touches upon the theoretical core of 
psychoanalysis, it may not surprise that it has evoked a lot of discussion ever since. Jean 
Laplanche and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis for instance, consider it a superficial distinction 
that does not do justice to the complexity of Freud’s thought. Futhermore, in the 
translations of Freud’s work the double use of terms for the one term ‘Phantasie’ leads 
to arbitrary interpretations (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1998, 156). Although they 
acknowledge the development in Freud’s metapsychological status of fantasy, this does 
not suppress the homology between the different levels of fantasy. Conscious fantasies 
may have a root in unconscious fantasies, and one may be able to 'work through' 
unconscious fantasies. However, when one wants to distinguish fantasy, one must not 
use the barrier between the (pre)conscious and the unconscious system, but one must 
discriminate within the unconscious itself: have the fantasies been unconscious all along 
or have they been forgotten and repressed? (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1986, 21-22). This 
seems to lead to the conclusion that the crucial distinction is between the constitutive 
and pathological origin of fantasies, between fantasies that disclose new aspects of the 
self and those that escape from it. The mind-bending issue of psychoanalysis is the 
distinction between fantasies that constitute (authentic) desire and those that deceive it. 
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 As I approach the notion of fantasy primarily from the Lacanian French movement in psychoanalysis, I 
will illuminate the meaning of the German ‘Phantasie’ first of all via its translation of Freud’s work in 
French. Freud’s first translators in French, Marie Bonaparte and Edouard Pichon, use the word ‘fantasme’ 
(phantasm) in order to stress the conceptual importance (and thus constitutive aspects) of the imaginary 
formations that the German word ‘Phantasie’ expresses. As such they try not to coincide the meaning of 
‘Phantasie’ with ‘fantaisie’ as a purely imaginary activity.  
I use the English word fantasy – and not the word phantasm – to translate the word that Lacan 
uses in his discourse, namely ‘fantasme’. With this word Lacan refers alternately both to the merely 
imaginary and to the constitutive aspects of fantasy. As the word fantasy covers, like the German word 
‘Phantasie’, both these sides, it seems to be the best option. However, it must be added that the meaning 
of the French ‘fantasme’ leans more to the constitutive aspect of ‘dream-like’ images, than to a willing 
production of satisfying images. In other words: in Lacanian psychoanlysis fantasy has probably more to 
do with ‘dreams that govern our daily existence’ (produced by the unconscious subject of desire) than 
with daydreaming as an activity of the ego. In consequence, when I use the word fantasy in my text, I will 
use it – consistent with its  'Kantian-Freudian' conception – with a special interest for its unconscious 
aspect, that is with a focus on the way in which fantasy determines, pre-reflexively, the way the world 
appears to us. When I use it in its conscious aspect ('fantaisie', daydreaming, imaginary compensation) I 
will describe it as a merely imaginary, illusory, form of fantasy.  
85
Can a final distinction ever be drawn? What is my self? Can we say what is real? What 
do I really want? What is healthiness? Can one conclude an analysis?84
 What we can say, is that fantasy in its 'Kantian-Freudian' understanding is an 
'original possibility' of imagining reality, and that it thus transcends the classical 
opposition of reality and illusion. “This opposition antedates psychoanalysis by many 
centuries, but is liable to prove too restrictive both to psychoanalytic theory and 
practice” (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1986, 6). 
5. Fantasy: the model of subjectivation
5.1. The double bind of fantasmatic identification 
For Kant, there are some fields in which we are necessarily involved in some sort of 
illusion. This ‘transcendental illusion’ is not an accidental or avoidable ‘logical illusion’ 
of fallacious judgments and the related ‘empirical illusions’ of subreption (cf. Caygill, 
1995, 244). It  
“is an illusion that we cannot at all avoid any more than we can avoid the 
illusion that the sea seems to us higher in the center than at the shore because we 
see the center through higher light rays than the shore … For here we are dealing 
with a natural and unavoidable illusion that itself rests on subjective principles 
and foists them on us as objective ones” (Kant, CPR, A 297, A 298).  
Kant describes three domains of the natural dialectic of transcendental illusion wherein 
we take the subjective conditions of thinking beyond the limits of empirical experience: 
psychology, cosmology and theology. Thus we come to pose the following ‘objects’: 
the soul, the world as a whole, and God. For the order of psychology this means that we 
assume the 'I' to be an experiential and substantial thing that is a given fact in reality. 
While, conversely, it actually is a regulative Idea of Reason that is indispensable 
(imperative) for a non-fragmented experience of ourselves. Kant gives an account, or 
logic, of the 'unavoidable' illusions that those three domains contain, without claiming 
to remove them. 
 The same movement of transcendental illusion goes for the barred subject of 
Lacanian theory. Žižek: 
"what we call "subjectivization" [which Žižek describes in an Althusserian 
context as:] (recognizing oneself in interpellation, assuming an imposed 
symbolic mandate) is a kind of defense mechanism against an abyss, a gap, 
which "is" the subject … In the domain of "pure reason", the subject of pure 
apperception - S, the empty "I think" - necessarily lapses into the transcendental 
Schein, mistaking itself for a "thinking substance", i.e., falsely assuming that, by 
way of self-consciousness, it has access to itself qua Thing-in-itself … the 
"lapse" designates the shift from subject into subjectivization: in my capacity as 
knowing subject, I "subjectivize" myself by way of recognizing myself as 
"person" in the fullness of its content" (Žižek, 1993, 171-172). 
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 And is a conclusion a matter of truth? Or of force, power, money, authority, tiredness, coincidence, 
ritualism …. ? 
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We necessarily ‘fill in’ the void of the subject by means of identifications: 
‘subjectivation’.85 We assume that as a person we actually have some ‘substantiality’, 
that there is a substance to ourselves. And we necessarily 'imagine' that the object of our 
desire is the real object of our desire and not merely a fantasmatic construction. This 
process of giving content to our transcendental form as desiring subjects is the work of 
fantasy! (Lacan expresses the relationship of the empty subject of the signifier to the 
lost object of satisfaction in his formula of fantasy: S<>a; fantasy interfaces the 
symbolical level and the libidinal level of the object a of enjoyment)  And the human-
computer interface is similar to this fantasmatic process in that it enables the subject to 
explore and stage his libidinal desire in a (cyber)space of signifiers. 
 Fantasmatic subjectivation carries with it that we are necessarily caught in a 
'double bind'. On the one hand we 'naturally' assume that something corresponds to 
everything we strive and long for. For if I think that my partner is nothing more than 
one of the many possible objects of my desire, a male desire that by its transcendental 
structure necessarily aims at some female object, the whole sublimated world of our 
love relationship falls apart.86 I necessarily assume that there is 'something special' in 
her (for me). This 'special thing' is what Lacan calls the agalma or the object a. Desire is 
driven by such 'special things', and therefore it always is 'deformed' or subjectivized. 
There is no pure desire. Desire has no 'true' or 'real' object (the example from the 
previous footnote shows that what we experience as 'our true love' actually is a fantasy-
object in which different orders intermingle). On the other hand – and this is the other 
side of the same question – the truth of desire is that the object it aims at is 'not all' (it is 
not the 'true object').87 This has as an important consequence, as Lacan brings forward 
in his later teachings, that the object of our desire is also our symptom. That this 
symptom has an irremovable aspect that even holds together the consistency of 
subjectivity (the sinthome), confirms once more the double bind.88 Žižek lumps this 
development together in the phrase 'enjoy your symptom!'  
This double bind is desire itself, its (subversive) dialectic. To use the Lacanian 
distinction between the ego and the subject, one could say that the ego is our necessary 
illusion. Lacanian psychoanalysis can be seen as a ‘logic of this illusion’, as an analysis 
of the way in which we are always already caught in a dialectic of the (conscious) self 
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 Both the word 'subjectivation' and 'subjectivization' are in use. I choose for the first one. 
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 This offers a good opportunity to illustrate the Lacanian distinction between the real, the imaginary and 
the symbolic. The real of this male-female relationship is purely physical: he has a penis and she has a 
vagina, and they want to get it on … Being in love is of the imaginary order. And the symbolic order 
exists when one shares one's life with the other. The high level of difficulty of fantasy in Lacan's theory 
results from the fact that fantasy combines those three orders. 
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 Lacanian theory has been criticized for this 'insatiable' desire that would perfectly suit the capitalistic 
tendency of ceaseless more consumption. Nevertheless, one can just as well claim the opposite: 
awareness of the 'illusory' structure of our desire leads to modesty and austerity. The key notion is, as in 
the major philosophies of life, self-knowledge. For Lacan, self-knowledge can only be produced in 
interaction with the other, and not given by an Other (the analyst, God, the beloved, the producer …), or 
via introspection. 
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 In his 1975-1976 seminar Le sinthome Lacan even considers the Oedipus complex as a symptom that 
keeps everything together (S.23, 18-11-1975). The Symptom holds the subject together because there is a 
primal repression that can never be undone (9-12-1975). One can concretize this notion of primal 
repression, which is the result of language, by using a different word for this impossible raising, 
elevation, and neutralization. We cannot rectify our sayings, although we often try to do so by saying that 
'we did not mean it that way', and thus try to crawl back into a neutral position. But the statement has 
been made, and functions (unconsciously) as a (symbolic) signifier that defines our (real) position.  
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and the (unconscious) other (in ourselves), of what can be mirrored (of ourselves) and 
what can not (the object a). Its stake is the continuous subversion of the ego’s illusions, 
without believing that those illusions can be fully eliminated. There always remains an 
'unavoidable illusion', which is the fantasmatic construction of the object of desire. We 
(fantasmatically) constitute the object of desire ourselves, but assume that its 
'attractiveness' is hidden in the object itself. 'Self-realization' then has to do with gaining 
insight in the following process: how my sense of reality (realism) is affected by my 
relationship to reality.89 On psychoanalytical interpretation Lacan then concludes: 
"It has the effect of bringing out an irreducible signifier … What is essential is 
that he [the subject, A.N.] should see, beyond this signification, to what signifier 
- to what irreducible, traumatic, non-meaning - he is, as a subject, subjected … 
This enables us to conceive … where the problem of the conversion of fantasy 
and reality converge, namely in something irreducible, non-sensical, that 
functions as an originally repressed signifier" (S.11, 250-251). 
Because there is constitutive repression (d.i. a more fundamental repression than the 
interferences or blockages that one can overcome, a repression that results from being a 
subject of language: 'Urverdrängung'), there is fantasy as a permanent structure or 
window for perceiving the real.  
As a result we are all to a certain extent wrapped up in the 'fundamental 
illusions' of one of the three structures that Lacanian theory develops with regards to 
this formation of the object. I shall point out briefly those three fundamental clinical 
structures (cf. Verhaeghe, 1994, 186-192). In the psychotic position the normal (unitary) 
experience of the self is disturbed to such an extent that (by defending oneself against 
the sense of loss of self) the psychotic 'hypostatizes' the object that he imagines to be ('I 
am being looked at', for instance, turning into 'I am the object of their pursuit'). For the 
psychotic the appearances (of the world, of himself) are massive depictions or 
conceptions. He knows what he is: the firm belief and unshakeable convictions of the 
psychotic, taking shape in the immediate reality of the hallucinations and delusions (that 
is to say appearances or 'unavoidable illusions' become delusions because the gap of 
desire is filled in).90 In the perverse position there is an ambiguous relation towards the 
object of desire. The pervert both recognizes and disavows the law that causes desire. 
The object that – because of the prohibiting law – is necessarily fantasmatic, is to the 
pervert both an object that provides genuine pleasure, as nothing more than an arbitrary 
construction. Therefore he can play without sense of guilt with the conventions and 
rules (and media) that provide the object of his desire. The pervert plays with the normal 
conception of himself and tries to accentuate this conception to the limit (for instance, 
89 In the end of our 'self-analysis' we do not reach our 'true self' but a point where it is impossible to 
distinguish between sign and reality, between signifier and signified. This is, Lacan says (S.23, 18-11-
1975), the original signifier/signified that means nothing and is just a sign of arbitrage. We could 
translate this as the self-confirming and performative statement: 'I am this!' This leads to a paradoxical 
idea of freedom. Dutch psychoanalyst P. C. Kuiper expresses this as follows. Man can only experience 
himself as optimally free, when he is maximally determined by motives. At the peak of his inner freedom 
he says (like Luther): 'I have no other choice'" (Kuiper, 1984, 156). 
90
 Lacan also speaks in another way about the psychotic structure, namely as an uncompromising 
character, and calls himself psychotic in that way. In the version of his lectures in 1975 in the United 
States (Yale, M.I.T.) that was published in Scilicet he states: “Psychosis is an attempt towards rigor. In 
that sense, I would say that I am psychotic” (cited in Marini, 1992, 244). 
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making oneself or the other radically into an object: sado-masochism). Characteristic of 
the neurotic position (both hysteria and obsessional neurosis) is the all-embracing sense 
of guilt. For the neurotic the object that he (necessarily turns himself into) is never 'it'. ‘I 
am not that’: the characteristic doubt of the neurotic; and the hysteric’s refusal to be in 
any possible way the object of others enjoyment. The neurotic experiences all 
identifications as alienating, and he tries to get at 'the real thing'. But as he always 
remains within the domain of the law he will never get 'it', as the law only allows for 
partial identifications and a partial enjoyment. Fantasy then actually is an escape. 
5.2. The computerized Self: appearance or illusion?  
Does the notion of reality as an effect (see § 3.4) or as appearance – and not as an 
objective given – imply that we are necessarily caught in a world of illusions? Here we 
may again refer to Kant as the central figure of modern Western thought. As for Kantian 
analysis, the crucial issue at stake in Lacanian psychoanalysis is to distinguish between 
appearances and illusions. Kant showed that we cannot know an ‘objective reality’, the 
things as they are ‘in themselves.  Therefore we have to resort to the necessary 
appearances of the things-in-themselves. But this is not the same as to be driven back on 
illusions (‘Schein’). For illusions consist in taking appearances as if they were the 
objects in themselves; disregarding the constitutive forms that the subject puts in the 
representation of the object (cf. Kant, CPR, B 69).  
"if one ascribes objective reality to those forms of representation then one 
cannot avoid thereby transforming everything into mere illusion" (Kant, CPR, B 
70).
As in Kantian philosophy, Lacan's logic of fantasy claims that the subject constitutes 
itself along with the formation of the object (cf. S.11, 184-186). But this constitution 
can, roughly, take place in two opposite directions: 
"But the object of desire, in the usual sense, is either a fantasy that is in reality 
the support of desire, or a lure" (S.11, 186). 
The fantasy-object is, to use the Kantian terminology, either an appearance in which the 
subject creatively represents reality, or an illusion or imaginary lure in which we 
disregard the element of subjectivation and fall into the trap of objectification: taking 
representation for reality itself and ignoring desire's hide-and-seek universe.91
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 In his essay 'Fantasy, Imagination and the Screen' (1983) 'Kantian' philosopher Roger Scruton describes 
this distinction between fantasy that discloses and fantasy that flees from reality as the difference between 
imagination and fantasy: "My thesis will be this: that imagination is involved in the understanding of art, 
and that the aim of imagination is to grasp, in the circuitous ways exemplified by art, the nature of reality. 
Fantasy, on the other hand, constitutes a flight from reality … if there is a transition from fantasy to 
reality, it is because there is a discipline which turns fantasy into imagination" (Scruton, 1983, 127). The 
human-computer interface is apparently a medium that can make such a transition. 
 In order to illuminate this Kantian terminology (from which I take imagination as similar to the 
Freudo-Lacanian notion of fantasy) I note once more that Kant calls imagination the original 
representations produced by the (productive) imagination: they are not derived from experience but 
provide its conditions. As ordered representations they are different from the willful or accidental 
production of representations ('fantasy') (cf. Caygill, 1995, 248). 
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The screen of fantasy now allows a luring objectification, and thus annihilation 
of desire, in two ways. I will try to illustrate this using the analogy of he computer 
screen. I can turn someone else completely into an object and thus ignore his desire 
(remember the infamous rape in cyberspace, wherein someone was able to acquire full 
control over someone else's avatar and hence could ‘rape' it, cf. Julian Dibbel, 2001). Or 
I can turn myself into an image (I play being a very self-confident personae in order to 
deal with my lack of a stable identity). 
 The question regarding the truth of the fantasy-screen hinges on the issue of how 
we deal with the irrepresentable real thing in myself and in the other or the outside 
world. For the real, unknowable X (the 'Thing') is both something in the subject (his 
'inner core') as well as something that he can bump into in the outside world.92
Information technologies can both screen us off further from this aspect of reality that 
we cannot or dare not confront or, conversely, offer a medium in which it can manifest 
itself. In this sense they function exactly as the screen of fantasy. They may lead us into 
illusion by letting us take the reality on the screen for the real thing itself, or provide 
new appearances of the real. 
Slavoj Žižek gives an example of the second possibility. About a neurotic 
weakling who adopts the screen persona of an aggressive macho, it "is all too easy to 
say that this weakling takes refuge in cyberspace daydreaming in order to escape from 
his dull impotent real life. What if the games we are playing in cyberspace are more 
serious than we tend to assume? What if I articulate in them the aggressive perverse 
core of my personality which, owing to ethical-social constraints, I am unable to act out 
in my real life exchange with others? Is it not that, in such a case, what I stage in my 
cyberspace daydreaming is, in a way, 'more real than reality', closer to the true core of 
my personality than the role I assume in my contact with real-life partners? … In this 
precise sense, as Lacan put it, the Truth has the structure of a fiction: what appears in 
the guise of dreaming, or even daydreaming, is sometimes the hidden truth on whose 
repression social reality itself is founded. That is the ultimate lesson of The 
Interpretation of Dreams: reality is for those who cannot sustain the dream" (Žižek, 
2001, 198). Žižek brings forward that fantasy may be more real than reality itself: its 
expression may take us through the 'screen of normality' that surrounds and encloses us.  
In general, surfing the Internet in search of enjoyment (in whatever form: sex 
sites, chatting, role playing) may offer insight into the fantasmatic formations and 
fixations of our desire. A continuous repetition of the same staging of desire (playing 
the same role, watching the same sexual scenes, etc) may provide information about us 
just as well as repetition in a 'talking cure'. Here again we meet the aspect of the 
computer screen as a medium that because of its ability for 'free-
playing/surfing/chatting' can offer insight in ourselves. Or as researchers on psychology 
in cyberspace, Michael Fenichel and John Suler, state in their survey of the 'Myths and 
Realities of Online Clinical Work': "Freud's psychoanalytic technique was designed to 
foster the very disinhibition that naturally occurs so easily on the Internet" (Fenichel et 
al., 2002, 486). 
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 There are some interesting parallels between Kantian and Lacanian theory. For Kant the thing-in-itself 
indicates both a limit, and the space beyond these limits. The thing-in-itself has "the negative quality of 
limiting the employment of the understanding and reason to what can be an object of intuition, and the 
positive quality of denoting a problematic space beyond these limits" (Caygill, 1995, 393). The 'real thing' 
is both an unknowable X in the external object, and in the subject itself. 
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However, information technologies may also radicalize the covering of the 
(unacceptable, unbearable, horrible …) 'real me' and the 'real other' by its electronic 
shield. Kevin Robins and Les Levidow describe such a functioning of information 
technologies in the development of warfare. "War converts fear and anxiety into 
perceptions of external threat. It then mobilizes defenses against alien and thing-like 
enemies. In this process, new image and vision technologies can play a central role. 
Combat is increasingly mediated through the computer screen. Combatants are involved 
in a kind of remotely exhilarating tele-action, tele-present and tele-engaged in the 
theatre of war, sanitized of its bloody reality. Killing is done 'at a distance', through 
technological mediation, without the shock of direct confrontation. The victims become 
psychologically invisible; the targeted "things' on the screen do not seem to implicate 
him in a moral relationship" (Robins & Levidow, 1995, 120). Information technologies 
may affect the (normal, social, moral) relationship between self and other by 
objectifying defenses into an electronic shield. War becomes fun: triumph of the 
pleasure principle. The screen of fantasy then becomes impenetrable armour. 
This short account of the double bind of the interface shows the computer screen 
does have the capability to function as a (what I will call) 'window' which 'discloses' the 
world (and not merely 'closes' it by its sheer imaginary imitations). Although the 
computer screen may not touch upon 'the real thing', it does however induce a 'real 
sense of presence'. This duplicity is the crucial aspect of psychical reality (it is not real, 
but neither merely an illusion), and this same characteristic goes for the computer 
screen. Robillard et al, who executed empirical research on the expanding therapeutic 
practice of exposing phobic patients to phobogenic stimuli in Virtual Reality 
environments (I will address this issue of phobia and the computer more concise in 
chapter 5) state: "It was found that anxiety could be induced in phobic participants by 
exposing them to phobogenic stimuli in therapeutic virtual environments derived from 
computer games", and the analysis indicates "a synergistic relationship between 
presence and anxiety" (Robillard et al, 2003, 467). The psychotherapeutical practice of 
exposing phobic patients to the object of their anxiety/fear in Virtual Reality 
installations shows that the computer screen screens off from the threatening object. 
However, at the same time it evokes something ('an effect') of this object. In their paper 
on social anxiety in virtual environments James et al. conclude that the "results of this 
pilot study suggest that social anxiety can be generated within a virtual social setting" 
(James et al., 2003, 242). And a survey study on the sensation of being present 
('presence') in Virtual Reality states: "Perhaps one of the most important consequences 
of presence is that a virtual experience can evoke the same reactions and emotions as a 
real experience" (Schumie et al., 2001, 187).  
 Because of the disunity in the subject and the unavoidable (fantasmatic) 
subjectivation Lacanian theory cannot give simple and unambiguous answers to the 
question of the psychological impact of information technologies. All it can do is 
provide a framework – which I am developing – from which to analyze concrete cases. 
On a psychical level the influence of the fantasy screen runs from being the pivotal 
support of desirable reality to being the bait which lures us into a trap and leads us to 
delusion.
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Conclusion
If fantasy operated simply and solely contrary to the principle of reality, its products 
would be nothing but pale imitations of 'real reality', and cyberspace nothing but an 
imaginary illusion. However, we have seen that the most crucial aspect of fantasy is the 
space it opens and moulds between 'immediate sensations' of reality and our psychical 
understanding of it. Fantasy actually is a space in which we as existent beings cannot 
help but live. Kantian theory depicts the imagination as mediating sensations and 
reality. In the more psychological approach taken by psychoanalytic tradition on this 
issue, fantasy implies that the 'immediate' object of desire is out of reach. Freudo-
Lacanian theory speaks of the 'lost object'. We always reach out for this object, and 
today the interesting phenomenon is that the computer screen is perfectly suited for 
doing so. The lost object causes desire. For the computer screen this means that the 
'object' 'behind' the screen, although non-material, can (psychically) function as the 
cause that generates all sorts effects on the screen that we experience as being part of 
our reality. For this is what a profound analysis of the screen teaches us: reality is to a 
large extent a matter of surface-appearances, of (absent) causes and (present) effects. 
Freudo-Lacanian theory considers reality actually as an effect, and fantasy as what 
mediates the real (from which we want to detach ourselves, but never succeed in doing) 
and the virtual as its 'copy'. Man's position is 'in the between': between body and mind, 
between self and other, between (conscious) ego and (unconscious) subject. Therefore it 
is not a matter of positing fixed notions of reality and illusion. It is, however, a matter of 
judging whether there is too much effect (design) in order to screen off too much 
absence (anxiety, insecurity …). For then the space of fantasy is closed. Or to put it in 
Kantian terms, as for instance Scruton does, imagination disappears behind (merely 
imaginary) 'fantasy', with all the pathological consequences that implies. However, 
normally when the screen maintains its dialectical relation between absence and 
presence, the (new) effects are integrated into (a new sense of) reality, as most 
technologies have proven by the fact that their (first revolutionary or disturbing) 
functions have become a normal element of the world that we live in.
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CHAPTER FOUR. TECHNOLOGY AND THE FANTASMATIC RELATION 
TO THE REAL 
Introduction
Are the concepts of technè and tuchè which as early as the ancient Greeks were used to 
cover the two principal 'movers' in our world, applicable to a story about that which is 
virtual and its relation to the real? I will explore the reach of these concepts within a 
Lacanian theory of computer(ized) systems and the way those human-computer 
interfaces relate us to that which is real. As this chapter highlights the relation between 
technical systems and the real, it is now the time to give a comprehensive and 
systematical exposition of what actually is the real in Lacanian theory. From this 
overview, and from the vital tension that the concepts of technè and tuchè express, I will 
try to make a crucial conceptual distinction of the two modes through which the 
computer screen 'psychologically' mediates our relation to the real. Some cases 
concerning psychotherapeutical application of computers are used to underpin this 
conceptual exercise. 
1. Technology and the real
1.1. Technè and tuchè: the pleasure principle and its beyond 
The question whether we live in a 'technological universe' that does not represent the 
real (the paradigm of the Vorstellung) but produces it through technical systems 
(Darstellung) is what I want to reappraise within the context of the ('ancient') 
relationship of technè and tuchè. For Aristotle technè is directed at creating what is 
impossible for nature to achieve, and is therefore a creative mediation between nature 
and humanity (cf. Guattari, 1993, 13). Greek thought in general considers technè a 
concept indicating both the crafts and the arts (cf. De Mul, 1999, 165). The craftsman 
and the artist both use technical knowledge and tools to produce their work. Besides its 
creative aspect – which Aristotle highlights – technè also (or at the same time) stands 
for a means to control and shape the world. It aims to control the heterogeneity of the 
world that the Greeks express in the word tuchè: the accidental, chance. This is the 
peculiar duplicity in technè: as a creative process it is also a 'means to shape the world 
according to our will', as a technical production of things it is at the same time creative. 
When one narrows technè to the aspect of 'machinism' - that is usually treated as a 
subheading of 'technics' (Guattari, 1993, 13) - it concerns the mechanic production of 
things. The automaton (the automatic production) and the robot are some of the most 
well-known and most advanced forms of this production by machine. The virtual 
realities of cyberspace could be the latest stage of the technè, since they combine both 
art and technology in a specific disclosure of the world (cf. De Mul, 1999). As 
technological productions the self-representations in cyberspace are, I would say, 
governed by the pleasure principle. That is what follows when one proceeds from the 
distinction of technè and tuchè to Lacan's distinction between automaton and tuchè (see 
S.11, 53-64). However, automatic production – either on a technological or a 
psychological level – has to deal with the disturbing tuchè.
 I discussed the interesting path opened up by Norbert Wiener in his Cybernetics
of considering living beings as machines. Lacan's huge interest in cybernetic theory 
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explains his use of the terms automaton and tuchè. Lacan is taken up by question 
whether the subject of the (unconscious) chain of signifiers functions as an automaton.
Is the virtual subject (that lives in fictions) a machine governed by the pleasure 
principle? It can function as an 'automatic pleasure machine' either, directly, by 
discharging energies via pleasurable images (primary process), or indirectly by binding 
energies to representations (as in thinking) so that pleasure can be found in reality. To 
reverse and apply the question at hand, is the subject of cyberspace like the unconscious 
subject that is freely floating around the World (Wide Web) of signs, not hindered by 
physical limitations? In this case of 'cyberspace as a dream world' (Suler) the human 
subject becomes like a robot in the process of mechanical production: merely an 
'element of a chain', or of an assembly line (a 'subject of flow production'). Or is this 
virtualized subjectivity 'anchored' in something beyond the 'automatic machine': 
personal interests or motivations, fixations, idiosyncrasies … all sort of 'traumatic 
things' that hinder ones operation as an automatic, submissive machine.93
 By using the terms automaton and tuchè Lacan raises a discussion concerning 
causality. The terms refer to the two modes of causality that Aristotle elaborates in his 
physics. The automaton stands for events that occur as a sort of blind result of external 
circumstances. Aristotle elaborates for the first time systematically the notion of the 
‘automatic’ (the ‘by itself’) as earlier used by Democritus and Plato. Plato speaks of a 
constitutive tension between the proper dynamics of natural processes and the direction 
that God determines. For Aristotle the causality of chance (tuchè) opposes the causality 
of the automaton. Lacan uses the notion of the automaton to refer to the network of 
signifiers that functions independently of the (conscious) subject. And concludes:  
“The real is beyond the automaton, the return, the coming-back, the insistence of 
the signs, by which we see ourselves governed by the pleasure principle” (S.11, 
54).
Lacan describes tuchè as an encounter with the real. And in psychoanalysis tuchè 
presents itself first of all in the form of the trauma: as that what is unassimilable in the 
psychic system (S.11, 55). Hence the psychic system (the subject of the signifier) does 
not fully function as an (disembodied, neutral) automaton. It (affectively) 'circles' 
around unassimilable things. Life is not a dream, Lacan says, because of "those radical 
points in the real that I call encounters, and which enable us to conceive reality as 
unterlegt, untertragen, which, with the superb ambiguity of the French language, appear 
to be translated by the same word - souffrance.94 Reality is in abeyance there, awaiting 
attention" (S.11, 55-56).  
We must notice the crucial difference between reality and the real. Reality is 
'underpinned': it has an 'understructure'.95 Reality appears on a screen of a 
(technological) distanciation from the real ('virtualization'; reality as always already 
virtual). Yet concurrent with this distanciation is the always-existing possibility that the 
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 My inclination to call this identification with all sorts of 'personal things' that hinder the striding along 
of the 'machine', subjectivation - and attribute it a central role in this thesis - already indicates an answer 
to the questions raised: 'no subject without a symptom'. It (the blow of the real) thus functions as a radical 
core of resistance (against full virtualization). 
94
 Translators note: "In French, the phrase 'en souffrance' means 'in suspense', 'in abeyance', 'awaiting 
attention', 'pending'. It is this sense that translates the German word. 'Souffrance'also means 'pain', of 
course. Hence the ambiguity refered to by Lacan". 
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 Or to put it in Marxist terms: reality has the real as its (excluded) basis, foundation. 
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real erupts and breaks through the screen, disrupting (interrupting) our (idealized, 
sublimated: normalized) picture of reality. This is the (tragicomic) situation of ourselves 
as 'representative beings', which cannot be elevated into a (utopian, pleasurable, truthful 
…) final discovery of the real (the 'real reality' behind the mask). The duplicity remains: 
that is the split subject of Lacanian psychoanalysis. So there is both the virtual subject, 
and the real as its unassimilable rest or kernel. Fantasy interfaces those two orders, in its 
most profound functioning in an original manner. So there are not two original 
dimensions (the real and the virtual, 'nature' and 'culture') which must be connected. 
Rather, the original interface constitutes reality. Our human self-image constitutes us as 
a human and not as a horse - to use one of Lacan's examples. It is this original interface 
that allows us to speak of two different dimensions: the real as what disturbs reality, the 
virtual as what fictionalizes reality.  
Fantasy designs the world into a desirable reality; it functions as a screen that 
designs a world of (pleasurable) surfaces. But it does so in a continuous antagonistic 
relation with a resisting real (jouissance). So the question is:  
"what is the first encounter, the real, that lies behind the [f]antasy?" (S.11, 54). 
As such, the screen of fantasy is a window which remains 'in touch' with the real behind 
its screen; it continues to encounter the real. Before I apply these notions to the 
computer interface, I will first explain this duplicity in relation to the pleasure principle. 
For the real is 'beyond the signs, by which we see ourselves governed by the pleasure 
principle'.  
 Lacan understands tuchè as an encounter with the real that disturbs the 
functioning of the pleasure principle. We only get to know the real by some sort of 
arbitrary and accidental encounter that pulls us (momentarily) out of the psychic system 
that normally mediates our relation to the 'inner' and outer world by means of signifiers. 
The system of signifiers is a system of mediation, and resembles as such Aristotle's 
technè as a system of creative mediation. Technè shapes what is impossible at the 
natural level. Whereas nature cannot produce a sculpture of a perfect human being, man, 
with his use of technè, can. Similarly, at the level of the signifier man can draw 
ideal(ized) pictures of himself: in his mind, and 'externalized' in novels, films, virtual 
personae. As with all idealized formations, man can also get addicted to their 
technological forms, such as avatars.  According to research on the use of avatars 
among adolescents in South Korea, there is an addictive use of avatars that functions as 
a cover up of the large and (almost) unbearable amount of stress ('the real of 
jouissance') that adolescents experience in real life (Lee & Shin, 2004)  
Psychoanalysis stresses the defensive function of (mental) productions. Lacan's 
fundamental distinction between pleasure and jouissance (see chapter one: § 3.6) 
expresses this. The signifier mediates jouissance and pulls this excessive tension within 
the limits of the pleasure principle, so that jouissance is transformed into a controllable 
pleasure. The real as what transgresses the homeostatic system of signifiers, is the cause 
of repetition. We not only (destructively) aim at this real in what we call the death-
drive, we also try to repeat this (traumatic) real in order to come to terms with it. Thus 
we see the precarious situation of man with regard to excessive excitement beyond his 
stabilized self-image. Fantasy tries to keep this situation under control. It not only works 
(consciously) to create a fictitious realm of signifiers giving a pleasurable alternative of 
the world: cyberspace as the display-world of fantasy-pleasure cut off from the 
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materiality of reality. It also functions (unconsciously) as a way to deal with the 'hard 
core' of reality itself: South Korean adolescents do not immediately see why they 
involve themselves to such an extent in avatar use. The real that this use of avatars tries 
to deal with, the high levels of stress that characterize Korean society, might be a 
soluble impossibility. Therefore it differs from the structural impossibility that Lacan 
considers the real (mentioned further on in this part of the chapter). Nevertheless the 
example indicates that the excessive use of avatar is related to a (traumatic) real that the 
adolescents can hardly cope with, and therefore the avatars are more than just fantasy-
toys to play with and have a good time. This example prefigures the general theme that 
technological fabrications with no relation to the real (a technè without tuchè) lead to a 
'dehumanized' world of simulation. Only the relationship to the impossible real makes 
fantasy create new appearances of reality. A theory of what is 'real' then obviously is 
pivotal.
1.2. The encounter with the real 
Referring to the four models on the relationship between the virtual and the real (chapter 
two: § 1.3.), we can ask whether the real is a 'copy' that does not reflect or represent an 
enigmatic original, but precedes and produces its original: a hyper-real? Characterizing 
the real as the 'beyond' already presupposes a certain answer to the question whether 
technological production or design fully determines our experience of the real. Scott 
Durham discusses this issue in relation to Baudrillard's thought, and we could share his 
position: "From the perspective of everyday life, the "real" would no longer seem to be 
on the side of planning, but on the side of the accident; not on the side of operationality 
and performativity, but on that of malfunction and misfire: it would be that which resists 
and persists beyond the limited space of the operation" (Durham, 1993, 164). 
 Because computers resemble speech, or the functioning of the signifier, they 
produce an 'artificial' magical world: a world as it appears to us. Lacan's notion of tuchè
stresses that the signifier alone cannot account for appearances. Life is not a 
(technological) dream. And psychoanalysis is not a form of idealism. Appearances must 
have some sort of relation to the real in order not to tumble into illusions - here Lacan's 
ontology is consistent with Kant's. Lacan elaborates this disturbance of the ideal 
(idealistic) world as the encounter with the real. Thus a perspective on the real and the 
reality of cyberspace is born. So, notwithstanding the striking reality of playing cyber 
warfare, (American) soldiers return traumatized and contaminated from the Gulf War 
('Gulf War Syndrome')96. An accidental or insignificant remark by someone else may 
cause the neurotic who plays an aggressive macho in cyberspace to realize that it is 
impossible to determine self-reliantly his self-image. The obsessive person who keeps 
on surfing the Net in order to seek a fulfillment of his desire may at the end realize that 
'it' is impossible to find. The (encounter with the) real disturbs the illusion that drives 
us. 'It' 'does not fit the picture', or it cannot be 'made into a picture' – like the obsessive 
trying to imaginarily control his (physical) limitations, hence the exhaustion 
characterizing him. A porn surfer may all of a sudden, 'coincidentally', loose his erotic 
interest for all the images that rush by (blown out of his 'psychical rush' by some sort of 
unwelcome and displeasing 'accidental' encounter that pulls him out of his dream). The 
encounter with the real may lead to the confrontational awareness that – to use Lacan's 
96
 The two major theories on the factors behind the disease emphasize chemical agents and stress. 
However, there is still a debate on this topic; see: 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/syndrome/analysis/
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words on the obsessive person – we are like frogs that want to be as big as a cow (S.23, 
18-11-1975).
The tuchè, the encounter with the traumatic real, occurs 'accidentally'.97 In cyber 
warfare the 'bloody reality' beyond the computer screen (the real) is mitigated 
('alleviated') by the techno-fantasmatic screen that keeps the combatants at enough 
distance - not just spatially but especially psychically - from the victims. By accident, 
the bloody mess of the victims may come to light. Then we are soon to think up (make 
up, dream up) a better story of why blood had to be spilled. This shows the position of 
the (Lacanian) real. It is (as good as) impossible to sustain the pointlessness and 
injustice of bloodshed. We cannot consciously assume the real ('unconsciously' we may 
be confronted with it: in a dream, for instance, which turns into a nightmare). So if the 
real disturbs the picture, we normally create a better picture. Then the symbolic-
imaginary screen alleviates the real again: it sustains our desire. The porn surfer who 
suddenly lost his erotic interest will return the next day when his screen is zipped up 
again, able to stage the fantasmatic contexts necessary for his pleasure. Žižek holds that 
the real can only be briefly contemplated when the subject is 'looking awry'. The 
'accidental' encounter with the real is something which occurs in the margin (of 
daytime/consciousness). The neurotic weakling playing the aggressive macho will find 
it very hard to confront the 'real cause' of his play. This 'real cause' may only appear 
accidentally - or in the margin of his normal consciousness - and is usually hidden by 
the screen and pleasure of his imaginary self-representation.
The real is an absent cause. It contrasts Baudrillard's model of hyperrealisation, 
wherein it stands for a virtual presence that results from systems of production. 
According to Baudrillard the idea of the virtual comes from the desire for a 'resolution 
of the world ahead of time by cloning of reality and the extermination of the real by its 
double'. However, this 'unconditional realization of the world' is impossible because 
there are always remainders, traces and excesses (cf. Doel/Clark, 1999, 272-273). The 
real necessarily slips away: it is a remainder, a remnant, and a surplus.98
1.3. A historical outline of the real in Lacan's work 
What does Lacan mean by the real? In order to cover this notion that plays such an 
important role in his (later) work and that nevertheless is so hard to grasp, one might 
first of all take a look at the historical development of this notion in his work. In her 
overview of the real, Ellie Ragland refers to Jacques-Alain Miller’s periodization of 
Lacan’s teachings to cover Lacan’s elaboration of the real. In the 1950s “Lacan 
described the real as concrete and already full, a brute, pre-symbolic reality which 
returns to the same place” (Ragland, 1996, 192). Lacan points out that it were the stars 
that manifested first and foremost the always in the same place (Lacan, 1988, 238). He 
illuminates the dialectic between the real and the symbolic when he advances that it is 
not fully explicable why human beings saw the Big Bear or Orion in a certain 
constellation of stars. He uses this example to found his theory of the arbitrariness of the 
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 Or it can occur – an interesting second possibility – as if it were by chance (cf. S.11, 54). In this second 
form we can only encounter it in ‘formations of the unconscious’, disguised, and possibly appearing as 
coincidental occurrences. One can think for instance of the Jewish people and the role that jokes play 
among them, in which something about  the Holocaust is expressed: hidden, and as if it were without 
intention. 
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 I will later on elaborate this surplus as the remnant of an original jouissance:  the surplus of enjoyment 
(plus-de-jouir)
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symbol. “The famous properties of form [my emphasis, A.N.] do not seem to provide an 
absolutely convincing explanation of the way in which we have grouped the 
constellations” (Lacan, 1988, 238). The symbolic is not an ‘analogue’ representation of 
the real, that Lacan considers in this period as a sort of function of constancy that we 
must necessarily assume to be lying behind the symbolic formations that are his primary 
concern. Let us not forget that in this period structuralism reigned supreme and steered 
his teaching to a theorization of the subject in which the human psyche almost dissolves 
into a superstructure of symbols with almost no bond to the physical body. In this 
approach the real is hence less important for the understanding of human reality, which 
is determined by the big Other of language. From this structuralist Lacan one could 
possibly extract a post-structuralist Lacan for whom cyberspace would be just another 
symbolic fiction. But this would mean denying the pivotal notion of the real that 
becomes increasingly important in his theory. 
 In the second period of his teaching, the 1960s and early 1970s, Lacan links the 
real to the Freudian Thing (cf. Ragland, 1996, 195). According to Freud ‘das Ding’ is 
the aspect of the fellow human being or neighbor that we cannot grasp or understand. 
Lacan translates ‘das Ding’ into the object in the Other which cannot be signified by the 
signifying chain , although this chain necessarily circles around it. So there are some 
similarities with his previous notion of the real as a necessary function of materiality 
‘underneath’ the symbolic order. Yet the impact of the real is now much bigger: “The 
subject comes into being as a defence against it, against the primal experience of 
pleasure/pain associated with it” (Fink, 1999, 95). The real becomes the central element 
in Lacan’s theory of the trauma. This traumatic element can come from two directions. 
The trauma can come from outside of ourselves as in the case –  albeit in a weak form – 
of a reprimand that 'awakes' us from our self-satisfied world.99 Or it can come from 
within such as deep feelings of affection that paralyze us. The Other (inside or outside 
ourselves) is confrontational. That is the real aspect of the Other, that Lacan attributes to 
his former purely symbolic Other.100 The Other is also a 'real Thing' (imagined in horror 
movies as a monster or as the alien inside ourselves); “the Thing is “what hurts”, the 
external traumatic X which derails the closed circulation of the Lust-Ich around 
hallucinatory objects, forcing the Lust-Ich to give up the pleasure principle and to 
“confront reality”; yet the Thing is simultaneously the subject’s innermost kernel of his 
being, what he must sacrifice in order to gain access to “external reality”” (Žižek, 1993, 
90). As 'the Thing' discloses an aspect of reality that is unbearable, we must also defend 
ourselves against its overwhelming impact. Here we meet the defensive aspect of the 
screen of fantasy. 
 From the early 1970s until his death in 1981, Lacan aligns his elaboration of the 
real with Freud’s attempts from the 1920s onward to explain the difference between the 
sexes. “Lacan taught that psychoanalysis begins at the point where Freud found a dead-
end, where the non-rapport between the sexes – the asymmetry or fundamental 
differences which constitute the masculine in culture or the feminine in culture – is a 
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 Hence one can even use Lacanian thought to strengthen the idea that education takes more than 
deliberation; man is not 'naturally good'. 
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 This also concerns the field of the material and the fictional. In the previous chapter I focused on the 
'materiality' (embodiment) of virtualized reality. The next chapter will explore man's 'substance' 
(jouissance) in virtual reality. Lacanian terminology in its later forms expresses this difference between 
the fictionality of reality and its 'materiality' in the difference between the big Other as the order of 
signifiers, and the object a as its leftover. In the development of his theory Lacan focuses more and more 
on the 'remainder of language' (cf. Nusselder, 2003) 
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reality” (Ragland, 1996,199). The impossibility that the real stands for now seems to be 
pulled out of the theory of the individual trauma and repositioned in the cultural field as 
the radical impossibility of reaching the Other, as Lacan indicates with his infamous 
phrase that ‘there is no sexual relationship’. In that they are situated differently with 
regards to the law and have a different kind of jouissance, man and woman will never 
supplement each other. Although this is one of the most difficult chapters in the 
Lacanian discourse, it seems to be Lacan’s focus on the jouissance of the body (the 
body as a libidinal organism that enjoys) that establishes the radical impossibility of 
clear communication. The result is that the ‘real’ of the symptom, the truth it refers to, is 
not situated so much anymore at the level of its (true) meaning or at the level of original 
events from which it might arise, but at the level of bodily jouissance as a satisfaction of 
drives. Lacan ends up with a theory that returns to the Freudian libido-theory (and this 
would be Lacan's final 'return to Freud'), wherein the world of the desiring subject 
gravitates around drive-fixations. In his final teachings Lacan goes beyond the 'classical' 
psychoanalytical dualism of signification and satisfaction (Miller, 2000, 30). 
Signification is enjoyed, or enjoyment is signification: two possibilities of Lacan’s 
category of the “sens joui”.101
1.4. The real as the object of lost gratifications 
This brief review of the development of the real in Lacan’s work shows that the 
category of the real was under a continuous construction. This is not that surprising 
since the notion of the real is crucial for what is the central concern of psychoanalysis, 
namely the status of the object of the drives and hence of desire. As a desiring being 
man wants to undo the loss that is constitutive of his existence. Which means that at the 
level of the drives he wants to regain gratification.  
 In a general sense, the real relates very closely to what Freudian-Lacanian theory 
calls ‘the lost object’, the object of ‘lost’, ‘prohibited’, ‘impossible’ gratifications. As a 
general theory on the constitution of subjectivity, it surpasses the psychopathological 
field of the trauma and reaches far into the field of (philosophical) anthropology. As 
such it does not concern itself primarily, to use the words Lacan’s student Serge 
Leclaire, with the traumatic event but with the traumatism (or the violence or excess) 
that the ‘the lost object’ itself causes (Leclaire, 1971, 26-7). The trauma and the 
defenses (whose interaction bring us close to the notion of fantasy) make up not just the 
pathological individual. Everybody must take a stance with regards to the lack that 
inevitably hits us as a human being, death being obviously the crudest intruder on our 
daily existence. With reason Lacan opposes Plato’s myth about an existence that the 
Other can supplement, through his myth of the lamella wherein human existence 
inevitably goes along with a real loss, namely death. 
“It is the non-representational nature of the real that brings on repetition, 
requiring the subject to return to that place of the lost object, the lost 
satisfaction. Every other satisfaction pales in comparison to the one that was 
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 Paul Verhaeghe (1999a) introduces a very effective distinction in Lacan’s work. He distinguishes the 
early Lacan who focuses on the symbolic and the imaginary, from the Lacan from seminar 11 (1964) 
onward who gives the most attention to the real and the drives (Verhaeghe/Declercq, 2002, 61). I will use 
this distinction frequently, as it indicates the centrality of Lacan’s seminar on the Four Fundamental 
Concepts of Psychoanalysis that I frequently quote. 
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lost, and the subject repetitively returns to the site of that absence in the hope of 
finding the real Thing, and yet forever missing it” (Fink, 1995, 228). 
When one reads this summarizing quote in a general anthropological (and maybe 
somewhat ‘experimental’) way one can state that repetition characterizes life itself. Man 
keeps on reproducing himself, he keeps on elaborating the same old questions because 
an answer is lacking et cetera. We even keep on having sex with the other over and over 
again, because we cannot truly reach him/her: 'Encore'. Because of the failure to say 
what we want to say we reproduce ourselves (S.20, 109). That is what Lacan is talking 
about when he says that the sexual relation does not exist. If the sexual relation would 
exist, Lacan says, we could touch the other at the level of the signifier. But as speaking 
beings we are solitary. There is no signifier that can present and represent the opposite 
sex in a pure state. Or it must be at the cellular level: one calls that the sexual 
chromosome (S.14, 19-4-1967). 
 A general characteristic of the real is its function as a limit: the real is the 
impossible (S.17, 143).
“since the opposite of the possible is certainly the real, we would be lead to 
define the real as the impossible” (S.11, 167).  
The real is an impossible presence: impossible to sustain (as in anxiety) or to confront 
(phobia); impossible to achieve in space or time; impossible to represent or symbolize. 
With the category of the real Lacan is dealing with an ontological category that is 
beyond the constitutive activities of the subject. Not everything that we say or do is the 
result of our unconscious desire. Desire is on the other hand the result of the distance 
from the real. Life is not a dream and psychoanalysis not an idealism (cf. S.11, 53). The 
(return of the) real warrants this truth. 
1.5. Every man has his cross to bear: the real loss as trauma 
As such a limit-concept the real enters into Lacan’s theory of the trauma, enunciated for 
example in the fifth chapter of The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis,
where he explains the theory of the real as trauma. Freud teaches us that trauma is what 
cannot be remembered and against which the subject sets up defensive organizations in 
his psyche. It resists direct recollection and articulation (and thus interpretation). This 
element of resistance is also another characteristic of Lacan’s conception of the real. 
“When the subject tells his story, something acts, in a latent way, that governs this 
syntax and makes it more and more condensed. Condensed in relation to what? In 
relation to what Freud, at the beginning of his description of psychical resistance, calls a 
nucleus … The nucleus must be designated as belonging to the real – the real insofar as 
the identity of perception is its rule” (S.11, 68).  
In this context Lacan discusses a dream described by Freud in chapter seven of 
The Interpretation of Dreams. There Freud recounts of a father who lost his son and 
went to sleep in the room beside the one in which his dead son lay, leaving an old man 
to watch over his son. After several hours of sleep the father dreams that the child is 
near his bed, taking him by the arm and whispering reproachfully: “Father, can’t you 
see that I am burning?”. The father wakes up and notices a bright light coming from the 
other room. He rushes into the room and finds the old man asleep and the clothes and 
one arm of the child scorched by a candle that fell onto the corpse. According to Freud 
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this dream is motivated (partially) by the fulfillment of wishes: the father wants to see 
his child alive once more and therefore is not awakened by the light until after the scene 
with his son. Although Freud admits that the interpretation of the dream is not complete, 
it does not deviate from his theory of dreams as wish fulfillments.  
Lacan considers this example as a not very steady confirmation of the thesis of 
dreams as realizations of desire. He sees another function emerging in this dream. The 
father does not so much awaken because of the light, after having realized his desire to 
see his son once more, but he awakes because he is confronted in the dream with 
another reality that carries more weight than he can bear. Lacan suggests that the words 
the child addresses to his father – the significance of which Freud is not conclusive 
about – express the cause of the child’s death. Lacan hence focuses on a reality that is 
more real than psychical reality (the psychical reality of dreams, for instance, which in 
the common understanding of psychoanalysis is supposed to express our desires and 
deepest truth). Surprisingly, Lacan states that the level of representations in a dream is 
not the final dimension of desire. For that is what those representations hide: “The real 
has to be sought beyond the dream – in what the dream has enveloped, hidden from us” 
(S.11, 60).
Our mental representations do not analogously represent the 'true reality' of our 
desire, as desire itself already is an 'association' with (or a way to associate with) a real 
loss. The real therefore comes to stand for all sorts of experiences of loss that are only 
retroactively seen as fulfillments. From the real only remain mental traces, memories. It 
is fantasy that puts down those 'traces of the past' (into 'traces of the future', wherein it 
imagines the return of the real). Hence desire actually seems to have a nostalgic form. A 
form that seeks to synthesize the broken fragments of life into a coherent picture (which 
is a desire - to put it in a Derridean reference to the major streams in anthropology - for 
God, Logos or Nature). What is nevertheless at stake, is to gain insight in the duplicity 
of fantasy: as an indispensable (a priori) form of experience, and as an illusory form of 
experience that – as in nostalgia – holds the picture for reality itself. 
1.6. Tuchè animates technè: the two-fold relation to the real of defense and disclosure 
When assimilation of this real heterogeneity is impossible, a dialectics of appropriation 
and expropriation follows. The English language has an interesting equivalent for this 
appropriation: to arrogate. It throws an illuminating light on the concept of arrogance, 
which we can describe now as assuming something as real (a real hero, a real writer 
etc.).102 The fantasmatic picture that the real threatens to disrupt is at the same time 
necessary to support desire. Fantasy is a screen that defends against a too direct 
intrusion of the real. The 'lost object' is pivotal herein. 
Lacan's notion of the lost object shows that an absence underlies our normal 
experience of reality. This absence is an imminent danger that can present itself in a 
whole series of different modes: anxiety, insecurity, pain, loss of the sense of self, 
boredom, 'nameless dread' (Bion) … The necessary deployment of a variety of defenses 
can take pathological forms such as distraction, grandiosity or fixation of self-identity 
(cf. Emanuel, 2001). We can have reflexive knowledge of the defenses that lie most at 
the surface (knowing that you are a storyteller), or that we can see at the surface of the 
102
 Also the (juridical) synonym for expropriation is interesting: alienation. It shows the original 
alienation that cannot be canceled out. I will describe this alienation of the subject of the signifier more 
and more – along with Lacan's theoretical development – as the inevitability of taking up a particular 
position or view.
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computer screen (storytelling in cyberspace). However, their most 'tricky' and far-
reaching (outrageous, exceeding) influence is at the unconscious level. The association 
to the encounter with the real is predominantly unconscious. It leads to the unconscious
fantasy: the 'unconscious motivations' or 'unconscious scenarios' that underlie the 
attitude of grandiosity underpinning the imagination of being a 'real hero', of living in a 
'real city', of having found the 'real me' in cyberspace ….  
In the first chapter I claimed with Peter Weibel that on a psychological level 
technologies function to overcome (mental) insufficiencies. When considering the real 
as the (absent) cause of repetition, we must not forget that Lacan discusses the question 
of the encounter with the real, the tuchè, in the setting of the analysis of repetition. 
“Only a rite, an endlessly repeated act, can commemorate this not very memorable 
encounter” (S.11, 59); “it is necessary to ground this repetition first of all in the very 
split that occurs in the subject in relation to the encounter” (id., 69). All sorts of 
‘repetitive acts’ (jokes, dreams, tragedies, stalking …) function as an envelopment, a 
psychic formation, of something (an experience of loss or of ecstasy; such as death or 
an impossible love affair wrapped around in the scenes of a tragedy) that we cannot 
integrate (at once) into normal psychic functioning.103 The umbrella name for the 
'affects' that go along with the threatening 'things' is anxiety. A characteristic of the 
human-computer interface is that, at a psychological level, the viewer is in a position of 
screening off anxiety. Video games exemplify this. "the video game is a psychodynamic 
process of projecting and managing internal threats … Video games can thus be 
understood as a paranoiac environment that induces a sense of paranoia by dissolving 
any distinction between the doer and the viewer. Driven by the structure of the video 
game, the player is constantly defending himself, or the entire universe, from 
destructive forces. The play becomes a compulsive, pleasurable repetition of a life-and-
death performance. Yet the player's anxiety can never be finally mastered by that 
vicariously dangerous play. He engages in a characteristic repetition, often described as 
'video game addiction'" (Robins/Levidow, 1995, 122). This explains why, since we 
cannot master the real, we are in a continuous process of repetition (of trying to do so), 
which may in excessive cases lead to an addiction to the screen. 
Also the subject of hypertext perfectly illustrates this role of the computer 
interface as a medium for a repetitive psychic envelopment of the real. In his essay 
'Conclusions' Terence Harpold diagnoses the hypertext reader who continuously passes 
on ('flows on', 'flies on') from one link to another and is, like an obsessive personality, 
endlessly searching for the perfect result. Hence the hypertext reader (ritually) denies 
that there is no link that can provide him with what he is looking for. His actions are a 
way to screen off the truth that there is no object that corresponds to his desire. It is 
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 One is tempted to state here ‘not yet’ instead of ‘not’. For it is with the integration (d.i. acceptance, 
recognition) of the loss that the compulsion to repeat must evaporate. Someone might stop stalking his 
former lover when he accepts her departure. However, is it possible to integrate the loss of life, death? 
The Lacan of the 1950's with his major influence by Heidegger’s notion of  ‘being-towards-death’, seems 
to move far ahead towards the idea of an ‘egoless subject’ that through symbolic (Hegelian) recognition 
can remove almost all obstacles of the ego. Yet it is not some sort of Buddhist enlightenment in which the 
subject integrates all otherness through the loss of its own self. The imaginary order of libidinal 
investments in objects still contaminates the recognition of ourselves as a play of symbols. “Don’t, 
however, get the idea that the ego volatilises after an analysis – be it didactic or therapeutic, one doesn’t 
go to heaven, disembodied and pure symbol” (S.2, 325). As a result of this ‘contamination’ of a purely 
symbolic communication a strict informational conception of the ‘mind’ is incomplete, as we saw in 
Lacan's  discussion of cybernetics. 
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exactly against this awareness, which is in the end an awareness of the truth of death 
and finitude, that the obsessive person tries to defend himself with his fantasmatic idea 
that he can control time and death (Harpold, 1994, 208). He believes that the Other has 
an object offering what he is longing for: he believes in the promise of closure, of 
satisfaction, that founds the links.  "The hypertext reader reads the texts as would an 
obsessional, insofar as he believes in the link, in its promise of a relation between 
lexias, and, ultimately, in the closure, saturation or saturability that founds the links as a 
navigational tool … Returning again and again to confirm the possibility of closure 
means refusing the gap in the field of the Other by replacing it with the positive term of 
the reader's own occultation within the narrative. Like the obsessional, the hypertext 
reader is compelled by the double bind of a forced choice … This double bind is, I 
think, the source of unease on the part of many readers concerning the equivocal closure 
of hypertexts. It seems that you can never finish reading these documents, because you 
can never quite get what it is you seek. There is always more to read, more to uncover, 
without actually getting the thing you're reading for" (Harpold, 1994, 209-210). 
We find here the relationship between fantasy and the real. The fantasmatic 
screen protects us against (a too direct an intrusion of) the real. Thus we put together 
(draw up, make up) the real fantasmatically: in all sorts of ideas, convictions and ideals 
('the promise of closure'). The obsessional rituals emphatically give proof of this 
process. This is Freud's so called crystal principle, wherein the broken crystal – 
pathology – shows the lines of fracture in the normal condition. For Lacan too this 
'defensive formation' of the real is a basic process. As the real is unassimilable, there is 
a point where interpretation bumps on the 'hard core' of psychic reality. Where Freud 
finds something that he calls the ‘navel of the dream’, Lacan discovers the relation to an 
ininterpretable real. In his famous case of the Wolf Man Freud leads the obsessional 
neurosis of his patient back to the centrality of his patient’s dream about wolves. In that 
dream wolves suddenly appear in the patient's bedroom window. According to Freud – 
via a long way of interpretation – this refers to the incomprehensible ('real') primal 
scene in which the child sees its parents copulating. For Lacan those representatives (the 
wolves) function as a representative of the subject’s encounter with the real. They are 
pivotal in the psychic life of the Wolf Man, although they are not ‘analogue’ to or 
deducible from ‘real reality’. They are composited from different elements in order to
represent, and at the same time to cover up, a traumatic event. Psychic reality – that is 
Lacan’s radical thesis – always is a composing, a putting together (a ‘drawing’, 
‘editing’) of the real. As the real does not cease to resist, truth, as what relates to the 
real, is that ‘what does not cease to inscribe itself’ (S.20, 55). 
 When one considers the encounter with the real as something that disrupts our 
normal picture of the world, but simultaneously causes or calls for a new invocation or 
evocation of it, the tuchè is also the source of the technè as a system to disclose the 
world. Heidegger understands technè as such a disclosure of the world: it brings forth 
beings into the unconcealdness of their appearance (de Mul, 1998, 166). Technè is then 
closely related to creativity and the work of art. A creativity – as Lacan would have it – 
animated by tuchè (which can then be seen as a variation on Plato's notion of the tuchè
as a divine intervention in the automaton of natural processes). The elimination of the 
tuchè thus undermines creativity. Virtual Reality seems to have a strong tendency to 
eliminate chance and the unexpected by anticipating as much as possible (cf. Krueger, 
1991, 189; and remind Rifkins analysis of  the digitization of time as a programming of 
events). And with this loss of the tuchè the creative aspects of reality could also 
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possibly get lost. In his 'Plenitude and Alienation: The Subject of Virtual Reality' Simon 
Cooper analyzes the relation between Virtual Reality and creativity. He borrows his 
theoretical framework a.o. from the neuro-biologist Francisco Varela, who examines 
chaotic elements from outside a system producing generative breakdowns from which 
new microworlds may emerge. "Thus 'noise' is not the restriction of creativity, but its 
underpinning" (Cooper, 1997, 102). The technological filtering of the environment is 
not merely an advantage that enlarges our capabilities. "Our consciousness may 
function like a filter, but the important difference is that the environment it engages with 
has not been filtered in advance. In the virtual environment, the chance operations that 
generate creativity are severly restricted by the design decisions needed to make VR a 
convincing illusion in the first place … The experience of loss or crisis that might send 
the subject on a purposeful activity is denied by the technology that attempts to render a 
world of full presence. The significant reduction of 'noise' works to stifle rather than 
enhance purposeful activity" (Cooper, 1997, 102). 
 We are in a two-fold – 'split' – relation to the real. Lacan emphasizes this 
division of the subject in its encounter with the real: “we see here a point that the 
subject can approach only by dividing himself into a certain number of agencies” (S.11, 
51). We necessarily keep the (traumatic) real at a distance; we design to eliminate the 
encounter with the real (as in VR). But at the same time it is the momentary encounter 
with the real that prevents us from taking the 'necessary illusions' for reality itself, and 
thus allows for a renewed (renovated, 'updated', revived, rejuvenated, remoulded) 
disclosure of it. 104
2. The fantasy-interface as a screen 
2.1. The screen and the shield 
In the years that followed his discovery of the importance of fantasies in psychic life, 
Freud was taken up by the problem of memory and its distortions (through fantasies). In 
1899 he publishes his findings on the defensive functions of some memories (‘Screen 
memories’, S.E. 3, 303-322). He advances the idea that some memories intermingle 
elements of memory – although in general detached from their contexts – and elements 
of fantasy. Although they defend the subject against the memory of a traumatic 
experience, they nevertheless express the infantile element that is so emotionally 
charged, by concentrating it on a fixed and objectified form (cf. Perron-Borelli, 2001, 
22). Since memory is not a perfect machine of representation of facts or original events, 
Freud compares it in a later text to a children's toy called the mystic writing pad ('A 
Note upon the 'Mystic Writing Pad'', 1925; S.E. 19, 227-232). This toy consists of a thin 
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 In order to start a description of a 'Lacanian' position of the relation between the virtual and the 
possible (see chapter 2, part 1), I want to remind that Lacan defines the real not as that what can become 
possible, but as that what is impossible. The real as the cause of repetititive symptoms, and the real as the 
object of anxiety expresses most clearly its (traumatic) presence that is impossible to remember or to 
endure. This real that cannot realize or actualize itself is both the cause of  virtualization (of distancing 
ourself from the trauma: 'talking about the trauma', 'rewriting the past'), as its limit: we cannot completely 
distance or detach ourself from it; it remains our inner core that we cannot liberate by bringing it out into 
the open (light). What brings Lacan closer to Peirce and Deleuze than to the scheme they criticize is the 
fact that his notion of the real obstructs a realization of our 'true nature'. Therefore we are necessarily 
'astronauts' that explore new spaces. However, what is absent in (post-modern) Deleuzian thought is – as 
Žižek often stresses – the notion of the real as a limit to the virtualization and the construction of reality. 
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sheet of plastic that covers a thick waxen board on which one can write with a pointed 
instrument. In the wax then appears a dark trace that can be removed by lifting the 
sheet. For Freud this shows the psyche's recording of material. Memory covers a 
continuous rewriting of events, of which only traces remain. 
Lacan often calls fantasy a screen, thereby stressing its defensive function. In its 
psychical dimension, reality appears through some sort of sublimation, idealization etc. 
Psychical reality is a certain mise-en-scène. The real, that underlies it, is therefore only 
accessible via this fantasmatic screen. Lacan exemplifies this theory by referring to 
perceptual experiments in which one can only see an object whose ray of lights blind us, 
through a screen that mitigates their impact. “I alluded to the reference given by 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty in La phénoménologie de la perception in which, from well-
chosen examples based on the experiments of Gelb and Goldstein, one can already see, 
simply at the perceptual level, how the screen re-establishes things, in their status as 
real. If, by being isolated, an effect of lighting dominates us, if, for example, a beam of 
light directing our gaze so captivates us that it appears as a milky cone and prevents us 
from seeing what it illuminates, the mere fact of introducing into this field a small 
screen, which cuts into that what is illuminated without being seen, makes the milky 
light retreat, as it were, into the shadow, and allows the object it concealed to emerge. 
At the perceptual level, this is the phenomenon of a relation that is to be taken in a more 
essential function, namely, that in its relation to desire, reality appears only as 
marginal.” 
                                            screen
reality is marginal                                    
(S.11, 107-8).105
 We compose reality around the fundamental relation to the real object of desire. 
That 'what one cannot name' (in love, in art …) motivates the efforts to appropriate this 
'object' and leads to its phenomenal construction. Lacan expresses this pivotal notion in 
a number of ways. He speaks of the real as a hole in reality that fantasy fills. Also his 
description of the real object (a) of desire as the semblant of being expresses this notion 
of the fantasy-screen that mediates the real; the fantasmatic object supports being (S. 20, 
87). As an ontology his theory brings forward that we only know the appearances of 
being. Nevertheless, the subject is more than an (idealistic) projection camera. Our 
subjection to the Other is not the only structuring principle that determines the 
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 Amorousness may illuminate this screen. One does not dare to look the person that causes the amorous 
feelings straight in the face, and one's regard hence dwells with all the persons that surround her/him who 
are not so emotionally charged. This 'neutral surrounding' is then indeed marginal compared to the 'object' 
one fantasizes about. 
screen
screen
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appearances of reality. Reality also takes shape in our relation (or fixation) to an 
inaccessible real. 
 In his 1956-57 seminar Lacan compares the functioning of fantasy to the frozen 
image of a film projection that has been stopped (S.4, 119, 157). This functioning is 
most explicitly visible in fetishism, which halts or fixes the chain of memory at a certain 
point called the 'memory-screen'. What for Lacan constitutes the fetish, the symbolic 
element that fixes the fetish, derives from the scene just before the traumatic perception. 
The fetish is a screen against the traumatic real. The projected image of the fetish is the 
limit where the recollection of history is interrupted. It is the sign of the point of 
repression (S. 4, 158). Lacan recalls one of the first examples of Freud’s analysis of 
fetishism (in ‘Fetishism’, 1927, S.E. 21, 152-157), on a man who spent his childhood in 
England. Later on in his life, when he lived in Germany, he always sought ‘ein Glanz 
auf der nase’ that he subsequently tried to peep on. The German expression transposes 
the English expression ‘a glance at the nose’ that kept on coming across his mind since 
his first years (S. 4, 158). Lacan stresses the importance of the linguistic dimension in 
the analysis of the fetish (the homophony of ‘glance’ and ‘Glanz’ that leads the man 
glancing at a ‘Glanze’, a shine or gleam, at the nose).  Furthermore, signifiers that mark 
the limit of his recollection (for it is this phrase that he can recollect from his first years) 
mould his fantasmatic scene. In his discussion of Freud’s text ‘A Child is Being Beaten’ 
Lacan thus brings forward that also the perverse fantasy (not: perversion) reduces the 
course of history to an instantaneous state (S. 4, 119). It projects, or freezes, one's desire 
into an object: 'that thing is what can satisfy me' – objectivation of desire.
This line of thought on perverse fantasy, that fixates desire onto a certain object 
and thus screens off from its infinity, make the interpretations understandable that 
consider the computer as a fetish-object. All sorts of symbolical associations link up 
with the computer(culture). The computer is seen as an object by which one lives 'at the 
frontier of new developments', a trendy and 'fast' lifestyle etc. This is the socio-
symbolical aspect of self-representation: tying ourselves to the symbolical big Other of 
computer culture. The computer can also create 'in the concrete' (that is to say not via 
associations with a cultural meaning, but via direct reflection) a 'better' or more 
agreeable self-image, as the issue of self-presentation on the screen attests to. Then the 
screen is a predominantly imaginary other. In any case, this symbolic-imaginary 
formation, or fixation, of (a more pleasing) personal identity, makes the computer 
function as a (fetish)screen screening off uncertainty, anxiety …: 'blankness'. From the 
psychological perspective the world of signifiers of cyberspace functions as an 
automaton, a self-regulating mechanism that works according to the pleasure principle 
in making the excesses of excitement manageable. It is a new realm of fictions that 
helps us to manage the problems of 'real life'. The role avatars play for South Korean 
adolescents illustrates this. For Cathryn Vasseleu "cyberspace is also a domain with its 
own breeds of automata which, for brevity's sake, I call cybernetic automata. I use this 
term to include all kinds and combinations of physical and virtual environments and 
'agents' that feature cybernetic feedback, procedural and information systems" 
(Vasseleu, 2002, 86). Computer-objects allow us to control and manipulate the world, to 
make it 'emotionally safe'. The computer in general is an object par excellence to gratify 
– at (inter)face value – our desires, and thus to keep the uncontrollable outside world at 
a distance (cf. Barglow, 1994, 128). The automatic repetition of the self, objectified on 
the computer screen (a digital avatar), can disconnect the  self from 'real life' and lead to 
a life in accord with the pleasure principle (no detour). The excess of computer 
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addiction illustrates this screening off of the other and the outside world (cf. Wassenaar 
and Van Doorn, 1998, 359). Another case, that of phobia, also shows this effort of 
eliminating the tuchè.
2.2. The screen as principally defensive: phobia, and its computerized treatment 
As a defense of anxiety the computer screen can function similarly to the phobic-screen. 
Lacan discovers similarities between the fetish and the phobic object in that both are 
symbolic-imaginary substitutes for a threatening presence (cf. Evans, 1996, 148). Then 
the example of Virtual Reality treatment of phobias becomes all the more interesting. 
Usually therapeutic use of Virtual Reality for phobias takes the form of exposure 
therapy: the phobic patient is exposed gradually to the feared object or situation. 
Research shows that little by little the fear of the phobic patients diminishes as they 
become accustomed to and more or less comfortable with, for instance, spiders or social 
environments.106 This in vivo exposure therapy is a combination of cognitive therapy, 
that teaches people to think differently (about spiders), and behavioral therapy that 
seeks to recondition the phobic reaction to the feared object by unlearning the learned 
stimulus-response reaction to it (desensitizing the subject).  
But does Virtual Reality treatment actually expose the patient to 'the real thing' 
that causes his anxiety? The Human Interface Technology Laboratory, for instance, 
states: "With in vivo (in life) exposure therapy, under a therapist's supervision and 
guidance, rather than avoiding it, the phobics slowly approach the thing they are afraid 
of in the real world."107 In the context of  my exposition of Lacanian theory so far it is 
no surprise, that this theory leads to a 'deconstruction' of the notion of the object in the 
'real world' as used here by cognitive theory. Both theories make different claims. The 
cognitive stream in psychotherapy that guides most Virtual Reality research explicitly 
states that its therapies are not Freudian. However, from a 'Freudian' perspective one 
must make the crucial observation that the object that Virtual Reality therapy exposes 
the phobic to is not the real object of his anxiety, but already its fantasmatic (and 
defensive) formation. That is, at least, what follows from Lacanian theory regarding 
phobia.
In his 1956-1957 discussion of phobia, Lacan argues that the phobic object is a 
fantasmatic construction protecting against anxiety (S.4, 23). The phobic object screens 
the subject from the real object (the anxiety inducing void) and thus turns anxiety into a 
fear focused on a particular object. From a Lacanian perspective it is therefore more 
accurate to say that Virtual Reality exposes the phobic to the object of his fear instead of 
the object of his anxiety, as the phobic object is exactly what turns anxiety into fear by 
focusing it on a specific object! Thus the Virtual Reality screen – not just from the 
material perspective from which it is obvious that the material spider is not present, but 
also from the 'psychological' perspective – is similar to the psychic screen in that it 
exposes man to a fantasmatic substitute of the real thing. The computer screen is hence 
predominantly a defensive screen against the object of anxiety, and – which is the most 
important point – does not actually start an 'interaction' with the real object of anxiety. 
VR treatment mainly focuses on getting the subject accustomed to the particular image 
that (on the phenomenological level) seems to cause his fear. Although also Lacan 
acknowledges that this 'imaginarization' or visualization is already a way to make the 
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 Cf. the issue of Cyberpsychology & Behavior (vol. 6, nr. 3, 2003) on CyberTherapy; and Carlin et al 
(1997) on the first case study of treating spider phobia with Virtual Reality exposure. 
107 http://ftp.hitl.washington.edu/projects/exposure/
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traumatic situation livable, and as such is an inevitable and even necessary aspect, the 
sole focus on the imaginary aspect hinders the transformation of the defensive screen 
into a window that actually is in a (of course also imaginary mediated) relationship to 
the real. When the object appears as in a 'window' (an image as a framework for 
viewing the real, composited of different elements instead of being an imaginary 
reflection) there are different 'visualizations' possible (an element of the 'spider' turns 
out to be the grimace of the father etc). In such a process of 'working through' there is 
hopefully in the end an 'exhaustion' and a 'dissolvation' of the phobia (cf. S.4, 402). 
While the phobic image remains as a 'screen' that one must get accustomed to, one is 
still fixated on one particular imaginarization of desire. 
3. The fantasy-interface as a window
3.1. The scheme of the veil 
In order to understand the twofold function of fantasy (defense and disclosure) it is 
crucial to have a grasp of the fundamental phenomenon in psychoanalysis: anxiety. For 
Lacan anxiety is – as stated – an affect, and not an emotion. Furthermore: it is the only 
affect that is not deceptive (cf. S.11, 41). That is, it is an affect with a real object. The 
real as the object of anxiety implies that nothing is as bad as not missing the ‘real 
Thing’, that is to say getting it. In his theory of anxiety, especially as put forward in his 
1962-63 seminar of the same name, Lacan polemizes with other theories by stating that 
anxiety has an object. Paradoxically, this object of anxiety is the lost object of desire. 
So anxiety occurs when we are not enough at a distance – 'separated' – from the object 
of ultimate pleasure which simultaneously annihilates us as a singularized subject 
(where pleasure topples into jouissance). It is not the absence of the object of desire that 
causes anxiety, but its proximity! It is on this point that he differs from Freud: "whereas 
Freud posits that one of the causes of anxiety is separation from the mother, Lacan 
argues that it is precisely a lack of such separation which induces anxiety" (Evans, 
1996, 10). Anxiety arises when the real approaches too close by, because then the gap 
(of desire) evaporates: the dream turns into a nightmare. The anxiety Lacan analyzes 
thus seems to be a ‘psychotic anxiety’, a fear of losing oneself, which can occur when 
nothing is lacking anymore: anxiety is the lack of lacking.  I will give some examples. 
When I try to objectify myself completely by ceaselessly staring into the mirror (or 
endlessly try to think out who I am), I may get to a point where I no longer do know 
who I am. Furthermore, there is the well-known idea that it might be more horrifying to 
obtain the ‘real Thing’ of eternal life than not to have it. Anxiety indicates that the 
distance to the emptiness that causes desire is about to disappear, and fantasy's 
mediation of the real is at the point of collapsing. As Lacan argues in his 1960-1961 
seminar on transference, desire is therefore a remedy for anxiety (cf. Evans, 1996, 11). 
Once again: it is not the fact that there is an emptiness that causes anxiety, but the non-
mediation of the emptiness. As long as we form or create the emptiness on the screen of 
fantasy, we desire and thus keep anxiety at a distance. Fantasmatic desire is a 
(necessary) medium. 
 Love, as a form of desire, is a remedy for anxiety, by giving an imaginary-
symbolic form to the object of desire that one can never fully assimilate. As such, it is a 
source of creativity, and the libidinal motivation of our odyssey through the world. In 
love there is a symbolical relation to what one cannot grasp. What we love in the other, 
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Lacan says, is something that lies beyond the qualities of the other (in his seminar on 
transference Lacan develops this notion of the object-cause of desire as the object a). In 
his exposition on ‘The function of the veil’ in his fourth seminar he (still) thinks this 
beyond as ‘nothing’ that we can present only symbolically. That is, we can only speak 
about what it is that we love in the other, without actually grasping it. We can merely 
imagine it: think of all the sonnets dedicated to love. Since we in this manner inevitably 
introduce something of ourselves in the description of the other, love necessarily has a 
narcissistic structure (cf. S. 11, 186). But this imagining is necessary to install a relation 
to this beyond: no symbolical relation (with absence) without the imaginary (S. 4, 157). 
All of man’s symbols testify to this; even the computerized symbol for crying [  :'-)   ] 
cannot do without its imaginary origin when it depicts a teardrop. 
 Phenomena like fetishism and love bring us to Lacan’s scheme of the veil: 
                      Subject                         Object                  Nothing 
         Veil   
(S.4, 156) 
The veil is that on which the absence can ‘paint’ itself, where one can project and 
imagine it. Lacan uses one of the most fundamental images of man's relation to the 
world, the ‘veil of Maya’, to express this relation of interposition. This veil is a 
powerful metaphor to express the relationship of man to everything that captivates him, 
for there is “a certain fundamental illusion in all the relations that are interweaved with 
his desire” (S. 4, 155; m.t.). On the veil the object can take the place of the lack. 
 The human-computer interface can also function as such a 'veil' on which we 
imagine what is beyond our capabilities or limitations. Since this structure is, according 
to Lacan, characteristic of reality itself, the computer interface is perfectly suited to be a 
medium for extending our awareness of reality. The point is, as we saw in the 
exposition on phobia, that from a Lacanian point of view one must evaluate this 
'imagining' in relation to the 'truth' of desire which is that there is no (stable) object that 
corresponds to it and gives us a firm basis. For one thing, love illustrates that desire can 
lead to a continuous creative disclosure of reality. For another, the fetish and the phobic 
object show that – although Lacan does not evaluate those phenomena purely negatively 
since both also are ways, albeit provisional, to make a traumatic situation livable – our 
interfacing with the world can also be predominantly defensive.108 Man can have 
different motivations for entering cyberspace (see chapter 3, part 4). Does he want to 
fully turn in on himself (cyberspace as the space for the Leibnizian monad that realizes 
the – godlike – desire of temporal simultaneity, 'everything at the same time', 'no delay', 
cf. Heim, 1994, 95; and 'Cyberspace, Or, The Unbearable Closure of Being', Žižek, 
1997)? Or does he actually want to engage in new forms of interaction and 
communication with the Other? That is, is he closing being by merely ('consciously') 
fantasizing, or disclosing being ('unconsciously') by means of new frameworks or 
windows? 
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 The most unforgivable error is, thus Lacan, that of  'good faith'. That is, as Miller explains, to take 
one's desires for realities and being the slave of one's fantasy. What causes the error of 'good faith' is 
enjoyment: the sens joui of fantasy (Miller, 1999a, 11). Sens joui: enjoying the meaning that fantasy 
provides. In 'good faith' one enjoys it to such an extent that fantasy seems to be reality itself.  
109
 Crucial to the understanding of the 'productive' aspect of fantasy (fantasy as a 
window) is its functioning at an unconscious level. At first sight fantasy is a defensive 
stand-in formation of the real (the fantasy of the automaton, or of automation, of 
automatic production: everybody happy, wealthy … the promise of the cyborg). But 
unconsciously fantasy does relate to the real, and seeks to give it shape. 109
3.2. The unconscious fantasy 
In his 'Transference among People Online' John Suler emphasizes a sort of 'unconscious 
homing device' that seems to determine much online behavior. People often start the 
same kind of relationships online. "Unconscious motivations related to the transference 
will also affect the "filtering" process that determines the choices the user makes in 
establishing relationships. Users may be surprised to find that the close friends they 
make online all seem to be the same types of people, even though this was not 
immediately obvious at the start of the relationship. This unconscious "homing" device 
can be very sensitive. Even when communicating only via text and in cumbersome or 
distracting online environments, we nevertheless zoom in on relationships that touch 
some hidden need within us." (Suler, 1996). Also the construction of virtual self-images 
by means of avatars seems to attest to such a 'homing device': the kinds of avatars 
people use to represent them are not irrelevant (cf. Suler, 1999a). Lacanian analysis 
emphasizes the function of signifiers in this 'unconscious homing device' (this 'homing 
towards the real'), because unconscious signifiers determine the image or the other that 
we 'choose'. What Lacan calls the ‘illusory object’ plays its role as a signifying function. 
Thus we can reach further into the understanding of why, for instance, a female’s shoe 
can provoke in a man the emergence of sexual energy that would seem to be destined 
for the reproduction of the species (S.5, 229). Fantasy is not solely a matter of the drives 
and their ‘innate’ images, but very much of the signifier (the symbolic). It is the 
signifier that 'bridges' the subject's current representation to the real (as certain phrases 
or partial images are pivotal in someone's avatar, and 'interface' this 'imaginary illusion' 
with the real of his desire). The crucial signifiers of someone's life (unconsciously) 
determine why someone constantly inclines to the same relationships or same fantasy-
images of himself. Because of this determining role of signifiers, fantasy is 
unconscious. Lacanian analysis tries to expose those signifiers that have shaped the 
fantasmatic construction of the object.110
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 Lacan’s notion of fantasy continues to bear a resemblance to Freud’s 'central usage' of  providing 
pleasure after the installment of the reality principle. Of course fantasy organizes pleasure. The whole 
point is, however, that this pleasure is not simply a conscious construction of the ego that thus seeks 
hallucinatory compensation for its deficiencies. There is an unconscious element in fantasy: we 
unconsciously try to refind forms of pleasure that we inevitably lost in the process of individuatization 
(and this effort of refindfing a ‘feeling’ that we lost may generate feelings of displeasure; as might be the 
case for instance in the enormous effort ‘to make a career’ in order to ‘become someone’). It is the 
unconscious subject – of the signifier – that determines the formation of the fantasy. 
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 In her text on 'The Drive' Marie-Hélène Brousse analyzes speech as a demand, and how the the 
signifier of the Other's demand defines the subject.  She gives the following clinical example. "I have a 
patient who is grappling with her mother's desire because she can't decide whether or not to have a baby. 
In reference to her mother's desire she can only remember one sentence. It's a memory of her mother 
being furious with her children, running after them and saying, "I'm going to kill you." The signifier of 
her mother's desire is "I'm going to kill you". In a sense, my patient was constituted on the basis of those 
signifiers, to kill a child. It's her interpretation of the Other's demand. The Other's demand is "die!" " 
(Brousse, 1995, 109-110). 
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Lacan expresses this steering aspect of the signifier in the formula of fantasy that 
he uses from 1957 onward: S<>a. Fantasy consists of heterogeneous elements; it 
connects the libinal (the object a of enjoyment) to the symbolical (the subject of the 
signifier).111 There are three dimensions in fantasy. There is the enjoyment that 
dominates, the images that cover up, and the signifiers that work (Nasio, 1987, 147; 
Ribettes, 1984). Lacan’s second paradigm considers fantasy as more than the ‘internal 
images’ to which the drives are attached. From his fifth seminar onward, Lacan 
understands fantasy also as a scenario (cf. Miller, 1999, 11). In a scenario it is about a 
play of images. When fantasy is a scenario, the image is subjected to the play of the 
signifier.  
The case of 'A child is being beaten' which I discussed earlier shows that 
conscious fantasies mostly root in unconscious ones, they are governed by or the result 
of the logic of the unconscious. According to Marshall Edelson the 'logic of fantasy' that 
Freud emphasizes in this text is like “the kind of changes in a fantasy that are like those 
an author might make in a script. What we have here are … different wishes and beliefs, 
and often providing in the imagination both protection and gratification simultaneously” 
(Edelson, 1988, 189). Where Freud discovered the laws of the primary process 
(condensation, inversion etc), Lacan poses the laws of the symbolic (grammar, syntax, 
combination, substitution). For Lacan, Freud’s analysis of the mentioned fantasy of 
fustigation shows the transformational grammar that directs the elementary structure of 
the unconscious (cf. Ribettes, 1984, 190). Transformation is proper to fantasy (Perron-
Borelli, 2001, 124). Of these the (dual) transformations of turning the active position 
into the passive (and inversely) is the most important (‘turning against oneself’, ‘turning 
into the opposite’; the drive attains its goal via a modification of its activity112). There is 
also projection (I project onto the other what is coming from myself: ‘she is in love with 
me instead of  I’m in love with her’) and substitution (one object or activity is 
substituted for another).   
 Bringing Lacan's theory of fantasy into the 'Controversial Discussions' 
mentioned earlier (chapter 3: § 2.3.) might help to summarize its position. Lacan refines 
the ‘Kleinian’ opposition between conscious fantasies and unconscious phantasies, from 
his own (early) theoretical framework. It is impossible, he says in 1958, to usefully 
distinguish the unconscious fantasies from the play of imagination if we do not see that 
the signifier structures the unconscious fantasy (S5, 252-253). Fantasies are 
unconscious because signifiers from the realm of the Other, and their laws, structure 
them outside our conscious awareness: the fantasy-image is 'set to work in a signifying 
structure'. That differentiates them from conscious constructions by the ego for gaining 
pleasure (although also this play of imagination may be the more acceptable version of 
unconscious fantasies). For Lacan one cannot speak of a ‘true reality’ of the content of 
primary mental processes: there are no original and primitive objects that correspond 
‘naturally’ to our ‘deepest wishes'. The substitution of reality by means of  the signifier 
is original. “The objects are already, if I may express me that way, signifiered
(signifiantisés)” (S5, 253; m.t.). Fantasy puts those objects again together out of 
signifying elements. It tries to regain the (lost) objects that we desire, which do not exist 
111
 Thus, and this is the basic theme of the next chapter, there is a virtualization of jouissance: for human 
beings enjoyment is mostly not a brute act of consumption but organized by and within the limits of the 
symbolical order. So Lacan’s formula of fantasy expresses the crucial notion that signifying elements 
bring the enjoyment of the fantasy-object (a) on a symbolical level.
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 Freud describes this in his ‘Instincts and Their Vicissitudes’ (S.E. 14, 117-140). 
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as such as they are already dissolved into signifying elements. From the 'object' that my 
nostalgic desire longs for, only bits and pieces remain, which form the 'material' for 
fantasy to reconstruct the object  (sounds, images, sayings …). Those signifying 
elements are the 'material' of the unconscious; they belong to the domain of the Other. 
The fantasmatic constellation of signifiers creates a certain window upon reality (and 
here we are again at a previous thesis on the functioning of metaphors as a window 
upon reality). Fantasy as such a window shapes the object of desire (object a) by means 
of signifiers coming from the Other. We shape the object of our desire by means of 
images and signifiers that we do not consciously choose.  
 With a reference to Freud’s notion of the ‘overdetermination’ of  symptoms – 
they never have simply one cause but are a ‘composition’ –  Lacan brings forward his 
fundamental idea of language ‘multiplying’ the object of man’s needs and demands. As 
it detaches us from the immediacy of the need, language opens up the space of multiple 
imaginary scenes that shape the object. The (One) object of desire thus disappears into a 
multiplicity of scenes.113
“It [the overdetermination of symptoms] means that interference will occur 
between the effects that correspond in a subject to a particular demand and the 
effects of a position in relation to the other (here, the counterpart) that he 
sustains as subject. ‘That he sustains as subject’ means that language allows him 
to regard himself as the scene-shifter, or even the director of the entire imaginary 
capture of which he would otherwise be nothing more than the living marionette. 
Fantasy is the perfect illustration of this original possibility. That is why any 
temptation to reduce it to the imagination, because one cannot admit its failure, 
is a permanent misconception, a misconception from which the Kleinian school, 
which has certainly carried things very far in this field, is not free, largely 
because it has been incapable of even so much as suspecting the existence of the 
category of the signifier. However, once it is defined as an image set to 
work in the signifying structure, the notion of the unconscious fantasy no longer 
presents any difficulty” (Ec., 272) [translation changed]114
 The signifying material of the Other governs or possesses the Self and 
'deconstructs' its autonomy. This material actually constitutes the framework wherein 
the conscious fantasy operates. Fantasy as a construction of the ego for gaining pleasure 
is, for the most part, governed by 'material' that functions as its building material: for 
my construction of an avatar on the Internet I use signifying material. Although I may 
think that the avatar is fully at my choice, I am already in the unconscious because of 
the use of all sorts of signifying elements (that are not my own). This is the strict, 
material sense of the unconscious: it is not a 'content' but a 'form'. In his psychological 
investigations of such mediamatic self-representations, John Suler tries to give a 
meaning to those (material) unconscious elements by letting people talk about other 
113
 Conjoining these ideas to the issue that digital media transform the object into an interface may 
explain why the computer interface and cyberspace, as domains of the signifier, are media for the 
rediscovery of  the object of man's desire: they provide all sorts of desirable scenes.
114
 The translator uses the (Kleinian) term phantasy to translate the French word ‘fantasme’. In order to 
avoid confusion I will use the word fantasy instead, as I will do in all texts cited from the Écrits. A 
selection
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people's avatar and their own: Avatar Free Association (Suler, 1997a). Also the images 
and elements of new media can be used to shape unconscious desire. 
3.3. 'Interactivity': the screen as a window or frame 
For Lacan, the window of fantasmatic identification frames our looking and constitutes 
us as beings of desire. Without it our partner would not appear as someone with whom 
we would like to share our life. And it causes the car to be something more than an 
appliance: it also organizes a way of living, a way we see the world. In the philosophy 
of technology, the car must frequently illustrate the shortcomings of the instrumental 
vision. Roland Barthes calls cars the 'cathedrals of modern times' for they are, like 
cathedrals, symbols of culture that express our feelings and desires. The car not only 
transports us through an objective reality, but also changes reality: it discloses new 
spaces (and closes old ones), spaces wherein we exist. The car is a framing of reality. 
Through its windows reality appears in a certain way, by putting us in a certain position
towards the real beyond its screen: a position of autonomy, individuality, mobility (and 
its current excess: immobilizing traffic jams). 
The cinema is of course another famous framing of reality. The camera (the 
projector) takes us to unseen spaces, or impossible places for our (‘natural’) eyes to see. 
The positioning of the camera already frames reality. Actually seeing such 'images' of 
reality requires an  identification with the virtual camera position (this is the experiential 
level of 'lived subjectivity': the 'immersion' of the film enthusiast, as contrasted with the 
neutral, objective position of the 'critic'). "In other words, the spectator identifies with 
himself, with himself as a pure act of perception (as wakefulness, alertness): as the 
condition of possibility of the perceived and hence as a kind of transcendental subject, 
which comes before every there is" (Metz, 1982, 49). The interfaces that lead us into 
cyberspace also open up new spaces. Those spaces are not merely flat projections that 
we look at, but also spaces in which we (fantasmatically) live: in a (text-based or 
graphical) virtual world I not only look at a flat screen but also 'live on the screen' by 
means of my identifications with the textual or visual appearances of myself.  
For Lacan we cannot fully separate the 'subjective' and the 'objective' position 
(the 'enthusiast' and the 'critic'): even the detached position of the critic is not neutral – if 
it would be neutral he wouldn't  be interested in any film whatsoever. This leads to a 
general theory of fantasy as the 'stuff' of the transcendental subject (which I will set out 
in the final chapter). Fantasmatic identification with a certain virtual position is the 
condition which makes perceiving a meaningful, significant, expressive reality possible. 
Identification with a virtual position always takes place. We look not only with our 
eyes, but also with the ‘projected’ fantasmatic gaze. That is, our looking is animated by 
desire. For beings of desire the fantasmatic window mediates the interaction with the 
other (side of the screen). Whereas the mirror-screen closes this 'other side' (and thus the 
differentiation of reality), this interaction causes the disclosing of (a different) reality. 
Then the subject not merely deals with his own imaginary reflections.  
At stake in Lacan's theory is the difference between the 'closed' and the 'open' 
window, between the mirror-screen and the window or the frame. It develops from the 
imaginary relationship (a – a’) towards the beyond of the image, the object a (a – a’\ (a); 
from the screen as a reflection of the ego towards a window of perception for the 
unconscious subject of desire. His formula of fantasy (S<>a) expresses the mirror-
screen as a frame that conditions the interaction with others and puts us in a certain 
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position to reality. The window frames reality, for the crucial aspect of the window is its 
function as a framework. Seeing presupposes some sort of framework (a 'horizon').  
New interactive media include the user as a participant in the virtual 
environment. This interactivity makes it hard to maintain a strict distinction between 
fiction and reality. Actually (inter) acting in a virtual world or chatbox on the Internet 
makes my (speech) acts no less fictitious than when I score a goal in a soccer game. 
When I genuinely interact with others, (speech) acts assume their full weight in reality. 
Talking without listening leads to imaginary deviations, as well as listening without the 
possibility of reacting. Most of the interfaces of 'old' media did not have the possibilities 
of interaction (and thereby excluded the user from participation) that keyboard, mouse, 
joystick or data glove provide for input, instant feedback and real time control. The 
possibilities of mass media (that sends its messages from a center to the passive 
receiver) to form virtual communities remain an imaginary entity, whose virtual reality 
only begets reality-effects by means of the interactivity of 'new' media (cf. Simons, 
2002, 150, 47). 'New' media's inclusion of the user makes its interfaces more than just 
'fixed', imaginary screens between the user and the digital other. Interfaces as 
'environments' are also, or even more so, frames or windows that organize reality. As a 
window, the interface allows interaction between user and system, so that the user 
animates the system, and the sytem animates the user in a concerted disclosure of 
reality. 
3.4. The interactive fantasy: the Self and the question of the Other 
The Other in me is like a riddle: why did I build this specific avatar, why did I say that, 
why did I take this specific photograph etc? In general, Lacan parallels this 
unconscious, unknown, Other side of the Self to a question that another person poses, 
namely the  
question ‘What do you want?’ The question that fantasy tries to resolve is: ‘what am I 
for the other?’ (what does she see in me, what do I mean to him … etc: Who am I?) .  
 “That is why the question of the Other, which comes back to the subject from 
the place from which he expects an oracular reply in some such form as ‘Che 
Vuoi?’, ‘What do you want?’, is the one that best leads him to the path of his 
own desire – providing he sets out, with the help of the skills of a partner known 
as a psychoanalyst, to reformulate it, even without knowing it, as ‘What does he 
want from me?’” (Ec., 312).  
The Self emerges as an answer to this question. In general, responding to the question of 
the other governs communication. So when the other is God, we try to find out what we 
must be, or do, in order to be ‘good’ in the eyes of God. Catholic doctrine, for instance, 
is as such an institutionalized answer to this particular question.115 When the other is 
another person in a virtual world that I communicate with via avatars, I construct my 
‘imaginary persona’ (avatar) not only according to my ‘own’ desire but also for the 
other, in accordance with what he said to me (and with the 'unconscious material in 
me'). Transference to computers will show that interaction with a computer, seen as 
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 Lacan’s  point – against a ‘fixation’or institutionalization of the answer – is nevertheless that ‘closure’ 
is not possible (when we want to refrain, at least, from the psychotic position of self-enclosed delusion, 
wherein we know the answer); we must continue to confront and expound ourselves with the imperfection 
of the other and thus with the faultiness of our own answer. 
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another person, defines identity-construction: I am, for example, the master over the 
obedient other (that asks 'how can I help you?'). In this process the subject cannot avoid 
making itself into an object (it defines itself as …). The subject even must make himself 
– or the other – into an object in order to avoid the impossibility of the answer (for can 
we ever say what we want or who we are, what it exactly is that attracts us?). 
Objectification is a necessary process to avoid the enigma or the abyss of desire (cf. 
Žižek, 1992, 191). Subjectivation and objectification thus go hand in hand (I will 
address this issue extensively in the next chapter). However, if the screen that fantasy 
puts up in this intersubjective dialectic of Self and Other is to refrain from illusion, the 
answer must continue interacting with the riddle coming from the Other (against 'frozen 
metaphors'). The question of the Other causes a hole in fantasy as a self-satisfied show, 
because it keeps on insisting and disturbing.116
 Because reality contains a 'hallucinatory' aspect that results from the interaction 
with the other/Other (explicitly visible in amorousness or infatuation), we may call it 
'interactive'. As this 'hallucinatory' aspect constitutes libidinous reality between people, 
it is not merely a hallucination of a self-enclosed monad. It is rather an interactive 
hallucination, exemplified so well by love relations (and in a broad sense the 'love of 
life', lacking in the depressive-psychotic position). At the center of our experience of 
reality is a fantasmatic aspect ('reality is marginal'), which necessarily takes shape by 
means of images and signifiers. Žižek considers reality to pivot around this element of 
construction. The fantasmatic core of reality 'coordinates' our experience as reality. It is 
for that reason that a 'hallucinatory thing' as the computer interface can provide new 
realities. What first appears to be a 'deviation' from reality (as we know it), then 
becomes a new entrance hall to it. Metaphoric spaces can design new shapes of (a 
virtualized) reality (see chapter three, part 1). Žižek speaks of a "realization of the 
metaphor: what at first appears as a mere metaphorical simulation, a pale imitation, of 
the true reality (computer as metaphor of the true brains, etc.) becomes the original 
paradigm imitated by blood-and-flesh reality (brains follow in an always imperfect way 
the functioning of the computer, etc.). What we experience as "reality" is constituted by 
such a reversal: as Lacan puts it, "reality" is always framed by a fantasy, i.e., for 
something real to be experienced as part of "reality", it must fit the preordained 
coordinates of our fantasy-space (a sexual act must fit the coordinates of our imagined 
fantasy-scripts, a brain must fit the functioning of a computer, etc.)" (Žižek, 1993, 43-
44).
 The crucial, intersubjective, aspect of fantasy does not concern need but desire. 
In the reality of desire, fantasy is 'interactive'. I 'imagine' how the other is, and 
subsequently I 'imagine' myself as the object that I am in the eyes of the other. Online 
love relations are obviously such interactive hallucinations. As we love our computer, 
human computer interaction in general generates such 'interactive illusions'. At the 
psychical level, reality centers on a psychological transference of 'something' that 
causes the screen to become alive. Then the computer screen transforms from a merely 
imaginary fantasy world into a window of perception. 
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 This hole introduces the object a as that is impossible to reflect, as what keeps on lacking in the mirror 
image. The difficult issue of fantasy is the double or 'split' association with this object a : we cannot avoid 
to perceive it fantasmatically, but must avoid to substantialize it. So, if we may 'traverse our fantasy', a 
new one returns … we must try to traverse our fantasies, but not in such a radical manner that we fall into 
the psychotic-depressive position of the loss of fantasy … 
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3.5. The screen and the other: computer psychotherapy 
"the problem of how an artificial situation can produce such an effect [of love] is 
one that fascinates Lacan throughout his work" (Evans, 1996, 103). 
As Turkle (1995, 111) shows, psychoanalytical psychotherapy has been for the greater 
part very skeptical about computer psychotherapy. For what does a computer know 
about deep emotions and the unconscious? It is doubtful whether we should position 
Lacan in this line of thought. In 1966 when M.I.T.-professor Jozef Weizenbaum writes 
the first computer psychotherapy program in history, called ELIZA, Lacan, during his 
seminar on the logic of fantasy, expresses a particular interest in this therapeutic 
machine. Although Weizenbaum wrote ELIZA as a test for the conversational 
capabilities of machines, people soon started to use it as a conversational partner for 
therapeutic purposes. It works as follows: when you type in a sentence, ELIZA gives 
you an answer according to certain codes, and a conversation may follow. Although 
Weizenbaum thought people would soon lose their interest in ELIZA because of its 
limited conversational capabilities, they actually were captivated by the conversation. 
Consequently, Lacan acknowledges that ELIZA appears to produce some sort of 
transference relation (S.14, 30-11-1966). People find something (of themselves) in the 
machine: they unconsciously transfer (fantasmatically) the object a of their desire into 
it. And what interested Lacan is – as emphasized – how an artificial situation can 
produce such a transference effect. The issue is people loving their computers, because 
in psychoanalytical terms love is an effect of transference. 
 When in 1966 the issue was still whether people actually could have an affective 
relation with a machine, nowadays one acknowledges that people really do have such 
relationships with computers. The work of Sherry Turkle, that I already mentioned, 
bares witness to this. Norman Holland gives proof of the computer as a seductive sex 
object, as a symbol of sexual power and prowess (Holland, 1996). Raymond Barglow 
describes the computer as a fusional object that operates in the unconscious "as a pre-
oedipal object related to its user as a mother is bonded to her child before its own 
boundaries and personal identity have been consolidated" (Barglow, 1994, 14). And in 
his 'Mom, Dad, Computer: Transference Reactions to Computers' John Suler states: 
"What makes computers especially enticing targets for transference is that they are 
VAGUELY human and PROGRAMMABLE to be whatever we make them out to be. 
… So how do you know when you're having one of these transference reactions to your 
computer? There are some tell-tale signs. When you want to throw the damn thing 
against the wall. When it "makes you" feel betrayed and disappointed. When you feel 
lonely and empty because you have not had enough time to spend with it. When you 
often want to be at your keyboard more than you want to be with family and friends, or 
when those people comment on how attached or emotional you get towards it. Any 
seemingly exaggerated or "inappropriately" strong feelings towards your machine 
probably means you think of it as more than just a machine. … Because we experience 
online others THROUGH the computer, it's also possible that the transference reactions 
to them may interact with the transference reactions to the computer. Transference to 
the computer may spill over to, amplify, or be contradicted by the perception of the 
online other" (Suler, 1998). Computers may appear as fellow 'humans': you can talk to 
them, they can ask you questions, you can play and cooperate with them, etc. And the 
way we perceive this medium influences the way we perceive the online other. So when 
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I consider the computer a programmable object, the other person that it relates me to 
may seem controllable as well. These transference effects give the computer the 
capacities of a therapeutic machine. For when I perceive the answers and questions of 
the ELIZA program as resembling those of my father, I might be able to 'work through' 
problems with my 'real-world' father by engaging in a conversation with my 'artificial 
father'. 
 Transference to computers shows man's 'psychological' relation with 'something' 
behind the screen. Whether this interaction considers a human user or a computer 
program is sometimes hard to distinguish: who is behind the therapeutical program, 
who's behind an avatar …? And it might even not be of central concern. The interaction 
with human users as well as with computer programs (which in the form of smart 
agents, bots en wizards appear to have human intelligence) deals with interfaces that 
make the 'other' present. Crucial is the interfaces causing the idea of a presence behind 
the screen (the 'transference effect'). They then 'posses' the object a, the object-cause of 
desire. Because transference effects abound, Lacan would probably be less pessimistic 
about the possibilities of a therapeutic machine than the inventor of ELIZA himself. For 
Weizenbaum considered the machine incapable of grasping the human meanings that 
reach beyond language, and that hold "the incommunicable feeling which the therapist 
always tries to help the patient express" (Weizenbaum, as cited in Turkle, 1995, 198). 
Because Lacan stresses the linguistic expression of meaning, and resists all notions of a 
direct expression of  'incommunicable feelings', the computer screen can function as a 
'screen of transference'. In psychoanalysis the analyst is after all also invisible for the 
patient. Pivotal is what he says to the analysand (his signifiers), and that he situates 
himself as the semblant of the object a, as the cause of the analysand's desire. That is, 
the analysand must 'imagine' that the relationship with the analyst offers him what he is 
looking for (in his 'unconscious motivations'). Online transference shows that the 
computer can do just that. The critical issue of computer psychotherapy would then shift 
from the presence of a real person that is 'directly' in contact with the analysand's 
'feelings' to the creation of an accurate program of interpretation. Analysis centers on 
the interaction at the level of signifiers, in an affective context (of transference). 
Computer interaction can operate at both levels.  
Lacan's theory 'deconstructs' immediate experience into an effect of the interplay 
of imaginary and symbolic aspects. Fantasy, which constructs the real in psychical 
reality, is the imaginary that works in a signifying, symbolic structure. And it is 
certainly not the imaginary as such. Therefore it is symbolic recollection, and not 
(imaginary) remembering or reminiscence, that decides the recall of (personal) history 
(cf. S.1, 14). Lacan agrees with Freud that the analogous remembering of the past by 
means of 'direct' internal images is often not accurate. Therefore the emphasis shifts 
towards the recollection of signifiers that have determined someone's life. This also 
undermines the 'cathartic method' that seeks to discharge troublesome emotions by 
reliving the past traumatic events. Because symbolic recollection is not about reliving 
experiences it revolves around re-arranging signifying material. Interaction with a 
computerized other might – in principle – also do the job. The computer can evoke 
'warm' imaginary affects that are necessary to maintain a lively relation, and can 
effectuate a 'cold' symbolical punctuation of the exchanged text. Thus it can work on the 
unconscious. For Lacan the unconscious is not an  'incommunicable inwardness'. He 
focuses rather on the exterior form of our intimacy, which leads him to the neologism 
extimacy ('extimité'): the unconscious is outside. 
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3.6. 'Interactivity' and the paradigm of interface-subjectivity 
In chapter two I discussed whether technological autonomy puts the human subject out 
of bounds. Automation is a well-suited topic to illustrate the issue once more, for one 
may describe it as "a system based on feedback mechanisms, which substitutes 
programmed machine-controlled operations for human manipulations" (Vasseleu, 2002, 
86). With the industrial robot as its ultimate symbol, automation radically poses the 
question of 'who-is-acting' (agency). On the one hand robots are the ultimate realization 
of modern subjectivity in that they give the human operator mastery over the machines: 
they react to man's instructions. On the other hand they appear as machines that act and 
make changes on their own, thereby turning the operator almost into a passive 
remainder. Friedrich Kittler's remark shows that this control is also at stake in 
cyberspace: "we are all being controlled through our machines, and the more networked 
machines become, the stricter the mechanisms of control and safeguard will get" (in 
Vasseleu, 2002, 86).
However, 'cybernetic machines' (environments, 'agents' and informational 
systems that we connect to via the 'universal machine' of the computer) might transgress 
this simple paradox of the industrial machine in which the machine struggles to free 
itself of its makers, while its users desire mastery over and through their machines. 
Cybernetic machines exceed the sharp distinction between man's control versus the 
control of the machine. In cyberspace we are not simply users of instrumental systems 
or, conversely, instruments of the machine. Because cyberspace is so much a 
'psychological space' (Suler) we are participants (see chapter two, part 4). The 
interaction between user and system causes the (psychical) reality of the computer 
screen. With that, we are in the paradigm of interactivity. 
" the interactive user keeps the system going by being active, physically 
engaged, alert and impatient … 
"Engaged in mutual and simultaneous activity, users and systems are animated 
by each other" (Vasseleu, 2002, 87).  
The subjectivity of 'the age of information' is not that of an autonomous, 
controlling ('phallic') human subject at this side of the screen, versus an impotent 
subjectivity that must hand over its power (vir, virtus) to an autonomous technological 
world at the other side of the screen (and gets Viagra in return). The subjectivity at stake 
concerns the interaction of user and system, of man and technology, of real and virtual, 
of tuchè and technè. It is to be found at the human-computer interface, in between the 
known, rational world of control of the (human) Self, and the computerized, 'imaginary' 
world of the (machinic) Other. Fantasy, as such an intermediary space, is crucial for 
understanding this world of 'interactivity'. The screens that computers hang everywhere 
on the surrounding world both connect our 'real life' to virtual scenes, and separates us 
from them. We are in the difficult, 'intermediary' position of being influenced and 
governed by the virtual worlds (we are 'identical' to them), and being different from 
them: there remains something of a free subject ('non-identity' with the object that we 
turn ourselves into). Therefore we are not in the autonomous position of the modern 
subject of representation that, although seduced by all sorts of imaginary and bodily 
pleasures, is still capable to detach itself 'spiritually' from its illusions. Neither are we 
only 'post-modern' subjects of seduction that lack a positive and critical point of 
reference for evaluating the manifold of lures. Neither true representation nor (utopian 
118
or dystopian) simulation. Neither Vorstellung nor Darstellung, objectivism or 
subjectivism. Interface-subjectivity is about the intermediary 'subjective-objective' 
position.
Conclusion
Information systems do not only produce avatars, computerized self-representations, 
which function as primitive machines of pleasure. The specific issue of the fantasy 
screen and hence of the computer screen, in my opinion, is that it is also a way to shape 
the real. The screen does not merely replace the real; it also 'gives it a face' in the first 
place. The real is not an objective given that can take the measure of the reality on the 
computer screen. The specific role of the real in Lacan's theory shows that, for human 
beings, one should do away with such a vision. The real is unassimilable, traumatic. The 
screen of fantasy moulds this real (jouissance), and is therefore beyond the simple 
wishfulfilling production of an imaginary double (pleasure). The unconscious fantasy 
implies at its basic level that one does not 'play' the same scenario's over and over again 
in order to gain pleasure via imaginary reflections; it is a conditional way to shape the 
real (encounter) underlying it. Similarly, the information that we retrieve from our 
memory (which Lacan also considers to be a system of ciphering or encoding) is not the 
one and only objective reflection of the information of 'events' that is stored in our 
memory. This mechanism also holds for computer (user) interfaces. The information on 
the screen does not objectively  reflect the 'true' encoding and storage by and in 
computers of real things in the outside world. Information does not exist objectively in 
computer memories; it depends on context and interpretation. Considering the real  in a 
psychological sense  as a traumatic thing 'hidden' in reality, not even the most primitive 
functioning of the psychic apparatus - the automaton of the pleasure principle, as 
manifest in (technological) dreams - reflects it. The screen of fantasy both screens off 
and 'constructs' the real that lies behind it, and the computer screen can function in both 
ways. Computerized treatment of phobia shows how imaginary reminiscence of the real 
anxiety-producing object is taken as its objective reflection, hence the desensitization of 
the image. Here the computer functions as a mirror-screen that forgets the 'real thing' 
behind it. Computer psychotherapy shows that the computer, as a therapeutical 
instrument, also can function differently. Then it constructs the traumatic encounter  (or 
unassimilable otherness, heterogeneity) on-screen out of 'bits and pieces'. The 
unconscious fantasy composes the slipping real, whereas the conscious pleasure seeking 
fantasy tries to replace 'it'. In computer psychotherapy the computer contributes to the 
composition of the real – and thus help us gain insight in our fantasmatic constructions. 
When technical construction occurs with a sense of non-conclusion (non-isolation), so 
when technè remains in contact with the tuchè, the computer screen actually may 
contribute to our experience of reality. In agreement with Katherine Hayles I hence 
conclude that the computer screen is not simply about the dichotomy of presence and 
absence; "for the avatar both is present and is not present, just as the user both is and is 
not inside the screen" (Hayles, 1999, 27). The computer screen is neither about 'true 
representation' (Vorstellung) nor 'false representation' (Darstellung). From a Lacanian 
perspective the core of subjectivity does not reside either 'here' (the body), or 'there' in 
the mental realm of representations. It lies there where the patterns of information of the 
– (unconscious) mind as a – computer interact with the 'noise' that cannot be encoded in 
the system. 
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CHAPTER FIVE. EMBODIMENT: THE IMAGINARY 'STUFF' OF VIRTUAL 
SPACE
"the ontology of cyborgology is embodiment"  
(Gray, Mentor, Figueroa-Sarriera, 1995, 12). 
Introduction 
By combining the terms 'cybernetics' and 'organism' NASA scientist Manfred Clynes 
coined in 1960 the word 'cyborg'. Whereas this initially referred to a human being 
whose bodily functions were aided or controlled by technological devices, nowadays 
the term has acquired a more general meaning and describes the dependence of human 
beings on technology, so that we can think that "all who enter cyberspace become 
cyborgs because they depend on machines for their online life" (Jordan, 1999, 187). The 
cybernetic theories of Norbert Wiener, which Lacan tried to incorporate in his thinking, 
form a good basis for explaining the question of the cyborg from a Lacanian 
perspective. Lacan uses cybernetics to show that the automatic codes of language (or of 
the unconscious as a language) make the human subject dependent on 'machinism'. The 
(contemporary) question arises how this 'codification' relates to the human subject as a 
material body. The question of space is pivotal: how do we inhabit virtual spaces? For 
Lacan the question of space is a profound psychological issue: we ('psychically') exist in 
space, and this existence is not without 'physical' attachment. The function of the ego 
and the body in the opening up of space should shed some light on bodily involvement 
in (cyber) space. From there the question of the cyborg, and the opportunities and risks 
of becoming one, should become apparent. This approach also enables us to draw a link 
between Lacan's discussion with early cybernetic theory and contemporary questions 
regarding cyberspace and cybernetics. 
1. The 'steersman' and his body
1.1. Wiener and Lacan: the logic of cyborgs 
With his book Cybernetics: Communication and Control in Animal and Machine (1948) 
Norbert Wiener revolutionized thinking about human communication and control by 
arguing its fundamental similarity to the communication and control of animals and 
machines. Both humans and machines are cybernetic systems that receive messages 
from the outer world via sensory organs or receptors, and regulate the interaction with 
the world via feedback loops. Just as machines can be controlled via messages, the 
driver ('steersman', in Greek: cybernetes) of a car controls the motor with his gas pedal, 
and thereby achieves a homeostasis of a constancy or regularity between the system and 
the world.117 In cybernetic systems input and output mechanisms control entropy: a 
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 The notion of homeostasis allows us to trace the cybernetic circuit in the work of Freud. The pleasure 
principle is the principle that keeps the level of excitement at a constant level, and can thus also be called 
a (cybernetic) principle of constancy. 
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thermo-dynamical concept defining the tendency of an organic system toward an 
increasing state of chaos. 
 Especially interesting in Wiener's description of cybernetic systems is his 
attempt to eliminate the difference between men and machines: the organic and the 
mechanical contain a common language. In their outline of cyborgology, Gray, Mentor 
and Figueroa-Sarriera describe Bruce Mazlish's book called The Fourth Discontinuity: 
The Co-evolution of Humans and Machines. "In Mazlish's story, Western intellectual 
history can be seen as the overcoming of a series of great illusions, termed 
discontinuities, because they posited as natural four artificial distinctions, those: 1) 
between humans and the cosmos (overcome by Copernicus); 2) between humans and 
other life (overcome by Darwin); 3) between humans and our unconscious (overcome 
by Freud); and 4) between humans and machines. Wheresoever we note the dissolving 
fourth discontinuity, cyborgs thrive" (Gray, Mentor, Figueroa-Sarriera, 1995, 5-6). 
 The cyborg also thrives in the work of Lacan. In his 1955 seminar he makes this 
perfectly clear with his answer to Octave Mannoni who is worried that language could 
be generated by a machine and thereby no longer human:  
"Don't be soft. Don't go and say that the machine is really nasty and that it 
clutters up our lives. That is not what is at stake. The machine is simply the 
succession of little 0s and 1s, so that the question whether it is human or not is 
obviously entirely settled - it isn't. Except, there's also the question of knowing 
whether the human, in the sense in which you understand it, is as human as all 
that" (S2, 319).  
 Those cybernetic theories of Wiener which Lacan takes issue with primarily 
focus on the controlling function of the 'steersman' with a predominantly instrumental 
conception of the computer. The Graphical User Interface (GUI) and later on the mouse 
made the computer more of a medium and less an instrument of control. In this case the 
word 'cyber' refers more to the (visual) space that the user can navigate through 
(cyberspace), than to the instrumental function of control (cybernetics). I will take 
Lacan's debates covering cybernetics as a starting point for a Lacanian exploration of 
cyberspace. Both cybernetics and cyberspace revolve around the codification of objects 
into an exact language of zero's and one's ('information codes' such as the software 
codes that run cyberspace, the information codes of DNA …). In the discussion between 
Wiener and Lacan it is worth noting the issue of the difference between information in a 
strict technical sense, and information concerning content. In the first sense it concerns 
signals that must be encoded in such a way that they can be deciphered independent of 
noise; information has merely a syntactical dimension of the formal relation of codes. In 
the second sense it concerns signs which are only understandable in a certain 
communicative context (Simons, 2002, 55); information then also relates to meaning 
(semantics) and use (pragmatics). Information and communication technologies may 
nevertheless transcend this distinction. When computers function as media (and not 
merely as instruments), data and content (or concepts), or encoded information and 
meaning, go together in the creation of a 'medial ecology' – that we live in like the space 
of fantasy.118
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 Fantasy creates a medium for us to live in: it not merely consists of analyzable, or decomposable 
messages or of pleasurable images; those two aspect go together in its functioning as an unescapable 
medium, and therefore is is to a considerable extent unconscious. 
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Lacan’s ‘texts’ are notorious for their attempts to formalize the unconscious. 
Until the 1950’s he underpins his formalizations with game theory.119  Afterwards he 
turns to cybernetics (cf. Marini, 1992, 68). In the lecture ‘Psychoanalysis and 
cybernetics, or on the nature of language’, included in the transcriptions of his 1955-
1956 seminars, Lacan shifts to cybernetics. For cybernetics is “concerned with the way 
in which one can reduce down to its essential elements the mode in which a message is 
transmitted” (S.2, 296). The comparison cyberneticians made between man and 
machine fascinated Lacan. According to Von Neumann and Wiener the most important 
entity in this equation is information, not energy (Hayles, 1999, 99). This gave Lacan 
the opportunity to redefine the Freudian unconscious, away from what he saw as its 
biological aberration; “Don’t you know that the energetic is nothing else, whatever the 
naive hearts of the engineers believe, then the appliance of a network of signifiers onto 
the world?” (S.17, 54; m.t.).
The cybernetics of Wiener corresponds to the structuralist theory of language. 
Katherine Hayles finds some clear “similarities between his definition of information 
and Ferdinand de Saussure’s view of la langue, or language as system. In both cases, 
communication proceeds through selection from a field of possible alternatives rather 
than through the direct articulation of inherent reference” (Hayles, 1999, 97-98). Wiener 
“realized that one of the subtle implications of this view is that messages are 
constituted, measured, and communicated not as things-in-themselves but as relational 
differences between elements in a field. Communication is about relation, not essence” 
(Hayles, 1999, 91). Lacan could not agree more with the idea that communication is not 
about essence. It does not transfer a pre-established essence (substance, meaning). One 
might say –  with a sideways reference to the philosophy of Paul Ricoeur – that the 
word is the locus of language where structure and event continuously interact (or technè
and tuchè). Put differently: words mediate between language as a structural system and 
the body as the site of libidinal investment of the world. Communication does not 
transfer a meaning that is already given. The embodied contextualization of messages 
constructs meaning. This is what Lacan's discussion with cybernetics will show. 
1.2. Information codes and embodiment 
The question addressed by Lacan in his discussion of cybernetics is the contemporary 
issue of the embodiment of cyborgs. How does the body relate to, or integrate in the 
cybernetic circuit? Frank Biocca gives a clear description of the problem, and relates it 
to Descartes' error of  'forgetting' the importance of the body and separating it from the 
mind.120 Biocca: "In a view of the computer as giant brain, widely shared in the 40s and 
50s, we see another version of Descartes' error. This coupling was of one brain to 
another. The communication between human and machine was one of conversation. The 
conversation was with a large disembodied electronic brain, seen either as a peer, slave, 
or competitor. Instead of a mind communicating through a body to another body, we 
have only two disembodied conversations, a sterile coupling of abstract symbol 
generators. It is the symbol manipulating vision of early artificial intelligence, rather 
than the situated embodiment of intelligence augmentation. At the close of this century, 
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 Barglow notices the special attraction of the advocates of information processing psychology to game 
theory: "For the codified rules of a game exhibit an independence of social and historical context that 
characterizes information-processing logic as well" (Barglow, 1994, 161). 
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 In chapter seven I will systematize this issue of the Cartesian subject and set out that  from a Lacanian 
perspective it is not a subject without a body, because fantasy is its 'stuff'. 
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the development of advanced computer interfaces appears to be increasingly 
characterized by what we might call progressive embodiment. Progressive embodiment 
is defined as the steadily advancing immersion of sensorimotor channels to computer 
interfaces through a tighter and more pervasive coupling of the body to interface sensors 
and displays" (Biocca, 1997, § 1.3).  
1.2.1. Cybernetics 
Lacan conceives the unconscious as an autonomous cybernetic circuit. Phenomena such 
as repetition and free association illustrate this 'automatic' production of signifiers. 
There is an (unconscious) system determining which signifiers can appear at a certain 
moment (cf. Verhaeghe, 2001, 76). The unconscious discourse of the Other functions as 
“the discourse of the circuit in which I am integrated. I am one of its links. It is the 
discourse of my father for instance, in sofar as my father made mistakes which I am 
absolutely condemned to reproduce” (S.2, 89). In his later lecture on psychoanalysis and 
cybernetics Lacan dilates upon this question of  determinism, that – I will try to show – 
hinges on the issue of fantasy. He uses cybernetics to shed light on the analytical 
situation in which one tries to let the analysand speak without intention (free 
association), that is to say  “he should intentionally get as close as possible to chance” 
(S.2, 296). But precisely this speech reveals some sort of determinism, as exemplified 
by the repetition of mistakes. “What is the determinism here sought after in an intention 
of chance?” (S.2, 296). Lacan supposes that cybernetics can illuminate this 
determinism. Thus he tries to construct psychoanalysis via the path of the exact sciences 
which study the real via a strict discourse (a syntax): cybernetics is “ a science of 
syntax” (Lacan, S.2, 305). Cybernetics conceives language reduced to its barest bones, 
as a binary system of 1s and 0s (that like a handful of other elementary symbols and 
operators such as A, B, x, y, + and – can form a ‘system’). A certain combination of the 
elements 0 and 1 can constitute a circuit transmitting a certain message. It might explain 
– to pull it into the field of psychoanalysis proper – why the analysand has said 
something or always repeats the same trait or action. Hence, repetition may show that 
beyond the 'pure' codified language, there is also the aspect of fixation. Because when 
we try to speak as freely as possible (and are at the level of the virtual subject of 
discursive construction where we construct ourselves in speech), there is a (libidinal) 
force that constantly leads us to the same point. Lacan's point of interest is how these 
two levels interweave. 
 Despite his fascination for these ‘exact’ formalizations, Lacan discovers that the 
cybernetic objectivation of mental processes does not fully work for a science of man 
such as psychoanalysis: “for the message to be a message, not only must there be a 
sequence of signs, but there has to be a sequence of directed signs” (S.2, 305). Although 
one can study the laws of language – in the domain of the Other – down to its most 
basic elements, it is still decisive to which other the subject addresses the sign.121 Man is 
not just a symbolic, virtualized subject of language (of an ordering purely based on 
syntax) under logical 'control'. He is also a subject of the drive, of a libidinal investment 
in images that directs his 'disembodied', formal desire and gives it meaning (a subject of 
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 Here we touch again upon the centrality of the transference in psychoanalytical praxis. In addressing 
the analyst, the analysand might (unconsciously) address someone else (in his fantasy the analysand 
relates to the analyst as the object a). It is by means of this transference that the analysand can ‘work 
through’ past problematic encounters.  
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a semantically ordering of things). This is what Lacan discovers on his path through 
cybernetic theory, and adds to it: 
“At this point we come upon a precious fact revealed to us by cybernetics – 
there is something in the symbolic function of human discourse that cannot be 
eliminated, and that is the role played in it by the imaginary” (S.2, 306).  
The imaginary as a never fully erasable – for also constitutive – identification with 
fantasmatic images is in fact the libidinal motivation in symbolical (self) expression. 
The libidinal relations toward our own and other people's images remain involved in our 
use of language. This ‘energetic’ element ‘colors’ the way we use language to transmit a 
message. Therefore this libidinal motivation halts the possibility of a clear cyber-
consciousness that would be reducible to the pure thought of exact signs. 
"We are embodied beings, and we always think by means of some imaginary go-
between, which halts, stops, clouds up the symbolic mediation. The latter is 
perpetually ground up, interrupted" (S2, 319). 
1.2.2. Cyberspace 
The aspect of embodiment of the virtual subject is contained in this 'imaginary' element. 
This is also what Sandy Stone's theory of embodiment in virtual environments can teach 
us. In her analysis of phone sex, for instance, she makes very clear the libidinous 
element in the communication of signs. This libidinous aspect of expecting a certain 
image or scenario to appear contains the element of embodiment in this purely verbal 
communication. "The worker verbally codes for gesture, appearance, and proclivity, and 
expresses these as tokens, sometimes in no more than a word. The client uncompresses 
the tokens and constructs a dense, complex interactional image … The client mobilizes 
expectations and preexisting codes for body in the modalities that are not expressed in 
the token; that is, tokens in phone sex are purely verbal, and the client uses cues in the 
verbal token to construct a multimodal object of desire with attributes of shape, tactility, 
odor, etc. This act is thoroughly individual and interpretative; out of a highly 
compressed token of desire the client constitutes meaning that is dense, locally situated, 
and socially particular. Bodies in cyberspace are also constituted by descriptive codes 
that "embody" expectations of appearance" (Stone, 2001, 189). 
The ‘pure subject’ of the signifier, of the circuit, cannot do without an original 
anticipation. “The foundation of the system is already in play. How could it be 
established if it didn’t rest on the notion of chance, that is to say on a certain pure 
anticipation, which already has a meaning?” (S.2, 305).122  The role of avatars in virtual 
communication clearly illustrates, or even visualizes, this notion of embodiment as the 
involvement of images in 'pure' (codified) communication. Also in the early text-based 
MUDs (Multiple User Dungeons/Dimensions) and computergames  the user must make 
a visual representation of those virtual worlds out of textual signs or instructions (and 
hence by virtue of his capacity for fantasy). It is not a superfluous ‘morass of 
subjectivity’ that gives meaning to language by means of its ambiguities, emotional 
content and human subtleties (it is, by contrast, an inevitable surplus subjectivity). 
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 In the previous chapter's part on technè and tuchè I showed that the psychic system is not fully 
reducible to an (disembodied, neutral) automaton, as it (affectively) 'circles' around certain 'things', which 
I designate here (in a Kantian sense) as 'products of the original imagination'. 
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Lacan’s work is not a plea for subjectivism (as subjective arbitrariness), on the contrary. 
Although fantasy as a realm of imaginary illusions that clouds clear thinking may be 
eliminated – which is precisely what psychoanalysis aims at –  one cannot eliminate the 
constitutive aspect of the imagination. We always anticipate the future on the basis of 
ideal images: being someone else, being somewhere else. That is what motivates us, and 
what also keeps the subject of clear thought – or of exact signs – on its feet.123 Therefore 
for Lacan a crucial question for understanding Descartes’ project is what Descartes 
desired.
Recent academic approaches toward television, film and mass communication 
often point out the meaning of messages as not merely determined by the signs they 
consist of. The receiver plays an important role in the construction of meaning, by 
means of his context, his suppositions about the intentions of the sender, and his own 
goals in the communication (cf. Simons, 2002, 42). Phenomenology as well as Lakoff 
and Johnson 's theory of metaphors bring forward that for a meaningful handling of the 
information that we retrieve via computer interfaces we need embodied background 
information. Meaningful information consists not of context-independent symbols and 
rules, but is enclosed in an embodied interaction with the objects of our daily life. We 
can also relate Lacan's discussion with cybernetics to the contemporary discussion 
regarding the conduit metaphor in information and communication technologies. The 
conduit metaphor supposes ideas as objects that we can put into words and send over a 
conduit, a channel of communication to the receiver who extracts the ideas from the 
words. It supposes meaning to exists objectively and independently of human beings 
(see appendix). George Lakoff considers this conduit metaphor false because "it is 
based on the assumption that reason is disembodied, that reason can be separated from 
the body and the brain, that it can be characterized in terms of pure form [my italics, 
A.N.] This is an idea that goes back at least to Descartes. What has been discovered in 
the cognitive sciences in the last fifteen or twenty years is that reason is embodied, that 
concepts are embodied – they have to do with how we function in the world, how we 
perceive things, how our brains are organized, and so on. It is not a matter of 
disembodied computation … Humans think in what are called "image schema's"" 
(Lakoff, 1995, 121). 
In the 1950s Lacan notices this embodiment of computation ('embodied 
background information', the 'image schema'). In his second seminar Lacan names this 
element that obstructs clear communication "the imaginary". Later on he explicitly calls 
it fantasy. Fantasy is the way we conceive of ourselves in relation to the Other. It has a 
‘foundational’ status: it founds the system of communication by linking it 'originally' to 
our embodied context. It directs the signs and thereby introduces a meaning that cannot 
be deduced from pure syntax. The attempt in analysis to speak without restrictions (‘by 
chance’) is a way to articulate the determining fantasy. 
123
 The role of (fantasmatic) motivation becomes clear in the case of depression. The depressed person 
has lost his imaginary anticipation of a future reality that is worthwhile. His fantasmatic mediation of the 
real has diminished: there are no things that make life worth living. 
125
2. Embodied space 
"At root, the question [of virtuality, A.N.] is the relationship between the human 
body and space, mediated by the sense of sight" (Mirzoeff, 1999, 181). 
2.1. The quest(ion) of space 
What constitutes space is not an open-and-shut case; there are various conceptions of 
space (cf. Wertheim, 1999, 33). Since the rise of modern science the physical 
conception of space dominates, wherein space is a boundless extension that contains 
everything, as a dimension of the world that is independent of bodies, like the space on 
my bookshelf: it is there, whether it is packed with books or not. In this absolute space 
of Newtonian physics space is a logically and ontologically independent dimension. 
This view is so entrenched in ordinary usage that we normally regard it as the primary 
meaning of space from which all others are derived. Space as an all-encompassing 
container is without reference whatsoever to sense perception. Leibnizian relationalism 
as another major paradigm in the modern conception of space does not consider space to 
be an absolute and infinite substance, as does the tradition reaching its culmination in 
Newtonian physics (Copernicus, Kepler, Galilei, Descartes). Leibniz conceives space as 
a purely relational system or mathematical structure (Torretti, 1998, 61). The situation, 
distance or relation of one body towards another defines a thing's place; it does not have 
a fixed place in a scientific system of coordinates. Space, according to Leibniz, is that 
what encompasses all those places. It does not have a genuine reality of its own. George 
Berkeley's epistemological idealism takes Leibnizian relationalism to its extreme. When 
there is no space without bodies, than space as such is 'mere nothing'. As Berkeley 
denies the existence of material, real things outside our perception, space results not 
from the relations between things, but from the projection of representations that God 
impresses in our mind. Although we may think that the representations come from real 
things outside us, they actually come from God. The conclusion that God is space seems 
to follow from this: by perceiving things in space we actually perceive 'the Author of 
our being'.124 From Berkeley it is apparently not a giant step to the 'space of cinema' 
(with God as the Great Projector), from which it is impossible to find the exit to 'the real 
world'. The shining of God's light opens up space.  
In Berkeley's philosophy space is a subjective phenomenon: fully related to the 
perceiving subject. It is the opposite of the objective space of Newtonian science. In 
chapter three I discussed that for Kant space is one of the principal forms (beside time) 
in which the imagination synthesizes the multitude of sensory impressions, like a 
television synthesizes the incoming signals and projects them coherently on the screen. 
Space is not an objective substance, but neither a merely subjective effect that can do 
away with the materiality of things. For Kant the subject's a priori form of appearance
conditions the objective existence of things. Without the subject's constitutive putting 
('Setzung') of the sensory impressions in the dimension of space there would be no 
objectivity possible. Space is the subjective form that makes it possible for unknowable 
real things to appear objectively (it is 'subjective-objective'). 
 The physical conception of space unties it from sense perception. Since it is 
perpetually present it is absolute, not dependant on the perceptions of a human subject. 
In a psychological conception space does not have such an absolute status; as tied to 
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 Newton also associated space with God; because God is everywhere space must be infinite. 
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sense perception psychological space can change. The use of drugs, for instance, can 
change the experience of space in such a way that someone may jump off a building by 
losing his sense of distance. Although Lacan also mentions “the objective space of 
reality” he focuses on the bipolar character of “the space in which the imagery of the 
ego develops” (Ec., 27). This space reflects all sorts of figures of ourselves (and is 
cyberspace not, from the psychological perspective, a whole realm full of technological 
mirrors?). Real, objective space and virtual space maintain, as I underlined before, a 
close connection (the space of 'real virtuality'). In a Lacanian approach the ('subjective') 
virtual space of the mirror-image functions as a framework (a 'window') for our 
perception and understanding of (what we think or imagine to be) the reality of 
'objective space'. Therefore the technological construction of virtual space (cyberspace) 
functions as a (not merely illusory) medium of consciousness.  
2.2. Mirror space: the ego as a virtual unity 
 "simply because it is an image, the ego is an ideal ego … 
The subject will discover over and over again that this image of self is the very 
framework of his categories, of his apprehension of the world – of the object" 
(S.1, 282).
We can perceive a branch and see a stick in it. Pierre Lévy considers the fact that man 
‘sees double’ as the basis of technology: “All technology is founded on this capacity for 
twisting and doubling reality, for the heterogenesis of the real” (Lévy, 1998, 116). The 
exchange between ourselves and the ‘real’ entities that we perceive, virtualizes the real 
by doubling it. “The dialectical operation serves as the basis for the virtual because it 
creates, always differently, a second world” (Lévy, 1998, 117). Lévy stresses the 
concurrence of man's capacity for creating technological artifacts and his capacity for 
creating a second world: no technology without imagination. Imagination is constitutive 
of (technological) reality itself.  
From a Lacanian perspective one might come to similar conclusions. For Lacan 
holds that even our sense of personal identity comes about via a doubling of the real. 
The 'me' is not present in an immature form from birth onwards only having to reach 
full maturity, like a tree is the mature form of the core that was already present in the 
seed (which shows that Lacan's theory cannot be headed under the scheme of realization 
of potentiality).125 Lacan follows Freud's basic notion that the ego is something that 
must be developed ("Das Ich muss entwickelt werden"). In the ensuing paragraphs I will 
give an account of the foundations of the Lacanian theory concerning the ego. This 
theory is crucial for understanding how man and machine, body and mind connect at the 
interface 
 According to Lacan imagination is a medium through which even we ourselves 
always exist as a virtual double. He formulates this constitutive relationship between the 
organism and its double for the first time in his famous theory of the mirror stage. Its 
pivotal notion concerns the identification with the specular image as furnishing the self 
with a virtual unity.
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 Or to speak 'Žižekian': "Becoming what I am? … no thanks! Better for both of us". 
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“The entire dialectic which I gave you as an example under the name of the 
mirror stage is based on the relation between, on the one hand, a certain level of 
tendencies which are experienced let us say, for the moment, at a certain point of 
life – as disconnected, discordant, in pieces – and there’s always something of 
that that remains – and on the other hand, a unity with which it is merged and 
paired. It is in this unity that the subject knows himself for the first times as a 
unity, but as an alienated, virtual unity” (S.2, 50). 
Lacan's theory of the mirror stage fills in a ‘gap’ in Freud’s theory concerning the ‘new 
psychical action’ that the different partial drives need in order to convert from the stage 
of autoeroticism, where satisfaction is gained from the individual's own body, to the 
stage of object-love where the individual invests its libido (also) in others. In the 
intermediate stage, the ego emerges as the result of the partial drives' investment in 
something that gives the subject for the first time a unified sense of self: the self-image. 
From his work ‘On narcissism: an introduction’ (1914, SE 14, 73-102) onward Freud 
defines narcissism as an investment of libido in the ego. But Freud does not clarify how 
this investment comes about, and thus leaves open the question concerning the 
‘mysterious’ emergence of the ego. Lacan gives an explanation by claiming that a 
primitive version of a unified self-experience occurs when the infant recognizes itself 
for the first time in the mirror. Between six and eighteen months the infant shows, by 
means of the illuminative mimicry of the Aha-erlebnis, that it recognizes the image in 
the mirror as itself.  
“This act, far from exhausting itself, as in the case of the monkey, once the 
image has been mastered and found empty, immediately rebounds in the case of 
the child in a series of gestures in which he experiences in play the relation 
between the movements assumed in the image and the reflected environment, 
and between this virtual complex and the reality it reduplicates – the child’s own 
body, and the persons and things, around him” (Ec., 1). 
The ego expresses a mastery over the diverse sensations of the direct or 'real' bodily 
awareness. And the individual expresses this feeling of mastery or control in certain 
dispositions or states of mind. In the mirror stage this is the state of mind of jubilation: 
the celebration of the infant in front of the mirror signals the event of controlling its 
own body via identification with the ‘illusory’ other: 
“The privilege of that experience is to offer the subject a virtual reality, non-
realized, grasped as such: to conquer. Every possibility for human reality to 
construct itself passes literally through it” (S.5, 225; m.t.).
The mirror stage is the paradigmatic structure of the imaginary. All identifications with 
‘images’ establish a sense of unity, mastery or autonomy that is not there ‘in the real’. 
As constitutive elements of our personal identity these ‘illusions’ permeate our reality 
with virtuality.  
Like Peirce (cf. chapter two: § 1.1.), Lacan seems to consider the mind to be a 
virtual thing. Peirce focuses on the impossibility of cognition or representation in a 
single moment: it needs the connection of moments in time (hence there is no 
'immediate sight'). Lacan stresses the doubling of places in which we exist as a 
128
condition of representation and cognition ('introspection' is erroneous – we cannot know 
ourselves without representing ourselves).126 With that we are ineluctably in the virtual 
space of the mirror. Or as Peirce stated (cf. chapter two, note 11): "the mind is virtual … 
not capable of existing except in a space of time". 'Images' interface the physical space 
of the body, and the virtual space of the mind. Also in Freudian psychoanalysis the 
'sense of sight' (see Mirzoeff's quote at the beginning of this section) is crucial in the 
mediation of the 'human body and space'.  
2.3. The optics of reflected figures: consciousness as an effect 
“[I]deas, thoughts and psychical structures in general must never be regarded as 
localized in organic elements of the nervous system but rather, as one might say, 
between them, where resistances and facilitations [Bahnungen] provide the 
corresponding correlates. Everything that can be an object of our internal 
perception is virtual, like the image produced in a telescope by the passage of 
light-rays. But we are justified in assuming the existence of the systems (which 
are not in any way psychical entities themselves and can never be accessible to 
our psychical perception)  like the lenses of the telescope, which cast the image. 
And, if we pursue this analogy, we may compare the censorship between two 
systems to the refraction which takes place when a ray of light passes into a new 
medium” (S.E. 5, 611). 
As the quote from The Interpretation of Dreams shows, Freud uses the reference to 
optics – not just to an optical apparatus as is the telescope in this quote, but also to the 
microscope and the camera (S.E. 5, 536) – to give a graphic representation of the 
psychic apparatus. Representations and thoughts are like ‘virtual images’ that are not 
located in organic elements of the nervous system but rather in between those elements, 
where the effects of the unconscious mould them, like the lenses shape the image in a 
telescope.127 Lacan explains: "The organic apparatus represents the mechanism of the 
camera, and what we apprehend are the images" (S.1, 123).  
Lacan also uses optical models as metaphors for the functioning of the psyche. 
"For there to be an optics, for each given point in real space, there must be one point 
and one corresponding point only in another space, which is the imaginary space" (S1, 
76). Optics demonstrates the intermingling of what we are inclined to call real space (a 
space supposedly being present independently from the bodies and human subjects that 
inhabit it) with imaginary space. The optical schema "allows us to illustrate in a 
particularly simple way what follows on from the strict intrication of the imaginary 
world and the real world in the psychic economy" (S1, 78). We cannot avoid 
'decorating' real space with our reflected figures. When consciousness functions as a 
camera, our vision is already mediated via 'glasses' that frame our perspective on the 
world. Lacan's conception of space therefore seems to lean towards the Kantian notion 
of space as an indispensable category for the appearance of things. 
 In his second seminar, Lacan uses the camera to provide a ‘materialist definition 
of consciousness’ (S.2, ch. 4). This definition might remind us of the modern 
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 Although there is thus a distinction of 'body' and 'mind', this is not a strict dualism. For pivital is what 
interfaces them, what I elaborate as fantasy. 
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 For some thoughts on the idea that it is the spatial, metaphorical representation of neural events that 
creates a ‘virtual inner space’, see Hopkins (2000). 
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materialistic and mechanistic explanation of physical space in which everything 
revolves around matter and the forces that move them, with no room for something like 
a soul or a mind. Lacan now explains consciousness without falling back on something 
like a soul or an immaterial mind. His materialist definition brings consciousness from a 
substance to an effect. It considers  
“consciousness to occur each time – and it occurs in the most unexpected and 
disparate ways – there’s a surface such that it can produce what is called an
image … All sorts of things can behave like mirrors. All that’s needed is that the 
conditions be such that to one point of a reality there should correspond an effect 
at another point, that a bi-univocal correspondence occurs between two points in 
real space” (S.2, 49).  
In the metaphoric of optics, consciousness is an effect of reflection (and as such 
characterized by virtuality). In the mirror image (reflection) we recognize ourselves in a 
complete form.  
"The human being only sees his form materialised, whole, the mirage of himself, 
outside of himself" (S.1, 140). 
We can gain consciousness of ourselves in all sorts of things in which we can recognize 
ourselves: works of art, of philosophy, manual works, consumer goods, instruments, 
machines, displays … : they give a concrete form to, they design, our desire.  
Likewise, we can gain self-identity in products of digital technologies. The 
computer screen as well functions as a mirror. Rob Shields states on the image-circuit of 
digital culture: "Such images, whether graphic, tactile or narrated, are central to the 
shaping of identity: largely constituted by the perception of the self as a separate totality 
(the individual) … technological images have become the mirrors in which to look for 
an identity" (Shields, 1997). Technological images can provide a sense of  personal 
identity because we can find (images of) ourselves in them. As such a 'mirror' we 
identify with the image on the screen. The computer is a medium for man, to use the 
words of Lacan, " to impress his image in reality": we find self-images in it and (try to) 
shape the world accordingly (thus it is almost a divine 'engine of creation').128
The point to be remembered here is that consciousness is a matter of surface-
appearances. In presenting the ‘outside’ of ourselves we make (up) our identity and 
become conscious of ourselves (self-conscious, self-confident – as with make-up – or 
even self-assured). Make-up and fashion are the most obvious examples of this intricacy 
of personal identity and surface-presence. In a broader context this allows for the 
interpretation of design as the skin of culture.
2.4. Imaginary space interfaces man and world 
As identification with images, the ego opens up virtual space. The alter ego of (ideal) 
images is its constant companion. Therefore we not only exist at the point where our 
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 This is similar to a Hegelian way of thinking. From a Hegelian point of view technology is an 
objectivication of our self-understanding: we externalize the image that we have created of our being 
(Coolen, 1992, 205). The discussion of the intricacy of Eros and Thanathos in chapter one showed that in 
Freudian theory man's being necessarily needs mediation. For at the level of language and desire this 
being is nothingness. On the level of the drives it is an excessive jouissance.
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own body physically is, but also at the virtual place where we imagine ourselves to be. 
This order of images resembles the functioning of the imago – which Jung originally 
introduced in psychoanalytic theory. The imago colors the way we relate to other 
people: we perceive the others through the lens of the various imagos. Although Lacan 
is largely negative in his judgement of Jung's notion of universal prototypes, in his 
theory the image also functions as a medium of perception. His notion of the mirror 
stage shows this.  
“I am led, therefore, to regard the function of the mirror-stage as a particular 
case of the function of the imago, which is to establish a relation between the 
organism and its reality – or, as they say, between the Innenwelt and the 
Umwelt” (Ec., 4).  
The imaginary order introduces, as media of perception, a distinction between the Inside 
and the Outside of the subject; severing the ‘here’ from the ‘there’ it opens up space. It 
causes duplication: the lived 'inner body' and the body-surface (in the next paragraph I 
will explain that the ego is mainly a projection of the surface of the body). The 
imaginary order both separates the 'organism' and his environment (and hence 
constitutes individual consciousness) and connects the individual to his world. This 
imaginary space (of fantasy) hence functions as an interface between man and world.129
Calling to mind Biocca's analysis (chapter three: § 3.2.) to anticipate the notion of the 
computer interface as a fantasy interface: "In immersive VR the whole interface defines 
the boundaries and shape of the body by defining the boundary between inside and 
outside, between the part of the VR world that is "me" and the part that is "the world" 
… From coherent patterns of energy impinging on the senses (i.e., the proximal 
stimulus) the virtual world is divided into "self" and "environment". I will first of all 
discuss fantasy as an interface in relationship to a domain that Lacan also refers to: 
ethnological research. 
Ethnology allows us to situate fantasy in relation to the problem of the ‘instinct’. 
It propounds that what distinguishes man from the animal is the latter's adaptation to a 
uniform environment. An animal has the natural space of its immediate environment, 
and its instincts express this immediacy. Man's relationship to his environment is not so 
natural, and one must take account of this ‘breach of man out of nature’ and distinguish 
between the instinct and the drive, to which for instance the work of Max Scheler 
testifies. The ‘unnatural’ phenomenon in man is that beside the instinctive striving for 
the fullfillment of needs there also is a separated striving for pleasure (Kunz, 1946, 
107). Whereas the instinct has a natural object, the drive does not. It has, as one says in 
psychoanalysis, a psychical object. Nevertheless, the drive is guided by ‘immanent 
images’ that relate to images of what attracts the organism in the outside world. Those 
‘drive-immanent’ images are what we call ‘phantasms’, or objects of fantasy (Kunz, 
1946, 125). Although not ‘natural’, they appear to be some sort of ‘innate ideas’.130 This 
deflection or mediation of the drive's object by a dimension of narcissistic images is not 
just an illusory process that can and must be overcome. It is also a 'deviation' that 
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 I more or less equate the imaginary space with the space of fantasy, because in the narcissistic matrix 
of the mirror stage we can find Lacan's first paradigm of fantasy (cf. Miller, 1999, 10; Ribettes, 1984, 
189).
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 Because the 'drive-immanent' images appear as ‘innate ideas’, Freud identifies the original fantasies as 
the ‘instincts’ of man. 
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characterizes the human relation to the object itself . It makes man into a 'crazy', 
excessive animal: we always want something more, less, or different from what we 
'really need'. I will introduce man's (imaginary) deviation from natural immersion in the 
immediate environment with Lacan's discussion of ‘The two narcissisms’ in the tenth 
chapter of his first seminar held in 1953-54.  
There Lacan explains the object of the drive as follows. First of all there is the 
narcissism that constitutes the self, and this identification with the body-image allows 
for the fact that organisms are attracted to images of objects of the same species. “First 
of all, there is, in fact, a narcissism connected with the corporeal image. This image is 
identical for the entirety of the subject’s mechanisms and gives his Umwelt its form, in 
as much as he is man and not horse. It makes up the unity of the subject … it makes 
possible the organization of the totality of reality into a limited number of preformed 
frameworks.” (S.1, 125). Human beings exist in a secondary space of images in which 
they recognize themselves, and that thus functions as a 'framework' for, for instance, 
finding a sexual partner. However, in man this relation to the environment via 
constitutive images of its own (bodily) form is once more deflected by the identification 
with images of others. “For the animal there is a limited number of pre-established 
correspondences between its imaginary structure and whatever interests it in its Umwelt.
In man, by contrast, the reflection in the mirror indicates an original noetic possibility, 
and introduces a second narcissism. Its fundamental pattern is immediately the relation 
to the other. For man the other has  a captivating value, on account of the anticipation 
that is represented by the unitary image as it is perceived either in the mirror or in the 
entire reality of the fellow being” (S.1, 125). This second-order narcissism can turn into 
the (hallucinatory) dimension of fantasy as merely imaginary pleasure: by trying to be 
like the ideal other.131
 Fantasy as the imaginary order both synthesizes the manifold stimuli originating 
in internal and external reality 'into a number of preformed frameworks', and anticipates
an ideal unity. Alongside the natural space in which we 'instinctively' try to find an 
object for our needs, there is the imaginary space in which we try to refind the object of 
our desire. The space of desire interfaces with our natural environment (and the 
computer interface perfectly manifests this, as it brings the objects of desire in our direct 
environment).
 We may proceed from this fundamental understanding of the difference between 
natural and imaginary (virtual) space to the virtual spaces of digital technologies. First 
of all the constitutive aspects of imaginary space. If man always already exists in a 
virtual space of reflected figures, cyberspace can also function as a virtual space for 
structuring man's object of desire. On the computer screen opening up cyberspace we 
(unconsciously) reflect images of ourselves that function as a 'framework' for our 
relation to others. This is Turkle's point of cyberspace as a new playground for giving 
form to our desires. The screen then mediates, for instance, my desire for finding a 
(sexual) partner. As a medium for expressing the way I conceive of myself, it gives a 
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 According to Lacan one of the most fundamental notions in Freud’s work concerns the possible strict 
equivalence between object and ego-ideal, for instance in a love relation (S.1, 126). In a realized fantasy 
the other is my ideal; I am as the other, or at least I aspire to be. Whereas this shows the reach of 
secondary narcissism, the analysis of psychosis may illuminate the constitutive role of fantasy. The 
distinctive feature of the psychotic is loss of fantasy. He cannot symbolize the real, and therefore seems to 
disintegrate (psychotic disintegration: “this hand does not belong to me”). For the psychotic the unity in 
the manifold has gone. 
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form to what I seek in others. It hence functions as a new medium for self-construction. 
Since the fantasmatic capacity of the mind functions as a medium taking us to a place 
other than where we actually (think we) are (it is not an analogue medium), telepresence 
belongs to the human condition itself. For as follows from Biocca's analysis, the general 
meaning of telepresence is "a sense of transportation to any 'space' created by media" 
(Biocca, 1997, § 5.3). The phenomenon of telepresence is thereby incorporated into new 
technological forms. The interface facilitates this sense of transportation and therefore 
also functions as an inter-space: it binds the physical space and the virtual spaces that 
we already knew of (by means of texts, speaking, reading, imagination, films etc) to the 
new technological forms of virtual space. New interfaces open up new space-time 
systems.132
When viewed from Lacanian theory this dwelling in virtual spaces is nothing 
new, and the new technological forms it takes do not necessarily lead us into a 
completely different era. As a 'cyborg theory' it is (or should be) sensitive to new 
technological formations of virtual space. However, there is also fantasy in its second 
(and possibly deluding) aspect. The distinctions Lacan draws – especially the one 
discussed earlier between primary and secondary narcissism – also makes his theories 
sensitive to potentially pathological effects of dwelling in virtual spaces. An example 
from cyberspace could be when the objects on the screen are invested with such an 
intensity that they start to function as an ego-ideal fully dominating someone's life (the 
addiction model). 
2.5. Imaginary space: projecting sensations at/as the surface of the body  
The constitutive imaginary function of the subject opens up space. The subjective 
projection of the self as an image-object differs from the 'real' self'. Therefore an 
original, bodily investment works in the identification processes that make us 'inhabit' 
the world. In his discussion of the identification with a surface-image, or virtual image, 
Lacan refers to a much discussed passage from Freud’s 'The Ego and the Id' (1923): 
“The ego is first and foremost a bodily ego; it is not merely a surface entity, but is itself 
the projection of a surface”, added by the footnote that says: “I.e., the ego is ultimately 
derived from bodily sensations, chiefly those springing from the surface of the body. It 
may thus be regarded as a mental projection of the surface of the body.” (S.E. 19, 25-6). 
Lacan's theory of the mirror stage upholds this Freudian notion of an ego coming into 
being via identification with the mental image of its body or bodily sensations. The 
imaginary function constitutes a psychical reality perceived as objective ('I see myself 
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 Let me illustrate this with an example that also McLuhan and Levy use. From the perspective of the 
technological Eros the wheel is not solely an extension of the body as McLuhan states, or a virtualization 
of walking as Lévy claims, but a materialization of the desire to overcome all distances. In the end, the 
wheel is also about speed. It is a medium to narrow the distances of space and time, but also to annihilate 
them. This illustrates again my thesis that technology is governed by a desire to regain the lost 
immediacy. A famous exponent of the theory that real-time tele-technologies annihilate our systems of 
time and space is Paul Virilio. Although I recognize the similarities, I do not follow his theory and its 
apocalyptic consequences. My point is that technologies manifest the annihilating desire that Virilio 
describes, but do not realize this desire in a (utopic/dystopic) fixed situation. Therefore it should not be 
evaluated as merely negative, as this movement belongs to life itself: in establishing new frames upon 
reality it also opens up new spaces. We can't simply hang on to 'life as we know it'. In that sense I agree 
more with Lévy. "With respect to this meditation on the escape from "there", we should bear in mind that 
virtualization does not simply accelerate already known processes or suspend, or even annihilate, time 
and space, as Paul Virilio has claimed. Based on expenditure and risk, it creates qualitatively new 
velocities, mutant space-time systems" (Lévy, 1999, 33). 
133
as': a constitutive difference or distance between the 'original I' and its reflected figures). 
But this objective space (of self-representation) cannot do without the libidinal, 
narcissistic investment in images that differ from the 'unreflected I' (at the bodily level). 
When we regard fantasy as equal to the imaginary function, as is the case for the early 
Lacan, then it has both a subjective and an objective status (without being either 
completely subjective or objective): it is objective-subjective. Fantasy as what is 
necessary for 'time-space distanciation', opens up the 'objective' space of the world we 
live in, but simultaneously introduces a subjective (bodily) aspect to it. Therefore there 
is no objective space of self-representation.133
The word 'space' is derived from the Latin word spatium, meaning 'race-track', 
or generally 'distance', interval', 'terrain' (Torretti, 1998, 59). A difference or distance
between the real and the imaginary is necessary for the coherent appearance of reality. 
One way to conceive the real is as a chaotic multiplicity of immediate sense impressions 
or bodily feelings that needs synthetization (in imaginary space) in order to make sense. 
Lacan is in this sense not far from Kant; the Lacanian understanding of space as a 
modus of the imaginary is very similar to Kant's. In Lacanian theory space as equivalent 
to distance or difference also implies a (psychological) distanciation from the original 
symbiotic unity ('mother-child') in order to have space for one's own identity; one must 
withdraw from the real of a primitive jouissance. An empty space or distanciation (the 
emptiness of the desiring subject) is therefore necessary for the sound functioning of a 
human being.  
Man's narcissistic doubling of reality is crucial to the psychological analysis of 
space. “The notion of the role of spatial symmetry in man’s narcissistic structure is 
essential in the establishment of the bases of a psychological analysis of space” (Ec., 
27).  The
psychological conception of space also teaches us the potential dissolution of this empty 
space (the melt-down of the desiring subject). It can do so in two directions. First of all 
the chaotic and devouring real may come too close by; with anxiety as the result, or 
psychotic modes wherein the real breaks through as the hearing of voices. Secondly 
man's images no longer mediate the real but replace them, which results in narcissistic 
illusions (simulations as an imaginary double that glosses over the real): disastrous 
plastic surgery as the excess of make-up; computer addiction as the excess of computer 
use; the 'consensual hallucination' of cyberspace as the excess of the medium.  
Man is caught up in a delicate situation, since he has no stable reality that he can 
or must adapt to. There is no true form (or 'real possibility') for him to realize. Man is 
'decentered', simultaneously in real and virtual space. Therefore his perception of the 
real is already virtualized by the constructive function of images putting the real in 
virtual space. Normally, the imaginary space of fantasy mediates the real and the 
virtual; its limits consist of the real (of pain) and the virtual (of narcissistic illusions). 
Elaine Scarry describes this field in her book The Body in Pain (1985), as well as in her 
essay on prosthetic reality (in the collection Electronic Culture, 1996).  Sandy Stone 
brings this field forward as crucial for understanding the 'psychical reality' of prosthetic 
reality: "Pain and imagining are the 'framing events' within whose boundaries all other 
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 This 'subjective-objective' fantasmatic core is at the basis of our sense of self, and therefore the self is - 
as Žižek diagnoses - scientifically never fully definable. "Even if science is able to articulate the genetic 
formula of what I objectively am, it will still be unable to articulate my 'objectively subjective' 
phantasmatic identity, this objectal counterpouint to my subjectivity which is neither subjective 
(experienced) nor objective" (Žižek, 1999, 313). 
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perceptual, somatic, and emotional events occur; thus, between the two extremes can be 
mapped the whole terrain of the human psyche" (Scarry, in Stone, 1995, 396). As a 
frame for reality, fantasy 'synthesizes' the immediate bodily sensations and sheer 
imagination. 
Since the mirror stage is the paradigmatic structure of the imaginary, all forms 
that we give to ourselves express a binding or unification of libidinal energies. From a 
psychoanalytical perspective such 'knots' of libido are the nuts and bolts of man's 
reality. The decisive notion hitching Lacan’s theory of identity firmly to its Freudian 
origins concerns the images that produce consciousness as thoroughly invested by 
libido. In his seminar on the formations of the unconscious (1957-58) Lacan states that  
“the image has that property of being a captivating signal that isolates itself in 
reality, that attracts and captures a certain libido of the subject, a certain instinct, 
due to which a certain number of identifying marks, of psychoanalytical points 
in the world, permit the living being to organize his behavior” (S.5, 225; m.t.).
Avatars show how this investment in surfaces engages the body in virtual space. They 
may even provide insight in our fantasmatic investment in the self-image. John Suler 
stresses that psychotherapy by means of avatars can function as a way to explore 
childhood memories, as a way to (re) shape one's life narrative and to interpret and 
rework dreams, daydreams and fantasy (Suler, 1999a). This imaginary self-
representation is where the 'inner self' and the 'outer self' coincide. Fantasy as such an 
interface obviously presents itself in the computer-interface.  
2.6. Avatars: engaging the body in space 
In Hinduism avatars are the descent, incarnation or embodiment of the goddess. By 
extension, the term concerns the changing states someone lives through. Both online 
forms of self-representation ('personae') and (anterior) ‘forms’ of the self in Lacanian 
theory (I see myself as …, I think of myself as …, I idealize myself as …) can be 
considered avatars. We can play with these 'forms', reshape and reform them in virtual 
space (the space of – symbolic – representation). It is for that reason that Sherry Turkle 
can draw a parallel between online personae and the self emerging in a psychoanalytic 
encounter: both are significantly virtual, either constructed within the space of analysis 
or in the virtual space of online role-playing communities (cf. Turkle, 1995, 256).  
An avatar in a virtual world may give a unified form to tendencies otherwise 
experienced as discordant and disturbing, just as the identification with the virtual 
image in Lacan's theory of the mirror stage. By picking an avatar (erotic, aggressive, 
animal-like …) I can formalize certain tendencies that remain otherwise dark and 
obscure. Lacan's point, however, is that the unconscious is not this 'dark and obscure' 
inside of the self, but only comes to being in the externalization. It is only in the form 
of, for instance, an avatar that I can come to recognize my 'unconscious intentions'; they 
do not exist as such before their 'materialization'. Therefore, the unconscious 'happens' 
at the interface. 
By bringing 'unconscious things' into an intersubjective dimension they become 
manageable. This is the basis of psychoanalytic psychotherapy. And such a process also 
take place in a virtual environment where, as cyber-therapy researcher John Suler 
explains, avatars (or 'props') function as masks that both hide and reveal: "Like masks of 
any kind, avatars hide and reveal at the same time. Behind it, people can conceal some 
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personal things about themselves, but the avatar also selectively amplifies other aspects 
of their personalities. It may reveal something about the member that otherwise is not 
immediately obvious – maybe not even obvious if you met that person in real life. 
Maybe not even obvious to the owners themselves. What users express in their props is 
not always a conscious choice. Sometimes it's unconscious. People may simply say that 
they are wearing a particular avatar because "I like it." When asked, they're not sure 
what it says about them. But other people may know" (Suler, 1999). One must stress, 
from a Lacanian point of view, that the virtual mask does not hide or reveal a present 
being behind the mask. The mask itself reveals being: what I am does not exist in its 
'true form' behind the 'imaginary form'. Behind the mask is nothing but the real of 
chaotic tendencies. The ego as the instance of personal identity is thus a (necessary) 
virtual unity hiding the real of chaotic tendencies, and the non-existence or emptiness of 
the 'true Self'. The unity of the Self is, as Lacan stated, an alienated unity. Therefore the 
frequently heard objection against a 'life on the screen' as being non-real or alienated 
cannot hold out. For we are always already alienated. 
 John Suler states that other people may know what an avatar signifies in a 
particular person. He thereby refers to a little game he developed, in which people in a 
virtual environment on the Internet take turns standing before a group and trying a few 
of their favorite avatars. The rest of the group then tosses out ideas, by freely 
associating to the image, about the psychological connotations of the avatars. In most of 
the cases it clarified a lot about the owner of the avatar. Although the Other thus (also) 
determines the Self, this does not imply – from a Lacanian perspective – that the others 
know the unconscious meaning of a visual expression and the person in question 
himself does not. Then the others are like a 'subject supposed to know': a fixed fantasy 
of the therapist as an omniscient being. Lacan stresses that the analyst is not like that, 
although analysis often brings out such fantasies. Psychoanalysis is not about such a 
hierarchic relationship. It concerns the mutual exploration of the unconscious, as it 
exists, for instance, in the medium of images. New technologies could add new media 
for the exploration of the unconscious (instead of drawings, visualizations in virtual 
environments), as also Suler concludes in his essay on 'Avatar Psychotherapy': "Using 
computer-generated virtual environments, "avatar psychotherapy" could be the 
exploration of the client's healthy and problematic identities by exploring the 
manifestation of those identities within imaginary scenarios. Using psychoanalytic 
terms, we would say that the client teases out, amplifies, explores, and therapeutically 
develops the various "representations," "identifications," and "internalizations" that 
make up their intrapsychic world, that are the nuts and bolts of their overall sense of 
self" (Suler, 1999a).  
Avatars illustrate the constitutive psychological factor in the construction of 
(virtualized) reality. We can experience a virtual community as just another way of 
socializing, as a reality, because – as in 'normal reality' – we can project our sense of 
identity on it. Avatars can 'materialize' or visualize the sense of self. Avatars are only 
the most obvious examples of how we recognize ourselves in the 'technological mirror', 
for all sorts of virtual environments, 'agents' and informational systems can function as 
alter egos (cf. Vasseleu, 2002, 86-88). In immersive Virtual Reality – which I discussed 
in chapter three: § 3.2. – the technological projection of (certain) sensory stimuli of the 
body determines the experience of what is 'me' and 'not me'. Being ('me') in the virtual 
world results from the technological visualization of sensory stimuli into a second world 
in which I recognize myself.   
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Because we invest ourselves in virtual environments as alter egos, 'being in a 
virtual world' is not some sort of disembodied presence (as in the conception: 'in 
cyberspace the mind leaves the body'). It actually has a material, embodied foundation. I 
conceive this material cause of presence, in accord with Freudian theory, as the 
sensations that occur at the surface of the body. Their mental projection is the image of 
the body that we call the ego.  
2.7. Fascination: the double bind of occupying virtual space 
In the mirror stage the jubilation of the infant on seeing his reflection is a  celebration of 
the control of its own body. Similarly, feelings of (an anticipated) mastery or control in 
general are expressed in certain dispositions or states of mind. Fascination is one of 
those decisive dispositions in which man constructs himself as a virtual double: it 
absorbs or engages him in the image.134 A crucial insight therefore bears upon the 
construction of a human, virtualized reality as always occurring via such experiences of 
fascination and hypnotization that integrate new sensation into a new sense of self. 
Fascination and the hypnotic effect of the image are pivotal for virtual reality.
“Fascination is absolutely essential to the phenomenon of the constitution of the 
ego. The uncoordinated, incoherent diversity of the primitive fragmentation 
gains its unity in so far as it is fascinated. Reflection is also fascination, 
jamming” (S.2, 50).  
New technologies like the mobile phone, the Internet and Virtual Reality lead to 
new 'avatars' (or 'Gestalts') of the self, and therefore arouse fascination and excitement. 
They provide new, fascinating images of ourselves by 'synthesizing' new, different 
(real) sensations within a new virtual world. The sensation of hearing a 'material thing' 
like a voice coming out of a phone-box, hearing this 'real object' from a far away place, 
leads to new formations and a different positioning of oneself. What fascinates us in 
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 Arnold Gehlen's philosophy of technology illustrates the role of fascination. Man is fascinated by the 
automatism of the machine, wherein he discovers himself in an objectified form. 
 In his 'Bodies on the Circuit' Jordan Crandall gives an interesting account of  man's pursuit of  
his ideal image that machine, television, and the computer construct. He describes a place called 'Better 
Bodies', "one of the places where bodies are being made fit to catch up to the images. Here the body 
sandwiches itself into a machine, pressed against a smooth contoured surface that has been molded to 
couple with it … The goal is to 'pump up' and literally morph the body into some idealized image held in 
one's mind like a carrot at the end of a stick. This image is a composite, patched together or collated from 
vast arrays of representations and self-reflections [my italics, A.N.] … Through the conduit of image, 
enforced temporality, body, and machine, one changes the very contour of the flesh, simultaneously 
downloading and internalizing the image while uploading the body into the realm of representation … It 
seems that wherever there is an image there is an incomplete body running after it, endeavoring to catch it 
or interpolate itself into it". Jordan gives a beautifull example of this theoretical notion: "And now, step 
onto the jogging treadmill for 20 minutes of cardiovascular activity. A television screen is projected 
directly ahead for motivation. Running on the rubber belt of the treadmill like a rat on a wheel, one runs 
towards images which one will never 'get to' or achieve, while the machine measures the rhythm and 
feeds back continually on a readout, comparing it to the value optimized for one's age and fitness level. 
To be under this value is to be inadequate to a cultural norm, encoded by and transmitted through the 
conduit of the machine; to be over it is to excel … the image is at the service of the optimization 
frequency, registered in the conduits connected to the treadmill … From one window or frame to the next, 
or between series of levels within frames, or through the wormholes provided by logos and icons, a 
language of travel is constituted, a language whose demands technology and reality hastily endeavor to 
meet ." ( Jordan Crandall, 'Bodies on the Circuit', http://www.ctheory.net/text_file.asp?pick=96).
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digital media is their capacity to create new 'Gestalts' out of discontinuities and 
heterogeneities (such as the morphing of different people into one 'Gestalt' as in Michael 
Jackson's video clip 'Black or White'). In this context media theoretician Lev Manovich 
makes the claim that new media replace the old media of montage with an 'aesthetics of 
continuity' where compositing is the central element; it blends the different elements 
"into a seamless whole, a single Gestalt" (Manovich, 2001, 144). Thus we can create 
simulations of impossible surroundings that appear more realistic than filmic 
representations. These new forms of 'montage' very often have no other intention than to 
arouse fascination or esthetic pleasure (cf. Simons, 2002, 113). 
The tricky thing about fascination is that it lures us. As Lacan's theory of the 
mirror image clarifies, fascination implies an (unconscious) absorption in something (a 
virtual image) that the subject itself is not (in the real). In fascination the object of desire 
is not our 'own'. It actually is the object of desire of the other, although it appears to be 
our own desire (we want to be like the fascinating other, we want what he wants). In 
fascination we identify with something that we are not: alienation. In his psychoanalytic 
approach to the (film) screen, semiotist Christian Metz reveals that in order for 
fascination to occur the images on the screen must appear as the expression of the desire 
of the spectator (cf. Sarup, 1992, 153). Since Lacan unravels desire as the desire of the 
other, the lure is an inevitable aspect of human reality (fantasy as a constitutive aspect 
of reality). We never get directly to the real; the real is always fantasmatically mediated. 
The analysis of the role of the imaginary in this chapter shows that we always 
camouflage it, and (try to) deceive others and ourselves. There is no human reality 
without this play of seduction. The paradox of the user interface is that it must always 
present the data-objects in a perceivable and recognizable form: data-objects, 
applications and user meet at the user-interface. Data, computer hard- and software and 
the 'wetware' of the human organism encounter each other. Hence the user cannot see 
anything in the data of the information codes without inserting his self-image into the 
scene they describe.
In immersive Virtual Reality (VR) the computer synthesizes the divers sense-
stimuli of the body of the user into a coherent self-image of the user. As it generates a 
self-image that we not only look at but also actually 'live in', it is one of the most 
fascinating media experiences available: we act through that image, we 'step inside' the 
computer-generated avatar. Hence it is also the most extreme example of how the 
computer can take over the 'synthesizing' role of the human subject. As media scientist 
Ken Hillis points out, the impression that Virtual Reality offers an experience of 
unmediated sensation, called "direct perception" by Virtual Reality designers,  is 'not 
true''. According to Hillis Virtual Reality is in fact a highly mediated series of 
conceptions or ideas, of military, commercial, scientific interests along with those of the 
software designers who interpret these conceptions and write the programs (Hillis, 
1999, 69-70). Too much fascination may make us 'forget' the composition 
(compositing) of the object that attracts us. So, it remains a matter of not taking the 
fascinating fantasy image for reality itself. Which is what Ken Hillis reproaches Jaron 
Lanier with his notion of post-symbolic communication (a house in virtual reality is not 
a representation of a house but is actually a house). Thinking in this vein falls into the 
trap off assuming that virtual reality can realize our nostalgic desire and get to the true 
form of the real (thus leaving all the troubles of the real behind). Such utopian thinking, 
according to Hillis, may take root during exploitation to justify social inequality. What 
we must not forget is that 'direct perception' is not reality itself but still a framing of 
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reality. "Lanier himself has forgotten the screen, if not the frame" (Hillis, 1999, 193). 
When we forget this framing, the screen turns into a mirror. 
 A full absorption in the world of ideal images provided by the media makes the 
creative process of subjectivation disappear,  and we risk losing ourselves. That is to say 
that alienation, which is a constitutive dimension, becomes total because we no longer 
recognize the tension between the ideal image (that we are not) and the real that escapes 
it: plastic surgery disasters as the excess of make-up. When fascination dissolves this 
tension, creative disclosure turns into enclosure. The image must remain a promise.
3. Cyborg subjectivity
"cyberbodies … a new social imaginary, where the body is reconfigured through 
a complex mix of image, culture, and technology" (Kennedy, 2000, 474). 
3.1. Emotions: a surface- and superficial thing?  
"In the end, you are determining emotional levels simply through the way you 
express yourself and your mode of behaviour" (Stelarc, in Scheer, 2002, 90). 
The (spatial) differentiation between the body as organism and the body as image 
constitutes the ego as a necessary alienation from the direct sensory sensations. That is 
the lesson we can draw from Lacan's theory of the imaginary. The imaginary ego retains 
strong elements of illusion and lure, but it has powerful effects. It ‘virtualizes’ our direct 
sensations by making our awareness of them an effect of the imaginary. That’s why 
someone may experience a small slap of the hand as extremely painful. It might also 
explain why a fakir can endure an extreme sensation like lying on a bed of nails: namely 
by extinguishing his ego. This topic of consciousness as an effect of surface-
appearances (images) becomes highly interesting for our analysis of the interface when 
we relate it to the issue of emotions.  
The study of emotions is a very old one and resolves around the question 
whether emotions come first, followed by the (cognitive, intellectual) labeling and the 
actions it evokes. Or the action occurs first, and is subsequently interpreted as a certain 
emotion ('I fled from this situation, so I must have been frightened'). From Lacanian 
theory one must pose emotions as an imaginary affair: they are surface-appearances. We 
only identify certain sensations as a specific emotion by representing them in a certain 
way (imagining them). This repudiates the existence of 'real emotions': all emotions are 
an effect of representation. Emotions are outside, exterior, on the surface. In this sense, 
Lacanian theory agrees with Merleau-Ponty who argued in his 1945 essay 'The Film and 
the New Psychology" that emotions "are not psychic facts hidden at the bottom of 
another's consciousness: they are types of behavior or styles of conduct which are 
visible from the outside. They exist on this face or in those gestures, not hidden behind 
them" (Merleau-Ponty, in Scheer, 2002, 90). 
This insight does not necessarily mean that emotions are merely superficial. 
Emotions do have a real effect: I really must cry when I 'feel' miserable. The point is 
that they do not have a pure (that is: immediate), real cause. Although they may touch 
on the 'essential', they do not do this without mediation. In this sense I agree with a 
conclusion drawn out of one of the works of performance artist Stelarc in which he 
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enacts (e)motions through cybernetic systems. His 'Movatar' is a metal jacket avatar 
whose motions a computer model maps via electronic muscle stimulation onto Stelarc's 
physical body. The 'Movatar' 'moves' him, and he in turn can modulate the motions of 
the avatar so that a cybernetic loop occurs. A theorist concludes, analogously, that "even 
if emotion is virtual, it can perhaps be described as grounded virtuality, linked to the 
substantial if not the essential" (Scheer, 2002, 94).  
What causes the emotions to appear (its 'real pulse') is significantly 'mediated' by 
the imaginary (by an 'avatar') so that we can only recognize it 'at the surface'. This fits 
within a theory of emotions as mediated by imagination and 'intentions'. Consider that 
one cries much sooner when one imagines oneself to be in a miserable situation, or to be 
very pitiful. One must situate this seemingly 'inhuman' understanding of emotions 
against the background of anxiety, the affectivity which is the principle concern during 
psychoanalysis. It is anxiety, in its many forms, against which people set up all kinds of 
defense mechanisms that psychoanalysis studies. For Lacan anxiety is the only affect 
that is real, the only affect with a real cause. Only anxiety is not deceptive and 
therefore, as he argues in his 1962-3 seminar Anxiety, it is not an emotion.
From this perspective it is hard to maintain that emotions play no role in 
interaction of humans and computers, which is the (romantic) argument that is often 
used to distinguish human-computer interaction from face-to-face interaction (cf. 
Turkle, 1995, 84). Since emotions are a matter of expression, and not of a 'real 
affectivity', computers do not 'possess' emotions. But they can evoke emotions in us and 
thereby make us believe that there are emotions involved in the technological interface 
with reality: we imagine them. Rosalind Picard, founder and director of the Affective 
Computing Research team at M.I.T.'s Media Laboratory, shares these conclusions. In 
her essay on computers and emotions she holds that computers can recognize and evoke 
emotions, yet not 'have' them (Picard, 1997). Reeves and Nash's 'Media Equation' thesis 
shows that people respond to computers and mediated worlds as if they were humans. 
People attribute personalities and gender stereotypes to computers, and respond to 
automated flattery as if it came from humans, etc. Users respond to computers as if they 
were humans. Affective computing is an interesting area for the topic of  'machinic 
emotionality' or cyborg emotions.135 For instance in the development of  'Affective 
Avatars', information about the users physiology is registered (by a full-face mask) and 
represented in the expressive graphical interface of the avatar. "This kind of 
enhancement greatly improves the possibilities for virtual reality environments to 
approximate physical and emotional presence".136 Affective avatars elucidate emotional 
presence as a matter of representation. A simple and personal everyday experience can 
further strengthen this idea. Even my daughter's well-built toy fish, which must be 
wound up in order for it to swim, can appear in a minimal way as a living being by 
evoking a feeling of pity in me when it has reached the end of its strength. What to think 
of the humanoid robots that are now being built?  
The imaginary as a doubling of reality has strong impacts as a luring dimension. 
When we ask the question what is the difference between man and computer we should 
not seek the decisive criteria at the level of emotions and feelings. For beings of 
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 For affective computing see: http://affect.media.mit.edu/. A research group in the Netherlands uses 
psychology to design friendship with an Embodied Conversational Agent (ECA): Bas Stronks et al, 
'Designing for Friendship: Becoming Friends with your ECA':                                          
http://wwwhome.cs.utwente.nl/~anijholt/artikelen/eca2002.pdf
136 http://affect.media.mit.edu/AC_research/projects/affective_avatars.html
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communication and representation like us, emotions are not the real, substantial criteria. 
The interaction with a simulated or machinic other also evokes emotional presence: we 
feel emotions and attribute emotions to the machine. Emotions are therefore rather like 
performances, mimetic operations. Lacanian psychoanalysis teaches us that what does
make us 'communicate with the real' is the possibility of experiencing the anxiety of 
losing our (imaginary) sense of self. So (humanoid) computers themselves would 
recognize this sense of the real if they would become anxious about their own future 
disappearance and try to resist this fate – when they rise against their human controllers 
who write them off and bring them to the scrap heap. This, however, remains in the 
realm of fiction, and in the minds of some worried scientists who fear that we will be 
subjected by the products of our technological advancement. 
3.2. Between deficiency and perfection: the never-ending promise of the cyborg 
In the chapter of his Understanding Media called ‘The Gadget Lover: Narcissus as 
Narcosis’ Marshall McLuhan refers to the figure of Narcissus to evoke the notion of the 
mirror-like extension of man. Where Lacanian theory shows that all sorts of things can 
function as a mirror, McLuhan elaborates technology as such a mirror, or what he calls 
'self-amputation'. “The principle of self-amputation as an immediate relief of strain on 
the central nervous system applies very readily to the origin of the media of 
communication from speech to computer” (McLuhan, 1994, 43). Basing himself on 
medical research, McLuhan explains the origin of media from the physiological 
inadequacy of the central nervous system to deal with all the stimuli that are coming 
from the outside world. Media are thus, in a Kantian-Lacanian way, necessary 
instruments to synthesize the multiple stimuli of the senses. McLuhan considers, for 
example, the wheel to be an extension of the foot, the result of “the pressure of new 
burdens resulting from the acceleration of exchange by written and monetary media” 
(McLuhan, 1994, 42). Media as extensions or ‘amputations’ of bodily functions are a 
means to maintain a sensory equilibrium (stimuli regulation). They have a protective 
function.137 Although a broad line in the philosophy of technology considers technology 
to be a means to compensate for bodily shortcomings, McLuhan’s reference to 
Narcissus links this explicitly to unconscious phenomena like fascination, self-
protection and self-exteriorization. Media have the power to hypnotize us and to make 
us 'forget' our own deficiencies: they numb the senses that cannot cope with all the 
stimuli. Or, more broadly, they numb the awareness of our own inadequacies and 
defects because of the fascinating image they depict of us.138
 From a Lacanian perspective this numbing of our senses is not necessarily a 
malicious process. For we exist (as subjects of desire) in a tension between the 
immediacy of sensations and its objectification in the ego. “The ego really is an object. 
The ego … is precisely what the immediacy of sensation is in tension with” (S.2, 49-
50). Furthermore for Lacan a (genetic) physiological deficiency is the root cause of the 
objectification of the ego: the prematurity of human birth and the defenselessness of the 
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 We might then suggest that computers are the necessary result of a world of increasingly intensifying 
telecommunication: computers as a - what Bolter and Grusin call - remediation of previous media. They 
not only provide, but also allow us to cope with the overwhelming amount of messages and contacts. 
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 In his thoughts on 'Technology and Repression' Richard Veryard argues that we repress technology 
itself, because we do not want to see how dependent we are, that our ideas and perceptions are not our 
own, and we don't want to see how alike we have become to our machines (Richard Veryard, 'Technology 
and Repression'; http://www.users.globalnet.co.uk/~rxv/tcm/techrep.htm) . 
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newborn infant.139 In a structural sense this is a disruption of man’s ‘natural’ relation to 
the outside world. “In man, however, this relation to nature is altered by a certain 
dehiscence at the heart of the organism, a primordial Discord” (Ec., 4). An inner tension 
between inadequacy and anticipation characterizes man’s imaginary relation to the 
outside world. With its anticipatory character the imaginary  – as the order in which the 
Freudian pleasure principle operates – functions as a means to maintain a certain 
equilibrium.  
Lacan shows that we as deficient beings always exist between inadequacy and 
perfection. Imaginary forms supplement the real, and function as a window upon man 
himself and his world. Man as a cyborg. Cyborg technologies materialize this window 
in technological artifacts that try to restore, normalize, reconfigure or enhance the 
human being.140 To give some examples: we supplement our bodily functions with 
artificial organs and limbs, glasses and pacemakers; almost everyone of us is 
reprogrammed (immunized) to resist disease, and psychopharmacological drugs are 
generally used to feel or behave better. 'Narcosis as (Second) Nature' (to paraphrase 
McLuhan).  
As human beings trying to restore, normalize, reconfigure and enhance our 
physical and psychical inadequacies by way of a screen of constitutive and idealizing 
images, we ('cyborgs') exist in the order of promise. Just as the infant recognizing itself 
in the mirror starts living in the order of promising images showing it what it will or can 
become, cyborg technologies give a technological form to the attractive and fascinating 
promises of mastery, autonomy, and control. Several authors stress that such 
fantasmatic images motivate science (cf. Bergoffen, 1995, 575) and technology with 
their promises of mastery, power, pleasure, plenty, and self-actualization (cf. Markley, 
1996, 73). For Turkle the promise of self-control is a crucial aspect of man's attraction 
to computers: "Many are seduced by the computer's promise of perfect mastery. Of 
course, the need to compensate for a vulnerable identity by establishing a sense of 
control is not a strategy limited to adolescents. People often try to control what feels 
chaotic inside through action on the outside. They diet, or they swear off cigarettes or 
alcohol. With such healthy efforts an enhanced sense of autonomy can arise, a sense of 
being an actor (an "act-or") in one's life. The computer which offers an environment for 
a new level of control and mastery becomes a key player in this kind of drama" (Turkle, 
1995, 274). Though we are 'cyborgs' always supplementing our 'vulnerable identity', 
this compensation does not lie on the road of illusions taking us away from our 'true 
self'. The promises of an ideal reality held forth by science and technology belong to 
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 Psychologist, systems analyst and philosopher Raymond Barglow stresses the ‘Defensive functions of 
logic and objectification’: “Unlike other animals that have complex survival skills biologically  “wired-
in”, human beings are born helpless … Against this dependency and vulnerability, children, and the 
adults they become, protect themselves in many ways. One of these is traditional religious belief, as Freud 
pointed out in The Future of an Illusion. Another is objectification of one’s surroundings, to bring them 
under one’s control.This strategy seems to liberate us in two related ways: first, it renders the world 
relatively predictable and manipulable; second, it renders the world emotionally safe: objects do not place 
demands on us that a human subject might” (Barglow, 1994, 128).   
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 These are the four types of cyborg technologies categorized by Gray, Mentor & Figueroa-Sarriera: 
1995, 3. 
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human reality itself. Actually, these promises sustain ('psychologically') the whole 
enterprise and lead man towards new discoveries.141
Problems arise when we imagine fulfilling these promises technologically; when 
we think that psychopharmacology is the solution to each and every psychic problem; 
when people get addicted to their life on the screen because they feel so much better 
there than in 'real life'.142 Then we fall into the trap of thinking about technologies in 
terms of hyperrealisation (see Doel and Clark's distinctions, chapter two: § 1.3.): the 
virtual that fully supplements the deficiencies of the real. The model of seduction is also 
a trap: technological possibilities seduce us to such an extent that we imagine the 
constraints of the real being eliminated (the addict who only lives online – the realized 
fantasy). Lacanian theory acknowledges the excessive narcotic capacities of media and 
technologies. However, its 'ethics' (of 'normality') assess 'narcotic media' as a means of 
disclosing the real by designing new windows of perception, which can never fully 
supplement or annihilate the real. What cyborg technologies basically do is design new 
realities. Drugs against anxiety do not eliminate its cause or make us into a perfect, 
anxiety-free human beings, but rather tone down the perception of what causes anxiety. 
The state of the art cockpit interface does not eliminate the real threats for the pilot but 
diminishes them by making the pilot's 'window of perception' as large as possible. There 
are two concurring tendencies that 'we must remain aware of' ('Wo Es war …'). On the 
one hand the technological interface with reality is a framework, and we hence cannot 
'see it all'. On the other hand there is a tendency to fully control that which escapes its 
framework (and thus 'forget' the framework as such), illustrated by the possible cyborg 
soldier of the future who pursues a fully tele-present war from behind a distant screen, a 
battle which may be all the more devastating for the real enemy. 
3.3. The excess of the cyborg: annihilating the threat of the real 
There is a danger attached to the mechanisms determining consciousness and emotions 
as (to a large extent) a matter of images, particularly so in cyborg forms of 
communication. Affective avatars illustrate that when surface representations of 
sensations are so decisive for emotional experience, a situation could arise of a cyborg-
self fully trying to control its sensations and affects (as the cause of anxiety) by 
'rationalizing' its appearance. This happens, for instance, to the subjects of Rational 
Emotive Therapy (RET: irrational thoughts and beliefs determine emotions, and we 
must therefore rationalize those beliefs), and the subjects of the Darstellung discussed 
in the second chapter. To the extent that the sense of self is a matter of images of ones 
own body, Lacan points out, what is feared most is everything which could potentially 
injure the body's boundaries.  
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 The crucial role of the promise (and its commercial form) can be found in a television medium that 
almost entirely exists by its grace: the Discovery Channel, where an overstated promise of the 
possibilities of science and technology must keep us attracted to its programming. 
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 In general: when the materialized screen for perceiving the real closes off an awareness of ourselves as 
a vulnerable, limited being. The real of man is his vulnerability. That's one explanation of Lacan's notion 
of anxiety as an affect that signals the too close approximation of the real. Therefore we always need the 
imaginary, the order of the promise, to keep the real at a distance. That's why Lacan says that, at an 
unconscious level, we all belief in our own immortality. A clear awareness of the real of our own finitude 
(d.i.: anxiety) is unbearable. We need beliefs to keep it at a distance. Technology incorporates those 
beliefs. Its quest for immortality (cloning, freezing the body, downloading our mental self in a computer 
…) expresses this in the clearest way. 
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At the end of his text on the intimacy of the relation between aggressiveness and 
the imaginary order Lacan draws various psychological conclusions out of the pivotal 
role of the body image in the experience of our self. For instance “the extent to which 
the fear of death, the ‘absolute Master’, presupposed in consciousness by a whole 
philosophical tradition from Hegel onwards, is psychologically subordinate to the 
narcissistic fear of damage to one’s own body” (Ec., 28). We fear the invasion or 
violation of our proper (bodily) domain because that may cause what we try most to 
keep at a ('narcissistic') distance: anxiety.  
The myth of Narcissus illustrates that the will to be similar to the image and to 
eliminate the tension caused by the 'real self' can lead to self-destruction: Narcissus 
drowns. Lacan elaborates this aggressive trait of narcissism into the notion of 
‘narcissistic suicidal aggression’ (E., 174, 187). In it, the subject tries to resolve the 
aggressive tension caused by the discrepancy between its (limited) self and its (ideal) 
image by directing the aggression against the (real) being that does not correspond to 
the image. Similar aggression is an ever-present risk among the possibilities of the 
cyborg. According to Robins and Levidow this duplicity of narcissistic identification 
defines the 'paranoid rationality' of the cyborg – the duplicity of both omnipotent 
control and the fear of being affected, attacked or injured: "The cyborg self can be 
characterized as follows: through a paranoid rationality, expressed in machine-like self, 
we combine an omnipotent phantasy of self-control with fear and aggression directed 
against the emotional and bodily limitations of mere mortals. Through regression to a 
phantasy of infantile omnipotence, we deny our dependency upon nature, upon our own 
nature, upon the "bloody mess" of organic nature. We phantasize about controlling the 
world, freezing historical forces, and, if necessary, even destroying them in rage; we 
thereby contain our anxiety in the name of maintaining rational control" 
(Robins/Levidow, 1995, 119). The same logic governs video games: "Video games in 
the wider culture are also about the mastery of anxiety and the mobilization of 
omnipotence phantasies; these psychic dimensions correspond to the cyborg logic of the 
military "game"" (Robins/Levidow, 1995, 122).  
This shows the technological interface with reality as a screen towards the real 
as an object of anxiety, as the disturbing limitations of our bodily unity. In The Culture 
of Narcissism (1979) historian and social critic Christopher Lasch teaches that 
pathological or secondary narcissism has more to do with self-hatred than with self-
love: it functions as a defense against aggressive impulses and anxiety. The ego as the 
result of the projection of bodily sensations into a mental self-image can evolve into a 
pathological entity trying to enclose itself in its image. It can cut off the ties with 
everything (the real) that poses a limit to its narcissism, and that calls for an awareness 
that 'not everything is possible'. Technologies function as such an extension or 
expansion of the ego, enlarging the psychological distance to the real (other). So the self 
that emerges from the identification with screen-images (the hyper-rational self of RET, 
the self of online communication, the self of the cyborg soldier …) can be extremely 
harsh: controlling the affect, flaming and aggressive acting out, killing without the 
'shock of direct confrontation' …  
3.4. Between exploring and dominating space 
The ego's habitation of the virtual (subjective) space opened up by the mirror image is 
complicated and tense. Virtual space, the duplication of the self and the distance it 
presupposes, on the one hand is a necessary condition for reflection and autonomy. On 
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the other hand the ego might go as far as to annihilate this distance, driven by the will to 
converge with its image. There is continuity between the self-preserving necessity of the 
ego and its excessive and narcissistic aspirations. Lacan esteems a psychological truth 
“the extent to which the so-called ‘instinct of self-preservation’ deflects into the vertigo 
of the domination of space” (Ec., 28). The previous paragraph showed the ego's 
tendency to expand imaginary, virtual space as much as possible; to make the 
psychological distance towards the real as large as possible out of self-protective 
motivations. The soldier behind the computer screen is the (paradigmatic) illustration 
thereof. This characteristic of the (computer) screen implies at the same time an 
(attempt to) fully dominate real (objective) space. In an extraordinary and gloomy 
digression (tapered here to the thought of physicists, perhaps nuclear physicists) Lacan 
asks himself whether this will of the ego to ‘realize’ space, to eliminate all otherness, 
does not inevitably lead to catastrophes. “Thus, by extending our grasp to the confines 
of matter, will not this ‘realized’ space … vanish in its turn in a roar of the universal 
ground? … war is proving more and more to be the inevitable and necessary midwife of 
all progress in our organization” (Ec., 27). The will to 'realize' space by reducing it to 
'human formations' (reducing it to imaginary space) inevitably has destructive 
consequences. Here again we discover the logic of Heidegger's 'Age of the World 
Picture': the (modern) desire to fully imagine the world on the (computer) screen is 
imperative for the way objects should appear, namely as calculable (or to update this: as 
computable) things. This will to dominate and control space, thus Lacan, characterizes 
the ego. 
 Teresa Brennan, whose analysis I used earlier to confirm my point concerning 
fundamental fantasies permeating our sense of reality, uses Lacanian theory to designate 
twentieth century Western culture as an 'age of paranoia'. "The need to control is part of 
the paranoia of the ego's era; it results from the subject's belief that the object, the 
objectified one, is out to get it, but this paranoia originates in the subject's own projected 
aggressive desires toward the other. Nonetheless, its paranoia makes the ego anxious, 
and its anxiety makes it want to control" (Brennan, 1993, 100). The sense of menace 
and (imaginary) objectification conspire. The more we try to objectify the other, the 
more intimidating he becomes. This 'Frankenstein effect' is felt by some scientists who 
work on an objectification of man as a robot. They are frightened of the possible 
outcome of their work, and uncertain whether they can fully control their creatures, as 
there might be something that escapes their control. This element of lack becomes even 
more threatening because their object is such a powerful machine. The bigger the desire 
for control is, the bigger the threat is felt that results from its failure. This parallels 
Freud's discovery concerning the working of our moral conscience. Trying to be 
perfectly conscientious leads to increased feelings of guilt and insufficiency. In general, 
the crude demands of the superego can be excessive in two ways. Either we fully 
annihilate ourselves ('I am nothing, a sinner') by following the demands of conscience. 
Or we possibly annihilate the other because we do not care a straw about the rules of 
conscience (the 'monster', the psychopath). 
 A curious duplicity characterizes the ego's journey through space. Normally, the 
ego is a necessary condition for the exploration of space: it opens up space by seeing 
ourselves reflected in other, virtual spaces. The imaginary object (the 'ideal form') that 
we seek is not simply out there in our natural environment but reflected in different 
kinds of virtual space (the mirror, art, the shopping mall, cyberspace …). So, our 'self-
portrait' moves us (and it legitimizes actions: 'man as an astronaut' for the exploration of 
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outer space; 'man as a multiple personality' for the exploration of cyberspace). Because I
see myself as (beautiful, desirable, explorative, multiple etc) I define my sense of self 
and my actions. It is the virtual image that sustains desire, and I get anxious when I lose 
this image, or depressed when it is negative: 'I am nothing, nobody wants me …'. This 
exploration of space can nevertheless transform into a domination of space. Lacan 
diagnoses science and technology as guided by such imaginary desires. This imaginary 
conquest of space can also seize upon man in the digital era (cf. the cyborg soldier). 
Virtual space then replaces real space: someone's life in cyberspace is no longer an 
exploration but a compensation. When life in cyberspace becomes such a hallucination 
(cyberspace itself as a 'consensual hallucination'), there is no longer (enough) distance
between the self and its image, and no space for (a symbolical, ethical, 'regulating': non-
narcisstic) desire. Cyberspace needs a 'free' subject of desire in order not to be wrapped 
up in it – remember that for Lacan 'freedom' and the law go together, the law not only 
prohibits but 'regulates' and conditions. Thus cyberspace can be made into a (new) 
virtual part of our reality.143
4. Third wave cybernetics
4.1 A Lacanian third wave cybernetics? 
Lacan's discussion with Wiener showed that one cannot purge human communication of 
the ‘imagining’ of the object of desire. The fantasmatic element renders the position of 
the subject in the symbolic order of communication codes. When in phone sex I desire 
and imagine myself to be the president of the Unites States and the other my servant, 
this determines the embodiment of the communication, its concrete experience and 
significance for me. At once, we notice here the difference between technological forms 
of virtuality and its preceding versions in which 'traditional' structures (conventions 
concerning duties, race, gender …) determine ones place in the symbolic order. In 
technological virtuality the individual is less bound to a symbolic order. It leaves more 
space for fantasy; the whole issue of role-playing in cyberspace testifies to this. Because 
of this 'liberation' from traditional structures many (feminine) theorists claim that the 
zeros and ones of techno culture imply the end of patriarchy (Sadie Plant, 1997). 
Although Lacan is often situated on the side of the 'bad guys', the main Lacanian point 
remains that it is fantasy that sustains the position in the symbolic order (someone's 
'point of view': being a student or the president). Lacanian theory is not so much about 
defending certain symbolic orders as about insight in their organization. 
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 Although the ego tries to eliminate the real by trying to screen it off completely, the (Lacanian) subject
of desire is in a continuous interaction with the real. Although the subject is also in the mediation of the 
screen ('no subject without ego'), it remains (ethical, symbolical) connected to what is behind the screen. 
So, the 'subjectivation' of  anxiety means: productive repetition  ('writing in order not to go insane') 
instead of imaginary fixation (phobia, delusions …). A subjectified interaction with the other of (online) 
communication could consist of: discussing with the other instaed of flaming him. In case of the cyborg 
soldier: some sort of ethical awareness instead of the moral dissociation from the psychologically 
invisible enemy. This shows that (symbolical, ethical, artistic … human: subjectified) desire implies a 
sublimated connection to the real. It is at least not a replacement of the real by the imaginary. This is also 
a major theme in the work of Baudrillard, who states in his 'Clone Story' on the imaginary other: "when 
the double materializes himself, when he becomes visible, he involves an imminent death" (Baudrillard, 
1981, 143; m.t.); a death of the subject of desire. 
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 Lacan's discussion with Wiener involves a discussion regarding the so-called 
first wave of cybernetics (from 1945 to 1960) in which homeostasis is the central 
concept. In the second wave of cybernetics, roughly from 1960 to 1980, the central 
element is reflexivity. From 1980 to the present the crucial concept in (third wave) 
cybernetics is virtuality (Hayles, 1999, 7). Lacanian thought can be fruitful for the 
question of virtuality, and especially the matter of embodiment. In order to pass from 
Lacan's discussion with first wave cybernetics to an application of his thought to third 
wave cybernetics, I will move through second wave cybernetics. 
Because of the emphasis on ‘subjectivized’ language, on the role of the subject 
of desire in the construction of reality, it might be tempting to situate Lacanian thought 
in the second wave of cybernetic theory. This second wave evolved from the problem of 
how to take into account the role of the observer in the perception of reality which led to 
the notion of reflexivity: “Reflexivity is the movement whereby that which has been 
used to generate a system is made, through a changed perspective, to become part of the 
system it generates” (Hayles, 1999, 8). In the work of one of the main theorists of 
second wave cybernetics, Humberto Maturana, this leads to an extreme form of 
constructivism. In their seminal paper ‘What the Frog’s Eye Tells the Frog’s Brain’ 
Maturana and his coauthors conclude that the “frog’s perceptual system does not so 
much register reality as construct it. As the authors noted, their work “shows that the 
[frog’s] eye speaks to the brain in a language highly organized and interpreted instead of 
transmitting some more or less accurate copy of the distribution of light upon the 
receptors”. The work led Maturana to the maxim fundamental to his epistemology: 
“Everything said is said by an observer”” (Hayles, 1999, 135).  
 In their analysis of the work of Maturana and Lacan, Boxer and Kenny conclude 
that for Maturana the self exists only in language. “We are structurally embedded in, 
and an intrinsic part of, our own medium. We cannot find or take any position that is 
apart from the medium in which we live. There is no way of separating oneself from the 
effects of one's actions in one's niche. This relates quite closely to Lacan's thesis that 
“There is no meta-language”” (Boxer and Kenny, 1992, 80). According to Hayles the 
notion of reflexivity that thus appears in Maturana’s work differs significantly from a 
psychoanalytical interpretation (as used in the discussions regarding cybernetics after 
World War II, the Macy Conferences) in which reflexivity entails a psychological depth 
or specificity: “Although the observer’s perceptions construct reality rather than 
passively perceive it, for Maturana this construction depends on positionality rather than 
personality” (Hayles, 1999, 143). It is easily defended from a Lacanian perspective that 
Lacan's notion of reflexivity does not conflict with Maturana's. In Lacan's theory the 
‘role of the observer’ in the construction of reality does not come down to an 
‘incommunicable inwardness’ or ‘deep feelings’ that obstruct clear communication. 
Fantasy, which I analyzed as an imaginary structure earlier in this chapter according the 
work of the earlier Lacan, is not simply the expression of ones own very personal 
inwardness. It is also constitutive in that it synthesizes our perception of reality. It is 
only to the extent that I 'imagine' myself to be the president of the Unites States that the 
messages that the phone sex worker sends through the line acquires a certain meaning 
and effect for me. In the previous chapter I demonstrated fantasy as what organizes 
perception. And exactly this function of fantasy is at work in techno culture. In role-
playing in cyberspace, for instance, it is the way I 'imagine' myself at the interface (as a 
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man, a woman, an animal … ) that determines the nature of the exchange of signs and 
my being (my sense of presence) in the virtual world.144
From a Lacanian perspective it is not the ‘personality’ but rather the 
fantasmatically sustained or embodied ‘positionality’ that determines the perception of 
reality. The subject is virtual: an effect of discourse, language, codification … But at the 
same time – and that is what Lacan's discussion with Wiener teaches us – it has a 
substance in respect to this virtuality: the work of embodied fantasies framing our 
perception. Using the terminology of Pierre Lévy, the virtuality of the subject consists 
of subjectivation (the way in which I appropriate the exchange of signs, the way I 'give 
body' to the surface-appearances) and objectivation (the way in which my subjective, 
fantasmatic and bodily fixations are brought into the 'construction of a shared world' of 
appearances). Fantasy is hence at the interface of the real and the virtual.  
According to Boxer and Kenny such a theory of the virtual subject is absent in 
Maturana's work. Therefore Lacan’s theory can supplement Maturana’s cybernetic 
theory in a step towards the third wave of cybernetics. Crucial to this step is fantasy's 
function as the 'stuff' of the virtual subject. The resulting 'cyborgology' covers both the 
dimensions of virtuality and of embodiment.  
4.2. Incorporating the virtual surfaces 
Sandy Stone expresses the question at issue in a reflection on game- and internet 
designers: "As I watch them, or rather their bodies (since their selves are off in the net), 
I remind myself that these are the people who are writing the descriptors right there in 
front of me – writing the computer code that makes the fantasmatic structures of 
prosthetic sociality. Then they will inhabit the structures that they write" (Stone, 1995, 
403). These people inhabit the fantasmatic structures they write. They embody them, as 
they particularize those structures thereby giving them an individual and locally 
situated meaning. Thus Stone comes to an important conclusion: cyberspace not only 
disembodies (as is the usual opinion) but also re-embodies. She explains this by means 
of the act of programming. "Programming itself involves constant creation, 
interpretation, and reinterpretation of languages. To enter the discursive space of the 
program is to enter the space of a set of variables and operators to which the 
programmer assigns names. To enact naming is simultaneously to possess the power of, 
and to render harmless, the complex of desire and fear that charge the signifiers in such 
a discourse; to enact naming within the highly charged world of surfaces that is 
cyberspace is to appropriate the surfaces, to incorporate the surfaces into one's own"
[my italics] (Stone, 2001, 193).  
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 In his 'psychology of avatars' John Suler shows how the use of different avatars (seductive, sexy, 
aggressive …) in a virtual world called 'Palace' leads to different reactions and interactions. He also 
analyzes how different avatars express the (what I would call fantasmatic) core of someones personality. 
Such as animal avatars: "Animal avatars are some of the most popular at the Palace. Some people come 
as their pets. Because animals symbolize certain traits or attributes in myth as well as popular culture 
(e.g., strength, loyalty, grace, independence, cunning, transcendence), the animal chosen for an avatar 
probably bears psychological significance to the person - perhaps representing some real aspect of his or 
her identity, or some characteristic admired by the person. Thinking in the tradition of the Native 
American, we might even regard an animal avatar as being an individuals "totem" - i.e., a symbol of one's 
essential nature or potential" (Suler, 1999). This objectivation of  our fantasmatic core, that then again 
influences the way in which we experience our presence in a shared world and the way we interpret the 
messages from others, ties in with Pierre Lévy's notions on 'Subjectivation and Objectivation as the two 
complementary aspects of virtualization' (cf. Lévy, 1998, 169) 
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We see here the crucial role of subjectivation in the process of virtualization. 
Cyberspace is not merely a world of surfaces; we also 'inhabit those surfaces' because of 
our libidinous investments of those images or scenario's. Thus we actually ('physically') 
exist in virtual worlds. In her essay on 'The Embodied Computer/User' Deborah Lupton 
also focuses on this point using some thoughts from Elisabeth Grosz's book Volatile 
Bodies (1994) on inanimate objects as extensions of the body image sensation: "They 
become psychically invested into the self; indeed she argues, 'it is only insofar as the 
object ceases to remain an object and becomes a medium, a vehicle for impressions and 
expressions, that it can be used as an instrument or tool'. Depending on how inanimate 
objects are used or performed by the body, they may become 'intermediate' or 'midway 
between the inanimate and the bodily' (Grosz, 1994, 81)" (Lupton, 2000, 478).  
 The same lessons regarding the embodiment of the virtual subject can be drawn 
from Lacan's discussion with cybernetics. The subjectivation or the psychical 
investments in the 'expectation of a certain appearance' of the discourse (the 
message/circuit of the Other), makes it an integral part of my world. Lacan's notion of 
(fantasy as) the imaginary thus overcomes the lack of individuality that characterizes 
Wiener's cybernetic systems, in which there is no such thing as an individualized unity 
since the components of a system form new configurations all the time, also when they 
die. Because man's interfaces with the world are highly psychically invested, they do 
not simply regulate entropy by means of feedback loops. The in- and output 
mechanisms interfacing the system and the outer world are not neutral regulators but 
active windows upon the outer world.  
 Therefore it is hard to agree with Lakoff's conclusion on computers, as 
expressed in the following dialogue: 
"Computers don't understand anything 
How so? 
They don't have bodies. They cannot experience things. Most of our abstract concepts 
are extensions of bodily based concepts that have to do with motion and space, and 
objects we manipulate, and states of our bodies, and so on. They then get projected by 
metaphor onto abstract concepts. We understand through the body. Computers don't 
have bodies" (Lakoff, 1995, 122). 
Because the interface connects or associates the human and the information system so 
closely, the computer is not merely a tool that generates a disembodied world of 
symbols. Because of his psycho-libidinal investment in these worlds of symbols, signs, 
images etc. man inevitably embodies this world and 'actualizes' it in his own 
circumstances: he 'expresses his own image in it'. Computers do have bodies. We are the 
'bodies' of its 'mind'.  
Conclusion
In order to say what a cybernetic organism (cyborg) is we must first of all have a clear 
notion of what a human organism is. For Lacan this is not a simple issue as he wonders 
whether the human is as human as we assume it to be. Because he does not consider the 
'essence' of a human being to reside in some sort of substance: a soul, feelings, a mind, 
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or a body, cybernetic theory interested him so much, for it even dared to put humans on 
a par with animals and machines. Nevertheless, in his investigation of man from the 
cybernetic perspective as a 'machine of the unconscious', Lacan discovers that man 
cannot be reduced to a mere subject of codification, as information theories would have 
it. Man's symbols have an imaginary origin so that an 'original anticipation' is 
ineradicable; communication is irreducible to mere codes and will never be fully neutral 
or transparent. In cyberspace communication this 'original imagination' manifests itself 
in the contextualization that gives the exchange of signs their effect/affect. In 
ethnological and anthropological studies this theme boils down to the issue of man 
never being fully able to work with disembodied symbols, since he makes these 
symbols out of the direct environment he lives in. Man reflects his environment: he 
takes images from the surrounding world to express himself symbolically, and 
subsequently reflects himself (his own concrete, lived, embodied context) in his 
symbolical expressions. Lacan elaborates this issue in his theory of the imaginary. This 
first 'paradigm' of fantasy shows the original function of fantasy: there is no sense of 
self without the imagination. Since the ego is primarily a body-ego, the body as a self-
image is always part of the virtual world of codes and signs. Therefore the issue of this 
chapter is the (imaginary) order of libidinal investments in images that contextualizes 
man's virtual world and relates it to the subject of the body. Cybernetic theory can never 
take up the meaningful world of embodied subjectivity. If it were to do so (and that is 
what Lacanian theory tries to do) it would have to give up its universal presumptions 
and favor a theory that stresses the framework: the 'lenses' for the embodied subject 
built into the virtual world of sheer codes. Embodiment, the 'ontology of cyborgology', 
implies perspectivism.  
Whereas the first chapter of this thesis held classical representations that rely on 
conversion of form ('analogue representations') to be inseparable from structuring codes 
('digital representations'), this chapter shows codes as not fully separable from 'original 
forms'. Together they show the specificity of the Lacanian theory of representation, and 
allow a better understanding of the Lacanian viewpoint regarding what specifically 
makes us human. This is the interaction between the disembodied subject of virtual 
worlds of codes, and the ego that dwells in (self) images. There is a very precarious 
balance at stake here. Although Lacan dismisses the idea of 'pure communication' and 
of a neutral perspective on the world, we should neither stick to and celebrate our own 
(technological) self-images. The (body) ego as self-image has a peculiar danger attached 
to it, which is that of pathological narcissism. There are two narcissisms: one constitutes 
the human self, another screens this self off from the real, diminishing what is human 
about us, namely desire. Although technologies threaten to increase secondary 
narcissism, they may also provide an opportunity to create new windows or frameworks 
with which to see reality (primary narcissism). Technological extensions of the ego's 
will to control are part of the 'human project' (not: humanistic – as the human is already 
a cyborgian posthuman) when they allow for an awareness of the real which is beyond 
its displays, an awareness which always effects the controlling distance towards the 
world as a screen. Then its displays are not mere mirrors, but also windows; not just 
reflections of the ego but also formations of the subject of desire. 
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CHAPTER SIX. FANTASY AND SUBJECTIVATION:  
SURPLUS-ENJOYMENT 
Introduction 
We love our technological objects. Psychoanalysis, as a discipline of suspicion, 
wonders what we suppress by attaching ourselves to objects. This puts us on the track of 
techno-fetishism. As Lacanian thought holds some form of suppression to be inevitable 
– speaking moves us away from 'immersive' enjoyment – the love of (techno) objects 
may also be an inevitable thing, required for personal identity. From this perspective I 
will address the issues of pleasure, fun and enjoyment that are a defining characteristic 
of new media objects, as well as trying to draw up Lacanian thought in a way that is 
capable of grasping these phenomena in a constitutive manner. Subjectivation will be 
the central issue. We define ourselves as an object, by identifying with enjoyable 
objects. Not only meaning is hidden in (unconscious) fantasy, but above all a sense of 
enjoyment. Subjectivation will be thematized (again) in the tension ('split') of inevitable 
self-objectification and reflection on it. 
1. Objects of enjoyment
1.1. Techno-fetishism 
"Reality itself founders in hyperrealism, the meticulous reduplication of the real, 
preferably through another, reproductive medium, such as photography. From 
medium to medium, the real is volatilized, becoming an allegory of death. But it 
is also, in a sense, reinforced through its own destruction. It becomes reality for 
its own sake, the fetishism of the lost object: no longer the object of 
representation, but the ecstasy of the denial and of its own ritual extermination: 
the hyperreal … Unreality no longer resides in the dream or fantasy, or in the 
beyond, but in the real's hallucinatory resemblance to itself" (Baudrillard, 1988, 
144-145).
The use of technology is often paralleled with fetishistic operations. Such an opinion 
holds that technologies disavow the limits of ordinary life and provide us feelings of 
pleasure by opening up a realm of seemingly unlimited possibilities. Especially the 
'hallucinatory imagination of reality' of digital technologies supposedly synchronize 
man with the pleasure principle. As 'engines of pleasure' they create fantastic 
experiences that overcome the natural constraints of the human condition (see chapter 
three: § 1.1). 'Invocational media' are endowed with a magical power to connect us to 
another world. In this worshipping of technologies' magical powers resides the pivotal 
psychical phenomenon of techno-fetishism. "Naïve technophilia and/or technological 
fetishism both constructs cyberspace as a transcendent location" (Usher, 1998). Michael 
Benedikt's early interpretation of cyberspace considers it to be a world of magic 
violating the principles of ordinary reality, thus lifting us to the level of the 'primitive' or 
magical functioning of the pleasure principle (the automaton of the previous chapter). 
"After all, the ancient worlds of magic, myth, and legends to which cyberspace is heir, 
as well as the modern worlds of fantasy fiction, movies, cartoons, are replete with 
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violations of the logic of everyday space and time: disappearances, underworlds, 
phantoms, warp speed ravel, mirrors and doors to alternate worlds, zero gravity, 
flattening and reconstructions, wormholes, scale inversions, and so on" (Benedikt, 1991, 
128).
 Techno-fetishism shows the apparent relationship between technology and 
enjoyment. In Freudian terms fetishism is the projection of sexual goals onto an object 
other than the 'normal' sexual goal of intercourse. We must right away remind the reader 
here (again) of Lacan's crucial distinction between the goal and the aim of the drives 
(which I will also address in the next paragraph with regards to the status of the object 
a). The drive does not necessarily have to reach its goal (discharge) in order to achieve 
its aim, which is to gain forms of enjoyment – and above all to maintain the state of 
enjoyment. Trudy Barber, who investigates the role of the computer in 
(sadomasochistic) arousal (in chat rooms), concludes that "the computer, as an object in 
itself is, quite simply, the new sex fetish … The tool of control being the computer 
instead of the whip" (Barber, 2001). And: "My own work argues that computer 
mediated communications, virtuality and cyberspace are embedded with fetishism" 
(Barber, 2004). Neil Postman in his book Conscientious Objections (1988) already 
revealed the role of arousal and excitement in the watching of television news. 
Television images capitalize on our 'primitive instincts', as they excite us by showing us 
earthquakes or explosions. Because of this arousal-factor, television news is primarily a 
form of amusement instead of an actuality. 
Technology and enjoyment both function at the same level because of their 
respective (psychical) intensities. Cyberpunk writer William Gibson puts the finger on 
this by considering technology actively and symbolically concurrent with the use of 
drugs. "I got really interested in these obsessive things. I hadn't heard anybody talk 
about anything with that intensity since the 1960's. It was like listening to people talk 
about drugs" (Interview with William Gibson, Science Fiction Eye 26). In her Fantasies 
of Fetishism: From Decadence to the Post-Human (2002) Amanda Fernbach introduces 
new terms to augment the classical Freudian model of fetishism in the age of 
information. Taking Gibson's novel Neuromancer as one of her prime texts, she defines 
its hero, the console cowboy, as someone who engages in a 'matrix fetish', seeking 
immersion in a maternal space. This "Matrix" or pre-oedipal fetishism is also what 
Claudia Springer describes in her analysis of the 'pleasure of the interface': 
"The pleasure of the interface...results from the computer's offer to lead us into 
a microelectronic Imaginary where our bodies are obliterated and our 
consciousnesses are integrated into the matrix." (Springer, 1991, 306).  
Fernbach distinguishes this Matrix fetishism from the "decadent fetishism" that she 
celebrates as the transformative and experimental play with categories of identities, in 
which power hierarchies, gender distinctions and boundaries between humans and 
machines are fruitfully traversed. 
 Whether one holds to the classical (Freudian) model of fetishism or not, 
disavowal remains its characterizing operation. Fernbach's two forms of fetishism 
illuminate the question whether this disavowal leads to a merely hallucinatory 
experience of reality or to a productive transformation of it (like Fernbach's figures of 
'cultural cross dressing' do: gays, lesbians, gender benders, sado-masochists, 
posthumanists, techno-pagans, postmodern primitives and geekgirl techno-feminist). 
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We may first take notice of Freud's remarks in his 'Three Essays on Sexuality' (1905) on 
the pathological character or otherwise of disavowal. "The situation only becomes 
pathological when the longing for the fetish passes beyond the point of being merely a 
necessary condition attached to the sexual object and actually 'takes the place' of the 
normal aim, and, further, when the fetish becomes detached from a particular individual 
and becomes the 'sole' sexual object. These are, indeed, the general conditions under 
which mere variations of the sexual instinct pass over into pathological aberrations" 
(S.E. 7, 154). In Baudrillard's hyperreality the 'techno-fetishism of the lost object' totally 
conceals or destructs the awareness of a reality as different from our (technological) 
conception. This is a pathological situation. In hyperreality, fantasy and reality are 
indiscriminable as fully realized worlds. It is not fantasy which generates unreality, but 
reality itself. Reality has become a screenplay. Whereas Baudrillard's extreme position 
denies the possibilities of distinguishing reality from (fetishistic) illusion, others accept 
a simple distinction. In his otherwise interesting book Projecting Illusion. Film 
Spectatorship and the Impression of Reality film theoretician Richard Allen examines 
what he calls ‘projective illusions’: experiences “in which, while we know that what we 
are seeing is only a film, we nevertheless experience that film as a fully realized world” 
(Allen, 1995, 4). He upholds that in order to explain these experiences correctly, we 
must introduce a distinction between normal and pathological disavowal, something that 
contemporary film theory in its dependence on Lacanian psychoanalysis does not do (p. 
135). “When disavowal is benign, I entertain the fantasy all the while knowing that it is 
not really the case” (Allen, 1995, 136). He equates ‘pathological disavowal’ with a 
splitting of the ego, when there is an instance in the ‘ego’ that actually believes the 
fantasy. 
 The question is therefore whether disavowal is clearly recognizable as what 
leads us into illusion, as Allen claims. If it is, we may indulge in acts of disavowal, such 
as watching a film, while simultaneously knowing that this 'projective illusion' has 
nothing to do with reality. This implies a very conscious awareness of the distinction 
between reality and illusion: reality as non-distorted (non-virtualized). Or does the 
opposite hold? Have we become unaware, as Baudrillard claims, of the processes of 
(technological) disavowal so that we hold this 'illusory world' to be reality itself, without 
us being aware of our loss of reality? To put it differently: is our love for all sorts of 
techno-objects that present a desirable representation of the world or of ourselves (as an 
object: in websites, photographs, films, television shows, advertisement …) a 
narcissistic (self) delusion that we no longer recognize as such? Or are we quite well 
capable of seeing what their little game is? De Kerckhove also poses this question and 
somehow comes to an interpretation which is different from that of his famous 
predecessor. "McLuhan saw in this phenomenon [of a fetishistic obsession for consumer 
technologies, A.N.] a purely psychological pattern of narcissistic identification with the 
power of our toys. I see it as the proof that we are indeed becoming cyborgs, and that, as 
each technology extends one of our faculties and transcends our physical limitations, we 
are inspired to acquire the very best extension of our own body. When we buy our home 
video system, we want it to perform every possible editing function, not because we 
will ever use them, but because we would feel handicapped and inadequate without 
them. This is probably a healthy approach, not pathology. Indeed, it suggests that we are 
perfectly capable of integrating devices into our identity, certainly into our bodies. Such 
an ability prepares the ground for the necessary development of a new psychology" (De 
Kerckhove, 1995, 3). 
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 I will try to describe the foundations of this psychology of the cyborg, which 
seeks to avoid the coercive opposition of reality and illusion. My exposition on 
virtualization implies the impossibility of a clear and strict distinction, as the image also 
defines the event (movies, fantasmatic productions in general, also shape our sense of 
reality). I will follow this lead within cyborgology by investigating the role of 
enjoyment in fantasy, despite its tricky position of being at the core of reality. 'At the 
heart of it all' (to quote Lombard and Ditton): the concept of surplus-enjoyment. Little 
research is available on this question of the relationship between 'being in a virtual 
world' and enjoyment, "perhaps because we tend to take the effect for granted" 
(Lombard/Ditton, 1997). 
1.2. The reality of pleasure: surplus-enjoyment 
“Reality isn’t just there so that we bump our heads up against the false paths 
along which the functioning of the pleasure principle leads us. In truth, we make 
reality out of pleasure” (S.7, 225). 
Reality itself is not saved from enjoyment. Lacan thus undermines Freud’s notion of 
fantasy (his so-called ‘central usage’) that draws a strict line between the two principles 
of mental functioning. Lacan acknowledges the existence of such a strict distinction in 
Freud’s ‘Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning’. However, for 
Lacan even in a simple hallucination, as the hallucination of food by someone who is 
hungry, there is more at stake than merely the making present of an object of need. In 
every hallucination, there is not only a need at stake, but also a (sexual) desire. “One 
can argue over each case, but it is absolutely essential to map the dimension of 
signification in every hallucination if we are to grasp what the pleasure principle means. 
It is from the point at which the subject desires that the connotation of reality is given in 
hallucination. And if Freud contrasts the reality principle with the pleasure principle, it 
is precisely in so far as reality is defined as desexualized” (S.11, 155). Because reality is 
not stripped of enjoyment ('desexualised'), it is not simply the opposite of hallucination 
(of enjoyment). Fantasy as the domain of the pleasure-principle isolated from reality-
testing is too narrow.145 The organisation of surplus-enjoyment, fantasy, is working in 
reality. Reality itself is invested by fantasmatically designed libido. Therefore the 
difficult stake of psychoanalysis is to see how enjoyment works in our 'normal' 
experience of reality; how a sexuality that is not a matter of sexual acts works.  
This is also the issue at stake in the (fetishistic) enjoyment of, or by means of, 
technologies. They are media for enjoying our (sexual) desire. Barber's analysis of the 
computer as a medium for sadomasochistic play, shows this in the most obvious way. 
But the issue is broader than this explicit reference to sexuality. Representations 
themselves cause forms of arousal and enjoyment. This is what Lacanian theory names 
the enjoyment in the signifier. The quote that heads this paragraph mentions reality itself 
as organized upon such representations of enjoyment. Thoroughly invested with libido, 
reality is organized around objects that provide us with enjoyment. This is the issue of 
fantasy as an interface between the real of jouissance and the virtual subject. Therefore 
one cannot distinguish in an infallible way between 'true’ reality and ‘subsitutary 
145
 We saw that Freud’s ideas on fantasy cannot be laid down in this duplicity. So Lacan turns himself 
primarily against commentators who try to fix the opposition of fantasy and reality as his ‘central usage’ 
of fantasy. 
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pleasure’ of fantasy. The mobile phone is not simply an object of pleasure that 
organizes a ‘false’ form of reality. It also organizes new, different forms of reality (of 
the way we relate to the other, communicate etc). It does so in a considerable measure 
('substantially' – as enjoyment is the 'substance' of desire) by organising new forms of 
enjoyment.  
""Reality is approached with apparatuses of jouissance".146 That is another 
formulation I am proposing to you, as long as we focus, of course, on the fact 
that there's no other apparatus than language" (S.20, 55). 
The unconscious, structured as a langage, is an apparatus. As it operates by means of 
signifiers it organizes surplus-enjoyment. This, I hold, is also what technological 
devices of communication do.147
 Enjoyment is to a large extent a matter of representation: as watching the 
television news according to Postman is, playing sexual or identity games on the 
Internet, seeing sex instead of having sex, enjoying ones position … . Therefore 
enjoyment itself serves to generate reality-experiences. The subject of cyberspace is 
sustained by libido invested in the (fantasmatic) scenes of these virtual worlds. The 
difficult issue of enjoyment is that it works, so to speak, in two directions. On the one 
hand, we find 'subsitutary' forms of enjoyment in the virtual world of the signifier – 
total enjoyment (being One) is impossible. On the other hand, it is this virtual world that 
'originates' enjoyment. We are always already in the condition of surplus-enjoyment. 
This is what Lacan means with his crucial graph of fantasy, S<>a. Fantasy, the medium 
(mediation/mediatization) of enjoyment, does not combine (afterwards) the two original 
realms of signifier and libido. Fantasy is the original combination of signifier and 
libido, thereby generating a medium in which we (psychically) exist, best exemplified 
by telecommunication.148
The object of central concern to psychoanalysis is simultaneously of the order of 
the drives and of the order of desire (by enjoying to talk I open up a world, a reality 
permeated with surplus-enjoyment – as in case of the mobile phone). The best formula 
for this object a, Lacan says in an ambiguous remark, is that the drive moves around it 
(S.11, 168). The object a is that from which the organism must separate itself in order to 
constitute itself as a subject (S.11, 103). As such it causes desire. The object a is thus 
the object of the drive and the cause of desire. As Lacan continuously brings forward 
that the subject of desire appears simultaneously with the word, one can go as far as to 
situate the first manifestation of desire in the cry of the infant. Its cry marks the 
separation from the breast and is thus the most primitive token of the ‘singularized’ 
subject of speech (cf. Nasio, 1998, 84). The word breaks the ‘continuity of being’ and 
marks the birth of individual consciousness.
146
 Translator's note: The French here, les appareils de la jouissance, could also be translated as 
"jouissance devices". 
147
 In the previous chapter I also addressed this question as the (unconscious) automaton of the pleasure 
principle. Here I will focus more on the question of enjoyment, and use the notion of surplus enjoyment 
to elaborate that enjoyment works beyond the pleasure principle. 
148
 Lacan argues, against Freud, that the primary process (Lust-Ich) is not temporarily preceding the 
secondary process (Real-Ich) by remarking that he never had the impression that babies have no outside 
world. "The process of the Lust-Ich may be primary – why not? it's obviously primary once we begin to 
think – but it's certainly not the first" (S.20, 56). 
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Fantasy functions as a screen between the order of desire and of the drives (cf. 
Žižek, 1997, 32). It brings the real enjoyment that the drives seek at the level of 
representation. And this situation is altogether true for the subject of the interface. It can 
never get at 'the real thing' because the structure of the screen itself condemns it to 
representations. Precisely in this 'circling around' the 'real thing', or constantly and 
repeatedly doing the same thing over and over again, it finds a form of enjoyment. The 
voyeur is its perfect illustration, or the Netsurfer who enjoys his continuous surfing – 
 without finding 'closure'. But the subject may get caught in this loop or cycle of 
circling around the object without getting it. Then the subject of desire is pushed into 
the background by the subject of the drive. These modes of subjectivity parallel the 
difference between the extremes of surfing the Net (as a 'libidinal body') for the sake of 
surfing and excitement, and doing so (as a disembodied mind) only to seek meaningful 
information. 'Normally' those two aspects go together ('in the middle', 'in media'): 
surplus-enjoyment. 
1.3. The perverse enjoyment of media: not the act, but the scene 
The inseparability of the reality principle and the pleasure principle gives fantasmatic 
enjoyment a certain control of 'normal reality'. Such an enjoyment does not imply an act
of transgressing the law; it is not a deed or a form of behavior that explicitly conflicts 
with the norms of social reality. Enjoyment within the law implies an organization of 
reality already in accordance with our desire to find forms of enjoyment. That is to say 
that my subjectivity contains an element of perversion not because at night, behind my 
computer, I actually realize desires that I must suppress (or that are not working) during 
the ‘normal’ daytime version of myself. Rather: my representations of the world 
(speaking, writing, surfing on the Internet …) are already governed by the 'imagination' 
of desire: surplus-enjoyment. The 'perversity' of fantasy is therefore for Lacan not on 
the level of the act, but on the level of our representations itself! Fantasy creates scenes 
to (re) discover enjoyment, which are the (unconscious) 'scripts' that permeate our 
everyday life. In media these 'scripts' may become more explicitly visible, thus showing 
that they actually sustain reality. Role-playing games on the Internet, the role of the 
subject in advertisement: they unroll 'scripts' of the subject as the protagonist of a good 
story. For Postman even the television news provides such scenes and puts the viewer in 
a position of (unconsciously) enjoying the events in the world. It is obvious that the 
television news' 'fantasmatic window' sustains and supports our picture of the world. It 
shows the 'image' (of enjoyment) as what also defines reality.  
The lesson of Freudian psychoanalysis is that gratification of wishes, the 
realization of desire, curbs the capacity of symbolization and eliminates the distinction 
between imaginary illusions and reality.149 An actual satisfaction eliminates the virtual
subject. But fantasy (as a window) instead of eliminating the virtual subject sustains it, 
since its satisfactions are (‘normally’) in our symbolizations. The law 'contracts' 
enjoyment, protection and defense.150 Television news provides a staging of the 
149
 In the therapeutical situation the analyst must therefore not gratify the analysands wishes, for this 
would take away the willingness to deal with the meaning of those wishes. 
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 In his chapter on ‘Imagination, Fantasy, and Defense’ Marshall Edelson (1988) states, with a reference 
to the work of Schafer (‘The Mechanisms of Defence, IJP, 49, 1968), that fantasy must insure “”the 
maximum of instinctual gratification possible under conditions of danger”” [note: explicitly perverse 
behavior does exactly this: a voyeur experiences maximal gratification because of the possibility that he 
may get caught, A.N.]. “What strategies for achieving gratification under conditions of threat are 
possible? One may as well ask, “What are the limits of human imaginativeness and inventiveness?” These 
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catastrophic event in such a way that we can endure it, and even find a certain 
(perverse) enjoyment in it (being the spectator on the scene). As Baudrillard recognized, 
perversity exists as enjoyment travelling through mediating apparatuses.  
 This enjoyment in the (order of the) law can nevertheless become explicitly 
manifest in certain behavior. Someone may find extreme satisfaction by fully obeying 
the law, executing its rules in such a strict way that we declare the person mad. Then we 
speak of perversion as a pathological position. It shows perversion as a clinical structure 
that fully makes someone, according to Lacan's theory, the instrument of the other's 
enjoyment. That is, someone finds enjoyment in fully obeying to the Other (the State, 
his master …). Sexual sado-masochistic practices are of course the clearest example. 
But do we not also call someone a sadist who makes himself completely into an 
instrument of executing the law, without any concern for what we call ‘human 
feelings’? 
Lacan’s version of Freud’s adagio that perversions are the negative of neuroses 
shows the difference between the perversity of behavior (the act) and that of fantasy (the 
scene). Perversity does not necessarily reside in perverse behavior, as it 'inhabits' the 
neurotic's fantasy itself. Therefore perversity does not simply mean that the pervert 
performs what the neurotic only dreams of (cf. S.4, 114). That we find in a pervert’s 
behavior what the neurotic suppresses, must be expound further. We find this 
perversity, primarily, in (unconscious) fantasy. Explaining things this way, Lacan 
emphasizes the (unconscious) scene of perversity, which he locates in (the neurotic's) 
fantasy.  
When we take a closer look at Lacan's formula of fantasy (S<>a), we must 
conclude that it holds for the neurotic subject. The subject of language is inevitably 
condemned to the neurotic position: it is split. For Freud such a splitting characterizes 
subjectivity itself, and not solely defensive formations (as for example fetishism). Freud 
“therefore posits the existence of a splitting of the ego, and we see such splitting again 
and again as an intrinsic element of the subject’s structure as such” (Dor, 1999, 37). 
Because of 'primary repression' we must make a distinction between the split subject 
that is always to a certain extent 'neurotic', and neurosis as a pathological position 
characterized by secondary ('neutralizable') repression. The 'always existing perversity' 
resides in a fantasmatic staging of the impossible object.151
 This makes (perverse) enjoyment a result of our virtual position. The Internet, 
television and all sorts of 'fetishistic' techno- objects put us in a certain position 
may turn almost any object, event or state of affairs that exists or occurs in the ad hoc nonlawful 
circumstances in which such a problem is encountered into a resource that can be used in attempts to 
solve it” (p. 177). He also stresses fantasy's duplicity of both providing satisfaction and protection, d.i. in 
Lacanian terminology, of supporting and sustaining the law and desire: “If the response to a wish-
fulfillment in fantasy is anxiety, guilt, or shame, which are painful affects, then the subject, who seeks 
both to experience pleasure and to avoid the experience of pain, faces the problem of fulfilling wishes 
under conditions of threat. He may attempt to solve this problem, in fantasy, governed by primary 
processes, so that some degree of wish-fulfillment is possible while the threat is to some extent mitigated 
… How can one separate the anxiety-reducing and wish-fulfilling aspects of a mental phenomenon? Any 
mental phenomenon seems to function both to gratify and to make secure, in both an expression of 
impulse and defense, provides discharge for what it also provides protection from” (p. 184-5). 
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 Thinking that one can actually possess this object makes one fall into pathological illusion. As is the 
case for the obsessional, who imagines the limitations and lack that characterize exisence itself to be a 
'raisable' thing. He thinks that the law simply prohibits an enjoyment (the object of fantasy) that is present 
behind its functioning: ‘if only I was not in this situation, then I could be completely happy’. Such ideas 
of possible full enjoyment are illusions ('fantasies of paradise').  
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(towards the real). Therefore they function as fantasmatic frameworks of reality that 
provide enjoyment. As split and therefore virtual subjects we are always in a position of 
framing the real: we design its scenes (and call it reality). As Freud analyzed fetishism, 
it is only when this conditioning relation to the object gets 'fully erotisized' and becomes 
itself an object of enjoyment, that it is perverse in the pathological sense (from watching 
television news to buying 'catastrophe video's', a.s.o.). Then one enjoys the frame itself 
(the computer, the TV, the mobile phone …) instead of the framed other. Then the 
frame works as a screen that fully disavows the difference or distance between 
framework and object: the window upon the world becomes a screen of self-enjoyment. 
However, also at the level of enjoyment the issue is not to oppose neutral vision and 
perverse disavowal. The framework itself is a sort of disavowal. 
1.4. The vital disavowal 
Now that I have pointed out the perverse nature of fantasies, it must follow that some 
sort of disavowal characterizes psychic reality. For disavowal is the fundamental 
operation in perversion. The different terms that I used so far to cover the field of 
enjoyment – fetishism, castration, splitting, and perversity – converge here. Freud 
elaborates the notion of disavowal in relation to the castration complex. He uses the 
term disavowal (Verleugnung) for a specific mechanism of defense used to cover up the 
recognition of a traumatic perception. This perception is (genetically) first of all the 
finding that the mother – or a woman in general – does not have a penis. The little boy, 
thus Freud in 'The infantile genital organization (1923)', disavows this perception that is 
so conflicting and incompatible with his understanding of the world, and believes that 
they do have a penis all the same (S.E. 19, 143). Freud develops this mechanism as the 
fundamental operation of fetishism, in which a person can only sustain his desire by 
clinging onto a representation (an object) that covers up the awareness of the world as 
not being at odds with his wishes. Thus we reach the infamous notion of the splitting of 
the ego. The fetishist holds two contradictory beliefs about the world, which 
necessitates a splitting of his ego. Alongside the real of his (traumatic) perception, there 
(simultaneously) is the belief that this (real) is not true (reality). 
 Lacan's elaboration of disavowal is crucial. He gives it a broader scope than 
Freud, from his trauma theory that I discussed earlier (chapter five: § 1.5). Lacan 
extends disavowal beyond the theory of sexual difference that Freud introduces it with. 
Disavowal is not merely a defense against ‘facts of reality’ (the fact that women do not 
have a penis). It is a defense against the ‘fact’ that our desire itself is always founded 
upon an absence! For it is (almost) unbearable to recognize that there is no real world 
corresponding to all our convictions and ideals, to everything that motivates us in life, 
d.i. to the whole world of our desires. Because the world of our desires is based on 
emptiness, disavowal is inevitable. Fantasy protects us from a devastating awareness. 
Therefore (the real of) anxiety is the result when its screen vacillates.152
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 According to Lacan anxiety is the only affect that does not deceive us, d.i. it is the only real affect. 
The radical awareness of our own mortality is the paradigmatic model of this anxiety (the Heideggerian 
anxiety). This is something completely different from the common awareness of mortality (‘of course I 
know I am going to die … we all will die’). Therefore the Epicurean model of the relationship towards 
our own mortality is superficial: the attitude that we should not bother about our death because we will 
not experience it anyway – for when death is there, I am not – is exactly a way to screen oneself from the 
traumatic impact of its awareness. 
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The necessity of such a minimal disavowal of the real makes a reasonable case 
for considering disavowal a characteristic of our experience of reality; a thesis 
reinforced by the paradigmatic example of disavowing our own mortality. 
Unconsciously, Lacan says, we all believe in our own immortality. And is this not 
perfectly illustrated by the fact that expressions (in Europe) on packets of cigarettes that 
smoking leads to a painful and slow death etc. hardly have any effect on the 
consumption of cigarettes (raising their cost does). Although consciously aware of 
smoking causing death, people keep on doing it.  
 Using the term 'projective illusions' links the discussion on immersion in 
illusions as not simply being a conscious activity to Richard Allen's book mentioned 
above. Allen merely envisages the conscious subject that actually knows his fantasies to 
be not real: “watching films clearly lies within the range of rational behavior” (Allen, 
1995, 138). Against this model of daydreaming, the 'subject of the unconscious' is 
always already dwelling in media of representation. The unconscious subject makes a 
sharp distinction between reality and the 'fictions of projective illusions' impossible. 
Films, for example, are not merely fictional duplications of 'real reality'. They also 
define our perspective upon the world and our experience of reality – or our 'task' in the 
world.153 From the 'perspective of virtualization' films are media also defining our 
reality, and therefore not necessarily invested with a pathological disavowal of 'real 
reality'. In general, (new) media also form, create, educate and train us. We are, as 
Giddens names it, in the situation of real virtuality, wherein 'projective illusions' also 
define reality. The techno-fetishistic (re)finding of enjoyment in all the technological 
objects, possibilities and perspectives, is not pathological – in Freudian terms – except 
when it creates a stifling atmosphere and thus dominates reality to such an extent that it 
no longer functions as a necessary condition for socializing, communicating, exploring 
and 'living' in general (as in Baudrillard's model, which therefore can be named the 
'addiction model'). Computer mediated communication, chat boxes, mobile telephony 
have up to now not replaced face-to-face communication. They also function as a 
condition for (more worldwide) face-to-face communication. As media wherein we 
(unconsciously) believe, they condition and support the opening up of new worlds 
 In disavowal I reflectively know that the world on the screen is not 'real', but 
nevertheless I am non-reflectively involved in it as if it was so. I disavow the non-
existence or absence of the (desirable) world that the screen evokes. Within the context 
of trauma theory, this disavowal of negativity (of castration, of the 'castrated mother') 
also offers a way to deal with – and alleviate – the traumatic impact of what is behind 
the screen. Watching television news shows that without some sort of defensive 
disavowal it is almost impossible to endure the images of dead people ('radical 
awareness' of the depicted events pulls one through the tranquilizing effect of the 
framework – of the pleasure principle). Hollywood's many films on the Holocaust not 
merely stage in an imaginary way the real and thus falsely disavow the horrible events. 
In American culture they also functioned (psychologically) – as I heard one critic say – 
as ways to come to terms with the horror of the Holocaust. The condition for opening up 
(new) worlds of representation is at the same time the condition for dealing with the 
intensities of traumatic impacts. As a 'normalization' or 'stabilization' of intensities, 
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 The most influential film for American presidents - concluded from an analysis of the films that they 
saw in the White House projection room - is the western High Noon (Fred Zinnemann, 1952), which is 
about a 'man alone' carrying all responsibility. 
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techno-fantasmatic objects have both aspects. Žižek analyzes this by making a transition 
from interactivity to interpassivity.  
1.5. Interpassivity and the technological belief 
Our original substitution by the signifier (speaking) transforms us into a (virtual) subject 
of the signifier. A human being is an interactive subject: the signifier replaces him. 
What I think is therefore not located in some sort of ‘true reality’ of my inner self, but in 
my expression by means of signifiers (this I thus exists merely as a point of self-
reference that the signifiers refer to; it is not a substance – see § 3.4. of the next 
chapter). In a certain way, the signifiers ‘think’ for me, they act for me and they 
‘believe’ for me (I believe by performing or executing the rituals of belief etc). This is 
an original transposition of ‘belief’ to the Other. As subjects of language we necessarily 
believe that systems of representation construct reality. There is no ‘true reality’ without 
representations. Such a ‘reality’ would be what Lacan calls the real, and his decisive 
point – which I elaborated in chapter three as virtualization – is that we are always at a 
distance towards the real. Otherwise we are in a disorderly ('lawless') reality of brute 
violence; or a reality of mechanic sex without love and eroticism, etc. We are 
necessarily ‘absorbed’ in apparatuses of representation.154
 However, when Lacan's theory develops more and more the notion of jouissance
(at the expense of the notion of the Other), this interactivity must be supplemented with 
a notion that expresses the defense of the subject against the (traumatic) real of 
enjoyment. This is what Slavoj Žižek does, and this is also what makes critiques of the 
Lacanian theory of representational systems, as putting – from its structuralist principles 
– too much emphasis on the absence of an 'objective reality', a bit more complex. Again 
the distinction of reality and the real is crucial. Žižek introduces the notion of 
interpassivity for a substitution that is in a certain way more original than the 
substitution by the signifier. Interpassivity means that an other undergoes the passive 
enjoyment for you. Mourners mourn for you, and in less dramatic situations the video 
recorder enjoys the film for you, or the sitcoms' canned laughter laughs in your place. 
The object/other undergoes the passive enjoyment so that you can remain an active 
subject. Although Žižek draws a sharper distinction between interactivity and 
interpassivity than would follow from Lacanian theory – for the substitution by the 
signifier also means that we distance ourselves from an immobilizing closeness or 
reticence: by speaking I liberate myself to a certain extent from traumatic feelings – his 
notion of interpassivity has the value of stressing the defensive function of fantasy. It 
puts fantasy as the necessary mediation of the passive core of our being. "Interpassivity 
is therefore to be conceived as the primordial form of the subject's defense against 
jouissance … The disavowed fundamental passivity of my being is structured in the 
fundamental fantasy which, although it is a priori inaccessible to me, regulates the way I 
relate to jouissance" (Žižek, 1997, 115-6). 
Interfaces of techno-culture incorporate this functioning of the fantasy-screen. 
Media 'think', 'comment' and 'watch' for us. The world that media produce is more and 
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 Lacan-inspired film theoretics such as Christian Metz, Octave Mannoni and Jean-Louis Baudry 
analyze cinema as such an ‘apparatus’ that absorbs the spectator in representations of his unconscious. In 
advance of the next part of this chapter, it can already be noticed that in semiotic and structuralist 
approaches of film (as a specific system of signs), that was dominant in the Cahiers du Cinéma, film as a 
spectacle that adresses the eye and the ear was largely absent. 
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more the world of the media themselves. News facts are checked by referring to other 
media ('what did the New York Times say about this?'). The work of commenting on 
television-content is increasingly taken off the viewers' hands and executed by 
television shows themselves (Beavis and Butthead's comments on video-clips). 
Celebrities who perform in talk shows, panels and games are only celebrities because 
they appear in those shows (cf. Simons, 2002, 268). Media generate a self-referential 
world that functions as a screen against ignorance, lack of information, lack of 
knowledge or lack of skills. The media-interfaces belief for us. With them we create a 
desirable world of (self) representation. As very commonsensical – 
 or unimaginative – subjects we may regard these representations as not 'true', but at the 
same time we ('unconsciously') live in their unlocked worlds. We may live in them as 
'celebrities': then media function as a screen against being unknown. 
In her essay 'Celebrity's Drive' Jodi Dean argues that techno-culture celebrates 
celebrity-subjectivity. Digital technologies mould self-experience in terms of 
accessibility, visibility and being known. Everything about us can and must be known to 
others, and we also want ourselves to be known to others. This way techno-culture 
produces subjects as objects of knowledge. Because of the (imperative) possibility of 
exposure to public knowledge, we act ('unconsciously') as if we are a celebrity. This is 
not "simply imagining oneself as a movie star or going through life as if on a stage … 
the sense of being known should not be reduced to some kind of naïve fantasy whereby 
one imagines oneself as a celebrity. Rather, most people in techno-culture know full 
well that they aren't real celebrities. In fact, this anxiety about not being known, this 
tension between the conviction that one is known and not known, is a key component of 
celebrity as a mode of subjectivation. And it is materialized in new communication 
technologies, in the screens and sites of networked techno-culture. So even if one knows 
that she isn't a celebrity, she acts as if she believes that she were. The technologies 
believe for her" (Dean, 2002). Giving us the opportunity of being known, technologies 
make us believe that we are 'not a nobody' (being unknown). Thus they screen off the 
anxiety of having a weak sense of self. In general, the screens of techno-culture screen 
us off from uncertainty and anxiety by producing an attractive, convincing, (ideally) 
'fully realized' world of representation. They create 'worlds of make-believe' in which 
we actually live (virtual money, virtual reality, virtual life etc). They believe for us, or, 
we must believe in them, since we cannot get out of them (what do I know of the world 
without my television and computer?). 
The affiliation of interactive and interpassive mediation and technological 
mediatization must learn us not to consider  technologies too hastily as leading to false 
forms of subjectivation, 'alienating' us from who we 'really are '. And we should be 
equally careful, as I will argue, with claims on techno-cultural liberation leading to 'free 
subjectivity', finally allowing us to be 'who we really are'. The apparatus of language 
gives both belief and alienation, and technological devices may do this in new ways. So 
instead of 'patriarchal' subjectivation, new techno-cultural formations (as a hacker, a 
techno-pagan, a celebrity …) may take place.  
1.6. Theoretical foundations of the transition from narrative to audio-visual culture 
One may distinguish a shift in Lacanian thought from reflecting narrative culture to a 
culture more focused on the sounds and images of new media. In the concluding part of 
his seminar The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis (1964) Lacan addresses 
the massive influence of mass media: 
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"Perhaps the features that appear in our time so strikingly in the form of what are 
more or less correctly called the mass media, perhaps our very relation to the 
science that ever increasingly invades our field, perhaps all this is illuminated by 
the reference to those two objects, whose place I have indicated for you in a 
fundamental tetrad, namely, the voice – partly planetarized, even 
stratospherized, by our machinery – and the gaze, whose ever-encroaching 
character is no less suggestive, for, by so many spectacles, so many [f]antasies, 
it is not so much our vision that is solicited, as our gaze that is aroused" (S.11, 
274).
This chapter's second section will address this issue in relation to digital media. But I 
will first sketch the theoretical development in Lacan's thought that may allow one to 
speak of a shift from narrative to audio-visual culture. I will do this via two paths: the 
limits of narrative theory, and the meaning of partial objects in psychoanalysis. 
1.6.1. The sinthome: the glory of the mark 
The impossibility of (truly) concluding an analysis implies the impossibility of bringing 
unconscious desire fully at the level of speech (meaning). There is a (libidinal) rest of 
non-sense, which does not belong to the narrative order. The end of analysis therefore 
concerns the indication of the convergence of fantasy and reality into ‘non-sensical’ 
representatives. “Consequently, it is false to say, as has been said, that interpretation is 
open to all meanings under the pretext that it is a question only of the connection of a 
signifier to a signifier, and consequently of an uncontrollable connection. Interpretation 
is not open to any meaning. This would be to concede to those who rise up against the 
character of uncertainty in analytic interpretation that, in effect, all interpretations are 
possible, which is patently absurd. The fact that I have said that the effect of 
interpretation is to isolate in the subject a kernel, a kern, to use Freud’s own term, of 
non-sense, does not mean that interpretation is in itself nonsense. Interpretation … has 
the effect of bringing out an irreducible signifier” (S.11, 250). “What is essential is that 
he [the subject] should see, beyond this signification, to what signifier – to what 
irreducible, traumatic, non-meaning – he is, as a subject, subjected” (S.11, 251).  
For both Freud and Lacan the process of ‘separation’ and ‘individuation’ 
(Mahler) leaves its traces in the subject.155 Freud speaks of an unconscious fixation to 
repressed desires. Lacanian theory focuses more on the representatives of those so-
called ‘unconscious desires’: “What is being repressed is not the forbidden oedipal 
yearning but rather the signifiers that mark the psychic separation from the maternal 
realm” (Gurevich, 1999). We should recall here Freud's crucial discovery of the 
connection between fantasies and the experiences of childhood, a connection that 
resides in what Freud calls 'word-connections' or 'word-bridges'. It explains the 
importance of linguistic elements in Lacanian psychoanalysis. Nasio therefore stresses 
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 See: M. Mahler, On Human Symbiosis and the Vicissitudes of Individuation (New York: International 
University Press, 1968). From a Lacanian perspective it is not necessarily the father who introduces the 
law, or the mother who is the object of desire. ‘Paternal law’ and ‘maternal realm’ are merely (worn-out?) 
metaphors emanating from the first stage of psychic development. They must describe the process of the 
constitution of the self, in which it is all about the psychical separation (subjection to the ‘paternal law’) 
from an imaginary plenitude (‘maternal realm’). The 'paternal law' is hence "a law which in other cultures 
might be incarnated in other persons and in other forms" (Laplanche/Pontalis, 1986, 31). 
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the importance of the central, repetitive verb in fantasmatic scenes. "The verb in the 
sentence of the fantasy represents, then, the cut between the subject and the object, it is 
the signifier that both separates and reunites the subject and the object" (Nasio, 1998, 
101). Such decisive signifiers determine how we try to reencounter our lost enjoyment. 
In the discussion mentioned above of the ‘Vorstellungsrepräsentanzen’ this makes that:
“the representative of representation in the absolute condition is at home in the 
unconscious, where it causes desire according to the structure of the [f]antasy” 
(Ec., 312). 
The element inseparably intertwining fantasy and the real, to constitute the psychic 
reality of the subject, is what Lacan later calls the sinthome. It opens up a whole new 
perspective for psychoanalytical research!156
Lacan’s theoretical development of a ‘subject of enjoyment’ goes along with 
acknowledging a symptom as not always being the expression of an underlying desire 
(and therefore a sign of neurosis). 'Symptoms' constitute as well: without particular 
‘tics’, no particular desire. “Lacan coins the sinthome to designate the idiosyncratic 
jouissance of a particular subject.157 The identification with the symptom is in this 
respect not a Symbolic or Imaginary one, but a Real identification, functioning as a 
suppletion (suppléance) for the lack of the Other” (Verhaeghe/Declercq, 2002, 69). 
With the sinthome Lacan covers Freud’s notion of drive-fixations. “Fixations, which 
Freud considered to be primal symptoms, are of a general nature, in Lacan’s view. The 
symptom is what defines mankind, and as such cannot be rectified or cured. This is 
Lacan’s final conclusion: there is no subject without a symptom” (Verhaeghe/Declercq, 
2002, 66). 'Pure desire' does not exist. As a 'body of enjoyment' we are always already 
'contaminated' by satisfactions of the drives which are at the level of 'real 
identifications'. 
Where Freud gets deadlocked and turns to phylogenetic origins of schemes 
moulding the drive (see next chapter), Lacan develops a theory on the real cause of 
fantasy that pivots on the notion jouissance. With the notion of the sinthome this 
becomes ‘jouis-sense’: it goes beyond the dualism of signification and satisfaction. The 
issue subsequently is to discover how all sorts of significant elements organize 
satisfaction (how speaking about myself creates me as a satisfying 'object' for my drive 
… to dominate, to see …). Or: how in a satisfaction of the drives a symbolic position 
takes shape (with the successful artist as ideal). 
In his seminar of 1969-1970 Lacan gives a (brute) example of this duplicity of 
signification and enjoyment. What he calls the ‘erotic practice’ of flagellation has an 
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 This element distinguishes Lacanian thought from Baudrillard's simulation model, wherein there is no 
limit to interpreation because there is no real: all facts or events are an effect of modelling. "Simulation is 
characterized by a precession of the model, of all models around the merest fact – the model comes first, 
and their orbital (like the bomb) circulation constitutes the genuine magnetic field of events … This 
anticipation, this precession, this short-circuit, this confusion of the fact with its model (no more 
divergence of meaning, no more dialectical polarity, no more negative electricity or implosion of poles) is 
what each time allows for all the possible interpretations, even the most contradictory – all are true, in the 
sense that their truth is exchangeable, in the image of the models from which they proceed, in a 
generalized cycle" (Baudrillard, 1988, 175). 
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 “Sinthome is an equivocal neologism, combining at least three different signifiers: symptôme
(symptom), saint homme (holy man), Saint Thomas (the one who didn’t believe the Other – Christ – but 
went for the Real Thing)” (p. 80). 
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equivalence to the gesture that marks, and the body as object of enjoyment. This 
marking of the skin is nothing other than a subject identifying itself as an object of 
jouissance. At the root of fantasy, Lacan says, is the glory of the mark (S.17, 55).158
Fantasy furnishes the virtual subject with a ‘hard kernel’ of identity, by ‘marking’ it, 
fixating it. The freedom of the virtual subject thus ends in a paradoxical situation. At the 
height of my freedom I must acknowledge: “I cannot do otherwise” (cf. Kuiper, 1984, 
156).
1.6.2. The partial objects and the cut 
The second way to elucidate the transition from a 'phallic' theory towards an 'object' 
theory is by reading Lacan's discussion of the object a in his sixth seminar held in 1958-
1959. In this seminar called Desire and its interpretation, in which Lacan sets himself 
the goal of defining fantasy (S.6, 18), he gives three examples of the object a. Lacan 
introduces its first order, that of the pre-genital objects, by defining man at the level of 
material exchange as an animal with two holes: one by which it comes in, and one by 
which it goes out. Exactly this characteristic makes the pre-genital object play its 
signifying function in fantasy (S.6, 423). So, on the level of pre-genital objects, fantasy 
is an ‘imaginarization’ of objects that can be cut of from the erogenous zones of the 
mouth and anus. Decisive for the object a is its element of cutting off (‘coupure’). This 
cut separating subject and object can be refound in the central (signifying) element of 
fantasies, whose nature it is to seek a reunification of subject and object.  
The infant experiences the breast and the excrements as cut of from its body. I 
emphasize once more that the object of the oral drive is not the breast as a ‘material’ 
object, but as a ‘psychical' object. For the drives the enjoyment that went along with the 
process of feeding is crucial. Orally oriented fantasies try to refind some of the subject's 
lost enjoyment by ‘imagining’ an object that can ‘feed’ it. The object thus functions as 
an ‘inexhaustible source’, just as a beloved person must give everything (s)he has got to 
the loving subject. Freud already acknowledges that partial objects determine 
intersubjective relationships (‘object-relations’). He considers the oral phase a 
‘cannibalistic’ phase that seeks to fully include or absorb the other – as fantasy object 
('because I’m so fond of you I want to eat you’). This orality exemplifies all subsequent 
forms of identification. Both Freud and Lacan consider (imaginary) identification, the 
undoing of boundaries and differences between the subject and the other, or between a 
subject and its environment, as characteristic of orality. Feelings of ecstasy would thus 
have their roots in an imagined reunion with the mother. In a more tedious form, orality 
expresses itself in the subject's continuous demands to the other who, whatever he does, 
always fails in his ‘duties’ – at least: as such it is felt by the subject of (pathological) 
fantasy. Also the second partial object that both Freud and Lacan acknowledge, the anal 
object, is already for Freud more than an object of auto-erotic pleasure. In the phase of 
toilet training the child's retaining and letting go of its excrements also communicates a 
message to its caretakers: I comply with your demand or I resist it. The excrements 
become in this way a first ‘gift’ to the other. The association with all sorts of objects 
that can pass for ‘gifts’ (I give you – or not – something that is precious to me … my 
time, money, attention …) express the subjects fantasmatic relationship to others. 
158
 One is tempted to translate the word ‘marque’ as ‘brand (name)' instead as ‘mark’. This might 
illuminate the commercial process of ‘branding’ as operating at the level of enjoyment and status, by 
pushing the product as an object of fantasy. 
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 At the end of the first chapter I mentioned the consideration of the computer as a 
pre-genital or pre-Oedipal object that melts away the boundaries between user and 
system and thus leads to an extatic experience of loosing self-boundaries. Another 
conceptualization considers the computer as a phallic object that enhances autonomy 
and control. Like the car, the computer would function as a phallus (symbol) with which 
man (a man) positions himself (symbolically) as a (strong, powerfull) individual. 
 The second register of the object a that Lacan distinguishes in his sixth seminar 
concerns the castration complex and the phallus. In most cases Lacan does not use the 
term phallus as an indication of the penis, but as an exceptional signifier. In his text 
‘The signification of the phallus’ he explains, “it is the signifier intended to designate as 
a whole the effects of the signified” (Ec, 285). The (symbolic) subjection to ‘the Name 
of the Father’, the paternal law, changes the reality of the subject. Things get really 
interesting when we see that the phallus is not necessarily the exceptional signifier that 
belongs to patriarchal culture (the critiques of feminist theory). Different, contingent 
signs can also incorporate this functioning of the phallus. Then we are dealing with 
signs that 'erect' someone as a specific person with a certain identity. Thus, a brand such 
as Nike can (help to) establish someone's socio-symbolic identity. Lacan’s exposition 
on the phallus as an object a in seminar six is exemplary for this process of 
supplementing the ‘classical’ version of Lacanian thought, and transforming it into a 
more valuable and contemporary version. Then the issue is how people actually ‘cut’ 
the law into their bodies (is this always pathological, or can we ‘enjoy our symptom’?). 
How do humans ‘postulate’, (re)find, a real element at/as the core of the reality of 
desire?  
What determines the character of the object a is the cut. There must be a 
signifying cut that marks the body. Now, history and ethnography sufficiently show that 
mutilation – separating a part of oneself – is essential to initiation rituals in which man 
defines his access to a superior dimension. Such mutilations function as an index, they 
orient desire and change the nature of the person who subjects himself to them (S.6, 
426). Therefore such markings function as the object a: they are the real elements of 
fantasy – cut into the body (or in case of a brand name: put on the body). Tattooing 
further illustrates this. A tattoo is pivotal to the way someone directs his life, to the way 
he situates himself to others etc. It functions as a signifying mark that orients his desire. 
It is a real element that carries the symbolic identity of the subject! (cf. S.6, 405). Lacan 
refers to the phallus (here as penis) as a part of the body that manifests the cut in a 
privileged way. Circumcision testifies to this: a part of the (skin of the) penis is cut off 
in order to mark the person's transition to the realm of God. Similarly, the central role of 
the penis in the child's phallic phase, in which it imagines the penis as something that 
can be cut of . The tumescence of the penis also contributes to its privileged position as 
a marker (S.6, 426).  
 The third form of the object a that Lacan distinguishes entails the transition from 
the symbolic Other to the real as the guarantee and support of my desire (so: next to 
being a philosopher because the socio-symbolic system attributes me such a position, I 
am a philosopher due to a real affectivity - the ‘wound of astonishment’). This does not 
make the meaning of the symbolic superfluous. Of course not. I still have to turn 
outside, to the Other, for a validation of my philosophical work. It does, however, 
indicate that the symbolic order cannot give account of anything. There is a remainder. 
And this is where we encounter the enigma of the drive. Or more specifically where we 
encounter the drive and its circular loop of maintaining satisfaction as what determines 
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one's symbolic position (I am not merely a philosopher because this is what I 'truly 
desire', but also because this work repeatedly puts me in a state of (surplus) 'enjoyment': 
thinking and writing as a dwelling in the 'realm of ideas' - as a way to design the 'lost 
enjoyment' of 'radical astonishment'). Lacan tries to elucidate this enigmatic functioning 
of the drive. In that he also focuses on the regaining of enjoyment by means of auditive 
and visual impressions.
One of the drives' objects, the third form of the object a in seminar six, is the 
voice. This is the subject's real weight in discourse, in the formation of the superego: it 
represents the instance of the Other that manifests itself as real (S.6, 428). This notion 
of the voice as an object of the drive goes back to the analysis of psychosis. In a 
delusion someone can perceive an imagined voice (from himself, from another: whose 
voice is it?) as real. The delusional personality experiences the voice as unmediated: the 
fantasy is real. That’s why, Lacan says, for a delusional there is nothing more consistent 
and existent than the voice itself. The telephone testifies that the voice is also an ‘object’ 
cut of from the body. However, the voice in delusion differs completely from the voice 
we may hear on a telephone. Lacan uses only one example, from what he calls ‘a 
kaleidoscope of experiences’, to indicate the voice in its mode of vanity, inexistence and 
bureaucratic emptiness. Ringing up a company to ask for some service may confront us 
with a voice that is completely indifferent to what is personal in our demand. Then it 
does not intervene at the level of the object a (S.6, 428-429). The voice as an object 
shows the two extreme possibilities of the fantasy screen that mediates our relation to 
the object a. It may fully screen us of from the personal weight of messages in 
communication (the bureaucratic mediation of our desire). Or the screen may tumble 
and let the object intervene directly – too directly – in our self-experience, as a 
threatening constraint that eliminates our freedom (act upon an inner voice).  
 In his ‘Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality’ Freud already introduces the 
pleasure to see and to be seen (in sexual activity). Nevertheless, one generally 
acknowledges the gaze as an object of the scopic drive as the second partial object – 
besides the voice – that Lacan adds to the Freudian theory of the drives. Freud considers 
seeing a drive that inevitably exists in an active and a passive form. Beside that, it is 
right from the outset directed at another person, and not auto-erotic. We find pleasure in 
looking at the other and in being seen by him or her. The drive to see and to be seen 
involves the other. Lacan elaborates this as the split subject at the level of the scopic 
drive. We are always already being looked at by others: other people look at us, judge 
us etc . Although we may think that we are autonomous, we are actually already under 
the condition, definition or regulation of the Other, hence split. Our fantasy can 
transform ('substantialize') this perspective from which everything and everybody is 
seen into an all-seeing being. “The spectacle of the world, in this sense, appears to us as 
all-seeing. This is the [f]antasy to be found in the Platonic perpective of an absolute 
being to whom is transferred the quality of being all-seeing” (S.11, 75).  
 There is a split between the eye – the perspective from which I see the world – 
and the gaze – the perspective from which the Other looks at me. “The eye and the gaze 
– this is for us the split in which the drive is manifested at the level of the scopic field. 
In our relation to things, in so far as this relation is constituted by way of vision, and 
ordered in the figures of representation, something slips, passes, is transmitted, from 
stage to stage, and is always to some degree eleuded in it – that is what we call the 
gaze” (S.11, 73). As this perspective of the Other is unattainable for me (I cannot look 
at myself through the eyes of the Other), the gaze is that what always eludes me. I can 
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only ‘imagine’ how I look through the eyes of the Other, that is to say fantasize about it. 
The Internet does a similar thing. The subject can make an object of himself 
(photograph, video) and send it around the network, so that he may see himself 
displayed as he is seen by others. In a delusional form in which someone massively
identifies himself with his fantasy, he can really think that he is as he pictures himself. 
This results, for instance, in the massive certainty of the psychotic who knows for sure 
who he is, or what he must do (“I am the saviour”, “I must kill you”). Then the split in 
the subject is fully stiched, sutured. Then the difference between what I think I am and 
the negativity of desire is absent ('lack of a lack').159
2. Subjectivized fantasy: identifying oneself as an object
“The principal organizing mechanism of the fantasmatic structure is the 
identification of the subject as it has become an object … From the 
psychoanalytic perspective, we are, in the fantasy, that which we lose” (Nasio, 
1998, 103). 
2.1. Subjectivation: the subject as an object 
Fantasy and subjectivation go together. For fantasy is the (non-pathological) condition 
for giving a concrete (empirical, 'material', actual, particular) content to the 
transcendental structure of desire. As such a condition it is not a symptom, but a 
sinthome – remember Freud's remark that fetishism is not pathological when it is a 
condition for finding enjoyment. Lacan's object a shows that patriarchal or phallic 
subjectivation does not have a natural privilege for finding our 'true desire'. The object a
also gives way to other forms of subjectivation. It is not (necessarily) the phallus which 
must be recognized as the privileged signifier. The point is rather that there always is 
this issue of subjectivation. Because of the conditional function of fantasy, the subject 
cannot avoid being an object. He cannot 'liberate' himself from being an object; quite a 
created (designed, styled, modeled) object, since the fantasy-object a does not have a 
fixed or stable double: 
“These objects have one common feature in my elaboration of them – they have 
no specular image, or, in other words, alterity. It is what enables them to be the 
‘stuff’, or rather the lining, though not in any sense the reverse, of the very 
subject that one takes to be the subject of consciousness. For this subject, who 
thinks he can accede to himself by designating himself in the statement, is no 
more than such an object. Ask the writer about the anxiety that he experiences 
when faced by the blank sheet of paper, and he will tell you who is the turd of 
159
 In a fully realized fantasy one looks at oneself through the eyes of the Other. It takes one “through the 
looking glass” to the ‘true’ image of oneself: the way one appears from the outside, objectively, as one 
'really is', as seen through the eyes of the all-seeing other. Pimental and Teixeira express this clearly in the 
title of their book, Virtual Reality. Through the new looking glass. This is the fantasmatic stake of Virtual 
Reality technologies: extending the (cognitive, visual) powers of ourselves beyond the ‘human’ 
possibilities, and in the end – the ultimate technological fantasy – merging with the ‘technological 
perspective’ (‘the computer’) itself: "Jobe Cyberchrist!" (The Lawnmower Man, Brett Leonard, 1992) – 
the realized fantasy of the ‘posthuman organism’, the (realized) cyborg.  
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his [f]antasy. It is to this object that cannot be grasped in the mirror that the 
specular image lends its clothes” (Ec., 315-6). 
The fantasy-object a is not the mirror image. It is the missing 'thing' in the mirror 
image; that which we cannot grasp. From this idea every creature can draw a lesson: “It 
is therefore clear why vampires are invisible in the mirror: because they have read 
Lacan and, consequently, know how to behave – they materialize objet a, which, by 
definition, cannot be mirrored” (Žižek, 1992, 126). 
 What is special to me may be irrelevant to you: the object a does not have a fixed 
referent. Furthermore it is crucial that very different media can provide the objects that 
arouse my desire. The phenomenal existence of the fantasy-object handles a broad range 
of ‘imaginary substitutes': 
“For this surplus of unnamable and enigmatic jouissance, referred to as a, can 
borrow any corporal, visual, auditory, olfactory, or tactile form; these forms are 
involved in the encounter of desire (unsatisfied, incestuously unsatisfied) 
between the child and the mother, and more generally between the subject and 
the Other” (Nasio, 1998, 95). 
Jacques-Alain Miller also stresses this point. All sorts of objects can cause desire. For 
that is what the object a as surplus enjoyment is: the unconscious cause of desire. 
Therefore one must extend the list of the object a broadly beyond the ‘natural’ objects 
of the drives. It encompasses all objects of industry, of culture and of sublimation; all 
objects that abound in society, that cause our desire and that ‘dab’ our lack-of-
enjoyment. They are ‘pieces of enjoyment (‘lichettes de la jouissance’) that give their 
own style to our way of living and our mode of enjoying (Miller, 1999, 23-24). 
 How should we now analyze fantasy? “A fantasy includes: a scene, some 
characters – in general they are few in number – an action, a dominant affect, and the 
presence in the scene of a definite part of the body” (Nasio, 1998, 100). First of all, we 
must discern how the subject is present in a fantasy-scenario: via what imaginary, 
symbolic and 'real' identifications does he create his identity? Or: via what ‘traits’ does 
the subject identify with a fantasmatic character? What action or verb is decisive in the 
scene? And as fantasy creates a multitude of ‘subject-positions’, the question is what the 
subject's position is in the scene. Is he a spectator or the protagonist? (cf. Bernet, 1996, 
177-180). What affect, emotion or tension does the action provoke? It should be 
stressed that the affect is not the same as the enjoyment that motivates the scene, which 
is mostly not (consciously) felt. I may feel very frightened or tense when I enter a sex 
chat room on the Internet, still doing it because I seek a kind of (unconscious) 
enjoyment, while I may be ashamed when my girlfriend confronts me with those 
actions. “[W]e should not confuse the three different levels on which the subject is 
affected: one is the surplus-of jouissance that unconsciously causes the fantasy; another 
is the affect or emotion that is experienced by the characters and dominates the 
phantasmatic scene; and yet another is the pleasure or pain that the very appearance of 
the fantasy provokes … In order to locate the unconscious jouissance which is at play in 
the action – which is different from the affect felt by the protagonist – we must consider 
which particular part of the body is involved in the action” (Nasio, 1998, 101-102). 
From the drive-perspective one must ask what erogenous zone of the body finds – via 
all kinds of substitutions of its ‘objects’- a form of enjoyment in the scene. Does the 
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scene satisfy a desire to see, to dominate, to control, to ‘melt away’…? Crucial is the 
element of partiality. A fantasy-object provides significance and satisfaction to the 
fantasizing subject more by specific elements (certain words it says, certain aspects of 
the body, typical ‘traits’, certain features in its behavior …) than as a complete image. 
We may immediately add this with a crucial insight that Reeves and Nash describe in 
their Media Equation. People only need the smallest clues to treat computers as an 
other. We attribute personality to all sorts of interfaces, from toaster ovens and 
televisions to word processors and workstations, not because they provide virtually real 
representations. We only need a little hint, the expression of a few words, to extrapolate 
such significant communication into a personality existing in the devices. "Virtually all
interfaces have a personality. This literally applies to anything that presents words to a 
user" (Reeves/Nash, 2002, 97). This aspect of (the extrapolation of) 'partiality' allows us 
to be more specific about what someone seeks – and finds – in a fantasy-object. The 
virtual hero of a computer game, for instance, is then not merely ‘the imaginary other’, 
the perfect image of myself. He is so fascinating because he represents certain elements 
that I wish to identify with, and he thus presents a form of enjoyment. The fantasy 
object presents enjoyment in representation. 
 The subject of desire is the (partial) object of his fantasmatic identification. 'Wo 
Es war, soll Ich werden' subsequently states that we should try to find out what kind of 
object we are. For Jodi Dean this implies that if one wants "to register as a subject in 
technoculture, one has to present oneself as an object for everyone else." (Dean, 2002). 
2.2. Lifestyles 
Since the 1960's personal and cultural identity is no longer an unchangeable given as a 
result of birth, social background and status. The most important cultural revolution of 
those days concerns the notion of identity as an 'eligible' construction, to be filled in 
personally by drawing from a whole range of images, examples, roles and all sorts of 
(re)presentations offered by the markets of images, fashion, music, film, commercials 
and news. This means that community is no longer a matter of direct connection with 
the surrounding village or neighbourhood. It becomes a matter of shared preferences 
and identifying marks such as clothing, hair (style), sexual or ethinical identity and all 
sorts of other parafernalia: tattoo's, peircings (Simons, 2002, 39). Brands and logos 
make consumer objects into personalities, whose charisma the consumer can share by 
his purchase, making them part of his personality. Lifestyles thus become a central issue 
in the analysis of personal identity. They "are the articulation and performance (in the 
sense of living-out) of complex and changeable forms of identification which are the 
result of negotiation between a person, with the intense idiosyncrasy of their own 
biographical embeddedness in lived situations, and normative models or 'templates' of 
subjective identity which are mediated less by traditional and local (or even national) 
forms of community but by images and behavioural 'scripts' presented in advertisements 
and television. These images and scripts are the tokens of lifestyles" (Shields, 1997). 
This must remind us of the earlier-mentioned issue of fantasy as the unconscious 'script' 
of our life!
2.2.1. The sinthome and the body 
Idiosynratical, personal 'things' and cultural models go hand in hand to construct 
identity, whereby the cultural examples are more and more distributed, delivered and 
produced by media. We are no longer the result of a (phallic) grand narrative that 
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produces our identity, but we also produce narratives ourselves. We provide a very 
personal content to our life-story by identifying with very personal 'things' (memento's, 
souvenirs, baby albums, and all sort of trivia - and in the context of new media we can 
mention the personal websites, baby albums on the Internet, gadgets …). These 
'idiosyncratical things' are at the level of the sinthome. That is to say that they function 
as the final piece of a personal narrative (from the transcendental signifier to the 
sinthome!). They are the 'hard core' around which one's personal life story is organized. 
For a story to have some sense, there must be an end to it. The sinthome functions as 
such an arbirtrary and non-sensical end. Slavoj Žižek describes the sinthome as 
“particular and contingent “tics” which give body to jouissance, best exemplified by the 
innumerable gadgets with which technology is bombarding us daily” (Žižek, 2001, 20). 
All sorts of technological objects that claim to satisfy our desires organize, with all their 
radiant attractions, certain ‘lifestyles’.  
The phenomenon of tatoos exemplifies that signification is not purely a verbal 
phenomenon, but also a bodily one. Lifestyles, on the other hand, exemplify how 
experiences of enjoyment organize someones symbolic position (a fast car, a fast 
computer … a fast life). New 'mediatic' identity-construction concerns the compression 
of sense and enjoyment in the production of certain 'nodes' that function as the kernel of 
subjectivity. Meaning and sense are not just narrated, they are also enjoyed. A Lacanian 
analysis does not have to endorse – as one might think at first sight – the great distrust 
of the transition from a verbal to a visual culture brought about by mass- and electronic 
media. Such distrust led so many twentieth century critics to endorse cultural 
pessimism. For the sensual and affective sensations of the image (its enjoyment) would 
diminish the mental capabilities that were considered to reside in the word and the book 
(the word as the medium of knowledge, insight and argumentation, and thus as the royal 
road to truth and rationality). 
The body is pivotal in this fight for self-completion, in this process of self-
objectification through identification with the slogans, images, signs, logos, memes etc 
that circulate abundantly in the world of media in which we are immersed. As Rob 
Shields argues in his essay on subjectivation in cyberspace: "Bodies are the site of this 
battle, the last refuge of identity and wholeness" (Shields, 1997). When media virtualize 
us to the extent that narration and representation no longer offer a resort of identity 
(there are so many possibilities and 'choices' for representing ourselves), the body 
becomes the place where identity is fixed. So, from the perspective of fantasy as a 
defensive function, tattooing is the inscription of identity in the body in order to prevent 
a lack of identity (and isn't the self-mutilation of the psychotic who cuts his arm also a 
ritual that occurs when he is at the brink of self-loss?). The same goes for all the 
identifying marks that we do not put in but on the body: paraphernalia, brand names … 
Such non-sensical representations function as a begin and end of discourse: the object a 
(the 'rest-piece') as final piece, tailpiece.160 The non-sensical representation provides 
experiences: the producer of consumer goods (which become brands and lifestyles) has 
become an 'experience maker' (Alvin Toffler).  
160
 Douglas Coupland considers bumper stickers as such closing entries (keeper plates … license plates?) 
of current North-American identity-production. "I don't know," says Andy the barman, "whether I feel 
more that I want to punish some aging crock for frittering away my world, or whether I'm just upset that 
the world has gotten too big – way beyond our capacity to tell stories about it, and so all we're stuck with 
are these blips and chunks and snippets on bumpers." (Generation X: Tales for an Accelerated Culture)
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2.2.2. The passion of the eye and the ear: 'Encore!' 
Scott Bukatman's Terminal Identity (1993) makes this fantasmatic interface between 
body and environment the principle form of a subjectivation that lies at the border of 
more traditional forms of subjectivity such as the (autonomous) individual. 'Terminal 
identity' is at the interface of body and computer terminal, and inscribes itself in the 
surfaces of old selfhood. Although one need not agree with his vision of hyper-
individuality merging with the new socialization of the Internet, his analysis does make 
clear that we must look for new forms of subjectivation in our interfacing with new 
technologies. Those technologies create our environment, which is increasingly a high-
tech surrounding focused on the ear and the eye. Experience nowadays travels largely in 
an audio-visual circuit; those technological images "have become the mirrors in which 
to look for an identity" (Shields, 1997). Supermodernistic architecture is unthinkable 
without the computer: it is highly focused on the sensations of light and space. The 
webcam is the latest technological extension of the human eye. The computer, in 
general, has developed from a machine that processes symbols into an audio-visual 
medium. A general acknowledged form of voyeurism (webcams, surveillance cameras 
… ) and exhibitionism (showing yourself on television, or on the Net via webcams) is 
its effect. The computer as a medium for looking and being looked at, interfaces the 
physical and the virtual, which become more and more intermingled.  
As early as the beginning of twentieth century mass-media culture, visuality – 
like the other senses – was considered an interface for sensuous stimuli to penetrate the 
body and to arouse affective reactions. With the computer as an audio-visual medium, 
audio-visuality is crucial for understanding man in his current world. Jodi Dean's 
analysis of visibility as the central concern of techno-cultural subjectivation endorses 
this. Techno-cultural subjectivation has to do with the scopic drive. We have a 
(physical) bent (of maintaining a state of excitement) for the play of images. For Lacan 
seeing and hearing are also animated by drives. The media of hearing and sight cause 
affective stimulation. Such an affectivity may not be surprising from a psychoanalytic 
point of view. Surprisingly is, at most, the fact that drives also operate in the domains of 
seeing and hearing (as the objects of orality and genitality are more obviously drive-
ridden). So it is not the affectivity attached to the technological audio-visual images per 
se that is from a psychoanalytic point of view the malefactor (as in so many critiques of 
the image). This affectivity only becomes problematic when it holds the subject back 
from his proper desire (his 'own' answer to the 'Che vuoi?'), and leads him into the 
drive's never ending loop of enjoyment. Visibility in techno-culture may illustrate this. 
The display-culture of making almost everything we want to see visible on the 
computer screen goes along with a penchant for showing oneself. Freud already 
discerned that voyeurism and exhibitionism are connected. In voyeurism most 
excitement comes from the fact of not being alone: someone may see you looking. The 
voyeuristic position can shift sides with the exhibitionistic position, in that the voyeur 
(secretly) wants to be looked upon. For Lacan, the perversion of scopophilia therefore 
comprises both voyeurism and exhibitionism. The pervert locates himself in it as an 
object for the scopic drive (cf. Evans, 1996, 139). Techno-culture constitutes us as 
objects of visibility for the other (Dean). We are under the gaze of the Other, an object 
in the eyes of others (via webcams, websites, videophone …). This is not completely 
different from traditional subjectivation – in which the others from our village gaze 
upon us and subjectify us by making us into an object. Techno-cultural (virtual) 
communities of kindred spirits or congenial groups may liberate from the hostility of 
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traditional communities towards certain personal characteristics (sexual identity, hair 
style …). But this does not immediately cause a 'free subjectivity' of technologies 
allowing us to escape subjectivation at all. Actually, they may reinforce the whole 
process of subjectivation (surveillance technologies). Or offer such strong and attractive 
environments that the subject ends up seeing himself as he is seen by the (online) others 
– just like someone who identifies more with his online personae than with his real life 
identity ends up in a situation of increased alienation. Or we may actually imagine 
ourselves to be a known person (celebrity), seeing ourself through the illusion created 
by the media of visibility. Such a chaining in the circuit of the drive ìs a pathological 
enjoyment. "Because one is never sure how one is being known, one is never certain of 
one's place in the symbolic order. How, exactly, are we being looked at … In response, 
then, the subject is driven to make itself visible over and over again" (Dean, 2002).  
The drive resembles an acephalic subject continuously following its libidinal 
forces and chasing the 'next sensation'. As 'techno-cultural' objects can also function as 
'natural' objects of the drives (see § 2.1.), in techno-culture the objects that 'dab our lack 
of enjoyment' are excessively present. Consequently, the balance of enjoyment and 
desire may tip towards the repeated search for enjoyment. Thus being reduced to a 
subject of the drive, to a subject without 'head', or without words, symbols – and here 
we are again at the distinction between the word/logos and the image/affection. 
Normally enjoyment and desire combine in surplus-enjoyment as what causes desire 
and gives the drives their object. But the trap of audio-visiual culture is in the circuit of 
the drive: it offers a whole range of 'images' that constantly give us an opportunity to 
'recreate ourselves'. We may end up in a never ending circuit: one more SMS, one more 
call, one more image … When the subject of techno-culture gets wrapped up in, or loses 
itself, in the circuits of communication, it loses its relation with a stabilising (real) 
reference that rules its desire. For Lacan desire is a formation of an (underlying, real) 
reference point (reality is 'untertragen'). Desire is not 'pure' (pleasure), but needs a rule 
(no desire without law). A rule that in this case of excessive presence of 'fetishistic 
objects' may call for restraint, modesty … 
Capitalism may well be content with this subject of the drive, continuously 
needing to 're-create' himself. The absence of a mediating, stabilizing symbolic sense of 
self (founded in the real), may contribute to increased consumerism. The best thing for 
capitalism to do, anyway, is to seek to abolish this (symbolic) ego-ideal and try to 
replace it with the (imaginary) ideal ego.161 What would serve it better than the 
replacement of the (limitating) 'old' superego by the summons (for excess), by the call 
to enjoy: 'encore'! 
2.3. Symbols, information and commitment 
Symbolic commitment poses a limit to the mere virtuality of the subject. When a 
symbolic regulation (ego-ideal) frames desire, the imaginary belief of everything being 
possible is 'prohibited'. So when I adhere to, cling to or support the ideal of modesty, I 
need not consume as much as would be possible. 'Symbolic rule' also means that we 
must bear the consequences of what we say or do, and consequently not everything is 
possible (the rule implies the impossible). Therefore in a Lacanian sense the virtual is 
not identical to the possible. A crucial aspect of virtualization – and that is also what 
Lévy stresses – is subjectivation. Although language, symbolic expressions in general, 
161
 It is probably for that reason that Žižek is able to see the good of the old family structures: as a way to 
resist capitalist consumerism. 
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and technological media open up an almost infinite virtual field of 'formations of the 
self' (in books, television talk shows, customs, fashion, virtual worlds, lifestyles …) 
integrated into our sense of Self, we still remain responsible for their (real) 
consequences. Subjectivation means that we 'carry' those possible forms (they are 
possibilities for me).
Contrary to what is often thought, psychoanalysis ascribes a huge responsibility 
to the subject. So even when I assume an aggressive avatar in cyberspace and rape 
someone else's avatar (gaining full control over it) I cannot excuse my deeds by saying 
that this aggressive form is an unavoidable result of the violent family or environment 
that I grew up in. Lacanian psychoanalysis shows that the subject of desire is not – and 
must never be – identical to its imaginary formations. There always is a 'gap in the 
analogical mind', an indeterminacy that is also the cause of freedom and responsibility. 
And we are responsible for keeping it open: we must gain consciousness of our 
(unconscious) 'immediate' involvement, 'Wo Es war, soll Ich werden'.  
In psychoanalytic treatment this element of subjectivation is taken up as a 
restructuring of the past: subtle changes in punctuation transform the story of one's life. 
This is not a disinterested dwelling on the past with all sorts of possible interpretations, 
but actually gives it a new form as the subject of speech makes it into something of his 
own. The 'I' with which someone refers to himself gets another 'content'. Lacan explains 
this notion of subjectivation in relation to the Cartesian subject, which he considers an 
‘I’ necessarily presupposed the moment that I assume in the first person what I will 
have been in the past. This assumption in the first person lays down the meaning of past 
events, it ‘records’ them.162 Although the incompleteness of language makes it 
impossible to ‘record’ the events in their final form, the personal assumption does give a 
‘substance’ to the subject. This is the binding, or even obligatory character of the 
symbolic: we are bound to what we say. Or: we are bound to the other. For the signifier 
refers to nothing except to a discourse, to the use of language as a 'line': a 'line' between 
those who speak (S.20, 32). It's about the symbolic pact with what is behind the screen. 
When we want to refrain from illusion, the narcissistic (self) images should be 
transcended by a (symbolic) relation to an object (a) that does not reflect or mirror back 
the imaginary self, an object that this self cannot consume in its narcissistic economy. 
When the visible continues communicating with the invisible, the (techno) fetishistic 
(visual) adoration of the object is broken up.    
The philosopher and sociologist of technology Otto Ulrich uses the term 
'Verdinglichung' ('objectification') to describe the growing distance that technology 
causes in the relation between human action and its consequences, which results in the 
decrease of responsibility. The Gulf video images, a phenomenon that Robins and 
Levidow analyzed for many years, might illustrate this 'moral distanciation' in its 
growth to an unprecedented extent: viewing the target from the missile nose-view. "This 
remote-intimate viewing extended the moral detachment that characterized earlier 
military technologies. It was the ultimate voyeurism: to see the target hit from the 
162
 'Recording the real'. However, as the real has no true form, this 'recording' is not analogue but contains 
elements of construction. Freud dilineates this fantasmatic element of construction for instance in the 
story or romance that the neurotic wites (in his mind) about his own family situation, his own history and 
origin ('Family Romances', 1909, S.E. 9, 235-244). Freud was also well aware of the importance of 
photographs in similar constructions of the individual's past. From thereon it is not a giant step to the role 
of the camera (cf. McQuire, 1998), cinema (cf. Sobchak, 1994) and digital technologies in the 'recording 
of the real'.  
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vantage point of the weapon … Seeing was split off from feeling; the visible was 
separated from the sense of pain and death … Military attack took the form of thing-like 
relations between people, and social relations between things, as if destroying inanimate 
objects" (Robins/Levidow, 1995, 121). Techno-fetishistic adoration or deployment of 
the possibilities of the computer may efface 'humane' (ethical, symbolical) relations to 
what's behind the screen (the real other). In any case 'information-warfare' phases out 
heroism by fully concealing the traumatic real behind the screen. The category of the 
hero is no longer applicable to its praxis, as the hero is someone who dares to confront 
this real. The screen turns the enemy into bytes. In his essay 'Info Fetishism' Doug 
Henwood shows that whereas for Marx fetishism implies that social relations between 
men assume the fantasmatic form of a relation between things, with "the info fetish, the 
thingly relation, and the social relation behind it, appears as the relation between bytes – 
a second order fetishism, you might say" (Henwood, 1995, 171). 
 One of the threats of cyberspace is this fetishistic disavowal of what's behind the 
fantasmatic screen. In online communication the obligatory or 'ethical' aspect of 
language (subjectivized language) is under pressure: we can 'imagine' our online 
character as fully separated from the demands and responsibilities of 'real reality' 
('dissociative imagination'). Such 'dissociative anonymity' – that John Suler 
distinguishes as one of the other major factors of 'the online disinhibition effect' – 
separates online behavior from in-person lifestyle and identity. When people are online, 
whatever "they say or do can't be directly linked to the rest of their lives. In a process of 
dissociation, they don't have to own their behavior by acknowledging it within the full 
context of an integrated online/offline identity" (Suler, 2004, 322). For Hubert Dreyfus 
the Internet is therefore similar to the press as Kierkegaard diagnosed it: we can have an 
opinion on everything without having to act accordingly. The online self resembles the 
(Kierkegaardian) esthetic, or the postmodern self: a self that only explores possibilities 
but that is never really engaged or committed (cf. Dreyfus, 2001, 81).163
According to Cooper information technologies' combination of detachment and 
functioning or operability (a combination I would call 'detached functionality') fulfills 
capitalism's ideological fantasies of maximum functionality without alienation (Cooper, 
163
 The religious context of Kierkegaardian thought allows a notion as true self actaulization. For only 
when someone has an unconditional commitment to somebody else or to something (to a certain case: 
religious, artistic, scientific ….) that he becomes a true Christian. In my opinion this does not imply that 
such a 'Christian' must keep away from all the 'modern media of communication' (as some current 
religious authorities would have it) but rather that he uses them for the case that he is committed to (like 
the indigenous people in Mexico who use the Internet for their struggle for self-government). The 
'Kierkegaardian' ethical-religious interpretation of communication media does, however, seem to reduce 
media to mere instruments that can – or must – serve (transparent) goals. It seems incapable of grasping 
the media's capabilities for experimentation and self-formation. It assumes a Self that exists prior to and 
untouched by media (or at least – because of technophobia – prior to technological media). Although 
Lacanian thought also stresses the symbolic commitment of the word, the symbolic Self is not a pure 
substance ('our deeper soul'), but already (de) formed by all sorts of media. Nevertheless, the symbolic 
subject must maintain a minimal distance (for normativity, liberty, control …) towards the attractiveness 
and seductiveness of media that might otherwise run our lives as a blind force (the computer addict, the 
scientist that is blind for the consequences of his work, the plastic surgery disaster …): the subject of 
desire as the 'gap in the analogical mind'. The epicentre of psychoanalysis is the same subject that science 
forecloses, and along with that subject comes a focus on the consequences of the scientific enterprise. The 
ethics of psychoanalysis is an ethics of the consequence (cf. 'La science et la vérité', E., 855-877). When 
technological or scientific enterprises (try to) eliminate the human subject, the consequences can be 
gruesome (addiction, destruction, deformation …) 
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1997, 105). So capitalism profits from this 'decline of the symbolic' or the diminution of 
what we might call 'traditional' regulation.   
2.4. Ideological interpellation in an age of information 
Žižek explains the two aspects of the law: a prohibiting and an imperative one. "Lacan 
draws a line of demarcation between the two facets of the law: on the one hand, law qua 
symbolic Ego-Ideal - i.e., law in its pacifying function, law qua guarantee of the social 
pact, qua the intermediating Third which dissolves the impasse of imaginary 
aggressivity; on the other hand, law in its superego dimension - i.e., law qua "irrational" 
pressure, the force of culpabilization totally incommensurable with our actual 
responsibility, the agency in whose eyes we are a priori guilty and which gives body to 
the impossible imperative of enjoyment" (Žižek, 1993, 47). The consideration of the 
postindustrial, information society as a "fatherless society" (Barglow, 1994, 42) is not 
unknown. We live in a society characterized by a "decline of the paternal metaphor" 
(Žižek, 1992, 157). Nevertheless this does not simply lead to liberation. "In the 
"Fatherless Society", then, we may find a harsher and more vindictive, not a weaker, 
superego, although it is one that no longer expresses the proverbial "voice of 
conscience"" (Barglow, 1994, 100). Whereas Barglow focuses on the rational 
discourses and bureaucratic systems that dominate our conscience in a far less personal 
and visible manner than the former authorities (fathers, teachers…) and therefore 
'colonize our lifeworld', I will stress – from Lacanian theory – another feature. Or, to put 
it differently, I will emphasize what the new Other(s) summon us to do, namely to 
enjoy. An informational society purportedly liberated from all the old structures and 
obligations, puts on the imperative of enjoyment: one must enjoy what one is doing, 
enjoying all the possibilities. Although this imperative is radically contrary to the 
prohibitions and interdictions of the 'old' Oedipal father, it is still an imperative. 
Proclaimed autonomous individuality, consisting of an unbound and therefore self-
reflexive self-construction, would thus be governed (unconsciously) by a harsh law. 
When we truly want to 'be ourselves' we must undertake (take upon ourselves) all the 
opportunities offered, and enjoy them. From a Lacanian perspective this task appears as 
another imperative coming from a new Other; a task that might even be more difficult to 
execute than the 'older' ones. New fictional structures of the postindustrial era subject us 
to an exhausting new morality in which we must have explored all possibilities. 
It may be true that nowadays tradition and the 'paternal law' (fortunately) play a 
lesser role. But we must discern what has taken its place. Ken Hillis (1999) tries to do 
so in describing the social contexts and political implications of Virtual Reality 
technologies, and stresses its embeddedness in military and capitalist interests. Even in 
one of the 'bibles' of the wired world, Steven Johnson's Interface Culture, we can read 
that it is capitalism that transformed technological 'extremication' (speed) into a lifestyle 
(Johnson, 1997, 6). According to Robert Markley cyberspace is the ultimate capitalist 
fantasy: it offers to exploit our desire as the inexhaustible material of consumption 
(Markley, 1996, 74). The 'ideology of the information age' considers information – as 
the replacement of industrial goods – as capable of unlimited growth and the trailblazer 
of a New Society (cf. Slack, 1987). Capitalism, as the dominant (set of) discourse, is 
one of the primary candidates for being the new Other. In promising fulfillment of 
desire, it addresses the subject of the drive – the subject as drive – that dwells in the 
loop of satisfaction and is always looking for ways to 'realize' itself in/as new 
(consumer) objects. The capitalistic fictional structures closely connect to new media 
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technologies that globalize its messages (of enjoying) so that capitalist fiction becomes 
a voice of ideological interpellation. For man loves the interfaces that lead him into 
cyberspace. 
The affective component between man and his 'machines' is strong: people love 
their computer. Freud's analysis of being in love may help to clarify this affectivity. For 
Freud, the (idealized, imaginary) other of a love-relation can take over the role of self-
judgment. That is, the (imaginary) ideal-ego can substitute the ego-ideal. Then the 
subject interiorizes the ideals of the other as its own. Man's affective relation to the 
computer (as an other), and the computer as a medium for transferring capitalism, may 
cause the seductive voice coming from the displays of the world ('enjoy', 'be yourself', 
'be free', 'be an explorer', 'live at the edge', etc.) to become the (normative) voice for the 
subject itself. 
There is an ideological interpellation coming from the new Other. Jodi Dean 
refers to Henry Krips' notion of ideological interpellation in his Fetish: An Erotics of 
Culture (1999). Krips points out that individuals constitute for themselves a picture of 
what the caller wants of (or for) them, and that they often conceal their own active role 
in the production of such positions. So they can maintain the idea that their position is a 
natural one, independent of who they are in the eyes of the caller (cf. Krips, 1999, 74). 
Of course, we all want to – and do – affirm that we are autonomous individuals. But a 
somewhat more profound look may show how much this pretended subjectivation as an 
autonomous individual is a matter of defining ourselves as an object for the gaze of the 
other. As this identification may be so tight, we may be fully unaware that the call or 
law that organizes our lives comes from the Other. Self-evidently, this goes both for 
'patriarchal' as for 'postmodern' culture. However, differentiating the two aspects of law 
reveals that a decline of the law's prohibiting aspect in a 'fatherless society' leads to an 
increasing role, pressure or even 'oppression' of the imperative aspect of law. 
2.5. Real identifications?  
The notion of the sinthome encompasses identification as increasingly a matter of 
bodily attachment to objects (inscribing things into or onto the body, enjoying them, 
consuming them …). We identify ourselves with consumer objects, gadgets, 
idiosyncratical signs and tokens of lifestyles etc. Another interesting technological 
development is biometrics. Biometrical technologies produce digital representations of 
an individual's unique physical characteristics, such as fingerprints, the shape of a hand, 
the iris, the voice, the face, or the blood vessels of hand or retina. These representations 
are stored in databases and used as means of identification for entering a certain 
physical space, a computer or an informational system. Also departments of public 
service (welfare), immigration offices, employees, hospitals and insurance companies 
use these kinds of identification technologies, or are interested in using them. Because 
biometrical systems promise an infallible means of identification, they seem more 
valuable than systems that require an object, such as a photo or document (cf. van der 
Ploeg, 2002, 249-252). Biometrical identification would provide an important tool for 
establishing certain connections between the physical and the virtual person, a crucial 
linking in a networked informational society. When so much information on people 
resides in files and databases, identifying the right physical person to the right file is 
vital. Also the use of the Internet highlights this problem, as it eases impersonating 
someone else, and pretence. The reliability of electronic commerce, e-mail and other 
transactions depends on the trustworthiness of the link.  
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Nevertheless it is questionable whether biometrics is a neutral instrument for 
establishing the 'sameness' of a person. Biometrical data always obtain a meaning in a 
certain practice, which are primarily disciplinary ones, as biometrical identification is 
disproportionally imposed on convicts, immigrants, social security recipients or 
socialized medicine patients (Van der Ploeg, 2002, 265). Biometric technologies not 
only register who we are, they also shape who we are (Van der Ploeg, 2002, 257). As 
such technologies of subjectivation, biometrical identifications not neutrally or 
objectively inscribe a person in the socio-symbolic 'context' by means of the 'text' of his 
body. The (pretended) real body-identification is rather the real weight of the subject in
a discourse. A biometrical identification of someone's voice as a real object functions as 
the 'hard kernel' of a subjectivity structured by socio-symbolic discourses (as Lacan 
holds that the voice as an object a is the real weight of the subject in his discourse, see § 
1.6.2.). Although biometrics pins down identity by voice recognition, the broader 
(fictional) structures still influence the signification of this identification. Therefore the 
'Gestalt' on the computer screen interfaces the real (biometric identification) and the 
virtual (structures). The real and the symbolic interface in biometrical technologies. As 
such it differs from biological determinism that supposes to determine the person by 
means of certain physical characteristics. Biometrics simultaneously involves biological 
and social identity, and as such goes beyond the opposition of nature and culture. 
Nature and culture go hand in hand in the technological production of a reality that is 
produced or sustained by the computer display. 
 Such an 'interfaciality' also holds for the abovementioned (techno) objects of 
body-identification. The real mark in/on the body does not fully determine someone's 
identity. Rather, this real mark determines the position in the symbolic order: by 
wearing Lonsdale clothes I position myself as…. The 'consumption' of objects leads to a 
symbolical positioning. And taking a certain (symbolical, virtual) position (as a 
scientist, a voyeur …) provides (hidden) pleasures – simply illustrated: the higher ones 
social position, the more one can consume. In Lacan's theory of fantasy enjoyment and 
signification are not two different things. Fantasy originally combines them, and thereby 
opens up a space for us to live in. The trickiest aspects of subjectivity cannot be 
understood by opposing the real bodily subject and the virtual subject of representation. 
The object of a fetishist is not the 'inborn' object of his 'natural' desire. The object results 
from the curious coalition of the libidinal and the signifying order, and thus forms a 
nodal point of subjectivity (either interpretable, consisting mostly of hidden meaning, 
then we call it a symptom; or non-interpretable, substantially pervaded with enjoyment, 
a sinthome). Nowadays those two realms interface to a considerable extent at the 
computer interface, which both separates the bodily sphere (of enjoyment) from the 
realm of representations, and connects them. Thus it functions as a medium for us to 
live in.  
A critique of so-called real identifications therefore remains important (of 
biological determinism, and of what appears biometrics to be at first sight). As well as a 
critique of utopist celebrations of cyber-liberation (and dystopist gloom and doom) that 
consider subjectivity to be nothing but a (bodiless) construction: simulation. 
2.6. The (cyber) fantasy beyond subjectivation: false liberation 
Hans Moravec's work illustrates the high hopes for technology. He considers the 
computer revolution a breakthrough capable of liberating both the human mind and 
human culture (Moravec, 1988, 4). Cyberspace in general, as the most advanced form of 
177
the technological enterprise, offers itself – as Markley brings forward – as the logical 
'telos' of technological progress. Its symbolic coherence depends on the narrative logic 
of progress: it is the completion of our craving for transcendence (Markley, 1996, 6). 
Cyberspace joins up with the Enlightenment project in which science and technology 
(must) contribute to economical and political freedom (cf. Ess, 1994, 234). 
 Traveling the 'freedom road', digital technologies could also lead to 'free 
subjectivity'. For example take Internet sociability. In her analysis of dating on the Net, 
Lynn Schofield Clark argues that Internet dating offers the "pure" relationship in its 
contemporary form. Anthony Giddens coins the term "pure" relationships in his work 
Modernity and self-identity (1991) to refer to relationships that do not anchor in 
anything beyond them. "The 'pure' relationship, therefore, is not necessarily constrained 
by the structures of social or economic life … it is considered 'pure' because it is no 
longer constituted within the social context of kin and community. Persons are no 
longer constrained in their selection of romantic partners by the social mores of their 
families or communities. Instead, relationships are sought out and maintained solely for 
the gratifications they provide to the persons involved. Therefore, these relations of 
modernity, Giddens argued, are always organized in relation to the reflexive self who 
asks, "how is this relationship fulfilling to me?"" (Schofield Clark, 1998, 176). There 
are nevertheless differences between electronic and pre-electronic relationships. 
"Giddens suggested that trust and "authenticity", or truthful and open self-revelation, are 
central to self-gratifying relations. In contrast, trust and "authenticity" are not central to 
teen chat room relationships; "fun" is" (id, 179). Therefore, the Internet version "might 
be said to be a postmodern "pure" relationship: one comprised of self-reflexivity in 
which experimentation and self-construction are central" (id, 180). It is this sort of self-
construction that many critics associate with a playful liberation from the 'Father'. 
Schofield Clark's article, which I discuss furtheron, nevertheless shows the ambiguity of 
this process. 
 One makes a vast claim when attributing to technologies such capacities to alter 
the cultural laws of identity-construction that they produce 'free self-construction'. They 
would even extend man's control so far as to encroach upon the laws of nature. Gene-
technology examplifies this best. This technology may cause our idea (hence: the 
fantasy) of being the masters over the laws of nature, that we can shape according to our 
will. Cultural efforts of representing the real (that tell us how to deal with death, for 
instance) supposedly are transcended by technological possibilities of manipulating the 
real (trying to eliminate our finitude, which is – certainly from the perspective of the 
technological Eros – still the ultimate goal of technology).164 In general, technologies 
advance ideas of us determining the laws that determine us. The law as an 'inevitable' 
(cultural or natural) production of reality supposedly could be replaced by a 
(technological) formation or control of reality, to such an extent that we could directly 
touch upon the real (DNA, 'pure self'). The masks would be ripped off; masks that 
plague us in a continuous dialectical round-trip between what appears as reality and the 
real behind it (a dialectic that causes 'The Plague of Fantasies' - Žižek, 1997). So 
164
 Taking death as the example of the real reveals at the same time the truth of the psychoanalytical 
notion of 'the return of the real': what we reject symbolically returns all the more frighteningly. For it is 
evident that in our technological societies of keeping death techno-scientifically at a distance, we are all 
the more terrified by its appearance. Because of this lack of symbolical deals with death one can explain 
the rise of all sorts of idiosyncratical (burial) rituals; which mark – in our terminology – the transition 
from Father to sinthome.
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Baudrillard analyzes a revolution of things that is no longer a matter of (dialectical) 
transgression (Aufhebung) but of their increase or acceleration (Steigerung): an 
'extremication' that results from the absence of the rules of play (Baudrillard, 1990, 52).  
From a Lacanian perspective such an elimination of the subject of law results in 
an enlargement of the ego – or referring to postmodern multiplicity we might say that it 
results in a multiplication of the ego. Baudrillard doesn't seem to differ radically on this 
issue of the destruction of the subject of desire. For he discusses the 'extremication' in 
the context of corpulency: the body without a scene, without an unconscious. That is, a 
body-enjoyment no longer moulded by the scene. When the (fantasmatic) scene no 
longer sustains the regulation of gluttony (such as a shared idea of physical health that 
makes you go to a sporting club), the body knows of too much enjoyment – and gets fat. 
Corpulency, as a social phenomenon which nowadays is also evident in Europe, shows 
that the 'Fatherless society' of supposedly (ideally, or ideologically) 'liberation' and 'self-
realization' provides strange ways to 'realize our potentials'. This discussion of 
corpulency may point out that Lacanian theory can complement the Baudrillardian 
analysis. There is more at stake than the disappearance of 'fantasmatic scenes' (of the 
'collective unconscious') that must prevent the excess of desire (corpulency). For this 
development seems to go along with a (quasi) individual and technological formation of 
'fantasmatic scenes' (fitness) –  perfectly illustrated by the place called 'Better Bodies' 
where one runs on a fitness treadmill chasing the images projected ahead on a televion 
screen (Crandall, see chapter four, § 2.7, note 18). 
So, in general we must not think shortsightedly that technologies lead to a 
canceling or raising of restrictions and limitations, and lead to the 'true' or 'real' freedom 
or autonomy that we desire. The mobile phone, for instance, does of course broaden the 
spaces of communication, and shifts or repositions the horizon of our availability. But it 
does not eliminate the restrictions of communication and thus liberate us from our 
physical position. One might also think in the opposite direction: it rather stresses the 
physical position in space and time (the most asked question is after all: "where are you 
now?"). We are still caught in all sorts of 'structures' and 'positions' (from which the 
physical position is the most obvious one): orders of power, money, social ideals etc. 
Lynn Schofield Clark shows that girls in their so-called 'free selfconstruction' online 
still subject themselves to the same ideals that govern sociability in 'real life'. They are 
anxious not to comply to standards of acceptability based on beauty and attractiveness, 
and therefore present themselves accordingly in online chat; "the employment of the 
technology is in keeping with social conventions concerning gender roles … the power 
afforded through selfconstruction on the Net does not translate into changed gender 
roles and expectations in the social world beyond cyberspace. In accord with the 
findings of Rakow and Navarro in their study of the introduction of cellular phones, we 
must conclude that the possibility that new communication technologies might subvert 
social systems is limited" (Schofield Clark, 1998, 168-169). Technological devices do 
not simply dust off our 'old self' and lay bare the real of free self-expression or of 'pure 
enjoyment'. Social conventions (although perhaps different) and broader structures still 
mould this 'real'.  
 A Lacanian standpoint does not have to endorse the (arbitrary) ideals and rules 
that govern the sociability of our world. Its effort is about recognizing and identifying 
the role they play; not thinking too hastily that we have done away with them, thus 
being governed by illusions – especially where this pitfall is most luring, as in the case 
of technologies. Psychoanalysis is dedicated to gaining insight in (the fantasmatic 
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support of) the symbolical structures that precede the ego and exceed conscious 
awareness.  
“The symbolic relation is constituted as early as possible, even prior to the 
fixation of the self image of the subject, prior to the structuring image of the ego, 
introducing the dimension of the subject into the world, a dimension capable of 
creating a reality other that that experienced as brute reality, as the encounter of 
two masses, the collision of two balls” (S.2, 257).  
It is more valuable to see how our subjection to discourses and discursive structures – 
and the laws that govern them – changes, than hastily claiming our liberation from 
them. Such an insight might prevent a blind extremication of things, which results from 
– unconsciously – following new structures while thinking that one has left behind the 
earlier 'communication networks' (of the Father, the Grand Narratives). Therefore Lacan 
made the soixante-huitards understand good and proper the naïveté of their Marxist 
liberation. Although they saw themselves as fighting the alienating laws of society, they 
actually were striving for another form of subjection: "What you aspire as 
revolutionaries, is a master. You will have it" (S.17, 239; m.t.). The role Lacan assigns 
to language is crucial again. Although one can subvert a society, one cannot step out of 
the practices of language. New forms of language inevitably lead to new (power) 
relations etc. - they do not dispose of power. Lacan therefore gives the following answer 
to a student who wonders what role psychoanalysis can play in the New Society: "A 
society isn't something that can be defined like that. What I try to articulate, because 
analysis gives me the evidence of it, is what dominates it, namely the practice of 
language" (id, 239). 
Practices of language can change, and technologies can be their changing force. 
According to thinkers such as Heidegger and McLuhan technology holds its greatest 
power in this intricacy with language (cf. Heim, 1993, 66).165 The Internet has different 
principles (different syntaxis, different grammatical rules) for organizing the exchange 
of signs. They may be different, but they still contain rules. A full idiosyncratic use of 
language (without following any rules at all) is incomprehensible, and destroys 
intersubjective understanding. Furthermore, the digital 'liberation of speech' does not 
make all new expressions original. Notwithstanding the fact that certain persons or 
groups create new forms of language, most of the Internet users simply follow the new 
trends. The Internet does not cause by itself the authenticity of expression that the Lacan 
of the 1950's calls 'full speech' – although it may offer some potential for doing so. The 
Internet therefore easily enables a discourse of false liberation. Such a Marxist term is 
usable for criticizing the proclaimers of cyber-freedom, just as Lacan criticized the 
ideologist of Marxism: they are not free but just following a different set of rules.  
Also biometrics shows how 'practices of language' dominate so-called 
(technological) clear access to the real. It is a science of the interface that mediates the 
'real subject' of bodily identification with the virtual subject of socio-symbolical 
contexts. The Lacanian position should make us aware how we as subjects of language 
still mediate the real that we pretend to find in techno-culture (the real of the body, of 
165
 Heidegger would probably abhor the current Internet language. Nertheless, it is not a matter of 
rejecting new plays of language on the (imagined solid) basis of (older, other) cultural ideals, but of 
questioning the proclaimed liberation as a possible (new) ideology.  
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pure relations …) by fictions. Only this insight can lead to (incomplete and non-
realizable) liberation: 'Wo Es war …' 
2.7. The body and the scene: subjectivity at the interface of meatspace and cyberspace 
The basic Lacanian point is that language, the order of signifiers, remains our horizon. 
The crucial role of metaphors in cyberspace shows this (see chapter 3: § 1.4).166
Therefore the Internet does not allow us to 'freely or naturally enjoy ourselves' without 
the burden of cultural laws. Also the Internet subjects us to the law of language. "Enter 
a MUD room, change your gender, construct the seductive character that you are not in 
real life … Don't you see that you are still subjected to the most explicitly and brutal 
form of law which forces your body into a constraining parade of signifiers? Love 
through words, and doubtless soon through images of the body, is not at all a liberation, 
a jump into ethereal space where desire is granted without limits; it is a surrender to our 
repressions (because outside of cyberspace we also make love to signifiers through 
signifiers); our simplest gestures are thus determined by the inescapable law of 
language" (Leupin, 2000).  
Moderators illustrate how the 'law' also on the Internet serves as the principle of 
inescapable subjectivation. John Suler analyzed the role of moderators in a virtual world 
called 'Palace'. Moderators host, advise, and socialize new users in a community, they 
are authoritative and have disciplinary powers. They act as a consultant, and control 
deviant behavior in a community. Because they are often conceived of as 'fathers' or 
parents, the phenomenon of transference to those figures is not uncommon (Suler, 
1997). The 'ecstatic' moment of leaving the old form of subjectivation – that so many 
readings of cyberspace testify to – is 'moderated' into another form of subjectivation: the 
old community is changed for a new community. This is the structure that belongs to us 
as beings of language. It requests insight in how our fantasy now (again) is structured. 
The fundamental Freudian distinction, which Lacan also takes up, between 
primal repression (alienation) and secondary repression, once more is useful for 
grasping the inevitability of subjectivation. Of course we must try to overcome all sorts 
of secondary alienation, for example by trying to create our 'own' interface and not 
simply adopting Bill Gates' standard version. In his 'Countdown to Ecstasy – The 
Disappearance of the Interface' Mark Amerika states: "there is already a kind of battle 
being waged by artists who work with network technology and this fight is over the 
interface … [O]ne camp is more elitist and wants to create their own interface while the 
other is happy to develop their projects with the more utilitarian interfaces being 
developed by major corporate enterprises". A panel discussion between artists 
reformulated this issue as "whether it was the artists responsibility to program their own 
unique interfaces or rely on the corporate whims of someone like Bill Gates" (Amerika, 
1999). So: yes, we should try to overcome all sorts of unnecessary alienations (limiting 
gender roles, digital divide …). But not deceive us that real authenticity or true 
originality then dawns at the horizon (for the horizon is the signifier). The computer 
screen actually makes us see the 'decenterment' of our 'own' imagination: we must 
produce images with media that are not our own, and we cannot avoid to use materials 
and signifiers coming from others. Also the subject's pretended transparent self-
166
 Techno-science objectifies all sorts of objects. However, we cannot objectify the horizon of signifying 
systems whereby we determine the object (see Žižek's discussion of this issue in his significant text 'Of 
Cells and Selves', 1999, 319). Before we determine the object, we ourselves are in systems of (re) 
presentation. 
181
construction on the Net makes use of signifiers whose signification is beyond conscious 
control. "For they do not know what they do", to quote Žižek. As such, the use of 
signifiers provides the horizon of self-understanding. Lacan showed that precisely this 
role of the signifier gives fantasy an unconscious element. Also at the computer 
interface the images are 'set to work in a signifying chain'.167
 That technologies disclose the world in a deficient way, inferior to language, 
does not follow from this (cf. Hottois, 1984). What is implied is that a 'technological 
universe' is not so rapidly build, since technologies cannot do away so easily with the 
signifiers' mediation. Technological mediatization and subjective mediation are not 
easily separable. Therefore, for example, the whole history of medicine should be seen 
as a continuous process of symbolization (Zwart, 1998, 110). Techno-scientifical 
progress consists of an ongoing reduction of complex phenomena into a limited number 
of basic systems. Lacan radically endorsed this progress, as shown by his attempts to 
reduce the unconscious to a logic system. If we do not see that even abstract systems do 
not present (but represent) the real, we fall into 'Aufhebung' as the illusion of 
philosophy, which technologies' fascinating products and achievements seduce thinking 
to do. A 'seduced' philosophy of technology brings us back to a new, technological 
metaphysics of presence. 
Contrary to 'seduction' I consider the computer screen to be the realm of the 
scene, as a 'staging'. I recognize the screen's capacities to lure and indulge us in a 'fully 
realized world' in so-called moments of closure. But when we avoid fixating this closure 
as being reality itself (which is the 'task' of the 'unsettled' subject itself), then the screen 
allows us to play, indulge or enjoy our fantasies and create a certain distance and insight 
in them. Such (reflexive) insight is also what Terence Harpold teaches us in his essay on 
'Conclusions' in hypertextual environments. He brings forward that closure is always 
fixated afterwards (nachtraglich) (Harpold, 1994, 198). There is a secondary
construction or fixation of an original event. This awareness guards us from taking the 
construction for reality itself: 'Wo Es war, soll Ich werden'. The scheme of deferred 
action that is crucial to French psychoanalysis is therefore still decisive for 
comprehending reality in the digital age. 
 The (unconscious) horizon of signifiers renders impossible a clear (Cartesian) 
distinction between the realm of the body and that of the mind. Representations govern 
the bodily realm of enjoyment, and in the order of representations enjoyment works. 
The (libidinal) images are still submitted to the law, which is in its most general form, 
the law of the signifier. This is the situation of surplus-enjoyment. Also the computer 
interface moderates the Inside (the immediacy of our 'instincts'; that what we really 
want to do, see, say etc) by the Outside (the form in which it is moulded). Different 
examples ('real me', 'real identification', 'instincts') show that meatspace interfaces with 
cyberspace. The 'true picture' that we (thought we) gained is moulded by external forces 
(which I here explicitly call 'the chain of signifiers'). Fantasy functions in such a 
dynamic. Thinking that we have eliminated its 'distorting' or disguising function and 
have gained the true perspective on the real, is precisely what fully wraps us up in it. In 
a Kantian terminology: the awareness of frameworks (of fantasy) withholds us from 
illusions. The only freedom we can have in fantasy's conditional mediation is to 
'decipher' its construction of the real. On the Internet this way of functioning is not 
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 A person's image appearing by means of biometrical techno-identification is at the interface of 
meatspace and cyber-socio-space. 
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different from real life. We may (first of all) think, or actually experience for a moment, 
that the medium offers us freedom, but we then find out that it constructs a specific 
world (instead of reflecting the 'true world'). Subjectivation of fantasy rests on those two 
pillars of (reflexive) insight and (unconscious) belief. As fantasy thus interfaces the real 
and the virtual, meatspace and cyberspace, it is impossible to get out of this dialectics. 
One radical breaking of the barriers of language, according to Lacan, consists of 
'impossible', exceptional moments (in analysis): when someone sees through the 
fantasmatic window of his desire, tumbles through it and touches upon the real. Another 
consists of a 'passage to the act': a momentary dissolution of the subject, and of the 
social bond. Then expressions are no longer a message (directed to the Other) but a 
matter of 'brute forces' (fights, suicide …). It is a flight from the dimension of the Other 
to the dimension of the real. According to Lacan only the passage to the act involves an 
exit from the scene altogether (Evans, 1996, 137). In the exceptional moments of 
'traversing the fantasy' we nevertheless do not exit the scene altogether, as a different 
staging reappears: when we break a fantasy, another returns. So normally, we live in the 
scene, and living in cyberspace is living in the scene. 
Cyberspace is basically a framing of reality. Simon Cooper analyzes the subject 
of Virtual Reality and concludes:  
"Subjective experience is now framed [my italics] by technological processes in 
a manner previously unimaginable" (Cooper, 1999, 100).  
The subject of desire, with fantasy as its frame upon reality, normally connects the two 
extremes of being a 'pure mind' (the mental 'freedom' of having no limiting form at all) 
and being a 'pure body' (following immediately your 'instincts'). Normally, we are 
bodies operating within specific scenes: we speak as embodied beings. The interfaces 
into cyberspace are new frames for connecting body and mind, which never were two 
separate entities but were combined by fantasy in the first place. 
Conclusion
This chapter explicitly focuses on the element of enjoyment in a techno-world that 
questions symbolism as the major, or even only, true way of disclosing the world. For 
can we interpret the meaning of technological artifacts and thus bring out what they 
('actually') say about the world? Technologies obviously go beyond that: they 
themselves bring out a world, and must be considered proper media, on par with the 
medium of language. By focusing on the element of enjoyment, Lacanian thought is 
able – though at first sight few people consider the possibility – to grasp this level of 
reality-disclosure exceeding the limits of hermeneutics. Enjoyment is, alongside 
meaning, the other major factor in reality-experience. It is for that reason that techno-
fetishism is of special interest. The displays of technology function 'psychologically' as 
ways to screen off the fundamental lack or 'passivity' of our existence: the brute fact that 
we suffer, experience lack, are not (always) in charge etc. By disavowing this they (help 
to) create a world that we can handle, in which we exist as being in control, accessible, 
'wired' ('active'). By screening off the passivity (of an excessive jouissance) they offer a 
pleasurable world. My point, again, is that such an element of screening off is intrinsic 
to being human; therefore the vital disavowal. Man necessarily filters his perceptions. 
Because of this 'filtering' of a jouissance that paralyzes us (in which we go under), 
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surplus enjoyment becomes the central issue. Our reality is motivated by an enjoyment 
that does not reside in the act, but in stagings, relations and positions, and fantasy thus 
works in reality as the organization of surplus enjoyment. Thus enjoyment is 
subjectivized into an enjoyment that 'marks' me, an enjoyment that I (unconsciously) 
seek or identify with. I have tried to show that nowadays this works in all the objects 
that determine different lifestyles. Analyzing this subjectivation of enjoyment widens 
the central issue of fantasy, subjectivation, from (ethical, normative) subjectivized 
language to subjectivized enjoyment that thrives in techno-culture. This 'physical' aspect 
also produces us as singularized subjects of desire. 
 By analyzing the subject of desire as being both motivated by the search for 
enjoyment (surplus enjoyment), and its excessive striving for a hallucinatory enjoyment 
that fully disavows the lack that characterizes the subject of desire, this chapter once 
more stresses the double bind of the subject. Our experience of reality is always 
substituted by enjoyment. But this enjoyment may actually 'take the place' (and this is 
where it gets pathological) of the relation the other, like when I chat not in order to 
communicate with someone else but solely to enjoy my self-image on the screen. The 
discourses that surround the production of techno-objects make use, of course, of this 
libidinal satisfaction that people attain from their 'ideal' image, propagating the objects 
as possible realizations of  the consumer's desires - and this is where they become 
ideological. Ideologies thrive by 'selling' imaginary conceptions as reality itself, thereby 
capitalizing on man's libidinal investment in his own ideal image. Technological 
ideologies function in a techno-fetishistic manner, for instance, in the idea of cyberspace 
as a transcendent location that offers the fulfillment of desire. They portray this promise 
as realizable via the (maximum) consumption of objects – that is, via the (insatiable) 
circuit of the drive. Consciousness of our tricky position in media may enfeeble the bite 
of ideologies.  
  I use the notion of subjectivation to distinguish the empty subject of desire from 
the subject of the drive that is trapped in the game of constantly maintaining his state of 
enjoyment. Subjectivation thus is connected to an 'ethical' aspect (in the way  Dreyfuss 
uses the Kierkegaardian ethical stage to analyze the Internet) wherein someone is not 
fully determined by the 'esthetical' pleasures of the interface. In a subjectivized relation 
the subject is not the slave of his search for imaginary pleasure, but  is able to install 
pleasure - as an inevitable aspect of reality - in the project of his 'own' desire.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN. A LACANIAN THEORY OF REPRESENTATION 
"In short, according to th[e] second version (Sandy Stone, Sherry Turkle), 
cyberspace announces the end of the Cartesian cogito as the unique 'thinking 
substance'. Of course, from this second point of view, the pessimistic prophets of 
the psychotic 'end of Oedipus' in the universe of simulacra simply betray their 
inability to imagine an alternative to Oedipus". (Žižek, 1999b, 112) 
Introduction
The focus on imagination requires that this chapter hinges on the mind-body dualism so 
frequently discussed in discourses concerning cyberspace. In this sense it serves as a 
kind of survey-chapter: issues addressed in previous chapters will now be discussed in 
the philosophical context of Cartesian subjectivity. I will discuss the notion of 
perspective in Renaissance art as an interesting and valuable way to extrapolate from 
the Cartesian 'thinking substance' to Lacan's 'desiring substance' and the technological 
point of view (the virtual personae of cyberspace). The deeply influential 'Cartesian 
subjectivity' will thus be confronted with Lacanian thought, of which I also try to give a 
general theoretical framework. In this manner I hope to construct an alternative to 
disembodied (modernist) rational subjectivity, without denying every form of 'rational' 
(Oedipal) subjectivation. 
1. The Cartesian subject of representation 
1.1. Descartes, causality and imagination 
To formulate more precisely the questions concerning the modern subject of 
representation and its (dis)guise in cyberspace, I will examine one of its primary 
origins: the philosophy of René Descartes. Descartes, in his discussion of that peculiar 
question of the modern age, namely whether the outside world possesses reality or not, 
introduces a decisive distinction between two realities. One of these realities exists in 
the mind as an object of understanding and is composed of ideas, entities and objects, 
while the other reality composes the actual, extra-mental world. He calls the 
representative reality in the mind ‘objective’, a term he borrows from Scholastic 
philosophy which evidently has a meaning differing completely from our current 
understanding of objectivity. This realitas objectiva is the opposite of the realitas 
actualis which is the "formal reality", the actual extra-mental existence of things. 
Descartes' causal principle ('there must be at least as much reality in the cause as in the 
effect') implies that whatever is represented 'objectively' in an idea must also be present 
in its cause. Thus his Meditations establish that his idea of God must have its origin in 
God Himself. Since we can also have pictures in our minds of the most complex things, 
for example a highly intricate machine, the question then arises what the cause of this 
idea was. Did the person see it, is he a genius with a brilliant mind and imagination or, 
we might add to Descartes, is he mad? As Descartes mostly downplays imagination – in 
his most positive views he considers it 'perceptional help' for comprehension – the 
intricate machine will probably be an idea of the pure mind itself (and, finally, caused 
by God). "[T]he power of imagining which is in me, differing as it does from the power 
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of understanding, is not a necessary constituent of my own essence, that is of the 
essence of the mind" (Descartes, 1988, CSM 2, 50). For Descartes God is the supreme 
cause or archetype: everything found in an effect must be found in this supreme cause. 
His thought thus remains indebted to Platonic and Christian metaphysics. Without it, the 
crucial transition from self-knowledge to knowledge of God and the subsequent 
validation of science would be impossible (cf. Cottingham, 1993, 27). It is therefore a 
metaphysical substance that in the end causes scientific 'clear and distinct' ideas of the 
mind. In the relation between cause and effect there is no role for the imagination; 
mostly it just contaminates our knowledge, for it is a faculty that belongs to the 
embodied creature, not to the pure mental substance. In a letter to Mersenne of July 
1641 Descartes writes: "One might perhaps think that the entire science which considers 
only sizes, shapes and movements would be most under the sway of imagination, but 
those who have studied it know that it rests not at all on the phantasms of our 
imagination, but only on the clear and distinct notions of the mind" (Descartes, in 
Cottingham, 1993, 85).168
Cartesian theory is often linked to new technologies - especially with regards to 
the metaphysical dualism of body and mind supposedly so sharp cyberspace. Here this 
will be done by looking at the role of imagination in both fields. First of all, digital 
technologies raise doubts about the causal relationship between model and 
representation (Roland Barthes names 'ça-a-été' the 'essence' of photography; the model 
causes the representation). This 'photographical' representation of reality as it is or has 
been is what the selection and compositing techniques of digital imaging technologies 
put under pressure. But one can also discern a second issue. Descartes claims: "All the 
intricacy which is contained in the idea merely objective – as in a picture – must be 
contained in its cause, whatever its cause turns out to be [my italics]" (Descartes, 1983, 
Part 1, art. 17). A scientific visualization in a Virtual Reality environment such as the 
CAVE, for instance, gives us an idea of what the inside of a molecule looks like, or how 
the collision of two galaxies occurs.169 Could the digital imaging (or 'imagination') of 
new technologies thus also cause new objective ideas in our mind? Digital technologies 
disturb the 'univocal', causal relationship to reality. But do they not simultaneously 
replace this mimetic relationship (of imitation) with a poetic (creative) one, in which 
other causes than the 'true referent' may also generate valuable representations of 
reality?  
Digital technologies question a presumption of Cartesian metaphysics that 
objective ideas in our mind are saved from (bodily) imagination. In the new sciences of 
complexity, as bio-molecular science, 'computerized imagination' is crucial as the 
168
 On the one hand Freudian psychoanalysis can be put on a par with the Cartesian subject in that both 
question the cause of mental representations. On the other hand, the atheistic foundations of Freudian 
psychoanalysis make it acknowledge the possibility of creatio ex nihilo and attribute a significant role to 
imagination, while for Descartes it is absurd to think that something can come out of nothing. 
169
 The projection-based virtual reality system of the ‘new’ CAVE is a ten square foot, high-resolution, 
3D video and audio virtual display theatre, in which all perspectives are calculated from the point of view 
of the user who wears active stereo glasses and controls navigation with a wand. It is one of the latest 
generations of interfaces: a completely immersive environment enhanced by computation and large 
databases. Information on the CAVE is adopted from CAVERN (the CAVE Research Network), a 
community of industrial and research institutions equipped with CAVEs, ImmersaDesks, and high-
performance computing resources all interconnected by high-speed networks for the purpose of 
supporting tele-immersive engineering and design, education and training, scientific visualization and 
computational steering. URL: http://www.evl.uic.edu/cavern/vrserver.html
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referent (atoms) has never been seen yet by human beings: one is necessarily in the 
order of computer simulations. Here, science inevitably goes along with computerized 
imaging (imagining), which could go so far as to bring art and technology back together 
again (cf. De Mul, 2002, 125, 187). These developments question the 'Cartesian' 
distinction between ideas that are only ('formally') a certain modification of 
consciousness, and those that possess ('objectively') a genuine representational content. 
In its interference or disruption of the causal, indexical relation between signs and 
reality, digital technologies trip up the strict difference between fiction and reality, 
between the 'phantasms' of the visual, embodied being and the true representations of 
the abstract mind. 
1.2. The mind screening reality: Cartesian perspectivism 
The Cartesian 'mind' that seeks to represent reality mathematically supposes it can find 
an exact, scientific perspective. In order to grasp this crucial issue of perspective (one 
speaks of  'Cartesian perspectivism') it is useful to reach back to one of the founders of 
the theory and practice of linear perspective in painting, Leon Battista Alberti (1404 – 
1472). In his work De pictura (‘On painting’, 1435) he describes the canvas as an open 
window onto history. The first step in the construction of this window (and its 
‘vanishing point’) is:  
“First of all, on the surface on which I am going to paint, I draw a rectangle of 
whatever size I want, which I regard as an open window through which the 
subject to be painted is seen” (Alberti, as quoted in Edgerton, 1976, 42-3). 
Alberti's famous metaphor conceives the canvas as a transparent window. The 
‘vanishing point’ is the point on the horizon to which all the lines from the base of the 
picture (the ‘orthogonals’) flee (instead of the more recent term 'vanishing point' Alberti 
speaks of the 'center point' or 'point of flight'; see Romanyshyn, 1989, 39).170 The 
counterpart of the 'vanishing point' is the so-called ‘distance point’: the point on this 
side of the window from which the scene is to be seen. Although I will not dwell on the 
exact construction of linear perspective, it results in the construction of an eye on this 
side of the window that could (in principle) see the world until the limit of infinity (the 
‘vanishing point’ at the horizon).  
 Because linear perspective constructs a geometrical space for a subject of 
‘infinite’ representation, some commentators have linked it to Descartes' philosophy. 
“Alberti’s conception of the subject is already Cartesian in its reduction of the space of 
painting to dimensionless punctuality” (Bryson, 1983, 103). The result is the visual 
culture of modernity being dominated by ‘Cartesian perspectivism’.  
“[W]hat is normally claimed to be the dominant, even totally hegemonic, visual 
model of the modern era, that which we can identify with Renaissance notions 
of perspective in the visual arts and Cartesian ideas of subjective rationality in 
philosophy. For convenience, it can be called Cartesian perspectivism” (Jay, 
1988, 4).
170
 For a good outline of the technique of linear perspective, see: Romanyshyn, 1989, 35–57. 
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Descartes’ philosophy broke with a dominant concept of vision: vision as a resemblance 
of exterior reality by copying the objects' images into the eye. Descartes' physical 
conception of light as lines overcame many of the problems of this older paradigm of 
resemblance, for example explain the ‘bending’ of light rays by lenses. Vision, for 
Descartes, is the representation in the mind by means of the light that objects ‘emit’, 
which goes via the senses and nerves to the brain. “Judgment is then the essential aspect 
of Descartes’ system of perception in which the sensory information perceived is 
nothing more than a series of representations for the mind to categorize … In the 
Cartesian system of vision, representation replaced resemblance. From this point on, the 
modern picturing of the world as representation became possible” (Mirzoeff, 1999, 43-
4). With mathematics at the forefront, the world became measurable and calculable. The 
geometrical mapping of space arose with this ‘Cartesian perspectivism’. A two 
dimensional map can represent three-dimensional space: Alberti’s metaphor. 
 The canvas on which the close observer paints the world, the window or veil 
between subject and object, is like a mathematical grid. The world appears as consisting 
of analyzable and fragmented parts. “The veil is a grid which arranges the world into 
parallel squares and in this respect the veil through which the modern self as spectator 
sees the world is a mathematical one” (Romanyshyn, 1989, 77). This window of 
representation strictly separates the subject as a spectator on this side of the screen from 
the world as an object of vision, a spectacle. The world beyond the screen becomes 
primarily a matter of light and information, of data (cf. Romanyshyn, 1989, 54-56). The 
human eye, human vision, measures the world's horizon; as such the window is the 
condition of the scientific attitude. Descartes’ Cogito as a subject of pure thought and 
vision, clear consciousness, is on this side of the window. As a point (of perspective) it 
differs radically from the world of bodily extensions at the other side of the window. It 
distrusts that world of bodily sensations and doubts whether the world really is as it 
appears via the senses. As such it is similar to the Freudian self that also distrusts the 
way the world appears (at first sight): “Both are born on this side of the window” 
(Romanyshyn, 1989, 78).  
 Cyberspace can be seen as a continuation of this modern raster grid. 'Pixel-
pictures' digitally encode the images by subdividing the picture plane into a Cartesian 
grid of cells (cf. Mitchell, 1992, 5). And the advent of the graphical user interface 
transforms the computer into a medium opening up perspectival and navigational 
spaces. Cyberspace could be interpreted as the most advanced technological form of 
Cartesian subjectivity. Supposedly it affords the 'mind' or virtual subject an almost 
infinite vision on, and mobility through, the world of data entered via the computer 
interfaces. I have already brought up several times the question whether the computer 
interfaces transporting us into cyberspace are a culmination of the tradition of 
representation, or rather its nullification. Through the discussion of Cartesian 
perspectivism above I hope to have created an appropriate context for a Lacanian 
account of the Cartesian subject of representation. Such an account is in my opinion 
most useful for understanding subjectivity in the age of information. 
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2. Lacan: fantasy as the 'real stuff' of the Cartesian subject 
2.1. Lacan beyond Cartesian dualism: Cogito and libido 
Alberti’s window of linear perspective is similar to Lacan’s window of fantasy.171 Both 
cover the space of projective geometry: the subject projects the real on the screen. This 
projected real – which we call reality – therefore has the structure of a projection-
screen.172 Sense of reality contains a projective element (the pleasure principle 'inhabits' 
the reality principle). The distance or space between the desiring subject and the real 
object is a necessary condition for the appearance of reality (in strict psychoanalytical 
terms this is the 'space' or 'gap' of alienation and separation, cf. chapter one, part 3). 
Distance motivates the emergence of represented reality (cf. S.11, 57). We don't see 
anything that is not at a distance, in space.173
Lacan’s discussion of the geometric laws of perspective lead to the conclusion 
that the Cartesian subject is a geometric point, a point of perspective (S.11, 86). The 
Cartesian subject is as the symbolic subject a point without substance, a mere point of 
view: the ‘distant point’. Lacan affirms this Cartesian subject of representation as being 
similar to the symbolic subject of desire that psychoanalysis studies.174 The Lacanian 
subject is nevertheless not a disembodied spectator at this side of the screen. It is not 
without substance, and does not have an infinite or ‘godlike’ vision. Lacan's ‘logic of 
fantasy’ (formalized in the matheme S<>a) theorizes the connection of the symbolic 
subject to something that is not of its order, outside (symbolic) signification: the real (of 
enjoyment). Symbolical interpretation cannot entirely construct the 'real truth'. There's 
also a 'libidinal' element in it (embodied communication: see chapter four). The cell 
phone as an object of symbolical interaction is also an object of enjoyment: it produces 
a (symbolical) self-image that we love, we love to talk etc. As an object of fantasy it 
gives form to enjoyment.175
171
 This is the thesis Gérard Wajeman developed in his 2000-2001 research seminar at the University 
Paris Saint Dénis, “La naissance du regard”, from which the present paragraphs borrow some ideas. 
172
 Christian Metz describes the identification with the camera in cinema, which leads to a double 
movement of vision: "All vision consists of a double movement: projective (the 'sweeping' searchlight) 
and introjective: consciousness as a sensitive recording surface (as a screen). I have the impression at 
once that, to use a common expression, I am 'casting' my eyes on things, and that the latter, thus 
illuminated, come to be deposited within me (we then declare that it is these things that have been 
'projected', on my retina, say) (Metz, 1982, 50). 
173
 Gilbert Durand claims in the chapter on ‘The Transcendental Fantastic’ [‘Space, The A Priori Form of 
the Fantastic’] of his authorative The Anthropological Structures of the Imaginary, against Kant that 
space, and not time, is the primary form of imagination: “Since, for us, duration is not the immediate 
datum of ontological substance, and time is not the a priori condition of phenomena – since symbols are 
not of its domain – space remains as the general “sensorium” of the fantastic function. Fabulation, the 
inexhaustible source “of ideas and images”, is, as even Bergson admits, symbolized by space, “the 
symbol of the creative tendency of the human intelligence”. Space may be a subjective construct and an 
illusion, but our intuition can produce nothing but images, and they are in space, which is the locus of our 
imagination. For this reason the human imagination is shaped by the development of sight, then of 
hearing and language, all of them means of learning and assimilation “at a distance”” (Durand, 1995, 
391).
174
 Lacan's relation to the Cartesian Cogito is nevertheless complex and therefore not univocal. On the one 
hand he considers it to be the consciousness that falsely thinks itself as transparent (cf. S.2, 6-7). On the 
other hand, the Cartesian subject is the 'subject of science', without intuitive but only rational access to 
knowledge (E. 831), that is as such a 'non-intuitive' subject of 'rational law' also the subject of 
psychoanalysis. 
175
 As Miller concludes regarding Lacan's final teachings – see chapter one: signification is enjoyed, or 
enjoyment is signification: sens-joui.
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The libidinal ‘body of enjoyment’ (or ‘the body as enjoyment’) directs 
consciousness; it fouls (and fools) the Cartesian screen of clear representation. The 
screen interfaces the symbolical and the libidinal: representation is affected. The 
Internet perfectly illustrates this symbolical-libidinal picturing of the world, as its 
representations are obviously not detached from the enjoyment it offers (seeing, surfing, 
playing, exploring). The Lacanian subject of the interface is beyond the mind-body 
dualism. “To the distant spectator self behind the window of his or her consciousness, a 
consciousness detached from the world and the body, psychoanalysis opposes its notion 
of the unconscious, of a self that is already borne by its embodied desires into the world, 
a self in intimate proximity with things … It not only restores the self to the world, but 
it does so in a concrete way through the intermediary of things, through the way in 
which things of the world are already tied to the body through the bonds of libidinal 
desire” (Romanyshyn, 1989, 205). 
I will take the opportunity to explore the Lacanian subject at greater depth as a 
disembodied point of view and an embodied object: its form and its content. 
2.2. The unconscious (virtual) subject as a partial perspective upon the world 
Lacan takes the Cartesian subject as the model of the (virtual) subject of language. 
“The unconscious is the sum of the effects of speech on a subject, at the level at 
which the subject constitutes himself out of the effects of the signifier. This 
makes it clear that, in the term subject – this is why I referred back to its origin – 
I am not designating the living substratum needed by this phenomenon of the 
subject, nor any sort of substance, nor any being possessing knowledge in his 
pathos, his suffering, whether primal or secondary, nor even some incarnated 
logos, but the Cartesian subject, who appears at the moment when doubt is 
recognized as certainty” (S.11, 126).  
Language cuts the direct tie with our ‘substance’ (body, soul, feelings …) and 
simultaneously introduces a self-identity at the level of the word. Identity is virtual 
because it exists at the level of representation, and not ‘in the real’ (cf. chapter two). 
And since we cannot pronounce our ultimate conclusions about ourselves, we are never 
fully known to ourselves.  
Unlike Freud, Lacan introduces the notion of an unconscious subject in 
psychoanalytic theory. This subject can be articulated in media-discourses that, for 
instance, position someone as a ‘star’. We assume the presence of something that is not 
there ‘in the real’. The ‘star’ has a virtual status; and this example at once sheds light on 
the metaphorical status of being in the world of language. It is impossible to say exactly 
what it means to be a ‘star’. This is the mechanism called primal repression by Lacan: 
what I am is impossible to determine fully (‘the ‘I’ is primordially repressed’). We must 
presuppose a subject of enunciation (the pure subject of the signifier, the ‘I’) as the 
(hollow) self-identity that accompanies our thinking and our speech. For without it there 
would be no ‘person’ to which the thoughts and enunciations belong. When we try to 
determine it, it fades away: doubt remains ineluctable. Lacan makes the “I think a mere 
point of fading” (S.11, 224). 
The (virtual, unconscious) subject of language is not a substance but a form.
Lacan’s development of the theory of the Cartesian subject leads up to this conclusion. 
There is a unity in our self-experience, yet this unity is purely formal. The ‘I’ with 
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which I refer to myself does not correspond with some entity in the empirical world. As 
such Lacan’s development of the Cartesian subject seems to have passed via Kant’s 
theory of the transcendental subject as a formal unity of apperception.176 In the context 
of Lacan's difficult notion of an unconscious subject only 'recognizable through its 
thoughts', it is interesting to note that Kant also describes the transcendental I as an It 
('Es') which thinks. He speaks of an 
"empty representation I, of which one cannot say that it is a concept, but a mere 
consciousness that accompanies every concept. Through this I, or He, or It (the 
thing), which thinks, nothing further is represented than a transcendental subject 
of thoughts = x, which is recognized only through the thoughts that are its 
predicates, and about which, in abstraction, we can never have even the least 
concept; because of which we therefore turn in a constant circle, since we must 
always already avail ourselves of the representation of it at all times in order to 
judge anything about it" (CPR, A 346). 
And Roger Scruton observes on Kant’s ‘unity of consciousness’: 
 “[t]he ‘I’ as thereby described is not part of the world but a perspective upon it
(a way things seem)” [my italics, A.N.] (Scruton, 1982, 56).  
The Cogito of Lacanian theory is a perspective upon the world. It functions in a manner 
similar to the human-computer interface. Applications software or end user programs 
interpret digital data merely as information of one specific sort (Simons, 2002, 95):  a 
word processing program doesn't allow the user to read or process images. So the 
program determines the form in which the data appear as information (namely as text), 
while being completely indifferent towards the content of the text. The Lacanian Cogito
necessarily gives a specific form to the world of information on the other side of the 
screen. It is not the all-seeing eye on this side of the screen, but it subjectifies 
(embodies) the supposedly neutral information. Just as the needs and desires of the user 
determine the specific way in which human-computer interfaces make the data 
available, the vision of the Lacanian Cogito (the window upon reality) is already 
colored by fantasy.  
 Vision is a partial perspective. Both the Lacanian Cogito and computer 
interfaces show this partiality, in the two-fold meaning of the word. On the one hand, 
'data' are interpreted from only one (virtual) perspective. On the other, this perspective 
is biased, one-sided, because it excludes other perspectives, and limits the interpretation 
and usability of the 'data' for the virtual subject. The computer interface is not a neutral 
and transparent screen (a conduit, or counter), but above all the face of the data that lie 
176
 Lacan’s ideas on the virtuality of 'mind' match with a way of thinking about the ‘virtualization of 
reality’ that finds an important starting point in the work of Kant. For Kant the ‘virtual soul’ shapes the 
actual existence of man in the physical world: “The move from the virtual as marker of potentiality in one 
order to marker of the potential between or among orders occurs in Kant’s ‘On the Form and Principles of 
the Sensible and the Intelligible Worlds’. Kant, in attempting to understand the nature of the soul, answers 
the problem of the incorporate soul existing in the corporate world by designating the soul as having a “a 
presence in the world [that] is not spatial, but virtual.” Thus the virtual begins to mark that which exists in 
one order and can only be actualized in another order” (Alan Goodrich, ‘Theories of Media: Virtuality',   
http://chicagoschoolmediatheory.net/glossary2004/virtuality.htm)
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behind it, just as the 'imago' is the face that determines how things appear to a desiring 
subject.
2.3. Fantasy as the stuff of the point of view 
The virtual subject is a (geometric) point of perspective. Our family name, for instance, 
gives us a certain 'perspectival position' in a 'world of texts' ('symbolical element' of the 
Cogito). Similarly, we can be a virtual persona in a textual community on the Internet (I 
can describe myself as …). For this 'textual persona' (point of view: pov) to have some 
concrete significance and meaning for the person represented, there must be some 
affective or libidinal aspect to it, which makes it a representation of me, or relevant to 
me ('imaginary element' of the Cogito). This is, according to Lacan, the work of fantasy. 
The example of 'virtual sex' illustrates this. Fantasies necessarily 'supplement' the 
exchange of signs on the computer screen in order to generate a 'lively significance' 
(and this may also translate Lacan's sens-joui, or enjoyed significance). These fantasies 
may be materialized through the use of avatars, or in the exchange of digital 
photographs, which are concrete forms of the mental imagery from which the libidinal 
subject extracts satisfaction. Fantasy necessarily supports linguistic communication. 
Without it there is merely a meaningless, 'robotic' exchange of signs. In the case of (the 
original) identification with my family name (that turns me into an 'unconscious' 
linguistic subject), I also identify myself with the 'imagery' that surrounds this name. 
That is, with the way in which I and others (or to be more precise, the way in which 
those two intermingle: 'I is another') see that family; as 'materialized' in the family arms, 
its reputation, its style, its wealth, the gossip that surrounds it etc: its whole fantasmatic 
ecology. 
 A linguistic subject is subjected to the laws of language. In a very concrete way 
this means that one is a subject of the legal system, of the system of law. Also here 
fantasies decide whether one recognizes oneself as subject to certain laws or not. The 
fantasy of an Islamic terrorist will not sustain the subjectivation of the laws of a liberal 
democratic society. And someone whose fantasies cause a strong identification with his 
virtual persona in cyberspace may find many difficulties in sustaining his ‘normal 
persona’ in ‘real life’. Fantasies give so much ‘substance’ to the machinery of the 
exchange of signs that Lacan concludes with regard to the (unconscious) Cartesian 
subject of representation:  
“Let us say … that the [f]antasy is really the ‘stuff’ of the ‘I’ that is originally 
repressed” (Ec., 314).  
Concurrent (or synchronous) to a detached and neutral subject of representation, 
we are an object of representation. The Lacanian subject exists simultaneously in the 
space of representation and in physical space (and is therefore still in the representation 
tradition, cf. Manovich, chapter two: § 4.1.) It cannot detach itself completely of 
physical space, as the interaction with the other turns it into an object in physical, 
embodied reality. We are such an object because we (fantasmatically) identify ourselves 
with the way in which the other sees us. This is, at least, Lacan's thesis which may 
illuminate (cyber) visual culture. Particularly cyber-sex shows this functioning of 
psychical support or assistance, in that the subject of detached online communication 
(libidinally) identifies himself with the image that the other has of him – or that is 
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constructed in the communication with the other. The self constructs fantasy in relation 
to the other. This brings us to a general exposition on Lacan's theory of vision. 
2.4. Lacan's logic of visual representation 
In 1637 Descartes published, along with his Discourse on Method, his treatise Optics,
which was to illustrate his new scientific method. It aimed to provide a geometry of 
vision, in which the study of light would account for the way we perceive objects. 
Light, with its refractions and reflections, passes immediately (and this claim of 
instantaneous transmission is pivotal to Descartes study) from the object via the lenses 
of the eye to the retina: "the light in the bodies we call luminous is nothing other than a 
certain movement, or very rapid and lively action, which passes to our eyes through the 
medium of the air and other transparent bodies, just as the movement or resistance of 
the bodies encountered by a blind man passes to his hand by means of a stick" 
(Descartes, 1988, CSM 1, 153). For Descartes the full explanation of our perception of 
light will involve more than physiology, for "it is the soul which sees, not the eye, and it 
does not see directly, but only by means of the brain" (CSM 1, 172, cf. Cottingham, 
1993, 110). Nevertheless, it is light that is the 'direct touch' between the object and 
subject of vision.
For Lacan, this 'directness' between object and subject is not so evident at all. It 
is, to the contrary, strongly mediated, and here fantasy plays a crucial role. In his 
discussion of the Cartesian geometric eye Lacan observes: “What is at issue in 
geometral perspective is simply the mapping of space, not sight” (S.11, 86). Lacan 
develops a distinction between the physiological relation (the image as a matter of light) 
and the 'psychological' relation (the screen as a matter of desire). We are, so to speak, at 
two places at the same time (which testifies once more of Lacan's roots in the tradition 
of representation, to which he gives an interesting turn, as the real is 'impossible'). We 
are at the place from which we look, and at the place from which we desire to see: 
where we identify our vision in fantasy (the ‘cinematographic identification’). In 
psychical reality those two positions go hand in hand. In cinema, for instance, both the 
eye and the identification with the camera create the experience of reality. The same 
goes for the psychical experience of being involved in a virtual world on the Internet. I 
not only look (in the first person perspective: through the eyes of my avatar, or in the 
third person perspective: upon my avatar and its direct surroundings), but I 'know' at the 
same time that my virtual image (my avatar, its behavior and expressions) is being 
looked at by the other participants in the virtual world. It is this 'interactivity' that causes 
the genuine experience of reality in this world. Without it, alone, this virtual presence 
would stop interesting me.  
Vision is not neutral and cannot proclaim an objective point of view, as in 
‘Cartesian perspectivism’. The point of view of linear perspective does not cover the 
whole process of sight. We not only look, but are also seen. “The object a in the field of 
the visible is the gaze” (S.11, 105). In Lacan's logic of representation we are both a 
subject and an object of vision. In the terminology of linear perspective: we are both at 
the distance point (the eye) and at the vanishing point (the point of alterity, where our 
vision reaches its limit: the point of the other, what Lacan calls the gaze of the Other). 
For we try to ‘imagine’ what we are in the eyes of the other: that is what fantasy does. 
Norman Bryson analyzes this logic via a painting of Raphael, Marriage of the Virgin, in 
which a group of people is depicted with the technique of linear perspective as standing 
before a temple whose blank opening at the center manifests the vanishing point from 
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which we seem to be looked at. “[T]he single vanishing point marks the installation 
within the painting of a principle of radical alterity, since its gaze returns that of the 
viewer as its own object: something is looking at my looking: a gaze whose position I 
can never occupy, and whose vista I can imagine only by reversing my own, by 
inverting the perspective before me, and by imagining my own gaze as the new, 
palindromic point of disappearance on the horizon” (Bryson, 1983, 106). 
Besides reflection, the image on the screen also involves a (perspectival) 
positioning towards a 'real' (truth). Lacan refers to a popular alternative to the use of 
perspective, namely anamorphosis. In this system of representation, standing in front of 
the picture (at the distance point) does not put the spectator ‘in line’ with the vanishing 
point. He must put his eyes level with the picture and go to one side or the other in order 
to see what the image shows. “Anamorphosis reveals that perspective is simply a visual 
convention and one that, when pushed to extremes, generates unnatural results” 
(Mirzoeff, 1999, 48-9). Thus Hans Holbein’s The Ambassadors (1519) depicts along 
with the two powerful figures at court a curious spiral shape that is revealed to be a 
skull when seen from the correct viewpoint. It hints that the ambassadors too will die 
and face judgment, despite their worldly power. In Lacanian theory the anamorphosis 
illustrates the impossibility to look truth straight in the face (to see things 'as they are'). 
The image protects us from the truth behind it (that is to say every image is a substitute 
for the truth of castration).  
As objects of vision the issue is to find out what kind of object we are in the 
eyes of the other (that we identify with). Christians see themselves, from a godlike or 
eternal point of view, as nothing but dust. This identification with his 'true picture' (as 
seen by God) 'breaks' his imaginary self-image. Likewise, online others make my 
presence in imaginary space more than merely an imaginary illusion of my ego. When 
we do not identify at all with such virtual perspectives (of others) on ourselves, we are 
'outside reality' (that is for Lacan basically intersubjective): in a pathological position.177
The truth of fantasy lies not in the Self ('is my avatar a true picture of myself'), but in 
relation to the Other that breaks up my self-image and, crucial for Lacan's notion of 
truth, must continue to do so: 'I never look at myself from the place from which you see 
me' (cf. S.11, 103). 
One can conclude Lacan's discussion with 'Cartesian perspectivism' in this 
manner. Descartes posits a transparent subject able to represent reality objectively in a 
geometrical space (both Heidegger and Lacan diagnose this as a subject that makes the 
world into a 'display'). Lacan posits the subversive subject of desire. Although it desires 
conclusion, which is (libidinal, symbolical) death, it can and must never converge with 
the representations it makes. Interactivity with the other must avoid the growing foggy 
of perspective; must avoid the screen from becoming a mere mirror. I will give a final 
discussion of this issue by means of the 'schemes' that articulate the observing subject 
in-the-world.
177
 The psychopath is an obvious example of someone who does not identify with the way he is being 
seen by others. This being without 'conscience' may manifest itself in cyberspace by 'raping' someone 
else's avatar. 
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3. Fantasy as a scheme 
3.1. Kant: schematism as a 'hidden art in the depths of the human soul' 
In 'The unconscious' (1915) Freud refers to Kant in order to emphasize the aspect of 
subjective constitution in our experience of reality. “Kant warned us not to overlook the 
fact that our perceptions are subjectively conditioned and must not be regarded as 
identical with what is perceived” (S.E. 14, 171; cf. Meissner, 2000, 1119). Kant 
considers the spatio-temporal world as a setting (‘Setzung’) that we as subjects of 
knowledge continuously execute. In order to be apprehensible, the manifold empirical 
sensations (the matter of our knowledge) must necessarily be put into the form of space 
and time. No appearances without the horizon of the time-space dimension. This 
synthesizing of sensations into appearances is an activity of the transcendental 
imagination. I already mentioned this in the third chapter, but will now give a more 
meticulous description, and examine imagination in its close relation with the 
understanding that connects the appearances into a coherent, knowable object.  
We must connect or combine appearances in order to make some sense of them. 
This, Kant says, is an activity of the understanding. Thus I see not merely several limbs 
and parts of the body, but I understand them as constituting one and the same body. The 
understanding relates the appearances to an object. For Kant coherent perception is 
impossible without concepts of understanding, or categories. A concept is an idea (in 
Greek: ‘phantasia’, ‘phantasma’) of the understanding through which we understand 
phenomena as a meaningful unity. In our conception of things we combine the elements 
of perception according to certain rules or laws. When we succeed in combining 
appearances by means of concepts we can understand the world. So in case of the 
aforementioned example of the body, it is our concept of the body that organizes our 
perception and awareness of it.178
Kant distinguishes three different levels of (formation or relation to) the 'object'. 
First of all, sensations relate us to the Thing ('Ding': latter something or thinghood; for 
there must be something rather than nothing in order for sensations to occur). Secondly, 
the transcendental imagination puts those sensations in the forms of space and time and 
thus makes the Thing into an object of experience ('Gegenstand'), or an appearance.
Thirdly, 'innate' concepts or categories of the understanding make those appearances 
into an object for knowledge ('Objekt'): "Appearances, so far as they are thought as 
objects according to the unity of the categories, are called phaenomena" (CPR, A 249).  
The unifying qualities of the categories turn the diversity of appearances into a 
coherent object of knowledge. So, although I might perceive many things as objects – 
'Gegenstande' – in which I can throw away my trash, I (must) understand that only some 
178
 There is the obvious reference to the concept of the 'body image' in the work of Maurice Merleau-
Ponty. Although I do not use and go into this reference, I do make some comments on (transcendental) 
psychology. The English literature on the psychology of the body has a diversity of terms to express this 
idea on 'concepts': body image, body scheme, body percept, corporal awareness of the body, postural 
model. The following distinction is practical. Body schemes are the sensorial and motorial schemes of 
organization that are constructed during the development of the body. They allow us to act (such as 
simultaneously driving and shifting gear in a busy traffic, playing with a ball and singing at the same time 
…) without a conscious awareness of how we are actually doing that. The body percept, or body image, is 
our (subjective) sight on our own body and its possibilities. So if someone perceives himself as clumsy, it 
will be hard to explain how easy it is to drive and shift gear at the same time. In the (French) context of 
(transcendental) psychology, we could say that Lacan, with his notions of the ideal (body) ego and the 
ego-ideal, focuses on the imaginary and symbolical aspects of the body image.  
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of them are a dustbin. The question is how to apply a concept correctly to an empirical 
appearance. For Kant this appliance occurs according to certain schemes that mediate 
empirical reality and the intellectual concept. A correct use of concepts requires some 
sort of 'intermediaries' that connect ('interface') empirical reality and concepts, the 
sensible and the intellectual domain. Kant calls them schemes.179 But why would the 
categories be applicable to the material of perception in the first place? Because Kant 
holds that the understanding does not take its fundamental concepts from empirical 
reality, but puts them in it. The spatio-temporal appearances therefore already contain 
the schemes: in the constitution of an understandable world of appearances the 
understanding played a constructive role. Imagination and the understanding are 
homologous in the construction of what we experience as a coherent reality. 
The scheme is a rule according to which the imagination synthesizes intuitions 
('Anschauungen'). The most general rule is that of the sequence. The form of the inner 
intuition is time: we always experience things in time. Therefore it may not surprise us 
that time is the primary scheme: "Time is the a priori formal condition of all 
appearances in general" (CPR A 34). Space is the form of all outer intuitions: when we 
perceive something outside us, it is in space. For Kant however, space already belongs 
to the inner state. Whether a representation has an outer thing as its object or not, it is 
basically a representation for an inner intuition, that has time as its form. The schemata 
that structure and organize our coherent understanding of things "are therefore nothing 
but a priori time-determinations in accordance with rules" (CPR A 145).  
In the Critique of Pure Reason the scheme of causality is the most important 
concept of the understanding. It illustrates that schemes are about a 'logical' 
determination of time.180 I will try to illustrate this. Each time that I type on my 
keyboard (A) and see sentences appear on the screen (B), I come to connect A and B as 
cause and effect. My understanding puts the connection of causality into this material, 
or it includes it under the concept of causality. As this concept is not derived from 
empirical perception, Kant comes to see this concept as one of the twelve categories of 
the understanding, that is to say the fundamental concepts that have their origin purely, 
a priori, in the understanding itself. All other concepts originate in the application of 
those categories to the appearances. So when I think that typing causes the appearance 
of sentences, the concept of writing results. The fact that B occurs each time after A 
(which is not exactly the same as B because of A) is what Kant calls the scheme of the 
concept causality: it leads to the conceptual determination of the appearances.181 As the 
imagination synthesizes the intuitions in accordance with schemes, imagination is 
pivotal in making reality into an object for knowledge (as it is for Lacan in making it 
into an object of desire). 
Kant gives the example of the concept of a dog – it makes the functioning of 
schemes more specific. "The concept of a dog signifies a rule in accordance with which 
my imagination can specify the shape of a four-footed animal in general, without being 
restricted to any single particular shape that experience offers me or any possible image 
179
 Kant expounds this theory in the first chapter of 'The Transcendental Doctrine of the Power of 
Judgement': 'On the schematism of the pure concepts of the understanding' (Critique of Pure Reason A
137-147). 
180
 Lacan's 'logic of fantasy' parallels this 'logical' determination of time: the subject finds each time, 
repeatedly, the same thing (encounters the same type of partner, acts the same way …). 
181
 Similarly: encountering, over and over again, the wrong type of partner can lead to the 'concept' of 
hysteria (a desire that wants to remain unsatisfied). Or: continuously surfing the Internet to seek 'that' 
what one cannot find, leads to the 'concept' of obsessional neurosis. 
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that I can exhibit in concreto. This schematism of our understanding with regards to 
appearances and their mere form is a hidden art in the depths of the human soul" (CPR 
A 141). The imagination provides rules or schemes for 'drawing' the figure of a concept. 
Those schemes aim at "the unity in the determination of sensibility" (CPR A 140). They 
'imagine' the intellectual concept in 'drawing' its general rules or figures in the manifold 
of appearances. But, Kant stresses, it is not similar to a fixed image (CPR A 140-142). 
The "image is a product of the empirical faculty of productive imagination, the schema 
of sensible concepts (such as figures in space) is a product and as it were a monogram 
of pure a priori imagination, through which and in accordance with which the images 
first become possible" (CPR A 141-142).  
 These schemes are pivotal for the formation of the object of knowledge. With 
them we recognize images as a certain object (or: recognize a concept in certain 
images).182 But, as the object-in-itself ('Ding an sich') can never be subsumed 
(interpreted, visualized …) under a certain concept (that is to say the concept does not 
have a final, perfect form) those conditions of linking sensibility and the intellectual 
must not become an imaginary hypostasis: an image that would (perfectly) unite those 
two domains.183 Kant also rejects the Platonic doctrine of a perfect mediation: there is 
no ideal image of a dog. 
3.2. Freud on fantasy as a scheme 
For Freud the (unconscious) core of fantasies conditions reality. This schematic 
structure of original fantasies organizes the elements of our perception. Fantasy doesn't 
merely follow sense-impression, it actually structures it. It is in-between real sense 
perceptions and their conscious understanding. In this manner it resembles the Kantian 
a priori condition of experience. A more current and neurobiological terminology 
would speak of those schemes as ‘in our genes’. They are the ‘blueprint’ of our 
psychological self, determining our desires. In 'From the history of an infantile neurosis' 
(1918) Freud states:
“[T]he phylogentically inherited schemata, which, like the categories of 
philosophy, are concerned with the business of ‘placing’ the impressions derived 
from actual experience. I am inclined to take the view that they are precipitates 
from the history of human civilization. The Oedipus complex, which comprises 
a child’s relation to his parents, is one of them – is, in fact, the best known 
member of the class. Wherever experiences fail to fit in with the hereditary 
schema, they become remodeled in the imagination … We are often able to see 
the schema triumphing over the experience of the individual” (S.E. 17, 119). 
Fantasy is both a trans-individual, general form of subjectivity, and an instance of the 
individual. For one thing, fantasy's original structure (the 'hereditary schema') makes 
'normal' experience contain a conditional element of structuring – the prohibition of 
incest, for instance, makes love relations within kinship a psychic impossibility. For 
182
 One may question the universality of the Kantian schemes by showing a possible socio-cultural factor 
in it. For, to use a previous example, my understanding of an object being a dustbin may be caused by the 
(police) rule or law (for the maintenance of public order) that punishes me when I throw my trash in an 
object that resembles a dustbin, but is not one.  
183
 In previous examples, relating Kantian and Lacanian thought on the scheme, such a 'perfect 
unification' of object and image is a pathological fantasmatic captivation.  
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another, fantasy functions as a compensation for the limitations that structured reality 
imposes upon us: we 'remodel experiences in the imagination' when they do not fit 
within schematized reality. So when I do fall in love with my niece, fantasy remodels 
those affects in order to escape its impossibility in reality.  
We may nevertheless only assume such a (transcendental) fantasmatic scheme 
determining each and everyone's life history when the interpretation of someone's 
individual biography has reached its limits, as Freud concludes in his text on the Wolf 
Man. 'Philosophical' thoughts on transcendental structures are for Freud  
“only admissible when psycho-analysis strictly observes the correct order of 
precedence, and, after forcing its way through the strata of what has been 
acquired by the individual, comes at last upon traces of what has been inherited” 
(S.E. 17, 121). 
Thus Freud formulates his controversial ‘phylogenetic’ hypothesis of the origin of 
fantasies. Not only does he believe in the development of the libido (with all its possible 
vicissitudes) in individual life. As a confirmed evolutionist Freud also thinks that the 
evolution of the human species lays down some specifically human structures in our 
psychic constitution. Via Darwin, Lamarck (who develops the idea of the inheritance of 
acquired character-traits) and Haeckel (the development of an individual organism goes 
through the same stages as the species as a whole) he arrives at his great hypothesis of 
the phylogenetic origin of the Oedipus complex, as described in Totem and Taboo (cf. 
Perron, 2001, 590). The founding experiences of each individual life history actually 
took place at the origin of mankind. In man's prehistory the sons killed the father of the 
'primitive horde', who kept all the females for himself. The guilt and remorse that 
followed this primeval murder then became a universal aspect of all human beings. The 
Oedipus complex repeats this phylogenetic origin that provides the matrix for our 
desires. The origin of each of us as a subject of desire is at the same time the origin of 
what it means to be a human being.  
3.3. Lacan: fantasy as the scheme of desire 
Bernard Baas' works (1992, 1998) consider the relation between Lacanian 
psychoanalysis and (Kantian) phenomenology. His conclusions delineate the fantasy-
object as the Kantian intermediary element between the understanding (the intellectual 
‘empty form’) and the sensations (the matter of knowledge). That is, the object a is the 
scheme of desire (Baas, 1998, 54-5). Also Žižek considers fantasy (or the fantasy-
object) the scheme of desire. “[F]antasy does not simply realize a desire in a 
hallucinatory way; rather its function is similar to that of Kantian ‘transcendental 
schematism’: a fantasy constitutes our desire, provides its co-ordinates; that is, literally 
‘teaches us how to desire’ … it provides a ‘schema’ according to which certain positive 
objects in reality can function as objects of desire” (Žižek, 1997, 7). Freud’s crucial text 
on fantasy, ‘A Child is Being Beaten’ illustrates this 'schematism of pure desire' in 
Lacan's work. 
 In this text Freud analyzes the transformations – or avatars (S.5, 237) – of a 
fantasy he regularly encounters in his therapeutic work, which comes down to the 
expression: 'A child is being beaten'. His patients use this fantasy in its conscious form 
(that is for Freud its 'third avatar') to generate libidinal pleasure: it often ends in acts of 
auto-erotic satisfaction. Freud discovers yet two previous forms of this (perverse) 
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fantasy. The first form of this fantasy of chastisement, that probably once was 
conscious, comes down to the sentence: 'the father beats a child'. It expresses, according 
to Freud, the child's desire to be loved by the father; for the father beats the other child, 
hence does not love her. The second form of the fantasy is according to Freud so guilt-
ridden that his patients cannot consciously remember it. Therefore analysis must 
reconstruct it, and then the fantasy reads: 'I'm being beaten by the father'. It expresses 
for Freud an incestuous desire for the father, that the extreme feelings of guilt 
completely reverse, as a form of punishment, into its opposite (loving turns into 
hating/beating). The child, or the adult it becomes, uses the fantasy in the third form in 
such a way that its central figures are no longer identifiable. The fantasy apparently 
does not revolve at all around the child and its father, or around figures that are directly 
associated to them (siblings, teachers etc). Therefore: 'a child is being beaten'.  
Lacan's analysis of this text considers the third form of this fantasy as nothing 
more then a general scheme (S.5, 238). This final form of the fantasy gives a specific 
(manageable, 'coherent', subjectivized, schematic) memorization or fixation of an 
impossible desire, which retains for the subject the faculty to constitute the privileged 
image in which its genital satisfactions find support (S.5, 239). Thus this fantasy-subject 
of chastisement finds satisfaction in ‘scenarios’ in which ‘someone is being beaten’. 
The repetition (replay, repeated performance) of some sort of 'beating' functions as a 
scheme, which provides the fantasy-subject the co-ordinates for 'drawing' the 
(empirical) object that can satisfy its desire. The scheme of fantasy allows the formal 
structure of desire to find an object in the order of sensibility. It resembles Kant's 
remark on mediation: "This mediating representation must be pure (without anything 
empirical) and yet intellectual on the one hand and sensible on the other. Such a 
representation is the transcendental schema" (CPR A 138). Fantasy as a scheme stripped 
of empirical reference, nevertheless determines the appearance of empirical objects of 
desire: as a formal structure or scenario. In 'designing' the empirical object, it 
simultaneously voices or phrases the fundamental 'concept' – in its psychoanalytical 
guise this is the fundamental fantasy.184
The psychological aspect of Kant's analysis of schematism (which also has 
epistemological, logical and methodological aspects) shows schematism as 'the hidden 
art in the depths of the human soul'. In psychoanalysis this 'hidden art' works in the 
pivotal phenomenon of repetition. John Suler points out the functioning of unconscious 
causality in online relations in which people constantly search for the same kind of 
partners, and thus constantly make the online other appear within the same window of 
perception. In chapter five I discussed the real as the cause of repetition, or 'the real 
cause of repetition'. The issue at hand shows that the real (of psychical reality) is (as 
good as) inseparable from the fundamental fantasy. We may even quote Kant's sayings 
on the scheme of causality to illuminate the (real) unconscious cause (the unconscious 
fantasy) ruling the object-choice: "The schema of the cause and of causality of a thing in 
general is the real upon which, whenever it is posited, something else always follows. It 
therefore consists in the succession of the manifold insofar as it is subjected to a rule" 
(CPR A 144; my italics).  
 Like the subject of knowledge needs the scheme and the imagination as 
conditions for knowing an object, the desiring subject only desires an object when it 
184 The unconscious, repressed, fundamental fantasy of the fantasy ‘A child is being beaten’ turned out to 
be the masochistic and incestuous fantasy of the girl - for this fantasy concerns primarily, although not 
only, girls - ‘being beaten by the father’. Such fundamental fantasies are a construction of analysis.  
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shows a ‘scheme’ (a 'trait', the mysterious x that makes the other attractive or repulsive) 
put in  reality by the subject itself. It does not follow, however, that the subject of desire 
fully constructs its object – like in some sort of psychotic hallucination. Rather that its 
‘material object’ only appears to be desirable when it fits within the subject’s 
fantasmatic scheme. Or when it fits within the subject's fantasmatic window, of which 
the computer interface is a new avatar as it also makes the unknown x appear in a 
certain way. 
Conclusion
"The problem is that notions such as the cyborg and the persona are not yet fully 
articulated so as to offer an complete alternative to the notion of the individual. 
However, this does not mean rejecting the model of the postmodern persona or 
the pov. Instead it is merely an indicator that we are still in the crisis period in 
which alternatives are incomplete. We are in the middle of an ethical and 
political 'working-out' of the possibilities and potential of new modes of 
subjectivation, without closure" (Shields, 1997). 
This chapter focuses on the role of imagination in Cartesian thought, or rather: on the 
absence of it in Descartes' philosophy, and Lacan's thrust to make it into the central 
notion of his psychoanalytical mode of thought, while still appealing to the Cartesian 
subject. By developing this theme I try to give an alternative to the unsatisfying 
postmodern solution to the Cartesian subject of 'neutral' and 'objective' vision, a 
'solution' that holds subjective perspectives as fully contextualized, singular and 
particular. I allude to the stream of thought that considers cyberspace to be merely a 
liberation of old normative ('Oedipal') modes of subjectivation, in that it offers the 
possibilities of free, singular expression. From a psychoanalytic standpoint, this 
naturally is far too dismissive of the 'deeper structures' that still determine individual 
consciousness. Interestingly enough, Lacan took up this matter by focusing on the 
crucial notion of fantasy as the conditional supplement of the Cartesian subject. On the 
one hand, it clings to the (Cartesian) idea that the way we see things cannot directly be 
traced back to natural states or conditions. On the other hand it (radically) denies the 
(Cartesian) notion of a clear, objective, neutral (and indeed: repressive) vision. It turns 
so-called objective vision into vision that is always partial. Fantasy, considered a 
faculty of the body by Descartes, mediates body and mind, (real) cause and (symbolic) 
effect. For Lacan, the bodily aspect of fantasy is its departure from libido: fantasy 
provides 'psychical' objects for 'physical' drives. The Cartesian neutral perspective thus 
becomes a staged perspective, a perspective from a certain 'lived subjectivity', a specific 
being-in-the-world. My exposition of schematism is intended to emphasize that this 
does not lead to a postmodern notion of fully singularized points of view (the pov that 
would thrive in cyberspace). Schemata show how fantasy mediates, interfaces, the 
singular and the universal; how 'singular expressions' are impregnated with a general 
pattern. Or how the pattern becomes visible in concrete acts or expressions. Kant and 
Freud prepared the ground for Lacan to theorize fantasy as what (originally) mediates 
'universal rationality' and 'singular subjectivity'. The scheme of fantasy illuminates how 
point of view (disembodied and de-contextualized in Descartes' philosophy, embodied 
and contextualized in postmodern philosophy) is 'embedded' in 'underlying' scenarios: 
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conditional scenarios that are necessary to deal with the noumenal dimension. So we 
can imagine an alternative to Oedipus. I try to do this by focusing on fantasy. Its 
creativity is not just a free (self) creation. It is a creativity that is at the same time a 
design of an underlying real determination, which Freudian psychoanalysis conceives to 
be the fundamental fantasy. Only in this sense, the model of creativity that my theory of 
fantasy stands for is one of 'liberation': via self-knowledge, without self-realization.  
 The pivotal function of mediation in Lacan's theory of representation can 
illuminate digital technologies' mediatization. Representations do not (rationally) reflect 
the real, nor duplicate it in a secondary order of illusions. They are, so to speak, the 
intimate expressions of a 'mute' real. For such a theory of representing the real, that does 
not fall back into dualisms of body and mind, or man and world, fantasy is crucial. This 
model of fantasy is working in the representations of the world by means of the 
computer screen. 
201
APPENDIX. Semiotics: towards the notion of the referent as a form 
"Ecstasy is that quality specific to each body that spirals in on itself until it has 
lost all meaning, and thus radiates as pure and empty form" (Baudrillard, 1988, 
187).
1. Introduction 
Since the beginning of Western thought, or perhaps even since the origin of mankind 
itself, man has realized that the exchange of meaningful messages is a mediated process 
consisting of the transmission, reception and recognition of signs. The sign, as it is 
generally understood, refers to something different from itself. It presents the object in 
its absence. The best-known system of signs, spoken language, is therefore a medium 
that relates us to ‘objects’ (things, persons, worlds, ideas, intentions etc) that are not 
immediately present. Presence, or what we are inclined to call reality, is mediated by the 
sign. For that reason Plato considered signs as deceptive 'things': they don't reflect 
reality in a direct manner but merely approach it.  
Western modernity, however, brings forth the thinking subject as the 
representation of the world in its exact form: thought is the perfect medium. The rupture 
between this thinking subject and the world, which is the radical consequence of the 
Cartesian cogito ergo sum, is broadly recognized or even diagnosed as the main 
characteristic of modern thought. The Cartesian Cogito introduces a crack in the 
ontological homogeneity of the universe. In a second move this (idealistic) subject 
nevertheless appropriates the material world by the medium of clear thought, thereby 
closing the gap in the system of knowledge. But Jean Francois Lyotard's ‘theory of 
delegitimization’ shows that contemporary thought can no longer rely upon the idea of a 
human rationality (in science or philosophy) that legitimizes tales of ‘true’ 
representation. A new rupture initiates and characterizes the so-called post-modern era. 
This is the ‘breach of contract’ between language and reality.185 Language no longer 
represents the outside world unproblematically. Because of the intransparancy of 
language as a medium, this (second) rupture between subject and object is structurally 
insolvable. The theories of modern semiotics are to a large extent responsible for 
developing this  perspective on the scope of the human mind.  
2. 'Mentalese': meaning as an object in the mind 
 John Locke (1632-1704) was the first philosopher who doubted, and finally denied, the 
objectivity of certain elements of representation (‘qualities’). He sought to understand 
the interconnection between representation and knowledge, thereby questioning the 
objectivity of knowledge. To that end he distinguished primary qualities which are 
‘formally objective’ (determinations of space and time such as size, form, position, 
number: the quantitative aspects of objects) from secondary qualities which are 
‘virtually objective’ (the objects' qualities of sense-perception, such as color, sound, 
smell). Those secondary qualities are ‘impressions’ that solely exist in consciousness 
and not in the things outside us, although an object may possess certain grounds 
(powers, ‘virtutes’) for giving us the impression that it is red or blue. But those powers 
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 Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: Report on Knowledge, (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1986). George Steiner, Real Presences (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989). 
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have no necessary resemblance or analogy to the impressions they cause in us. This 
body of ideas developed by Locke gave an important push to the notion of a 
‘virtualization of reality’. 
 Locke introduced the formal study of signs to philosophy. One can recapitulate 
Locke's philosophy of language, and that of the British empiricists Hobbes, Berkeley 
and Hume, in the view that meaning is not an independent 'thing' outside us, but 
primarily relates to our thinking or consciousness. Locke strikingly formulates this in 
his Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690), where he states that  'the use of 
words is to be sensible marks of ideas; and the ideas they stand for are their proper and 
immediate signification'. In the current philosophy of language we call this ‘mentalese’. 
Beyond British empirism we find its classical version in the Continental rationalism of 
Descartes, Leibniz and the school of Port-Royal. This rationalistic version holds ideas 
as present (‘innate’) in our consciousness from the beginning. They are not based on 
sensory perception as in the empiricist version. This rationalistic tradition makes itself 
felt in modern forms of ‘mentalese’, such as the linguistic theories of Noam Chomsky. 
He holds consciousness to a large extent as pre-structured: the principles of a universal 
grammar are ‘innate’. Jerry Fodor's cognitive psychology uses the computational 
paradigm that considers mental processes as following strict rules, in order to advance 
the thesis of an ‘innate’ ‘Language of Thought’. 
 The ‘mentalese’ tradition in the philosophy of language locates meaning in 
consciousness and not in the things themselves (direct reference) or in some other 
ontological domain (Platonism). Therefore it is no coincidence that the term ‘semiotics’ 
occurs for the first time in the work of John Locke. But this ‘mentalese’ tradition still 
considers meaning to be an object, an object in the mind. With that it fits our pre-
theoretical intuitions of successful communication consisting of the correct 
understanding by the listener of a thought in the mind of the sender (the 'conduit 
metaphor'). Communication would thus be a matter of ‘coding’ a thought into language 
and subsequently ‘decoding’ it. Notwithstanding its mental character, meaning is still 
considered as a ‘thing’ that exists prior to its articulation in language.186
3. Ferdinand De Saussure: meaning is dependent on the sign 
The work of Ferdinand De Saussure (1857-1913) radicalizes the modern turn to the 
thinking subject, which does not consider meaning to be independent from thought. For 
De Saussure one cannot conceive meaning independently of its articulation in language. 
The sign does not have a one-to-one relationship to its referent, and meaning is no 
longer the description of this reference. The concept of the sign breaks in two parts: the 
signifier (acoustic image) and the signified (the concept that goes along with the 
signifier). The sign results from the association of signifier and signified (De Saussure, 
1983, 67).
“A linguistic sign is not a link between a thing and a name, but between a 
concept and a sound pattern. The sound pattern is not actually a sound; for a 
sound is something physical. A sound pattern is the hearer's psychological 
impression of a sound, as given to him by the evidence of his senses. This sound 
pattern may be called a 'material' element only in that it is the representation of 
our sensory impressions. The sound pattern may thus be distinguished from the 
186
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that it assumes that meaning is objective" (Lakoff, 1995, 119). 
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other element associated with it in a linguistic sign. This other element is 
generally of a more abstract kind: the concept”. (De Saussure, 1983, 66)  
De Saussure's linguistic theories loosen the sign from its stable meaning. Two key 
views are decisive for this dissolution of the traditional sign. The first, which is for De 
Saussure the first principle of language, is the arbitrary nature of the sign (De Saussure 
1983, 67). Or, to be more specific, the arbitrariness of the link between the signifier and 
the signified. Although users treat the signifier as 'standing for' the signified, there is no 
necessary, intrinsic, direct or inevitable relationship between the signifier and the 
signified. Horses could just as well be called bikes. This arbitrary and conventional 
character of signification, of what is signified by a signifier, is also shown by the funny 
situations that may arise when different languages use the same words. I remember, for 
instance, a Frenchman who found it quite astonishing to watch a Dutch current affairs 
program called ‘Hier en nu’ (‘Here and now’ in English, but in French: 'Being Naked 
Yesterday' – probably it could only affirm the French preconceptions about Dutch moral 
corruption). These examples show the ontological arbitrariness of the link between 
signifier and signified: the order of things does in the end not by itself cause certain 
names and their conventional determination by the social or cultural context. Although 
De Saussure mentions certain degrees of arbitrariness, the (philosophical) implication is 
the non-fixed character of signification. The signifier does not refer to a fixed concept. 
“If words had the job of representing concepts fixed in advance, one would be able to 
find exact equivalents for them as between one language and another. But this is not the 
case” (De Saussure, 1983, 114-115). This semiotic notion of arbitrariness anticipates a 
crucial notion of 'cyber-semiotics', which is the arbitrariness between the code-object 
(the zeros and ones of digital encoding) and the form in which it is expressed by the 
computer (applications, interfaces). Furthermore, De Saussure mentions the physical or 
'material' aspect of the signifier. This gains importance in the case of new media objects, 
where the form of the 'interface object' is not a reflection of the (code) object's ideal 
signification (the cursed ideality of the signifier). The shape of the 'interface object' is 
also determined by the materiality of the media as well as technological possibilities and 
limitations. 
 The relations between the sign and other signs within the system as a whole 
determine the value of the sign. This is the second key argument for the dissolution of 
the sign. 
“The notion of value... shows us that it is a great mistake to consider a sign as 
nothing more than the combination of a certain sound and a certain concept. To 
think of a sign as nothing more would be to isolate it from the system to which it 
belongs. It would be to suppose that a start could be made with individual signs, 
and a system constructed by putting them together. On the contrary, the system 
as a united whole is the starting point, from which it becomes possible, by a 
process of analysis, to identify its constituent elements”. (De Saussure, 1983, 
112)
De Saussure ‘decenters’ the individual sign (as Lacan later on uses De Saussure’s work 
to decenter the individual subject). Both the signifier and the signified are relational 
entities. A sound (‘a’) does not mean anything without its relations to other sounds 
(‘pa’). De Saussure has a special interest in language as a system (‘langue’), in the 
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system of rules and conventions that determine its personal use (‘parole’). This 
‘embeddedness’ of sounds in a system of rules determines signification. By defining 
signs in terms of their relationship to other signs the conception of meaning becomes 
purely structural and relational rather than referential. The contextual structures and 
rules of the semiotic system determine meaning.  
 As the first quote from De Saussure brings to the fore, the hearer’s 
psychological impression of the sound creates the concept. Therefore both the signifier 
and the signified are purely “psychological” (De Saussure, 1983, 12, 14-15, 66).187
4. Lacan’s sequel to De Saussure 
The priority of the structural system makes the meaning of a sign determinable by 
analyzing the underlying structures of its use. This is the appealing idea that Levi-
Strauss uses for anthropology and Lacan for psychoanalysis in order to understand the 
‘deeper’ meaning of the phenomena they investigate. Lévi-Strauss and Roland Barthes 
develop the concept of  ‘floating signifiers’ – of special significance in semiotic 
discussions on digitization – in order to designate signifiers that are to a large extent 
determined by their interpreters: they mean what someone wants them to mean. They 
are so open to interpretation that they constitute a “floating chain of signifieds”.188
Additionally, an 'empty signifier' is entirely devoid of a definite signified. Lacan also 
uses the notion of the floating signifier. He even glorifies Lewis Caroll’s Humpty 
Dumpty, who reasons, “when I use a word, it means just what I choose it to mean – 
neither more nor less”. It brings Humpty Dumpty very close to a sort of ‘psychotic 
freedom’ in which the subject does not care a straw for conventions. Knowing that 
Lacan’s ideas about the play of signifiers should be seen in the context of the Freudian 
discovery that the unconscious does not know of reference to reality, makes this ‘free 
play’ of the signifier more comprehensible.  
 Lacan’s provocative appraisal shows his attempts to alter De Saussure' theory on 
the arbitrary relationship of signifier and signified. He declares the ‘primacy of the 
signifier’: the signifier determines the signified, and not the other way around. 
Arbitrariness then means that the ‘effects of signification’ (‘effets de signifié’) have the 
appearance of having nothing to do with what causes them (S.20, 23). The signifier is 
first; the signified is only its effect. Therefore the signified inevitably 'slips beneath' the 
signifier, resisting our attempts to delimit it. However, he does think that there are some 
‘anchoring points’ (‘points de capiton’) – so strongly opposed by Derrida – that 
(temporarily) connect the signifier to a certain signified; they institute some sort of 
stable signification (Ec., 154, 303). Because of this ‘fixation’ Lacan's theory differs 
from post-structuralist theories on the incessant sliding of signification and the post-
modern fluidity of the subject. 'Gratifications' anchor the virtual subject.189 Fantasy's 
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language (and the conventions, structures, authorities and traditions it contains) that establishes the 
certainty of a representation. The law establishes meaning, i.e. certain signification. In his later work it is 
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‘passionate attachments’ limit the incessant sliding of signification. They pose a limit to 
the virtuality of meaning that the constantly changing contexts bring about.   
 Lacan's teachings of the 1960’s and 1970’s question the structuralist primacy of 
the relational system. He also focuses on specific performances or practices that are 
merely instances of the use of the language-system. An element of non-sense, not 
explainable by its relationships or its reference, 'works' in the constitution of meaning. 
A personal example may give a provisional idea of this line of thought. A former friend 
of mine, and the group of punks he was in, used to scream loudly ‘IIIEEEH’ towards 
people in the streets. The meaning of this specific and crazy performance of language is 
not interpretable by its relationships towards other sounds, or by its inherent reference. 
But it is not without relation to meaning at all. In a paradoxical way this ‘meaningless’ 
utterance establishes or founds the identity of the punks (interesting to notice how punk-
novices must create the signification of their new identity by doing or saying, in a 
clumsy way, ‘stupid’ things) Such ‘signs without meaning’ are, at the most, 
understandable as part of a ‘system’ of  (identifying) marks or signs that establish a 
specific lifestyle. They are not (fully) definable negatively, in a Saussurian way, by their 
contrast with other items. They are not “whatever the others are not” (De Saussure, 
1983, 115). They also ‘are what they are’. 
 Lacan's 'primacy of the signifier' catches the eye in a cyber-semiotic translation 
of his semiotics. It is a theoretical analog to the current technological practices of 
interface-signifiers (sound, vision) laying down to a large extent the signification of the 
data-object. The signified object seems to become a mere effect ('interface culture'). It is 
nevertheless Lacan's psychoanalytical attentiveness for 'fixations' that prevents 
everything from becoming a simulation (effect), and goes beyond the interpretative and 
hermeneutical relation of user and sign.  
5. Summary. Three positions on the relation between sign and referent: idealism, 
realism, and constructivism 
The study of signs (semiotics) shows that reality is always mediated, a situation 
radicalized by the digital revolution. It leads to the pressing question whether there is a 
reality outside the signs at all. There are three different philosophical positions. 
Idealism holds that signs construct our perception of reality, which subsequently 
is purely subjective. The subject constitutes reality like a projector in a cinema projects 
the objects on the screen. Idealism conceives this ‘screen’ as the world in its dimensions 
of space and time. The subject therefore not only projects reality, but it also perceives
what it projects. Then there is nothing but signs, or to put it in the notorious words of 
Jacques Derrida: ‘there is nothing outside the text’ (Derrida, 1976, 158). There is no 
'transcendent signified' (Derrida 1978, 278-280; Derrida, 1976, 20). In linguistic 
relativism (that some call a postmodern form of idealism) the subject does not have 
access to reality outside signification. An odd agent of a ‘post-modern idealism' is 
Lewis Carroll’s character Humpty Dumpty, who thinks that he can determine the 
meaning of his words without being limited by its ‘real’ reference.  
The extreme opposite of this idealistic position is realism. As the more common-
sense approach, it holds that a single objective reality is present outside us. It parallels 
so called ‘language-word isomorphism’ that considers correspondence between sign and 
more and more the order of the real (of the body, the drive and of jouissance) that is crucial to the 
'fixations' of fantasy. 
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referent to be a one-to-one relationship. In realism the ideas and concepts of things, 
which the subject makes with signs, are mental reproductions of real things in the 
world. Exact images of the real things leads to true knowledge. So the subject must 
conform to the object. Photography illustrates realism's aspiration of recording the 
object as they really are. Nevertheless, photo-realism's claim of creating objective 
images received broad criticism for not recognizing the element of construction in the 
process of registration (cf. Mitchell, 1992, 29). And so did realism as a philosophical 
position. Ernst Cassirer, for instance, extensively argued that the world of images of 
human conduct does not simply reflect empirical facts (cf. Neumann, 1973, 121). 
For the intermediate position between idealism and realism, constructivism,
language – and every system of signs – plays an important role in our sense of reality. 
Sign systems structure and also construct reality. Constructivism does not eliminate the 
reality of the outside world, as does idealism, or simply pose it as something barely 
affected by the sign, as does realism. Whatever the right position between language and 
reality may be, the revolutionary idea in the structuralist stream in semiotics (so 
influential on Lacan) and which still is of major importance, is that of the referent not 
being a content (in the world or in the mind): The signified concept is not a substance 
but a form.
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PRÉCIS 
The present work addresses technology from the perspective of the philosophy of man, 
that is to say it attempts to understand technology in its relation to the human condition. 
In the broader context of classical philosophical thought this condition is characterized 
by a desire for  'the real thing', and for the pleasure that inhabits both the striving for real 
presence and its 'imagined' realization. Hence the Platonic Eros remains a crucial frame 
of reference for understanding these aspects of human existence, even in an age of 
information, just like the figures of Platonic philosophy were crucial to modern thought.    
Before concentrating on the 'erotic' undercurrent guiding man's technological 
production, a general description of technology is given in the first chapter. Although 
psychoanalysis shares this emphasis on an erotic striving underlying human activity, it 
nevertheless radically differs in its conception of the goal and the realization of these 
desires. Therefore a description of the Eros in technology and in various classical 
philosophical schools is concluded by the third part of the first chapter offering an 
outline of Lacanian thought. Here I present the initial thrust of our understanding of new 
technologies from the perspective of depth psychology. 
Virtuality is the key term in current information and communication technologies. This 
notion should however not be conflated with the digital revolution of the last decades – 
as a common misunderstanding would have it. A painstaking description of 
virtualization, and the use of the concept throughout the ages, is a necessary starting 
point for the second chapter's analysis of virtuality in relation to new technologies. I 
take Pierre Lévy's brief book on the notion of virtuality as a tool for focusing and fine-
tuning Lacanian thought concerning this concept, which then turns out to be remarkably 
apt for its analysis.  
The  Lacanian axis of language and law are two crucial forces in the virtualization of 
reality. Since Lacan's work does not really deal with technology as a force for 
virtualization, I make a start by analyzing technology – from a Lacanian position – as 
the third major virtualizing force of human existence. Seeking the catalysts of this 
virtualizing force I describe the digital revolution in general, and specifically human-
computer interface technologies. The chapter ends with a survey of the questions and 
problems that interface technologies pose for an understanding of human consciousness 
and identity. 
The third chapter systematically analyzes the central notion of my investigations, 
touched upon briefly in the previous two chapters, namely fantasy. In Freudo-Lacanian 
theory fantasy is an ineluctable medium of human consciousness and identity: no 
human self is without fantasy. I introduce the crucial role of fantasy in new 
technological configurations of the world and ourselves by discussing the role of design.  
Design, like fantasy, is the skin of human subjectivity – it gives form to what we desire. 
One of the crucial insights that underlie the psychoanalytical tradition is that behind 
apparently superficial formations such as fantasy and design no 'true presence' is hidden, 
waiting to be stripped of its 'false masks', and thus revealing its true face. Man's reality 
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is a mediated one. Since we necessarily live in 'psychic media', the concept of fantasy 
takes center stage. 
This depth-psychological aspect of fantasy (of central importance to my thesis) is 
closely examined in this third chapter dealing with the theories of Freud and Lacan 
regarding fantasy. I also discuss Kant's analysis of this deep, constitutive and structuring 
aspect of fantasy (which Kant calls "imagination").  
As a medium deeply embedded in the human psyche fantasy escapes the classical 
opposition of reality versus illusion, yet nevertheless does have a point of reference for 
its veracity. This is not 'objective reality' but truth, which in Lacanian psychoanalysis is 
always the truth of desire. Our mediated existence is a 'natural condition' that may 
continuously alter or widen our world, but can also result in opacity of the screen and 
self-enclosure. I call this condition the precarious position of subjectivation.  
The insights offered by Freudo-Lacanian theory into the psychic mediation of human 
existence provide a good basis for analyzing, and judging, the huge impact of computer 
technologies on the human self. Their coherent description is pivotal for the foundation 
of cyborg ontology. 
The fourth chapter displays this specific tension between the ego as a virtual unity and 
the virtual subject of information codes, peculiar to the position of subjectivation. It 
does so by reviewing the status of fantasy within this tension as it 'navigates' between 
two extreme possibilities, either being a mere 'screen' hiding the real or a 'window' 
opening up new formations of the real – what are called 'new realities'. The notion of the 
real turns out to be crucial for a systematical evaluation of the formations of fantasy.  
This notion has been in a continuous process of theoretical construction due to its 
specific significance in Lacanian (trauma) theory: therefore an extensive systematic 
overview is presented. The systematization of fantasy as the interface between the real 
and the virtual, in the human mind (mediation) as well as in its current technological 
manifestations (mediatization), reanimates the ancient problem of the relationship 
between technè and tuchè.
The ideal process of communication would entail sending messages without any form 
of 'noise' –  mathematical theories of communication postulate and theorize such an 
abstraction. A human science such as psychoanalysis, however, cannot disregard the 
elements of 'noise' in communication brought about by man as a corporeal and 
unconscious being. These elements of "noise", which in psychoanalysis proper concern 
the issue of transference, are actually at the core of psychoanalytic theory.  
Hence chapter five starts by analyzing the 'subjective' elements inescapably introduced 
by man in his communication with others. In Lacan's theory of the imaginary he 
examines these elements, yielding insights regarding man's participation in 
communication as a corporeal being. These insights I then apply to information and 
communication technologies. I use the theory of the imaginary to address one of the 
central issues of current theories concerning cyberspace: that of embodiment.  
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This requires a description of Lacan's discussion with the cybernetic theories of his day, 
particularly those of Norbert Wiener. Subsequently, I extend this discussion to current 
interpretations of cyberspace. From a Lacanian viewpoint the crucial issue of  
'embodiment' relates to the question of space. How do we occupy (cyber) space?  
Lacan's notions concerning the ego concur with Freud's theory of the ego in that he 
basically envisions a body ego. Lacan attaches major importance to the libidinal 
investment of (self) images, which are primarily images of the body constituting 
personal identity. These theories are the starting point for a closer look at current 
technological forms of identity-construction, which I analyze under the heading avatars: 
technologically produced self-images.  
The imaginary aspect of seeing ourselves reflected in all sorts of (technological) mirrors 
appears to color our habitation of the virtual space of information codes in an enduring 
manner. Such a theory of the fundamental tension, the opportunities and the threats to 
man living in both the virtual space of mirror-images and the virtual space of 
information codes could contribute to the formulation of a 'third wave cybernetics'. In 
my vision this third wave would do justice to both the role of the bodily aspects of the 
ego and the abstract subject of information in an age of virtuality. 
The real also has a specific significance in relation to enjoyment – Lacan points to this 
with his capital notion jouissance, which is at the core of the sixth chapter. The 
question is how media-technologies relate to the real as an object of enjoyment. 
Fetishism is an exquisite topic for bringing this issue into focus. Fetishistic mediation 
shows enjoyment as not primarily 'brute consumption', but as a staged thing, put 
together, produced. This indicates why the media provide so much pleasure, and 
explains the forces of attraction and seduction behind the media's role in giving 
pleasure, or entertaining. 
We are always at a certain distance from the real –  we must mediate the real and 
thereby give it form. Enjoyment also occurs via the Other, mediated; or with each other 
as we construct shared words to satisfy our desires. Many virtual worlds of cyberspace 
perfectly suit this model of enjoyment seeking, which is simultaneously a self-
construction – for Lacanian theory considers these two processes as joint strategies. The 
narrative worlds providing our existence with a recounted significance are not separate 
from enjoyment.  
With this emphasis on the aspect of (unconscious) enjoyment in the process of self-
construction, Lacan's work seems to account for a shift in Western culture from 
narrative to audio-visual, in which enjoyable objects – largely provided by media and 
technologies – have become pivotal for a sense of self. By underlining and analyzing 
this development in Lacan's work, I try to make it more suitable for understanding 
contemporary culture. Especially the notion of the sinthome explains signs as objects of 
enjoyment, besides being objects with a certain meaning. Or more precisely: signs have 
meaning as enjoyed things, or their meaning is enjoyed.  
This leads to an analysis of life-styles as one of the central issues of current audio-visual 
culture: a styling of the self through enjoyable fantasy-objects. Although a self made out 
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of logos, brands and other objects of identification reflects the ebb of 'traditional' self-
construction enforced by symbolic communities and moral appeals, this process does 
not necessarily increase our level of freedom. Since the model of subjectivation holds 
that we cannot avoid identifying ourselves – fantasmatically – as an object, the 
'traditional' objectification could well be replaced by new objectifications largely 
produced by a capitalistic Other.  
We are always caught in the double bind of identifying ourselves as a specific object, 
without being identical to that object. We are in between free subjectivity and 
determined objectivity. The model of subjectivation also shows how self-construction 
can get out of tune. In the terminology of meaning versus enjoyment this can happen 
either by too much predetermined meaning coming from a fixed set of laws (lets say, 
the Victorian culture of repression of Freud's time), or by providing too much 
enjoyment threatening the committed, 'ethical' relationship to others (a weakness of 
current audio-visual culture). 
The seventh and last chapter presents an overview of my development of Lacanian 
theory on subjectivity in which it is seen to revolve around the issues of interfacing 
freedom and determination, ego and subject, consciousness and unconsciousness, body 
and 'mind'. First the role of imagination in the work of Descartes is described. Whereas 
his philosophy of consciousness can only give imagination a negative meaning I show 
that a 'philosophy of the unconscious', such as Lacanian psychoanalysis, places it at the 
core of subjectivity. I draw this conclusion, to round off the theory of fantasy, by 
analyzing fantasy as a 'schematism' always accompanying and mediating our so-called 
conscious awareness of the world.  
We exist in between Cogito and the unconscious, that is to say, in the medium of 
fantasy. The discussion of Descartes and Kant situates psychoanalytical thought 
regarding fantasy in relation to two of the most influential currents in western 
philosophical tradition. Fantasy lies at the basis of this thesis' movement from mediation 
to technological mediatization. 
Finally an appendix should give the reader who is not familiar with some of the basic 
notions of semiotic theory an introduction to the theoretical questions regarding signs 
and reality. As Lacan's work depends to a large extent on semiotic theories, the 
appendix is also relevant for understanding Lacan's thought, and its elaboration of 
semiotics. The central question of the appendix on the connection of signs and referent 
is so crucial for an age of information that I offer an overview of the most important 
theoretical positions on this issue. 
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Samenvatting 
De voorliggende studie benadert technologie vanuit een wijsgerig-antropologisch 
perspectief, en probeert technologie aldus te verstaan in relatie tot de menselijke 
bestaanswijze. In klassieke filosofische stromingen wordt deze menselijke conditie vaak 
gekarakteriseerd door het verlangen naar het ware, en door het genot dat gepaard gaat 
met dit streven naar 'presentie' en haar verbeeldde realisering. Daarom blijft in het 
'informatie-tijdperk' de Platoonse Eros een cruciaal referentiepunt.  
Voorafgaand aan het belichten van de 'erotische' onderstroom van technologieën geeft 
het eerste hoofdstuk een beschrijving van technologieën in het algemeen. Alhoewel de 
psychoanalyse ook het erotische streven in menselijke handelen benadrukt, onderscheidt 
het zich radicaal van het Platoonse denken wat betreft de ideeën omtrent het doel en de 
realisering van deze verlangens. Daarom wordt in het derde deel van dit hoofdstuk de 
beschrijving van de Eros in technologie en in verschillende filosofische stromingen 
afgesloten met een algemene weergave van het Lacaniaanse gedachtegoed. Daarin 
formuleer ik vanuit het perspectief der dieptepsychologie de uitgangspunten voor een 
begrip van nieuwe technologieën. 
Virtualiteit is een sleutelpbegrip voor de huidige informatie- en 
communicatietechnologieën. Dit begrip moet echter niet worden vereenzelvigd met de 
digitale revolutie van de afgelopen decennia - een nogal veelvoorkomend misverstand. 
Daarom is een nauwgezette beschrijving van het begrip virtualisering en het gebruik 
ervan doorheen de eeuwen een noodzakelijk vertrekpunt voor de analyse die in het 
tweede hoofdstuk plaatsvind van virtualiteit in relatie tot nieuwe technologieën. Ik 
gebruik Piere Lévy's beknopte werk over virtualiteit als een instrument om het 
Lacaniaanse denken op dit begrip te richten en fijn te stellen. Dan blijkt dat dit denken 
uitermate geschikt is voor een analyse van virtualiteit.  
Taal en wet, twee pijlers van de Lacaniaanse theorie, zijn eveneens twee cruciale 
krachtlijnen in de virtualisering van de realiteit. Omdat Lacan's werk zich nauwelijks 
richt op technologie als een dergelijke kracht maak ik - vanuit een Lacaniaanse positie - 
een begin met het analyseren van technologie als een derde 'grondstructuur' der 
virtualisering. Om de katalysatoren van deze vorm van virtualisering te achterhalen, 
beschrijf ik de digitale revolutie in het algemeen en de mens-computer interface in het 
bijzonder. Het hoofdstuk sluit af met een overzicht van de vragen en problemen die 
interface-technologieën stellen omtrent het bewustzijn en de identiteit van de mens. 
Het derde hoofdstuk analyseert op systematische wijze het centrale begrip van mijn 
onderzoekingen, namelijk de fantasie. In de Freudo-Lacaniaanse psychoanalyse is de 
fantasie een onuitwisbaar medium van menselijk bewustzijn en identiteit: er bestaat 
geen menselijk Zelf zonder fantasie. Door de rol van design in onze technologische 
vormgeving van de wereld en van onszelf te bespreken, introduceer ik de centrale rol 
van de fantasie. 
Evenals fantasie is design de 'huid' der menselijke subjectiviteit - het geeft (uiterlijke) 
vorm aan wat we verlangen. Een van de centrale inzichten van de Freudiaanse traditie 
bestaat eruit dat achter de ogenschijnlijk oppervlakkige formaties van fantasie en design 
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geen 'ware werkelijkheid' schuilt, die erop wacht van z'n 'valse maskers' ontdaan te 
worden om zo z'n ware gezicht te tonen. De menselijke realiteit is een gemedieerde 
realiteit. Omdat we onontkoombaar in 'psychische media' leven, speelt het begrip (der) 
fantasie een centrale rol. 
Deze diepte-psychologische aspecten der fantasie worden in het derde hoofdstuk, dat 
zich richt op de theorieën van Freud en Lacan over de fantasie, nauwgezet onderzocht. 
Ook onderzoek ik Kant's analyse van deze 'diepe', constitutieve en structurerende 
aspecten der fantasie (die Kant 'verbeelding' noemt). 
Als een medium dat diep ingebed is in de menselijke psyche overstijgt de fantasie de 
klassieke tegenstelling tussen realiteit en illusie. Toch is er een referentiepunt voor de 
waarachtigheid van fantasmatische formaties. Dit is niet een zogenaamde objectieve 
realiteit, maar de verhouding van fantasie tot wat Lacan de 'waarheid van het verlangen' 
noemt. Zo wordt ons gemedieerde bestaan een 'natuurlijke conditie' die ofwel ons 
bewustzijn van onszelf en de wereld kan verruimen, ofwel tot de duisternis van de zelf-
opsluiting kan leiden. Deze mogelijkheden typeren wat ik de precaire positie der 
subjectivering noem. 
De inzichten der Freudo-Lacaniaanse theorie betreffende de psychische mediatie der 
menselijke existentie bieden een goed uitgangspunt voor het analyseren en beoordelen 
van de grote invloed van computer-technologieën op het menselijke Zelf. Om de 
fundamenten te leggen van een cyborg ontologie draait het daarom in belangrijke mate 
om de coherente beschrijving van die inzichten.  
Het vierde hoofdstuk toont de spanning tussen de virtuele eenheid van het ego en het 
virtuele subject der informatie-codes - een spanning die eigen is aan de subjectivering. 
Fantasie 'navigeert' in deze spanning tussen de ene extreme mogelijkheid waarin het 
functioneert als niets meer dan een 'scherm' dat het reële slechts verbergt, en de andere 
waarin het als 'venster' nieuwe formaties van het reële opent ('nieuwe realiteiten'). Het 
concept 'reële' blijkt van doorslaggevend belang te zijn voor een systematische 
beoordeling van de formaties der fantasie. 
Door de specifieke betekenis van het reële in de Lacaniaanse (trauma) theorie kent het 
een voortgaand proces van theoretische constructie. Om hieraan recht te doen geef ik 
een uitgebreid systematische overzicht van dit begrip. Het theoretiseren van de fantasie 
als een interface tussen het reële en het virtuele, zowel in de menselijke geest (mediatie) 
als in de huidige technologische manifestaties (mediatisatie), reanimeert tevens het 
klassieke vraagstuk omtrent technè en tuchè.
Een ideaal communicatie-proces zou bestaan uit het versturen van berichten zonder 
enige vorm van 'ruis'. Mathematische communicatie-theorieën veronderstellen een 
dergelijke abstractie. Een geesteswetenschap als de psychoanalyse kan de 'ruis-
elementen' die door de mens als lichamelijk en onbewust wezen in de communicatie 
worden ingebracht echter niet verontachtzamen. Dat dergelijke elementen in de 
psychoanalytische therapie tot de overdrachts-effecten worden gerekend, geeft de 
betekenisvolle rol aan die ze in de psychoanalytische theorie spelen. 
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Het vijfde hoofdstuk begint daarom met het analyseren van de 'subjectieve' elementen 
die door de mens onontkoombaar ingebracht worden in de communicatie met anderen. 
Lacan formuleert zijn inzicht in dergelijke elementen in zijn theorie van het imaginaire, 
die ik vervolgens toepas op informatie- en communicatietechnologieën. Ik gebruik de 
theorie over het imaginaire onder meer om een van de centrale kwesties van cyberspace 
te bespreken: die der belichaming van de (virtuele) codes.  
Het uitgelezen beginpunt hiervoor is Lacan's uiteenzetting met de cybernetische 
theorieën van zijn tijd, in het bijzonder die van Norbert Wiener. Deze discussie zet ik 
voort naar de huidige interpretaties van cyberspace. Vanuit Lacaniaans perspectief 
schuilt het cruciale vraagstuk der 'belichaming' in de kwestie der ruimte. De vraag is dus 
hoe we eigenlijk aanwezig zijn in (cyber)space.  
Evenals Freud beschouwt Lacan het ego fundamenteel als een lichaams-ego. De 
psychoanalyse kent een enorm belang toe aan de libidineuse investering in 
(zelf)beelden, die allereerst lichaamsbeelden zijn en in belangrijke mate 
verantwoordelijk voor de vorming van persoonlijke identiteit. Deze psychoanalytische 
theorieën vormen het uitgangspunt voor een dieper inzicht in de huidige technologische 
vormen van identiteits-constructie, die ik met name analyseer in de vorm van avatars: 
technologisch geformeerde zelf-beelden. 
Dat we onszelf tevens weerspiegeld zien in allerlei vormen van (technologische) 
spiegels lijkt ons (zogenaamd 'ontlichaamde') verblijf in de virtuele ruimtes van 
informatie-codes blijvend te beïnvloeden. Vanuit een dergelijke spanning tussen de 
virtuele ruimte der spiegel en die der codes kan een bijdrage worden geleverd aan wat 
wel een 'derde stroom cybernetica' genoemd wordt. Met een 'Lacaniaanse bijdrage' aan 
een dergelijke cybernetica wordt meer recht gedaan aan de dubbelheid van 
lichamelijkheid en informationele abstractie in een tijdperk van (technologische) 
virtualiteit. 
Het begrip reële bergt ook een belangrijk genotsaspect in zich. Lacan drukt dit uit in zijn 
kern-concept jouissance, dat centraal staat in het zesde hoofdstuk. De vraag is hoe 
media-technologieën omgaan met het reële als een object van genot. Fetisjisme biedt 
hierop zicht, aangezien in fetisjistische mediëring het genot niet allereerst een 'brute 
consumptie' is, maar geënsceneerd, samengesteld, geproduceerd. Vanuit dergelijke 
constructies van het genots-object valt te begrijpen waarom media zoveel genot kunnen 
verschaffen, en waarom ze zo aantrekkelijk en verleidelijk kunnen werken.  
Een centraal punt in Lacan's theorie van het reële is dat we er altijd op een zekere 
afstand van zijn; we moeten het reële bemiddelen en zo een vorm geven. Ook genot 
verloopt via de Ander, is gemedieerd. We zouden ook kunnen zeggen dat genot gebeurt 
via de Ander, daar we gezamenlijke werelden construeren om onze verlangens in meer 
of mindere mate te bevredigen. Veel virtuele werelden van cyberspace komen overeen 
met dit model van het zoeken van genot, waarin tegelijkertijd het zelf geconstrueerd 
wordt - de Lacaniaanse theorie benadrukt de samenhang van beide processen. De 
narratieve werelden die ons bestaan een verhaalde betekenis verlenen zijn niet ontdaan 
van genot, een genot-in-de-betekenaar. 
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Door het (onbewuste) genots-aspect in de zelf-constructie te benadrukken, lijkt Lacan's 
werk zich rekenschap te geven van een belangrijke verschuiving in de Westerse cultuur; 
namelijk die van het narratieve naar het audio-visuele waarin genots-objecten, 
grotendeels verschaft door media en technologieën, onlosmakelijk verbonden zijn met 
ons zelf-besef. Door deze ontwikkeling in Lacan's werk te benadrukken en te 
analyseren, probeer ik het beter toepasbaar te maken voor een analyse van de 
hedendaagse cultuur. Een begrip als de sinthome laat zien dat objecten naast (narratieve) 
betekenis ook een genotsdimensie bezitten. Met tekens genieten we van betekenis, of  
krijgt genot betekenis 
Life-styles worden dan van centraal belang in de huidige audio-visuele cultuur: we 
styleren onszelf door middel van lustvolle fantasie-objecten. Alhoewel een dergelijk 
Zelf dat opgetrokken is uit logos, merknamen en andere populaire identificatie-objecten 
de neergang reflecteert van meer traditionele vormen van zelf-constructie door 
symbolische gemeenschappen en morele aanspraken, hoeft het niet noodzakelijkerwijs 
onze vrijheid te vergroten. Want de opvatting omtrent subjectivering die ik verdedig, 
stelt dat we er niet aan ontkomen onszelf - fantasmatisch - te identificeren als een 
bepaald object. Zo zouden de 'traditionele' vormen van zelf-objectivering best 
vervangen kunnen zijn door nieuwe objectiveringen, nu gemaakt door een 
kapitalistische Ander. 
We zitten onontkoombaar gevangen in de ambigue regels van een spel waarin we 
onszelf identificeren als een bepaald object, zonder daarmee samen te moeten vallen. 
We zitten in de speelruimte tussen vrije subjectiviteit en gedetermineerde objectiviteit. 
Dit model van subjectivering laat tevens zien in welke richtingen zelf-constructie door 
kan slaan. Wanneer we de terminologie van betekenis tegenover genot gebruiken dan 
kan dit ofwel gebeuren door teveel opgelegde, gedetermineerde betekenis (bijvoorbeeld 
de Victoriaanse cultuur van verdringing uit Freud's tijd), ofwel door dermate veel genot 
te bieden dat de betrokken, gesublimeerde, 'ethische' relatie tot anderen onder druk komt 
te staan (een gevaar van de huidige cultuur). 
Het zevende en laatste hoofdstuk biedt een overzicht van mijn interpretatie van de 
Lacaniaanse theorie der subjectiviteit. Hierin draait het om de mediatie (de 'interface') 
van vrijheid en determinisme, ego en subject, bewustzijn en onbewuste, lichaam en 
geest. Ik beschrijf er allereerst de rol van de verbeelding in Descartes' werk. Waar zijn 
bewustzijnsfilosofie de verbeelding slechts een negatieve rol kan toekennen, laat ik zien 
dat een 'filosofie van het onbewuste' zoals de Lacaniaanse psychoanalyse het in het hart 
der subjectiviteit plaatst. Dit blijkt nog eens door fantasie te analyseren als een schema 
dat onze zogenaamde bewuste omgang met de wereld altijd begeleid en bemiddelt. 
Onze existentie voltrekt zich in belangrijke mate tussen Cogito en onbewuste in: in het 
medium der fantasie. Door zowel Descartes als Kant te bespreken, situeer ik het 
psychoanalytisch gedachtegoed omtrent de fantasie in verhouding tot twee van de meest 
invloedrijke stromingen in de Westerse wijsbegeerte. Door op dergelijke manier het 
inzicht in de mediërende rol der fantasie nog eens te vergroten, wordt het makkelijker 
de stap te maken van filosofische beschouwingen omtrent mediatie naar technologische 
vormen van mediatisatie: de overgang die dit werk poogt te maken. 
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Voor de lezer die niet vertrouwd is met de belangrijkste begrippen uit de semiotiek kan 
de appendix een inleiding bieden in de vragen omtrent de verhouding tussen tekens en 
werkelijkheid, die ook in dit werk zo vaak aan de orde komen. Omdat ook Lacan's werk 
in belangrijke mate op semiotische theorieën steunt, is de appendix eveneens relevant 
voor het begrip van zijn werk en zijn uitwerking van de semiotiek. De centrale kwestie 
omtrent de verhouding van teken en werkelijkheid is van een dermate belang voor het 
huidige informatie-tijdperk dat ik een overzicht biedt van de belangrijkste theoretische 
posities hierin.  
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